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v.	Abstract	
URBAN	RETROFIT:	PRESSURES,	POLICY	AND	PEOPLE	IN	DOMESTIC	RETROFIT	AT	THE	CITY	
LEVEL	
This	thesis	adopts	a	socio-technical	approach	to	studying	the	issues	and	responses	around	
domestic	retrofit.	Firstly	it	examines	the	broad	drivers	around	domestic	retrofit,	ranging	
from	climate	change	to	energy	security	and	fuel	poverty,	to	the	impacts	of	neoliberalisation	
and	the	economic	crisis.	It	also	explores	the	particular	social,	technical	and	political	
pressures	upon	this	issue	in	urban	contexts,	exploring	issues	such	as	interurban	
competition,	urban	governance	and	experimentation,	as	well	as	their	interaction	with	the	
specific	socio-technical	challenges	of	domestic	retrofit.	It	then	explores	how	this	problem	
has	been	approached	by	UK	policy	through	a	combination	of	marketization,	technical	
specificity	and	localised	delivery.	
Empirically,	it	employs	a	comparative	case	study	approach	using	three	domestic	retrofit	
responses	in	three	different	cities	in	England	to	explore	the	range	of	responses	that	have	
emerged	from	this	policy	climate	and	the	different	forms	and	effects	that	these	can	have.	
These	included	a	householder	co-operative	in	Manchester,	a	multi-stakeholder	business	co-
operative	in	Birmingham,	and	a	council-led	scheme	in	Bristol.	It	explores	how	each	of	these	
responses	is,	in	its	own	way,	experimental	and	contingent,	involving	an	assemblage	of	
actors	and	factors	ranging	from	the	macro	level,	through	the	meso,	city-regional	level,	to	
the	micro-or-individual	level,	which	create	a	time	and	place-specific	response	with	a	
particular	set	of	priorities,	activities	and	outcomes.	
It	then	explains	that	it	is	both	horizontal,	local	relationships,	and	vertical	relationships	with	
factors	and	actors	at	the	macro	and	micro	levels	that	affect	the	case	studies’	form	and	
orientation.	It	shows	how	the	policy	context	can	both	enable	and	limit	change	and	learning	
from	localised	projects,	by	supporting	certain	aspects	such	as	funding	particular	
technologies,	but	not	others	such	as	consistent	finance	and	subsidy.	It	concludes	with	some	
reflections	for	retrofit	policymakers	and	some	possibilities	for	further	research	in	the	topic.	
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Chapter	1	-	Introduction	
1.1	What	to	expect	from	this	thesis	–	exploration,	synthesis	and	
critical	analysis.	
The	research	being	presented	in	this	thesis	is	a	qualitative	socio-technical	exploration	into	
how	and	why	different	groups	of	people	and	organisations	have	constructed	responses	to	a	
particular	challenge	in	different	urban	contexts.	In	this	case,	that	challenge	is	how	to	
improve	the	energy	efficiency	of	existing	domestic	properties	in	the	UK.	It	seeks	to	answer	
questions	around	what	the	underlying	motivations	and	overarching	pressures	for	acting	on	
this	issue	are/were	and	how	they	interacted,	how	the	issue	has	been	constituted	through	
UK	policy,	and	what	features	and	capacities	of	different	urban	contexts	caused	different	
responses	to	have	emerged	in	different	places,	with	different	effects.	It	will	explore	a	range	
of	academic	approaches	to	the	different	facets	of	this	complicated	problem	and	illuminate	
the	trends	and	tensions	in	the	political	and	policy	context	in	which	those	responses	operate.	
A	comparative	case	study	approach	will	introduce	you	to	a	range	of	city-based	actors	and	
organisations	from	the	grassroots	activists	of	Manchester’s	Carbon	Co-op,	to	the	business	
brains	behind	the	Energy	Saving	Co-operative	and	the	local	authority	officers	and	charity	
workers	involved	in	the	Bristol	Home	Energy	Upgrade,	and	immerse	you	in	their	struggles	
and	successes	as	they	attempted	to	address	this	challenge.		
The	key	aims	of	the	thesis	are:	
i. To	understand	how	and	why	different	responses	to	the	issue	might	emerge	from	
different	urban	contexts,	despite	operating	under	the	same	policy	context.		
ii. To	understand	how	the	policy	context	in	which	these	responses	operate	acts	as	
both	an	enabler	and	a	limitation	to	the	transformative	potential	of	these	
responses.	
In	order	to	achieve	these	aims,	there	are	a	series	of	objectives	that	the	thesis	will	address:	
• Explore	and	identify	the	key	sociotechnical	issues	around	domestic	retrofit	in	urban	
contexts,	
• Create	a	framework	that	synthesises	these	issues,		
• Analyse	how	these	issues	are	manifest	in	the	policy	context	in	the	UK,	
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• Compare	urban	domestic	retrofit	responses	to	highlight	and	explain	unevenness	in	
responses,	and	the	role	of	the	issues	identified	above	in	shaping	these	responses,		
• Investigate	how	these	responses	are	affected	by	the	macro-context	in	which	they	
operate,	
• Use	the	findings	to	critically	analyse	the	global	socio-political	landscape	and	policy	
context	and	argue	for	improvements.	
The	thesis	will	address	these	objectives	using	the	following	format.	Chapter	1	will	continue	
to	frame	the	issue	in	terms	of	the	key	interwoven	macro-societal	drivers	for	domestic	
retrofit	–	climate	change,	energy	security	and	economic	concerns,	which	form	an	energy	
efficiency	‘nexus’.	It	will	also	describe	and	outline	the	scale	and	nature	of	the	retrofit	
problem	in	the	UK	in	terms	of	energy	use	and	housing	tenures,	and	outline	the	basic	socio-
technical	issues	and	approaches	to	dealing	with	it.	Chapter	2	explores	a	range	of	literatures	
and	perspectives	on	the	various	aspects	of	urban	approaches	to	energy	issues	broadly,	and	
to	the	specific	issues	with	domestic	retrofit	itself,	including	the	technical	risks,	roles	and	
influences	of	people	and	behaviour,	and	the	various	ways	of	organising	retrofit	responses.	
Chapter	3	examines	a	range	of	theoretical	approaches	to	both	socio-technical	and	urban	
energy	issues,	synthesising	them	into	the	hybrid	framework	of	‘experimental	assemblages’	
which	will	be	used	to	examine	the	policy	context	and	the	three	cases	in	more	detail.	
Chapter	4	explains	and	justifies	the	research	design	employed,	from	the	epistemological	
approach	to	the	comparative	case	study	methodology	employed	and	the	data	analysis	
strategy.	Chapter	5	presents	the	first	empirical	chapter	with	an	exploration	of	national	
policy	affecting	domestic	retrofit,	understanding	how	the	energy	efficiency	‘nexus’	is	
manifest	in	policy	and	what	effects	this	has	on	practices	and	responses	in	urban	contexts.	
Chapters	6,	7	and	8	describe	and	explore	the	three	case	studies,	three	experimental	
assemblages	which	represent	different	urban	responses	to	the	issue	of	domestic	retrofit:	
the	grassroots	response	of	Carbon	Co-op	in	Manchester,	the	business	experiment	of	Energy	
Saving	Co-operative	in	Birmingham	and	the	policy	experiment	of	the	Bristol	Home	Energy	
Upgrade	in	Bristol.	Chapter	9	discusses	the	processes	of	assembling	these	three	domestic	
retrofit	experiments	and	explains	how	city-regional	relationships,	priorities	and	resources	
produce	different	approaches	in	different	contexts	which	produced	varying	forms	of	
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change,	as	well	as	explaining	how	the	different	‘experiments’	and	forms	of	learning	were	
encouraged	by,	but	ultimately	limited	by	state	policy.	
The	original	contribution	of	this	thesis	is	threefold.	Firstly	its	comparative,	city-based	
approach	to	studying	domestic	retrofit	brings	together	issues	of	place,	politics	and	
governance	with	a	socio-technical	problem.	Secondly,	the	contribution	of	this	thesis	lies	in	
its	unique	synthesis	of	multi-scalar	issues	and	research	areas,	which	enables	a	holistic	
investigation	into	how	retrofit	responses	are	constituted,	incorporating	a	vast	range	of	
factors	from	individual	motivations	to	macro-societal	pressures,	technical	issues	and	
context-specific	features	of	the	places	in	which	these	responses	occur.	Most	importantly,	it	
also	presents	a	new	multi-level	theoretical	framework	in	‘experimental	assemblages’	which	
incorporates	real	appreciation	of	the	impact	of	different	urban	contexts	on	practical	
responses	to	policy	issues,	explaining	variation	and	unevenness	through	processes	of	
mediation	and	negotiation	of	interests	through	city-based	actors.	This	framework	could	
provide	a	basis	for	understanding	not	only	the	particular	issue	of	domestic	retrofit,	but	any	
place-based	socio-technical	issue.	
1.2	Why	bother	talking	about	domestic	retrofit?		
In	order	to	answer	the	questions	and	meet	the	objectives	posed	above,	the	starting	point	
must	be	to	explore	and	frame	the	nature	of	that	problem.	The	approach	to	this	has	been	to	
ask	an	obvious	and	pertinent	question:	why	is	there	a	debate	about	domestic	retrofit?	As	it	
turns	out	from	initial	literature	searches,	observing	at	events	and	talking	to	people	involved	
in	domestic	retrofit	(which	formed	the	first	few	steps	towards	defining	a	research	problem),	
there	are	a	multitude	of	reasons,	from	climate	change	to	economic	development,	to	policy	
approaches,	energy	security,	anti-capitalism	and	fuel	poverty.	The	aim	of	this	section	is	to	
introduce	the	overarching	debates	and	use	them	as	the	starting	point	for	understanding	the	
many	ways	in	which	the	problem	of	domestic	retrofit	can	be	constructed,	understood	and	
approached.		
1.2.1	The	main	drivers	of	domestic	retrofit.	
In	terms	of	energy	issues,	there	are	two	key	macro-societal	energy-related	debates	that	
domestic	retrofit	is	involved	in:	climate	change	and	energy	security.	Anthropogenic	climate	
change,	caused	by	the	emission	of	certain	gases	into	the	atmosphere	–	a	large	proportion	of	
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which	are	carbon	dioxide	from	burning	fossil	fuels	-	is	considered	by	many	to	be	moving	to	
dangerous	levels,	causing	problems	such	as	extreme	weather,	droughts,	floods,	disease	and	
agricultural	failure	(Anderson	and	Bows,	2011	and	Hansen	et	al,	2012).	Many	debates	
around	tackling	climate	change	through	adapting	the	energy	system	focus	on	reducing	
carbon	emissions	through	changing	methods	of	energy	generation	and	supply	–	moving	
from	fossil	fuel	power	stations	to	renewable	energy	sources,	for	example.	The	connection	
between	climate	change	and	domestic	retrofit,	though,	is	instead	focussed	on	the	reduction	
of	end-use	energy	as	one	of	the	key	tools	for	carbon	emissions	reduction.	The	logic	of	this	
position	is	that	emissions	from	each	unit	of	end-use	energy	are	multiplied	by	efficiency	
losses	through	its	generation,	transmission	and	supply,	so	cutting	energy	demand	can	yield	
vast	carbon	emissions	reductions	quickly	across	the	whole	energy	system	(Anderson	and	
Bows,	2011).	Energy	use	of	the	existing	housing	stock	makes	up	over	a	quarter	of	the	total	
energy	use	of	the	UK,	around	the	same	as	that	of	road	transport,	more	than	that	of	heavy	
industry	and	far	more	than	that	of	air	transport	(DECC,	2012).	Naturally,	improving	the	
energy	efficiency	of	the	housing	stock	is	considered	a	significant	component	of	efforts	to	
reduce	overall	energy	use	and	start	to	counteract	the	process	of	climate	change	(James,	
2012	and	Kelly,	2009).		
Energy	security	is	a	different,	but	not	unrelated	issue.	Good	energy	security	refers	to	the	
supply	of	affordable,	accessible,	reliable	energy	to	consumers,	from	state	organisations	and	
industry	end	users	to	businesses	and	household	end	users	(IEA,	2014).	There	are	concerns	
over	the	finite,	dwindling	reserves	of	oil	and	gas	left	in	the	earth,	and	about	what	this	
scarcity	of	fuel	means	for	energy	prices	and	the	availability	and	reliability	of	energy	supplies	
at	both	a	national	level	and	at	an	end-user,	consumer	level	such	as	the	household	(Hodson	
and	Marvin,	2010	and	Bradshaw,	2010).	Energy	security	is	affected	by	relationships	between	
energy	importing	and	energy	exporting	countries	(the	UK	is	an	energy	importer),	with	
energy	importers	somewhat	vulnerable	to	supply	problems	and	price	fluctuations	and	
demands	from	energy	exporters	(Bradshaw,	2010).		Again,	moving	from	reliance	on	finite	
sources	of	energy	like	oil,	gas	and	coal,	to	renewable	sources	of	energy	such	as	solar,	wind,	
biomass	and	tidal,	is	considered	a	way	of	improving	energy	security	and	reducing	energy	
vulnerability.	However,	the	connection	between	energy	security	and	domestic	retrofit	is,	
again,	in	the	role	of	improved	energy	efficiency	as	a	further	means	of	reducing	energy	use:	
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the	lower	the	demand	for	energy	from	consumers,	the	less	dependent	on	imported	fossil	
fuels	the	nation	is,	and	the	less	exposed	the	consumer	is	to	price	hikes	and	fuel	scarcity.		
1.2.2	How	energy	and	economy	are	entwined	
It	seems	that	domestic	retrofit	forms	part	of	climate	change	and	energy	security	debates	in	
the	same	way	–	it	its	ability	to	reduce	end	use	energy	and	therefore	reliance	on	and	
consumption	of	fossil	fuels.	However,	both	climate	change	and	energy	security	are	also	
tightly	entwined	with	economic	concerns	and	debates	–	the	third	factor	in	what	Bradshaw	
(2010)	describes	as	the	global	energy	‘nexus’.	In	the	case	of	energy	security,	part	of	the	
issue	with	the	relationship	between	importers	and	exporters	of	energy,	and	the	
dependence	of	modern	society	on	secure	energy	–	particularly	electricity	(Graham	and	
Thrift,	2007)	-	is	that	secure	energy	supplies	are	strongly	linked	with	economic	productivity	
and	international	competitiveness.	Conversely,	energy	vulnerability	can	be	viewed	as	a	
major	source	of	economic	instability	(Huber,	2009).	Altvater	(2007)	characterises	this	
relationship	as	‘fossilism’,	indicating	the	meshing	and	interdependence	between	capitalism	
and	fossil	fuels.		
This	strong	link	between	energy	and	economy	also	brings	a	set	of	further	sub-issues	that	
augment	the	importance	of	end-use	energy	in	security/economy	debates.	One	such	issue	is	
fuel	poverty,	which	relates	specifically	to	the	vulnerability	of	householders	to	energy	price	
fluctuations	(specifically	price	rises).	Fuel	poverty	has	risen	to	prominence	as	a	political	issue	
over	the	last	fifteen	years	in	the	UK	and	in	some	areas	of	Europe.	Its	definition	has	changed	
from	being	households	spending	over	10%	of	their	income	on	fuel	costs,	to	a	more	complex,	
subjective	definition	concerning	low	income	households	with	high	fuel	costs	(Moore,	2012).	
Worrying	consequences	of	fuel	poverty	include	households	being	underheated	to	reduce	
costs,	or	householders	encountering	serious	financial	issues	such	as	mounting	debts	
(Thomson	and	Snell,	2013).	Underheating	has	a	direct	link	to	health	issues	such	as	asthma	
and	other	respiratory	diseases	(Peat	et	al,	1998),	increased	winter	deaths	(Darby	and	White,	
2002),	and	the	strain	of	struggling	to	pay	fuel	bills	can	have	devastating	physical	and	mental	
health	impacts	particularly	on	children,	the	elderly,	low	income	households	and	other	
vulnerable	people	(Liddell	and	Morris,	2010).	Consequently,	fuel	poverty	has	become	the	
subject	of	much	political	debate	over	the	last	decade	(Rudge,	2012)	and	domestic	retrofits	
that	produce	fuel	bill	savings,	improved	comfort	and	improved	health	for	the	householder	
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are	considered	a	tool	in	protecting	vulnerable	people	from	the	effects	of	fuel	poverty	
(Guertler,	2012).		
A	further	energy-economics	issue	that	affects	domestic	retrofit	is	that	under	broad	Western	
political	and	economic	shifts	towards	‘free-market’	or	neoliberal	capitalism,	energy	markets	
in	the	UK	and	Europe	have	become	fully	deregulated:	what	used	to	be	a	national	service	
industry	from	source,	through	network	and	supplier	to	the	end	user,	is	now	a	liberalised	
trading	market	(Eyre,	2013).	One	consequence	of	this	is	that	a	small	number	of	large	multi-
national	energy	‘giants’,	colloquially	known	as	the	‘Big	Six’,	comprise	over	80%	of	the	
market	share	of	domestic	energy	suppliers	(Nationwide	Utilities,	2015).	These	energy	
suppliers,	particularly	in	the	UK,	have	powerful	roles	in	shaping	national	government	
responses	and	local	domestic	energy	efficiency	schemes	addressing	the	problems	of	energy	
security,	climate	change	and	fuel	poverty,	but	their	agendas	are	not	always	compatible,	
leading	to	conflicts	of	interests	and	political	battles	around	policy	and	regulatory	
approaches	(Catney	et	al,	2014).		
Climate	change	is	similarly	bound	with	economic	concerns.	Previous	debates	such	as	the	
‘limits	to	growth’	thesis	have	suggested	that	economic	growth	and	environmental	
protection	are	mutually	exclusive,	but	a	dominant	mode	of	thinking	conceptualised	by	
‘ecological	modernisation’	(Hajer,	1995)	claimed	that	economies	and	societies	could	
develop	and	grow	in	a	manner	that	was	simultaneously	protective	of	the	environment	and	
of	natural	resources,	exploring	and	advocating	notions	of	‘green	growth’	and	‘low	carbon	
economies’	as	win-win	scenarios	(for	example,	Janicke,	2012).	Thus,	the	‘green	agenda’,	
which	historically	in	the	1970s	was	seen	as	a	value-driven	movement	concerned	with	nature	
and	ecology,	has	now	discursively	been	consumed	by	climate	change	as	the	single	issue	and	
economic	growth	as	the	primary	goal	(Meadowcroft,	2005),	resulting	the	incorporation	of	
carbon	control	and	climate	change	targets	into	economic	strategies	and	growth	
opportunities	(While,	2011).	This	co-option	of	the	environmental	agenda	has	been	even	
more	acute	in	the	light	of	the	recent	financial	crisis,	with	publics’	and	governments’	
concerns	about	economic	decline,	inflation	and	unemployment	at	heightened	levels	
(Hodson	and	Marvin,	2014).	For	domestic	retrofit,	it	logically	follows	that	if	improved	energy	
efficiency	is	seen	as	a	‘solution’	to	both	climate	change	and	energy	security	issues,	and	both	
of	these	are	strongly	aligned	with	economic	priorities,	energy	efficiency	is	naturally	
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absorbed	by	this	agenda	as	well,	and	indeed,	energy	efficiency	is	often	lauded	as	a	market	
opportunity	which	will	generate	jobs	and	boost	economic	growth	through	the	‘green’	sector	
(see	the	Carbon	Plan,	HM	Government,	2011).	
A	further	sub-debate	arises	when	considering	the	technical	aspects	of	domestic	retrofit	–	
energy	and	building	technologies	and	products,	for	example	-	in	relation	to	climate	change	
and	its	entwinement	with	economic	agendas.	Technological	development	is	often	linked	to	
economic	growth,	particularly	in	boosting	the	competitiveness	of	states,	cities	and	regions	
worldwide	(Castells,	2011	and	Massey,	2007).	Reflecting	the	combination	of	climate	and	
economic	agendas	mentioned	above,	the	development	of	‘low	carbon’	technologies	such	as	
electric	cars,	smart	meters,	smart	networks,	low	carbon	buildings,	satisfies	both	of	these	
agendas	and	is	often	viewed	as	an	ultimate	‘fix’	(Janicke,	2012).	As	part	of	this	agenda,	
strong	pressure	for	the	development	and	demonstration	of	some	form	of	climate-and-
economy-friendly	form	of	energy	efficiency	‘innovation’	drives	down	upon	domestic	retrofit	
as	well.	As	shall	be	shown	in	the	following	section,	domestic	retrofit	is	a	complicated	socio-
technical	problem	involving	multiple	technologies	such	as	heating,	building	fabrics,	controls,	
human	behavioural	habits	and	many	other	practical	issues,	so	an	innovative	‘fix’	such	as	
those	above	is	extremely	difficult	to	produce	(Tweed,	2013).		
1.2.3	Governance,	politics,	and	scale.	
Having	discussed	how	the	two	broad	energy	issues	of	climate	change	and	energy	security	
affect	domestic	retrofit,	and	how	these	are	entwined	with	and	even	dominated	by	
economic	concerns,	important	questions	are	raised	about	how	and	why	this	is	so,	and	what	
this	means	for	the	organisation	and	orientation	of	political	and	practical	action	around	
domestic	retrofit.	Significant	changes	in	economic	policy	in	Western	countries	in	the	last	
thirty	years	have	shifted	government	approaches	away	from	Keynesian	fiscal	policies	
characterised	by	high	government	spending	on	public	services,	towards	free	markets	and	
competition-based	policies	with	economic	growth	as	a	single,	overwhelming	priority	
(Crouch,	2011,	Hall,	2011	and	Harvey,	2012).	There	is	broad	consensus	that	with	this	shift	
the	authority	and	position	of	nation	states	–	including	in	relation	to	climate	and	energy	
issues	-	has	shifted	from	a	hierarchical,	state-led	government	arrangement	to	a	multi-level	
governance	arrangement	that	now	incorporates	the	interests	and	practices	of	private	and	
corporate	interests	and	actors,	with	less	direct	provision	and	a	focus	on	markets	(Bulkeley	
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and	Betsill,	2005,	Bulkeley	and	Schroeder,	2011,	Massey,	2007).	The	significance	of	this	is	
not	only	in	the	dominance	of	economic	concerns,	but	is	also	in	the	implications	this	has	for	
the	practical	organisation	of	climate,	energy	and	therefore	domestic	retrofit-related	
activities	(Theobald	and	Shaw,	2014).	With	blurred	distinctions,	roles	and	capabilities	
between	individuals,	markets,	states,	public	and	private	sectors,	who	is	responsible	for	
retrofit?	What	organisations,	actors	and	networks	of	organisations	and	actors	can	and	might	
act	upon	it	and	how	do	these	political	conditions	affect	how	they	go	about	it?	Broad	issues	
of	governance	and	politics	that	may	at	first	glance	seem	far	removed	from	retrofitting	
houses	to	improve	their	energy	efficiency	are	in	fact	crucial	in	setting	the	context	in	which	
the	case	studies	in	this	thesis	are	acting.	Along	with	these	shifts	in	Western	economics	and	
politics	have	come	changes	in,	and	debates	about	scales	and	forms	of	governance	and	
practical	action	on	climate,	energy	and	economy-related	issues,	with	different	pressures,	
perspectives,	options	and	actors	in	different	contexts	at	different	scales	(Bridge	et	al,	2013,	
Hodson	and	Marvin,	2013).	There	are	multiple	scales	of	engagement	with	all	of	the	key	
issues	raised:	at	the	global	scale	through	governance	institutions	such	as	the	World	Bank	
and	The	International	Panel	For	Climate	Change	(IPCC),	at	the	national	scale	through	state	
policy	and	regulation,	and	at	various	subnational	scales	from	the	regional	right	down	to	
neighbourhoods	and	the	individual	household	(Bulkeley	and	Betsill,	2005	and	Bulkeley,	
2012).	Low	carbon	‘zones’,	eco-villages,	eco-cities,	energy	‘regions’	‘local	economic	
partnerships’,	‘green	buildings’,	‘community	energy’,	transition	towns	and	so	on	depict	
climate,	energy	and	economy-related	activities	in	various	spatial	forms	that	are	not	always	
clearly	defined,	all	of	which	could	be	deemed	as	‘local’	-	a	contested	and	flexible	concept	
(Catney	et	al,	2014).		
For	cities,	these	multiple	scales	of	engagement	and	the	contested	nature	of	the	local	bring	
particular	pressures	and	issues:	the	potential	for	sub-national	spaces	to	take	control	of	their	
own	governing	lead	to	questions	about	the	capacity	and	capability	of	different	places	to	
define	their	own	future	visions	and	strategies	around	the	triad	of	energy,	climate	and	
economic	issues	(Hodson	and	Marvin,	2010).	There	are	also	peculiarly	urban	pressures	in	
relation	to	the	climate-energy-economics	nexus	explored	above:	cities	are	deemed	as	both	
responsible	for	these	problems	in	terms	of	high	concentrations	of	populations,	energy	
consumption	and	carbon	emissions,	and	responsible	for	solutions	in	terms	of	high	
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concentrations	of	skills,	industry	and	potential	sources	of	social	and	technical	
experimentation	and	innovation	(Gossop,	2011	and	Bugliarello,	2011),	whilst	also	under	
pressure	to	remain	economically	competitive	in	an	emerging	international	urban	economy	
(Jonas	et	al,	2011).	Cities	also	house	multiple	potential	spaces	of	activity.	Decentralised	
energy	strategies	of	the	Greater	London	area,	district	heating	systems	in	Sheffield,	and	a	
sustainable	living	community	group	in	a	neighbourhood	in	Stockport,	for	example,	mobilise	
different	spatial	dimensions	of	UK	cities	to	address	energy-related	problems.	For	domestic	
retrofit,	activities	configured	in	different	spaces	at	different	scales	mean	different	things	
conceptually	and	practically:	‘retrofit’	could	mean	whole	cities	or	urban	areas	-	their	
buildings,	infrastructures	and	energy	networks	(Eames	et	al,	2013),	‘communities’	
(Karvonen,	2013),	neighbourhoods	or	streets,	or	the	intricacies	of	individual	buildings.	With	
these	very	different	scales	and	spaces	of	activity	it	is	important	to	consider	the	scale	and	
spaces	of	retrofit	activity,	and	how	that	affects	and	reflects	the	interpretation	of	the	broad	
issues	of	energy	security,	climate	change	and	economic	concerns	outlined	above.	
1.2.4	Summary	
This	section	has	illustrated	how	the	three	broad	issues	of	climate	change,	energy	security	
and	economic	concerns	work	together	to	create	a	suite	of	pressures	on	domestic	energy	
efficiency	as	a	problem	and	domestic	retrofit	as	a	solution.	These	large	and	varied	debates	
around	climate	change	and	energy	security,	along	with	changes	in	the	political	and	
economic	landscape	bring	a	number	of	sub-issues	such	as	fuel	poverty	and	technological	
innovation,	as	well	as	particular	pressures	in	urban	contexts,	and	variations	in	scalar	and	
spatial	engagement	with	all	of	these	issues.	This	creates	multiple	facets	to	the	issue	of	
domestic	retrofit,	which	is	seen	as	having	the	potential	to:	1)	reduce	carbon	emissions	2)	
decrease	dependency	and	vulnerability	to	energy	supply	and	pricing	issues	at	both	
individual	and	national	scales,	and	3)	protect	people	against	ill	health	and	financial	hardship	
as	a	result	of	fuel	poverty.	Figure	1	below	illustrates	these	issues	and	their	interdependency	
in	a	triad:	climate	change,	energy	security	and	economic	concerns	merge	as	the	key	drivers	
for	domestic	retrofit,	modified	by	other	issues	such	as	governance	and	political	debates,	
place-based	issues,	and	technological	issues.	
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Figure	1	Urban	Domestic	Energy	Efficiency	nexus	
However,	there	is	both	pressure	and	opportunity	for	effecting	these	changes	at	various	
spatial	scales	which	mean	different	things	practically	and	conceptually.	A	lot	of	issues	and	
options	arise	through	these	broad	debates	around	domestic	retrofit,	so	one	of	the	tasks	of	
this	thesis	is	to	explain	how	different	actors	in	different	urban	contexts	interpret	and	
prioritise	these	varied	pressures	and	opportunities	and	make	choices	about	how	to	
approach	domestic	retrofit?		
1.3	What	is	the	nature	of	the	domestic	retrofit	problem	in	the	
UK/England?	
1.3.1	Bricks,	gadgets,	people	and	politics:	An	introductory	framework	
The	previous	section	showed	how	domestic	energy	efficiency	sits	within	a	number	of	broad	
and	highly	complex	energy-related	debates	around	climate	change,	economic	concerns,	
security	of	supply,	health	and	fuel	poverty.	It	introduced	and	explored	some	of	these	
debates	in	order	to	demonstrate	the	range	of	influences	on	the	‘problematic’	of	retrofit,	
and	to	situate	end-use	energy	and	the	housing	stock	as	both	problem	and	solution	to	these	
various	big	issues.	However,	a	basic	understanding	is	needed	of	what	the	physical,	practical	
problem	of	domestic	retrofit	looks	like	to	those	discussing,	debating	and	addressing	it:	
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whichever	angle	the	problem	is	approached	from,	there	are	some	characteristics	of	the	
problem	that	are	common.	To	help	define	and	begin	thinking	about	the	process	and	
practice	of	domestic	retrofit	it	is	useful	to	view	it	through	a	basic	framework:	a	conceptual,	
interlinked	combination	of	four	broad	components,	which	provide	a	foundation	for	further	
discussion.	As	shown	in	Figure	2	below,	these	components	are	the	external	pressures,	the	
building	fabric,	the	building	systems,	and	people.	
	
Figure	2	Domestic	retrofit	framework	
1.3.2	What	actually	is	‘domestic	retrofit’?	
Simply	put,	domestic	retrofit	means	people	making	structural	or	technological	alterations	to	
an	existing	domestic	property,	for	the	specific	purpose	of	improving	that	property’s	energy	
efficiency	performance,	by	reducing	its	energy	use/demand.	As	discussed	in	section	1	and	
shown	in	figure	2	above,	there	are	external	pressures	that	drive	domestic	retrofit	practices,	
comprising	broad,	interconnected	debates	and	discourses	around	domestic	energy	
efficiency	concerning	climate	change,	energy	security	and	economic	concerns,	health,	fuel	
poverty,	technological	innovation,	and	spatial	debates.	These	determine	the	various	
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perspectives	from	which	the	‘problem’	of	–	or	‘need’	for	domestic	retrofit	activities	can	be	
viewed	and	approached	in	terms	of	policy,	practical	action	and	in	terms	of	academic	
understanding.	In	this	thesis	the	combination	of	these	macro-societal	social,	political,	
economic	and	environmental	pressures	acting	upon	and	shaping	domestic	retrofit	activity	is	
conceptualised	as	the	‘landscape’	in	which	domestic	retrofit	is	operating.	This	term	is	
explored	in	further	detail	in	chapter	three.	
In	terms	of	practical	action,	domestic	retrofit	can	involve	a	range	of	activities	and	types	of	
alterations	that	can	be	divided	into	two	broad	categories:	those	concerning	the	building	
fabric	and	those	concerning	the	building’s	systems(Swan	et	al,	2013)	.	Retrofitting	the	
building	fabric	includes	adding	to	or	changing	the	fixed,	structural	elements	of	the	domestic	
property.	This	includes	insulating	walls,	lofts	and	floors	in	order	to	reduce	heat	losses	from	
the	property,	replacing	or	improving	areas	of	glazing,	and	draughtproofing	or	making	
building	alterations	that	improve	air	tightness	and	reduce	heat	losses	in	other	ways.	
Retrofitting	the	building’s	systems	includes	modifying	the	mechanical	and	electrical	systems	
in	the	property,	such	as	those	providing	heating/air	conditioning,	lighting,	small	power	(i.e.	
to	kitchen	equipment	and	sockets)	and	water	–	particularly	hot	water	(because	this	uses	
energy).	Modifications	to	these	systems	include	upgrading	or	replacing	boilers	and	central	
or	electric	heating,	altering	the	fuel	source	for	these	systems	(e.g.	from	gas/electricity	to	
biomass)	installing	microgeneration	technologies	such	as	photovoltaic	(solar)	panels	or	heat	
pumps	that	can	provide	power,	air	heating/cooling,	or	hot	water,	replacing	light	fittings	with	
more	efficient	ones,	and	many	others.		
However,	the	two	categories	of	building	fabric	and	building	systems	alone	are	not	sufficient	
to	examine	the	issues	around	domestic	energy	use	in	a	holistic	academic	manner.	The	third	
component	of	the	overall	system	of	domestic	energy	use	is	people.	This	refers	both	to	the	
people	involved	in	organising	and	carrying	out	the	domestic	retrofit	works	such	as	advisors,	
suppliers	and	installers,	and	the	people	who	live	in	the	property.	The	occupancy	habits,	
number	of	people	in	a	household,	demographic	characteristics	such	as	age	and	economic	
status,	preferences,	values,	political	views	and	-	as	a	product	of	all	of	these	-	the	behaviours	
of	the	people	that	live	within	the	building’s	fabric	and	use	its	systems,	has	an	enormous	
impact	on	the	energy	use	and	efficiency	of	a	property	(Summerfield	et	al,	2010)	and	upon	
their	decisions	to	retrofit	or	not	to	retrofit.		 	
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1.3.3	What	is	the	scale	of	the	problem?	
In	England,	there	are	approximately	22	million	households	(DCLG,	2014).	Both	the	overall	
population	and	the	number	of	households	are	growing,	and	the	built	environment	in	
general	is	expanding	to	accommodate	these	increases	at	an	estimated	rate	of	around	1-2%	
per	year	(Ravetz,	2008).		
For	various	reasons,	improving	the	energy	efficiency	of	the	housing	stock	in	the	UK	has	
become	a	serious	priority,	and	for	new	domestic	properties,	there	are	a	series	of	UK	Building	
Regulations	covering	building	fabric,	building	systems,	components	and	controls	as	well	as	
overall	building	performance	that	aim	to	set	the	energy	efficiency	of	these	properties	at	a	
high	level,	and	keep	their	energy	use	low	(HM	Government,	2010).	With	new	buildings	
comes	the	opportunity	to	design	and	build	the	property’s	fabric,	systems	and	controls	with	
energy	efficiency	already	in	mind,	and	with	a	regulatory	framework	to	guide	that	design.		
However,	the	vast	majority	of	properties	–	around	90%	-	that	stand	now	in	2014	were	built	
more	than	20	years	ago	(DCLG,	2014),	and	these	properties	were	almost	exclusively	not	
built	with	energy	efficiency	as	a	priority.	At	a	demolition	rate	of	around	0.3%	per	year	of	the	
existing	housing	stock,	most	of	those	existing	properties	–	around	75%	-	will	likely	still	stand	
in	2050	(Ravetz,	2008).	With	the	majority	of	the	housing	stock	not	going	anywhere,	any	
intention	to	improve	the	energy	efficiency	of	the	UK	housing	stock	with	any	significance	
therefore	has	to	address	the	existing	housing	stock,	which	is	an	entirely	different	scenario	to	
new	buildings.	This	means	working	with,	adding	to	and	modifying	existing	fabrics,	layouts	
and	systems.	Furthermore,	English	Housing	Survey	data	also	shows	that	83%	of	all	
properties	are	in	urban	or	suburban	areas,	a	figure	which	is	increasing	with	time,	placing	
increased	onus	on	cities	as	sites	with	especially	high	need	-	and	potential	–	for	domestic	
energy	efficiency	improvements.	
1.3.4	Energy	use	of	domestic	buildings.	
Given	that	the	‘problem’	of	domestic	retrofit	is	rooted	in	an	underlying	desire	to	reduce	its	
overall	energy	use),	it	is	important	to	understand	some	basic	facets	of	domestic	energy	use,	
to	set	the	scene	for	why	particular	sectors	of	domestic	retrofit	such	as	privately	owned	and	
occupied	properties,	and	particular	technologies	such	as	solid	wall	insulation	and	boilers	
have	become	a	political	and	practical	priority.		
	
	
20	
Domestic	energy	use	is	made	up	of	five	components:	space	heating,	hot	water,	appliances,	
cooking	and	lighting.	Estimates	of	the	proportions	of	total	household	energy	use	for	each	
component	depend	on	the	model	used,	and	of	course	in	reality	these	vary	considerably	
between	property	types,	but	generally	speaking,	by	far	the	largest	proportion	of	domestic	
energy	use	in	the	UK	is	for	space	heating,	at	over	60%	of	total	household	energy	use	(DECC,	
2014,	see	table	below).		
Component	of	domestic	energy	use	 Estimated	proportion	of	total	energy	
use	
Space	heating	 63%	
Hot	water	 18%	
Appliances	 13%	
Cooking	 3%	
Lighting	 3%	
Table	1	-	Domestic	energy	use	by	component	
	(adapted	from	UK	housing	fact	file,	DECC,	2014).	
Given	that	space	heating	makes	up	the	highest	proportion	of	end	use	domestic	energy,	an	
obvious	conclusion	from	this	is	that	in	order	to	get	the	greatest	improvements	in	energy	
efficiency,	efforts	should	be	concentrated	on	improving	the	efficiency	of	space	heating	
systems.		
Whereas	the	energy	efficiency	of	electric	lighting	and	appliances	is	largely	dependent	upon	
the	efficiency	of	the	appliances,	systems	and	fittings	themselves,	such	as	light	bulbs,	white	
goods,	computers,	and	switching	and	controls,	the	energy	efficiency	of	space	heating	is	
more	complicated.	Firstly,	it	is	dependent	upon	how	much	heat	is	lost	from	the	building,	
which	is	determined	by	the	thermal	performance	of	the	building	fabric.	Secondly,	it	is	
dependent	upon	the	efficiency	of	the	heating	system	and	controls	in	use,	which	can	range	
from	gas	central	heating	boilers,	(of	which	there	are	many	types	with	different	efficiency	
characteristics,	and	are	generally	less	efficient	the	older	they	are),	electric	storage	heaters,	
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wood	burners,	oil	burners	and	alternative	fuel	systems	such	as	biomass	(Energy	Saving	
Trust,	2015a).		Thirdly,	the	energy	use	of	all	of	these	systems	and	controls	are	in	turn,	of	
course,	dependent	upon	how	occupants	use	them:	how	often,	which	rooms,	at	what	
temperatures	and	for	how	long	the	heating	is	on,	and	so	on	(Summerfield	et	al,	2010).	
Furthermore,	the	efficiency	of	hot	water	systems	–	the	second	highest	proportion	of	
domestic	energy	end-use	-	is	often	connected	to	the	age	and	type	of	heating	system.	This	is	
because	many	of	the	older,	less	efficient	space	heating	systems	are	associated	with	older,	
less	efficient	water	heating	systems	such	as	coal	fires	with	back	boilers	for	hot	water,	or	
electric	storage	heaters	and	immersion	heaters	for	water	(Energy	Saving	Trust,	2015a).			
The	majority	of	heat	is	lost	from	buildings	in	two	main	ways:	by	conduction	through	the	
fabric	of	the	building	and	by	convection	through	gaps	in	the	building.	Therefore,	options	for	
reducing	heat	losses	from	buildings	involve	either	improving	the	insulation	properties	of	the	
fabric	to	reduce	heat	lost	through	conduction,	or	through	improving	the	air	tightness	of	the	
building	to	reduce	heat	lost	through	convection.	The	basic	measures	for	doing	this	involve:	
• Insulating	lofts,	cavity	walls	and	solid	walls	(and	sometimes	floors)		
• Replacing	inefficient	single	glazing	with	double	or	triple	glazing		
• Reducing	what	are	known	as	‘thermal	bridges’	where	materials	or	services	penetrate	
the	building	fabric	and	increase	conduction	between	inside	and	outside	
• Draught	proofing.		
(Baker	et	al,	2013)	
The	options	for	improving	the	energy	efficiency	of	space	heating	systems	include:	
• Replacing	whole	old,	inefficient	heating	systems	such	as	warm	air	vents	and	storage	
heaters	with	central	heating	and	radiators.		
• Where	central	heating	is	already	in	use,	replacing	old,	less	efficient	standard	gas	
boilers	with	newer,	more	efficient	condensing	and/or	combination	boilers	(which	
can	also	improve	the	efficiency	of	hot	water	heating)	(Energy	Saving	Trust,	2015a).		
• Improving	heating	controls	and	the	length	of	time	heating	systems	are	in	operation	
using	thermostats,	timers	and	thermostatic	radiator	valves	(TRVs)	so	that	spaces	are	
heated	only	at	certain	times,	when	they	drop	below	certain	temperatures	or	only	
heating	the	rooms	that	are	occupied,	as	opposed	to	heating	the	entire	dwelling	for	
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long	periods,	although	the	actual	effects	of	heating	controls	on	reducing	energy	use	
in	space	heating	are	varied	(Shipworth	et	al,	2010).	
This	particular	issue	of	space	heating	and	building	fabric,	as	the	main	component	of	
domestic	energy	use,	is	indeed	where	the	focus	of	current	UK	energy	efficiency	policy,	and	
the	focus	and	intent	of	the	main	case	studies	involved	in	this	thesis	lies.	However,	these	
aspects	of	domestic	energy	efficiency	are	not	consistent	between	property	types,	tenures	
and	ages,	which	also	affects	how	the	issue	is	approached.	
1.3.5	Domestic	property	types,	tenures	and	ages	and	what	this	means	
for	energy	efficiency.	
It	is	estimated	that	the	vast	majority	of	dwellings	in	England	in	2012	were	owner	occupied,	
at	65%	of	dwellings,	with	the	remaining	dwellings	fairly	evenly	split	between	privately	
rented	dwellings	(18%)	and	social	housing	(17%,	which	includes	both	local	authority	and	
housing	association	properties)	(DCLG,	2014).	Despite	considerable	improvements	in	energy	
efficiency	in	all	properties	in	the	last	fifteen	years,	owner	occupied	and	privately	rented	
dwellings	tend	to	be	the	worst	performing	and	the	least	improved,	as	shown	in	figure	3	
below,	with	far	fewer	dwellings	having	an	Energy	Performance	Certificate	(EPC)	rating	of	A-
C,	and	far	more	dwellings	falling	in	the	lowest	band	of	F/G	than	in	social	housing.		
	
Figure	3	EPC	Ratings	by	tenure	in	1996	and	2001	
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Figure	4	Age	of	households	by	tenure	
There	are	a	number	of	factors	contributing	to	this,	which	relate	to	both	external	pressures	
and	aspects	of	the	buildings’	fabrics.	Taking	the	buildings’	fabrics	into	consideration	first,	a	
much	greater	proportion	of	social	housing	than	private	dwellings	are	flats,	which	are	
inherently	more	compact	and	more	energy	efficient	than	houses.	Conversely,	a	far	greater	
proportion	of	private	dwellings	than	social	housing	are	houses	that	were	built	before	1945	
(see	figure	4		above),	which	means	they	are	more	likely	to	have	solid	walls.	Older	properties	
with	solid	walls	are	far	more	difficult	and	considerably	more	expensive	to	insulate	than	
newer	properties	with	cavity	walls	and	fall	into	the	‘hard	to	treat’	category	(explained	
below)	-	a	very	approximate	guide	is	£250	for	cavity	wall	insulation	as	opposed	to	between	
£5000-£18000	for	external	wall	insulation	(Energy	Saving	Trust,	2015b).	Private	sector	
homes	also	lag	behind	social	sector	homes	in	terms	of	other	basic	energy	efficiency	
improvements:	fewer	private	sector	homes	have	more	than	200mm	loft	insulation	and	
fewer	private	sector	homes	are	fully	double	glazed.	Furthermore,	more	private	sector	
homes	(particularly	rented	homes)	are	not	centrally	heated,	and	when	they	are,	private	
homes	are	more	likely	to	have	older,	less	efficient	standard	boilers	than	social	housing	
(DCLG,	2014).	Social	housing	has	also	benefitted	from	a	number	of	programmes	such	as	
Decent	Homes,	CERT	and	CESP,	which	have	improved	the	energy	efficiency	of	the	stock.	
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1.3.6	Retrofit	principles	
Underlying	this	framework	and	emerging	from	some	of	the	key	features	of	domestic	energy	
efficiency	are	some	key	principles	that	it	is	important	to	outline	when	researching	how	and	
why	retrofit	may	or	may	not	be	approached	in	different	ways.		
1.) Whole	house	retrofit:	
It	is	widely	agreed	that	the	most	effective	way	of	improving	the	energy	efficiency	of	a	home	
is	to	do	so	by	considering	the	house	as	a	whole,	with	all	of	its	fabric,	systems,	controls	and	
people	considered	as	part	of	a	domestic	energy	system	together	(Baker,	Smith	and	Swan,	
2013).	Retrofitting	homes	with	single	measures	such	as	insulation,	solar	panels	or	boilers	
separately,	are	unlikely	to	yield	significant	energy	savings	alone.	Furthermore,	the	
installation	of	one	component	can	sometimes	affect	the	performance	of	another,	either	in	a	
complimentary	way	such	as	by	improving	its	effectiveness	(e.g.	insulating	walls	means	that	
the	benefits	of	a	more	efficient	heating	system	are	even	greater)	or	in	a	negative	way	by	
creating	further	problems	(e.g.	overinsulating	can	cause	problems	with	air	quality),	both	of	
which	further	support	the	need	to	consider	the	building	as	a	whole.	
2.) Fabric	first		
There	is	a	commonly	accepted	logical	order	in	which	retrofit	measures	should	be	installed	in	
order	to	maximise	the	energy	saving	potential	in	a	dwelling.	Given	that	most	of	the	heat	is	
lost	through	the	fabric	of	the	building	and	the	goal	is	first	and	foremost	to	reduce	the	
energy	demand	of	the	building,	the	building	fabric	is	the	first	aspect	of	retrofit	that	should	
be	addressed	(Heaslip,	2013).	After	this,	boilers	or	fuel	burners	and	controls	can	be	
retrofitted	to	make	the	heating	system	more	efficient	and	beyond	that,	microgeneration	
technologies	can	be	installed	to	improve	energy	supply	efficiency.	This	ensures	that	systems	
and	technologies	are	not	fitted	and	then	the	energy	savings	from	them	wasted	on	heat	
losses	through	the	building’s	fabric.		
As	mentioned,	however,	there	are	some	dwellings	that	are	easier	to	retrofit	than	others.	
Modern	homes	with	cavity	walls	and	simple	loft	spaces	that	can	be	quickly	filled	or	fitted	
with	insulation	materials,	for	example,	are	relatively	easy	and	cheap	to	bring	up	to	higher	
standards	of	energy	efficiency.	Other	properties	are	not	so	easy	to	modify,	and	in	England	
43%	of	properties	can	be	defined	as	‘hard	to	treat’.	These	are	usually	dwellings	with	solid	
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walls	or	dwellings	off	the	gas	network,	with	a	few	that	are	dwellings	with	no	loft	or	high-rise	
flats	(Wetherall,	Swan	and	Abbott,	2012).	This	creates	different	issues	in	different	property	
types	and	areas,	which	require	different	approaches	in	terms	of	installation	but	also	in	
terms	of	financing.	
1.3.7	Risks	in	retrofit	
It	should	also	be	noted	that	retrofit	does	not	have	automatically	positive	consequences.	
‘Good’	retrofit	involves	balancing	external	pressures	such	as	reducing	carbon	emissions	and	
improving	comfort	and	health,	and	not	creating	other	problems	as	well.	Improving	the	
building	fabric	and	space	heating,	for	example,	may	reduce	energy	costs	and	carbon	
emissions	in	some	cases,	but	there	are	possibilities	that	perceptions	of	comfort	could	
deteriorate	or	that	the	aesthetics	of	a	building	have	been	altered	negatively	by	insulation.	
Risks	include:	
• Hygrothermal	risks	(Gupta	et	al,	2014)	-	these	relate	to	air	quality	and	moisture	
levels	in	dwellings.	Overinsulating	properties	can	cause	mould	and	damp	and	
increase	the	need	for	ventilation	–	there	is	a	need	to	balance	air	tightness	with	air	
movement	and	this	requires	technical	skill	and	competence	in	selecting	retrofit	
measures	and	in	installing	them	in	the	appropriate	order,	especially	in	older	
properties	that	tend	to	have	poorer	air	quality	(Baker,	Smith	and	Swan,	2013).	
• Workmanship	and	lack	of	technical	expertise	–	poorly	installed	or	inappropriate	
retrofit	measures	can	result	in	lower	than	expected	energy	savings,	making	draught	
or	air	quality	problems	worse,	or	creating	new	problems	such	as	unattractive	aspects	
on	or	in	the	property	that	need	to	be	repaired	afterwards,	particularly	in	older,	hard	
to	treat	properties	where	householders	wish	for	original	features	like	cornicing	or	
decorative	windows	to	be	retained	(Mallaband	et	al,	2013).		
• Implementation	gap	-	the	use	of	the	building	and	behaviour	of	occupants	can	result	
in	lower	than	expected	energy	savings	when	expectations	have	been	based	upon	the	
technical	performance	of	components	rather	than	how	they	might	be	used,	which	
should	be	considered	when	selecting	technological	options	in	retrofit.	For	example,	
people	may	heat	their	dwellings	to	higher	than	expected	temperatures,	use	spaces	
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differently,	or	continue	old	habits	such	as	using	baths	instead	of	showers	(Walker,	
Lowry	and	Theobold,	2014).	
	
1.4	Summary		
In	conclusion,	private	owner-occupied	and	rented	homes	in	older	properties	with	old	
heating	systems	are	the	poorest	performers	in	terms	of	energy	efficiency.	These	properties	
make	up	a	considerable	proportion	of	the	UK	housing	stock	and	due	to	the	concentration	of	
populations	and	the	density	of	housing	in	urban	areas,	the	vast	majority	of	them	are	found	
in	cities	and	towns.	Space	heating	makes	up	the	highest	proportion	of	energy	use	in	a	
dwelling	and	as	this	is	dependent	upon	heat	losses	through	fabric	and	the	efficiency	of	a	
heating	system,	potential	retrofit	measures	that	address	these	(insulation	and	heating)	are	
generally	prioritised	in	both	assessing	the	energy	performance	of	buildings	and	in	trying	to	
improve	them.	Many	English	properties	are	not	conducive	to	easy	improvements	to	building	
fabrics	(mainly	solid-walled	properties)	and	even	so,	many	that	could	have	been	insulated	
easily	in	lofts	and	cavity	walls	have	not	been.	On	top	of	this,	many	properties	in	the	private	
sector	do	not	have	the	most	efficient	heating	systems	or	controls.	Due	to	these	trends	and	
characteristics	of	the	English	housing	stock,	the	energy	efficiency	performance	of	the	
private,	owner	occupied	housing	sector	has	recently	attracted	a	lot	of	attention	in	terms	of	
political	rhetoric	and	debate,	and	in	particular	the	specific	aspects	of	insulation	and	heating	
systems.		
But	as	we	know	from	the	framework	outlined	above,	the	physical	characteristics	of	buildings	
and	the	statistical	‘facts’	around	domestic	energy	use	are	just	one	part	of	domestic	energy	
efficiency	in	terms	of	policy	and	practice.	This	‘problem’	is	not	a	static,	objective	entity:	it	is	
a	continually	shifting	function	of	the	different	components	of	the	framework:	fabric,	
systems,	people	and	external	influences,	a	problem	that	has	been	constructed	through	
historical	social,	political	and	economic	processes	around	domestic	energy	use	in	the	UK	and	
beyond.	This	thesis	aims	to	look	at	domestic	retrofit	holistically,	acknowledging	the	suite	of	
social	and	technical	issues	outlined	above,	but	particularly	in	urban	contexts.	It	explores	
firstly	the	unique	pressures	upon	and	opportunities	within	cities	that	shape	retrofit	
activities,	and	secondly	how	the	peculiarities	of	different	cities	and	their	place-specific	
features,	people	and	relationships	can	produce	quite	different	responses	within	the	same	
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basic	framework	presented	above.	The	importance	of	this	research	is	in	looking	not	for	one	
‘solution’	to	the	issue	around	domestic	retrofit,	but	exploring	multiple	approaches,	their	
outcomes	and	effects,	and	the	things	that	limited	them.	It	is	also	important	because	it	uses	
this	particular	socio-technical	issue	to	discuss	some	key	urban	issues	such	as	trends	towards	
experimentation	and	uneven	development	that	are	not	specific	to	domestic	retrofit	but	
nonetheless	are	embodied	in	the	examples	of	urban	domestic	retrofit	experiments	in	this	
thesis.	
The	next	chapter	will	present	the	key	academic	themes	that	converge	around	domestic	
retrofit	in	cities,	explore	how	a	range	of	literatures	engage	with	the	suite	of	issues	involved,	
and	discuss	how	these	varied	themes	and	approaches	can	contribute	to	the	holistic	
synthesis	in	this	thesis.	
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Chapter	2	-	Literature	Review	
2.1	Introduction	–	what	work	is	this	literature	doing?	
The	previous	chapter	sought	to	outline	the	macro-level	drivers	for	and	pressures	on	
domestic	retrofit,	as	well	as	define	the	particular	nature	of	the	problem	in	scale,	tenure,	and	
technical	elements,	in	the	UK	context.	The	purpose	of	this	literature	review	is	to	provide	a	
thematic	review:	identifying	a	range	of	ways	of	understanding	the	issues	raised	in	Chapter	1	
such	as	the	nexus	of	climate	change,	energy	security	and	economic	concerns,	the	particular	
problems	of	privately	owned	and	occupied	homes	with	solid	walls,	and	the	peculiarities	of	
addressing	these	issues	in	an	urban	context.	The	intention	is	to	illuminate	the	possibilities	
for	understanding	different	aspects	of	both	the	national	policy	context	and	the	three	case	
studies,	and	how	they	relate	to	this	range	of	themes	and	issues.	This	research	is	not	
attempting	to	‘fill	a	gap	of	knowledge’	in	any	of	the	specific	disciplines	explored,	but	instead	
to	synthesise	literatures	from	different	research	areas	addressing	different	parts	of	the	
problem	of	domestic	retrofit	in	English	cities	and	using	different	ways	to	understand	them:	
this	is	the	original	contribution	to	knowledge.	Because	of	the	tension	between	the	array	of	
issues	this	very	specific	topic	encompasses,	it	is	important	here	to	draw	on	a	broad,	but	
targeted	literature	base:	first	setting	the	scene	in	terms	of	understanding	how	the	
organisation	of	energy	related	issues	in	cities	is	affected	and	shaped	by	political	issues	and	
governance	trends,	then	understanding	of	how	the	features	and	organisations	in	particular	
places,	and	the	specific	people	and	interests	that	are	involved,	can	shape	responses	to	
energy	related	issues,	thus	linking	the	macro-issues	to	localised	responses.	The	chapter	
concludes	by	looking	at	how	domestic	retrofit	specifically	has	been	researched	in	various	
socio-technical	ways,	and	what	helpful	perspectives	and	important	issues	have	emerged	
from	these	studies.		
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2.2	Understanding	the	macro-context:	how	landscape	issues	create	
experimentation	and	unevenness.		
2.2.1	Global	changes	
We	have	already	identified	that	macro	issues	and	processes	such	as	climate	change,	peak	oil	
and	economic	crisis	act	variably	as	pressures	and	drivers	for	domestic	retrofit	of	privately	
owned	houses	in	English	cities.	However,	there	are	other	macro-issues	–	particularly	socio-
political	ones	-	that	have	affected	the	way	that	people,	places	and	organisations	may	
respond	to	the	triad	of	energy	related	issues,	including	that	of	domestic	retrofit.	This	section	
will	outline	how	some	of	the	main	contextual	pressures	and	issues	around	the	governance	
of,	and	pressures	on,	contemporary	world	cities	have	been	understood	across	various	
literatures,	and	the	conditions	and	possibilities	these	create	for	domestic	retrofit	activity	in	
cities.	
Without	delving	too	far	into	a	debate	about	the	exact	features	of	globalization,	it	is	
commonly	acknowledged	that	some	key	global	societal	shifts	that	have	taken	place	in	the	
latter	half	of	the	twentieth	century	have	some	overarching	and	wide-reaching	effects	
worldwide,	and	it	is	these	processes	that	this	section	will	highlight.	Firstly,	from	a	political	
economy	and	cultural	studies	perspective,	the	rise	of	free	markets	and	competition	as	
economic	principles	as	opposed	to	Keynesian	fiscal	policies	–	particularly	through	the	
Thatcher	and	Reagan	governments	of	the	1980’s,	has	had	major,	irreversible	impacts	on	the	
relationship	between	government,	politics	and	economy	in	different	nation	states,	and	
particularly	upon	the	UK	as	one	of	its	original	proponents	(Crouch,	2011,	Hall,	2011	and	
Harvey,	2012).	These	include	the	distancing	of	nation	states	from	their	roles	as	providers	to	
citizens,	towards	new	roles	as	proponents	and	‘managers’	of	markets,	alongside	shifts	in	
cultural	and	social	thinking	away	from	the	collective	(which	was	traditionally	rooted	in	
national	identities)	towards	a	socially	fragmented	and	largely	individualised	conception	of	
social	and	political	life	(Beck,	2008	and	Ritzer	and	Ryan,	2004).	Alongside	this,	the	process	of	
rapid	technological	advancement	in	information	and	communications	technologies	enabled	
emblematic	features	of	neoliberal,	market	based	economies	such	as	new	virtual	spaces	of	
communication	and	information	flows	between	people,	places	and	organisations	to	become	
the	‘cornerstones	of	contemporary	society’	(Castells,	2010).	The	combination	of	these	
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processes	results	in	what	appears	to	be	a	rather	diminished	regulatory	role	for	the	nation	
state,	and	a	heavy	reliance	on	private	markets	and	competition	as	tools	for	governing.	
However,	the	state,	despite	its	changing	role,	is	still	instrumental	in	channelling	and	
distributing	these	global	changes	and	shifts,	through	institutions	such	as	local	authorities,	
legal	systems	and	state	buildings:	historically	created	to	represent	authority	and	territories,	
but	through	these	new	global	trends	now	provide	vehicles	for	market	and	network	
managing	(Castells,	2010	and	Sassen	2006).		
The	relevance	of	this	for	exploring	domestic	retrofit	responses	in	cities	is	firstly,	to	explore	
whether	or	not	UK	retrofit	policy	of	existing,	privately	owned	and	occupied	housing	does	
reflect	these	shifts	towards	markets	and	competition	as	tools	for	governing,	and	secondly,	
to	explore	the	particular	impact	these	trends	have	on	cities	and	the	networks	of	actors	
within/around	them	in	terms	of	how	this	might	enable,	constrain	and	shape	(or	any	
combination	of	these)	domestic	retrofit	responses	that	emerge	in	these	contexts.	Bumpus	
and	Liverman	(2008),	While	(2010	and	2011)	and	Whitehead	(2013)	argue	that	wider	
processes	of	marketising	economic	and	social	policy	have	steered	discourses	around	energy	
issues	and	climate	change	towards	the	economic	aspects	of	carbon	pricing,	offsetting	and	
trading,	alongside	individual	consumption	and	energy	behaviours.	They	argue	that	this	is	
because	these	are	the	aspects	of	the	environmental	agenda	that	are	most	easily	
incorporated	into	dominant	neoliberal	discourses	around	capital	movement	and	
accumulation,	as	opposed	to	those	aspects	concerned	with	caring	for	nature,	ecology	and	
the	planet.	Through	investigating	how	the	case	studies	align	with,	interpret	or	balance	these	
competing	discourses	and	political	interests	we	can	tell	a	story	about	just	how	the	broad	
pressures	above	impact	on	and	interact	with	practical,	local-scale	activity,	thus	affecting	the	
kinds	of	change	that	may	occur	as	a	result	of	this	activity.	
2.2.2	How	do	these	changes	impact	urban	governance?	
As	mentioned	in	chapter	1,	for	cities	tackling	energy	issues,	their	position	is	complex	and	in	
tension:	cities	are	cited	as	major	polluters	and	sources	of	carbon	emissions	due	to	the	
density	of	populations,	energy	consumption	and	industrial	activity	in	and	around	them,	and	
yet	at	the	same	time,	are	viewed	as	sites	of	techno-economic	and	socio-political	innovation	
and	change	(Eames	et	al,	2013,	Bugliarello,	2011,	Gossop,	2011)	–	even	revolution	(Harvey,	
2012)	-	and	the	potential	sources	of	solutions	to	energy-related	problems.	Simultaneously,	
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they	are	also	some	of	the	most	vulnerable	places	due	to	the	effects	of	climate	change	such	
as	sea-level	rise	and	extreme	weather,	having	dense	populations	and	often	vulnerable	
locations	(Satterthwaite	et	al,	2009),	as	well	as	housing	some	of	the	most	economically	
deprived	and	socially	isolated	communities	at	the	greatest	risk	from	energy	security	and	
related	fuel	poverty	and	health	issues.	However,	the	result	of	the	widespread	policy	trends	
in	the	economic	West	towards	marketisation,	decreased	regulation	and	decreased	public	
spending,	as	explained	above,	is	to	weaken	nation	states’	powers	to	act	directly	on	serious	
issues	of	economic	development,	energy	security	and	climate	change	(Gossop,	2011,	
Hodson	and	Marvin,	2010	and	2012	and	Jonas	et	al,	2011),	opening	up	“spaces	for	
alternatives	and	local,	voluntary	and	charity	sector	responses	to	be	given	oxygen”	(Hodson	
and	Marvin,	2014,	p7),	in	short:	new	ways	of	governing.	
There	is	broad	consensus	in	the	geographical	and	political	economy	literature	that	with	
these	processes,	and	the	emergence	of	supra-national	scale	institutions	such	as	the	World	
Bank	and	the	European	Union,	as	well	as	international	scale	agreements	and	regulations,	
the	authority	and	position	of	nation	states	has	moved	from	a	hierarchical,	state-led	
government	arrangement	to	a	multi-level,	multi-stakeholder	governance	arrangement	that	
now	incorporates	the	interests	and	practices	of	private	and	corporate	interests	and	actors	
at	multiple	scales	from	the	local	to	the	global	(Bache	and	Flinders,	2004,	Jessop,	2008,	
Bulkeley	and	Betsill,	2005,	Bulkeley	and	Schroeder,	2011,	Massey,	2007).	Examples	of	this	
are	the	prevalence	of	private	finance	initiatives	in	the	UK,	and	the	increasing	practice	of	
subcontracting	private	firms	to	perform	both	national	and	local	state	activities	from	health,	
to	security	services	(e.g.	G4S),	housing,	waste	services	and	many	others.		
It	is	argued	by	critical	urban	theorists	that	this	shifting	of	state	responsibilities	away	from	
central	government,	either	into	sub-national	state	institutions,	non-government	
organisations	and	the	private	sector	or	upwards	to	supranational	bodies	means	that	new	
spaces	of	state	activity	are	being	formed	at	a	sub-national,	regional	territorial	scale	–	often	
with	cities	instrumental	in	these	spaces	(Brenner,	2004	and	2009	and	Swyngedouw,	2004	
and	2010).	These	new	scales	of	activity	are	characterised	not	only	by	these	public-private	
networks	of	governing	but	also	by	the	positioning	of	cities	and	regions	in	competition	with	
one	another	in	global	circuits	of	capital,	a	position	often	deliberately	encouraged	by	
neoliberalised	national	and	supranational	policy	which	distributes	state	funding	on	a	
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competitive	basis	(Brenner,	2004	and	2009,	Jonas	et	al,	2011,	Gossop,	2011	Swyngedouw,	
2004,	Massey,	2007	and	Marcuse	and	Van	Kempen,	2000).		
As	Jonas	et	al	(2011)	explain,	these	competitive	trends	create	considerable	economic	
pressures	for	cities	and	sub-national	spaces:	adapt	(and	play	the	competitive	game),	or	face	
economic	ruin.	In	these	spaces,	it	is	thought	that	people,	local	state	actors,	corporates	and	
third	sector	actors	coalesce,	in	varying,	place-specific	and	often	temporary	configurations,	
around	particular	issues	such	as	climate	change	and	energy,	in	order	to	attract	external	
investment	and	manage	resources	and	economic	activity,	thus	engaging	directly	from	local	
level	with	global	circuits	of	capital	and	governance	structures	(Brenner,	2004	and	2009).	
Swyngedouw	(2010)	highlights	the	differential	levels	of	influence	of	different	social	groups	
and	interests,	actors	at	different	scales	and	their	roles	and	inputs	into	these	struggles	of	
shaping	space,	place,	economic	activity	and	territory,	highlighting	the	“geometries	of	
power”	that	are	created	by	these	networked,	multi-level	coalitions	of	actors	under	the	
conditions	of	economic	competition.		
The	importance	of	these	perspectives	for	understanding	the	emergence	of	domestic	retrofit	
responses	in	cities	is	in	highlighting	that	those	responses	are	likely	to	have	been	produced	
through	a	dynamic	process,	dependent	on	the	relationships,	networks	and	entwinement	
with	issues	and	events	within,	around	and	outside	those	cities:	these	forms	of	networked,	
multi-level	and	multi-sector	governance	that	are	now	a	‘normal’	part	of	urban	activities,	
particularly	in	marketised	Western	cities	such	as	those	in	the	UK.	What	this	
acknowledgement	of	the	‘new	normal’	does	is	beg	an	exploration	of	whether	these	
contemporary	urban	pressures	and	forms	are	present	in	the	examples	of	urban	domestic	
retrofit	responses	that	we	study	in	this	thesis.	With	such	strong	trends	of	rescaling,	public-
private	networks	and	interurban	competition,	does	the	governance	of	domestic	retrofit	also	
incorporate	this	multiplicity	of	public	and	private	actors	at	different	scales?	Are	these	
initiatives	concerned	by	or	affected	by	the	urban	pressures	of	external	reputations,	
vulnerability	and	competition	for	investment?	If	so,	how	has	this	affected	and	directed	their	
focus	and	their	transformative	potential?	
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2.2.3	Space	and	place	–	new	understandings	of	cities.	
The	increasing	interconnectedness	between	individuals,	businesses	communities	and	
organisations	across	the	globe	and	the	associated	mobility	of	information,	knowledge	and	
capital	in	its	various	forms	has	changed,	or	even	annihilated,	as	Harvey	(2005)	would	argue,	
societal	perceptions	and	instrumental	roles	of	space	and	time	and	their	relation	to	
economic	and	social	life,	resulting	in	new	and	varied	conceptions	and	arrangements	of	
places,	contexts	and	their	relation	to	state	structures	(Swyngedouw	2004).	This	creates	a	
condition	in	which,	it	is	argued,	that	space	and	place	-	and	therefore	their	role	in	practices	
and	activities	such	as	those	around	domestic	retrofit	-	are	no	longer	appropriately	defined	
by	national	state	boundaries,	or	by	‘fixed’	or	‘absolute’	cartographic	representations	of	
space	(maps	of	boroughs,	districts,	city	borders	and	so	on)	which	can	be	exclusionary	and	
lack	a	depth	of	understanding	of	how	that	space	has	been	constructed	and	is	experienced	
(Harvey,	2005).	Instead,	when	viewing	spaces	of	activity	as	constructed	‘relationally’	(Ward,	
2010)	–	i.e.	by	their	internal	relationships	and	networks,	and	‘relatively’	–	by	their	
relationships,	networks	and	reputations	with	other	places	and	spaces	at	different	scales	and	
in	often	physically	distant	locations	(Massey,	2005	and	Harvey,	2005),	it	allows	a	deeper	and	
more	complex	view	of	place-based	activities	that	does	not	assume	their	spatial	elements	to	
be	predefined	and	uncontested.			
However,	the	construction	of	urban	spaces	in	particular	can	be	seen	not	only	as	products	of	
human	relationships	and	networks,	but	of	an	entanglement	between	those	relationships	
and	networks	and	the	elements	of	the	built	environment	that	characterise	cities.	People,	
organisations	and	territory	combine	with	energy	and	water	infrastructures,	buildings,	roads,	
and	so	on,	as	well	as	a	meshing	with	the	wider	political	processes	outlined	above,	temporal	
events,	social	norms	and	different	cultures	and	power	relationships.	This	multiplicity	of	
socio-technical	elements	of	the	city	has	been	captured	particularly	helpfully	through	
assemblage	thinking	(for	example,	McFarlane,	2011,	Farias	and	Bender,	2012	although	this	
idea	is	explored	further	in	the	next	chapter)	and	through	the	framework	of	splintered	
urbanism	(Graham	and	Marvin,	2001)	in	which	privatisation,	technological	advancement	
and	the	interconnection	of	global	cities	create	political	and	power	divisions	within	and	
between	cities	through	the	physical	elements	of	marketised	infrastructure	and	service	
provision.	
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The	importance	of	understanding	how	space	is	defined	through	the	relationship	between	
people,	places	and	the	physical	built	environment	for	the	domestic	retrofit	case	studies	is	in	
understanding	how	the	spatial	elements	of	domestic	retrofit	–	as	one	element	of	the	
responses	-	are	constructed	differently	in	different	places	through	these	socially,	relationally	
and	contingent	assemblages	of	space.		
2.2.4	Products	of	the	global	context	at	the	urban	and	local	scale:	
unevenness	and	experimentation.	
Unevenness	
Exploring	these	multiple	global	pressures	and	new	conceptions	of	space	is	not	solely	
descriptive.		They	also	mean	that	development	and	investment	are,	as	a	result,	
geographically	uneven,	with	hotspots	of	development	and	activity,	concentrations	of	
resources	and	investments	in	certain	spaces	(such	as	economic	‘corridors’	in	Europe	–	see	
Brenner,	2009)	and	as	a	result,	less	development	and	investment	in	others.	Smith	(1985)	
and	Harvey	(2005)	illustrate	with	a	Marxist	approach	how	flows	of	capital	through	both	
state	and	private	hands	into	certain	urban	development,	construction	and	regeneration	
processes	increases	economic	dependency	on	these	areas	whilst	draining	other	areas.	
Swyngedouw’s	concept	of	‘glocalisation’	(2004)	with	its	spatial	politics,	networks,	the	
forging	of	territories	and	uneven,	place-specific	power	dynamics	and	relationships	also	
captures	this	dynamic	nicely.	Energy-related	issues	and	changes	relating	to	them	are	argued	
to	be	equally	geographical	and	scalar	in	their	nature	(Bridge	et	al,	2013,	Bradshaw	2010)	
with	concerns	over	peak	oil,	increasing	energy	demand	from	developing	countries,	energy	
security	and	‘processes	of	globalisation’,	playing	out	differently	in	different	places	and	
spatialities:	multiple	interests	and	stakeholders	presents	multiple	possibilities	for	
interpreting,	defining,	researching	and	responding	to	these	global	pressures	and	trends	and	
pressures,	as	well	as	multiple	visions	of	what	these	responses	might	produce.			
Hodson	and	Marvin	(2014),	for	example,	explore	competing	discourses	around	what	the	
term	‘sustainable	cities’	means	through	a	variety	of	research	approaches:	it	could	relate	to	
‘smartness’	or	‘resilience’	of	cities,	with	varying	degrees	of	technological,	ecological	and	
commercial	focus,	it	could	relate	to	localised	experimention	around	sustainable	urbanism,	
the	management,	securitization	and	bounding	of	urban	resources	and	flows,	or	be	
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approached	through	‘carbon	regulation’	enmeshed	with	existing	urban	governance	
processes.	These	varied	ideas	around	what	a	‘sustainable	city’	might	be	demonstrate	the	
multiplicity	of	problem	framings	around	urban	energy	issues	and	secondly,	how	complex	the	
drivers	for,	and	motivations	for	any	kind	of	transformations	in	urban	contexts	are,	
depending	on	the	framing	of	the	problem.	This	is	synonymous	with	the	multiple	framings	of	
the	broad	issues	surrounding	domestic	retrofit.	Notions	of	carbon	control	(While	et	al,	2010,	
2011	and	2013),	and	the	positioning	of	a	‘green’	and	‘low	carbon’	economy	as	an	
opportunity	for	rebuilding	after	a	global	economic	crisis	(Luke,	2014	and	Hodson	and	
Marvin,	2010)	drive	many	aspects	of	the	policy,	but	there	are	also	pressures	from	
international	carbon	emissions	reduction	targets,	international	energy	markets	and	energy	
supply	vulnerability.	Furthermore,	when	connecting	‘new	state	spaces’	and	relational,	
relative	forms	of	space,	with	these	multiple	framings	of	energy	issues,	Hodson	and	Marvin	
(2013)	illustrate	how	different	configurations	of	social	interests	navigate	the	economic,	
industrial	and	social	legacies	of	the	places	in	which	they	operate	alongside	these	new	global	
pressures	and	tensions	in	different	ways.	Within	the	United	Kingdom,	they	show	how	the	
notion	of	a	‘Low	Carbon	Nation’	is	interpreted	and	constructed	in	geographically	varied	
ways,	through	regionally	specific	processes	of	development,	management	of	local	
resources,	financial	flows,	place-based	identities,	visions	and	strategies.	These	produce	
specific	responses	and	interpretations,	from	environmental	economics	in	Greater	
Manchester,	to	strengthening	infrastructures	in	Wales,	and	recirculating	wealth	from	oil	
reserves	back	into	sustainable	community	projects	in	the	Shetland	Isles.		
With	a	specifically	urban	focus,	Hodson	and	Marvin	(2010)	also	explain	how	in	World	Cities	
from	San	Francisco	to	London	and	Frieburg	among	others,	strategic		responses	to	ecological	
issues	and	resource	constraints	have	become	vehicles	for	pursuing	a	common	goal		of	
producing	secure	and	resilient	infrastructures.	As	well	as	articulating	an	important	shared	
agenda	which	embodies	the	global	pressures	on	cities	discussed	above,	they	raise	concern,	
along	with	Meadowcroft	(2009)	about	the	elite	-	and	primarily	economic	interests	-	that	
often	constitute	these	varied	strategies	whilst	excluding	others:	who,	in	terms	of	social	
groups,	values	and	visions	of	change,	is	represented	when	strategies	about	sustainability	are	
constructed?	This	issue	is	also	highlighted	by	Ernstson	and	Sorlin	(2013)	when	they	
demonstrate	how	‘ecosystem	services’	in	cities	such	as	Cape	Town		–	decisions	about	land	
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use,	parks,	transport	services,	energy	infrastructures,	preservation	of	resources,	and	so	on	-	
are	socially	produced	through	contestation	and	negotiation	between	different	social	groups,	
and	often	result	in	uneven	geographies	of	access	to	and	benefits	from	these	services	and	
infrastructures.	Dierwachter	and	Wessels	(2013)	make	a	similar	point,	showing	how	
municipal	and	institutional	choices	in	funding,	planning	and	organising	climate	experiments	
across	the	metropolitan	region	of	Seattle	resulted	in	uneven	involvement	of	its	multiple	
boroughs,	because	of	uneven	resources,	skill	levels	and	institutional	capacities	at	these	
hyperlocal	levels:		
“the	uneven	localisation	of	climate	action	across	metropolitan	regions	can	be	as	much	about	
ability	to	pay,	as	willingness	to	play”(Dierwachter	and	Wessels,	2013,	p1382	
Crucially,	they	argue	that	this	is	exacerbated	by	the	entwinement	of	neoliberal	state	
restructuring	with	climate	‘control’	and	sustainability	‘fixes’	-	structures	of	competitive	
funding	at	municipal	and	state	level	create	‘non-choices’	for	localities	lacking	in	capital	and	
resource	through	no	fault	of	their	own.	Whitehead	(2013)	similarly	links	this	unevenness	
directly	to	global	processes	by	hailing	this	variation	as	a	demonstration	of	how	entwined	
global	trends	of	urbanisation	and	neoliberalism	have	shaped	the	framing	of	the	
environmental	agenda	and	climate	governance	in	their	image,	through	such	structures	as	
environmental	entrepreneurialism,	competitive	funding	for	local	projects,	outward-looking	
exemplars	and	so	on.	Swyngedouw	(2007	and	2009)	would	similarly	argue	that	climate	
change	and	environmental	catastrophe,	under	the	post-political	context	of	
neoliberalisation,	simply	creates	an	opportunity	for	capitalist,	private	sector	actors	to	gain	
greater	control	of	urban	development	processes.		
In	terms	of	further	uneven	impacts	not	just	geographically	but	practically,	as	a	result	of	
differential	representation	of	interests,	Bulkeley	and	Schroeder	(2011)	demonstrate	how	an	
effective,	inclusive	intermediary	resulted	in	a	strong	and	widely	representative	guiding	
vision	that	enabled	the	construction	of	a	citywide	sustainable	stormwater	drainage	system	
in	Los	Angeles.	However,	Hodson	and	Marvin	(2011),	illustrate	the	alternative	in	Greater	
Manchester:	that	limited	representation	in	the	network	charged	with	developing	an	energy	
system	transition	resulted	in	the	pursuit	of	a	narrow	vision,	and	little	practical	action,	but	
show	in	London’s	case	how	an	agenda	and	strategy	around	decentralised	energy	was	
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composed	and	implemented	through	the	particular	strengths	and	power	of	the	Greater	
London	Authority	and	associated	regional	governance	structures	(Hodson	and	Marvin,	
2010).	Rutland	and	Aylett	(2008)	show	how	the	construction	and	implementation	of	a	
climate	change	mitigation	strategy	in	Portland,	Oregon	came	about	through	the	constant	
negotiation	of	different	actors’	visions	of	the	problem	of	climate	change,	identification	of	
the	spheres	in	which	the	local	intermediary	and	municipal	authority	could	act,	and	the	
resultant	inclusion	and	exclusion	of	various	spaces	in	the	city,	as	well	as	parts	of	what	
actually	constituted	Portland’s	carbon	emissions.	
These	practical,	urban-focussed	examples	of	common	pressures,	varied	responses,	
contested	social	interests	and	geographically	uneven	effects	together	act	as	good	
illustrations	of	the	pressures	of	interurban	competition,	spatial	and	territorial	contestation	
and	the	contingency	and	entwinement	of	urban	assemblages.	These	literatures,	although	
not	relating	specifically	to	domestic	retrofit,	show	us	how	urban	responses	can	
demonstrate,	through	their	variation,	the	many	possibilities	for	action	and	different	
‘geometries	of	power’	or	negotiations	of	interests	under	the	context	of	what	Hodson	and	
Marvin	(2014	p7),	deem	an	“era	of	multiple	crises”:	climate	change,	economic	and	cost	of	
living,	peak	oil	and	governance.		
The	point	of	exploring	these	multiple	discourses	and	multiple	interests	is	again,	to	highlight	
the	multiple	ways	in	which	localised,	urban	activity	around	energy	and	sustainability	issues	
can	interpret	the	‘landscape’	pressures	on	energy	efficiency	and	domestic	retrofit,	and	how	
these	interpretations	are	not	free	of	political	and	social	pressures	and	effects:	the	idea	of	
some	discourses	and	interests	outweighing	others	in	strategy	decisions	and	networked	
activity	is	particularly	important	to	note	when	exploring	why	domestic	retrofit	cases	have	
tackled	the	many	facets	of	domestic	retrofit	in	one	way	and	not	another,	or	why	certain	
areas	of	the	problem	have	been	deemed	more	important	than	others.	
Experimentation:	the	‘answer’	to	urban	sustainability	questions?	
The	second	key	trend	that	it	is	argued	has	emerged	from	these	pressures	and	changes	at	the	
global	level	is	that	of	experimentation	as	a	form	of	governing	and	approaching	
sustainability,	energy	and	climate	change	related	issues,	particularly	in	cities.		
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Both	Hoffman	(2011)	and	Bulkeley	and	Castan-Broto	(2013),	focussing	on	climate	change	
governance	specifically,	situate	the	experimental	trend	as	a	product	of	–	or	response	to	–	
the	multi-level	governance	of	climate	change	and	changing	roles	of	state	institutions.	They	
argue	that	this	is	a	product	of	what	Hoffman	(2011)	describes	as	“disillusionment	with	
international	policy	negotiation	and	fragmentation	of	political	authority”,	which	has	created	
the	conditions	for	an	“era	of	governance	experimentation”.	Evans	(2011)	similarly	argues	
that	urban	sustainability	experiments	or	what	he	calls	‘living	labs’	are	borne	from	governing	
coalitions	giving	up	‘modernist’	ideas	about	total	control	and	instead	embarking	on	what	he	
terms	‘adaptive	experimentation’	with	a	clear	view	towards	improving	resilience	to	the	
pressures	of	climate	change,	economic	instability	and	energy	vulnerability.	These	
experiments	in	their	many	conceptions,	are	thought	to	operate	outside	of	formal	or	
mainstream	policy	and	economic	activity	(Hoffman,	2011	and	Bulkeley	and	Castan-Broto,	
2013),	thus	representing	novel	and	open-ended	possibilities	for	low-carbon	or	sustainable	
futures.	
Evans	and	Karvonen	(2011)	in	Bulkeley	et	al	(2011)	explain	how	‘urban	living	labs’	offer	the	
promise	of	working	out	complex	solutions	to	complex	problems	in	‘real	life’.	They	connect	
technological	innovation	with	already	existing	users	and	behaviours,	linking	processes	at	the	
hyperlocal,	individual	technology	or	building	level,	with	a	variety	of	stakeholders	living	and	
working	in	and	on	the	experiment	from	local	government	and	third	sector,	property	
development	or	educational	institutions,	and	also	avoid	the	tensions	between	top-down	
and	bottom-up	initiatives	by	creating	lateral,	local	relationships	akin	to	the	‘middle-out’	
retrofit	strategies	explored	later	in	the	chapter.	Karvonen	and	von	Heur	(2014)	highlight	
three	key	elements	to	urban	experiments:	1)	their	situatedness,	in	which	the	tensions	
between	already	existing	places	and	their	new	functions	as	sites	of	knowledge	production	is	
negotiated,	2)	their	change-orientation,	i.e.	that	they	are	deliberately	intended	to	make	a	
significant	change	to	a	socio-technical	system,	and	3)	their	contingency	–	their	embrace	of	
the	risk,	unpredictability	and	messiness	of	‘real	life’	laboratories	as	opposed	to	natural	
science	‘labs’.	These	features	make	urban	experimentation	and	its	grounded,	practical	
knowledge	immensely	appealing	as	sites	of	knowledge	production.	However,	both	Evans	
and	Karvonen	(2011)	and	Karvonen	and	von	Heur	(2014)	issue	a	warning:	to	be	cautious	of	
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viewing	urban	laboratories	as	producing	a	superior	form	of	knowledge	when	it	is	in	fact	just	
one	form	of	knowledge	among	others,	and	is	highly	political	and	contested	in	its	production.		
Evans	and	Karvonen	(2014),	for	example,	show	how	the	‘living	lab’	of	the	Manchester	
Oxford	Road	Corridor,	which	tests	energy	use,	flood	protection	and	pollution	amongst	many	
other	things,	creates	new	interplays	and	relationships	between	city	actors,	and	novel	ways	
of	feeding	technical	knowledge	from	measurement	and	monitoring	into	urban	policy,	but	it	
does	not	open	up	this	space	of	knowledge	production	and	its	governance	to	new	actors	in	
the	Manchester	‘scene’,	thus	excluding	certain	actors	and	reinforcing	dominant	governance	
networks.	Castan-Broto	and	Bulkeley	(2013)	also	show	how	the	state	of	experimentation	
can	be	maintained	differently	in	different	sites,	for	different	purposes	depending	on	the	
context:	for	example	in	attempting	to	securitize	water	supplies	in	an	elite	housing	
development	in	Bangalore,	and	in	protecting	residents	from	violence	in	a	social	housing	
development	Monterrey.	These	processes	of	maintenance	both	attempt	to	normalise	
experimentation	and	retain	its	novelty,	and	involve	the	negotiation	of	different	
configurations	of	actors	and	social	interests	who	have	been	included	or	excluded	from	the	
site	of	experimentation	and	from	the	knowledge	produced	by	it,	highlighting	some	
important	contextual	and	political	tensions	around	experiments	once	they	are	in	situ.	
What	is	also	interesting	about	these	notions	of	experimentation	is	the	varied	function	and	
form	of	these	local-level	activities:	Bulkeley	and	Castan-Broto	(2013)	demonstrate,	through	
their	international	database	of	627	climate	experiments,	a	range	of	local-level	initiatives	
addressing	issues	from	adaptation,	the	built	environment,	infrastructure	provision	to	
transport	and	carbon	sequestration,	and	involving	various	actors	from	national	to	local	
government,	private	actors	and	sub-national	or	third	sector	organisations	including	
international	agencies.	These	initiatives	were	often	conducted	by	partnerships	and	nearly	
half	of	them	focussed	on	energy	supply	or	use.	Evans	and	Karvonen	(2011)	discuss	
experiments	ranging	from	an	entirely	new	low-carbon	city	(Masdar	City	in	the	UAE)	to	
reworked	buildings	and	small	neighbourhoods	in	an	‘urban	landscape	lab’	New	York.	Some	
are	newly	fabricated	and	some	work	with	existing	urban	sites,	with	varying	emphases	on	
technical	innovation	and	lived	experience.		
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Drawing	conclusions	from	this	exploration	of	experimentation	it	is	reasonable	to	expect	that	
the	domestic	retrofit	responses	under	consideration	may	be	to	some	extent	experimental,	
whether	explicitly	or	not,	as	a	product	of	the	global	and	national	policy	and	governance	
context	in	which	they	are	situated,	and	that	they	have	political	implications	regarding	the	
knowledge	and	change	they	intend	to	produce.	To	what	extent	this	is	the	case,	and	to	which	
conceptualisation	of	an	experiment:	a	niche,	a	living	lab,	or	a	policy	experiment,	they	most	
closely	align,	will	become	clearer	through	the	analytical	process	(these	terms	will	be	
explored	in	detail	in	chapter	3).	Viewing	the	domestic	retrofit	case	studies	as	experimental	
in	general	is	helpful	in	many	ways:	it	captures	the	emerging	nature	of	their	endeavours:	to	
‘try	out’	ways	of	addressing	the	various	problematic	areas	of	domestic	retrofit,	given	how	
multi-faceted	and	complex	it	is,	and	it	is	a	helpful	way	of	illustrating	how	the	many	
pressures	described	above	are	brought	together	in	a	particular	way	of	governing	at	national	
and	supra-national	level,	that	then	opens	up	the	possibilities	for	uneven	and	varying	
responses	at	the	local	level.		
Looking	inside	localised	experiments	
Looking	at	localised	activities	in	more	detail,	though,	it	is	important	to	note	that	this	thesis	
seeks	to	link	the	global	pressures	outlined	above,	with	the	particular	characteristics	of	the	
urban	context,	with	the	actual	experiences	of	localised	initiatives,	to	better	understand	the	
interplays	between	these	levels	of	activity.	For	that	reason,	it	is	important	not	to	simply	
explain	away	localised	experiments	as	products	of	the	global	environment,	but	to	recognise	
them	as	also	the	lived	experiences	and	passions	of	individual	people,	and	seek	further	
clarification	of	the	role	of	local	actors,	organisations	and	people	in	shaping	these	
experimental,	uneven,	varied	activities	into	the	responses	to	domestic	retrofit	that	emerge,	
and	what	the	challenges	of	that	are.		
The	view	from	inside	these	local	experiments	or	niches	is	therefore	likely	to	be	different	
from	the	view	upon	them:	looking	in	more	detail	at	the	construction	and	dynamics	of	local	
initiatives,	the	key	messages	are	that	they	have	to	deal	with	multiple	pressures,	often	
coming	from	different	value	bases,	and	negotiate	these	pressures	based	on	who	is	involved	
and	what	capacities	and	resources	are	available	to	them,	which	is	a	complex	process.	For	
example,	Middlemiss	and	Parrish	(2010)	compare	the	wildly	different,	but	still	‘local’	
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networks	involved	in	two	radically	different	contexts:	firstly	those	involved	in	establishing	
community	owned	renewable	energy	in	indigenous	tribes	in	Northern	America	and	
secondly,	the	organisation	and	participation	in	an	energy	efficiency	education	campaign	in	a	
rural	UK	town:	both	of	which	had	broadly	similar	energy-focussed	priorities,	but	manifested	
very	differently	because	of	the	wildly	different	priorities	of	the	tribal	alliance	versus	a	small	
English	town.	Similarly	in	a	case	study	of	the	transition	to	a	biomass-fuelled	regional	energy	
system	in	Murau,	Austria,	there	were	particular	features	of	the	region	such	as	a	local,	
plentiful	source	of	biomass,	a	detachment	from	the	national	regime	(i.e.	a	lack	of	threat	to	
any	political	or	business	elites),	and	the	participation	of	a	powerful	range	of	actors	including	
businesspeople	and	the	media,	that	drove	this	to	success	(Spath	and	Rohracher,	2010).	
Further	examples	include	Peters	et	al	(2010),	who	look	at	the	development	and	impacts	of	a	
low	carbon	advice	centre	in	Islington,	London,	and	it’s	relationship	to	local	government,	
Holm	et	al	(2011)	who	investigate	different	local	eco-housing	and	construction	projects	
constructed	by	different	configurations	of	local	actors	in	Denmark	with	varying	effects	and	
interests,	and	Seyfang	(2009)	in	her	case	study	of	a	straw-bale	sustainable	housing	initiative	
in	Canelo,	Arizona.	They	all	highlight	the	particular	capacities	of	places	to	act	differently	in	
response	to	these	issues,	through	the	mobilisation	of	local	resources,	expertise	and	
knowledge,	and	the	creation	of	context-relevant	rationales	of	what	these	local	initiatives	
are	for.		Whilst	not	all	of	these	studies	relate	to	specifically	urban	contexts,	they	do	point	to	
key	local	features	and	circumstances	that	steered	and	enabled	significant	transitions	and	
they	highlight	the	vast	variation	in	local	responses.	
However,	the	other	key	aspect	of	grassroots-based	literature	is	its	attention	to	people	and	
their	agency	in	relation	to	these	kinds	of	strategies.	Rutland	and	Aylett	(2008)	document	in	
detail,	using	actor	network	theory,	the	way	in	which	different	individuals’	views,	feelings,	
motives	and	beliefs	were	incorporated	into	the	climate	change	strategy	in	Portland,	Oregon,	
and	in	Brown	and	Vergragt’s	‘bounded	socio-technical	experiment’	in	Boston	(2008),	they	
highlight	the	leadership	of	an	individual	project	manager	who	created	a	clear	guiding	vision	
for	a	zero	carbon	building	development,	and	an	alignment	of	values	and	worldviews	with	
the	rest	of	the	design	team	involved.	Middlemiss	and	Parrish	(2010)	also	highlighted	the	
individual	skills	and	capacities	of	particular	members	of	the	intertribal	alliance,	in	accessing	
and	negotiating	legal	information,	for	example,	and	their	powerful,	shared	motivation	for	
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energy	autonomy	as	a	community.	Seyfang	(2009)	highlights	the	personal	value-base	
around	civil	society,	pro-environment	values	and	community	empowerment	from	which	
grassroots	transitions	to	sustainability	emerge,	in	contrast	with	top-down	attempts	that	
begin	with	state-defined	priorities.	What	is	important	about	individuals	in	these	cases	is	the	
recognition	that	activity	in	places	is	not	just	a	product	of	the	macro-conditions	in	which	they	
exist:	there	is	still	the	potential	for	individuals	to	act	based	on	particular	reasons	and	beliefs	
of	what	those	actions	represent,	that	are	intrinsic	to	them	(Davidson,	1963).	
Finally,	this	body	of	literature	highlights	issues	around	forms	of	knowledge	similar	to	those	
raised	in	the	exploration	of	experiments.	These	literatures	illuminate	the	particular	
strengths	of	context-specific	knowledge	and	it’s	ability	to	be	relatable,	practical	and	have	
potential	for	higher	order	learning,	like	the	zero-carbon	building	experiment	in	Boston,	
which	challenged	local	construction	practices	(Brown	and	Vergragt,	2008),	and	the	various	
housing	and	construction	‘niches’	in	Denmark	(Holm	et	al,	2011),	each	of	which	tested	
different	areas	of	the	housing	energy	efficiency	problem,	from	technologies,	to	regulation,	
to	radical	ways	of	living,	and	produced	different	forms	and	foci	of	knowledge	accordingly.	
The	transformative	potential	of	place-specific	knowledge	from	such	experiments	sounds	
promising,	but	its	influence	in	practice	can	be	limited	by	other	contextual	features:	perhaps	
a	response	is	too	place-specific,	or	governance	and	policy	arrangements	limit	wider	learning	
and	change	(Seyfang,	2009	and	Seyfang,	Park	and	Smith,	2013),	particularly	under	narrowly	
constituted	policy	conditions,	with	the	prioritisation	of	scientific	or	‘expert’,	and	economic	
forms	of	knowledge.	This	undervaluing	of	contextualised	knowledge	in	urban	development,	
in	favour	of	the	prioritised	scientific	and	economic	forms	(Atkinson	and	Klausen	2011)	is	an	
imbalance	that	Perry	and	May	(2010)	argue	stifles	meaningful	progress,	and	is	an	important	
consideration	when	linking	these	more	nuanced	accounts	of	local	responses	to	
sustainability	issues	to	the	political	elements	of	urban	living	labs	explored	above.	
Relationships	between	local	experiments	and	mainstream	policy:	the	dangers	of	co-option	
and	dependency.	
Questions	emerge	from	this	exploration	of	experiments	and	localised	initiatives	around	how	
they	relate	to	wider	processes	and	what	this	means	for	the	changes	they	might	effect.	
Localised	experiments	can	show	how	grassroots	initiatives	stimulate	successful	changes	to	
existing	regimes:	acting	as	the	‘seeds’	for	transitions	to	more	sustainable,	lower	carbon	
	
	
43	
living	and	governing	(Kemp	et	al,	2007,	Geels	and	Schot,	2007,	Kemp	et	al,	2001,	Smith	et	al,	
2005	and	Seyfang	and	Smith,	2007).		Other	cases	show	that	local	practices	can	be	very	much	
context	specific	and	limited	in	their	ability	to	stimulate	change	beyond	their	contexts,	as	
mentioned	above.	North	and	Longhurst	(2013)	suggest	that	learning	from	grassroots	
experiments	could	be	greatly	enabled	by	the	peculiarities	of	the	urban	context,	due	to	the	
intensity	of	networks	and	resources	in	cities,	i.e.	the	‘institutional	thickness’	of	the	city,	and	
through	this	the	possibility	of	generating	knowledge	that	quickly	moves	beyond	the	
hyperlocal	scale.	Geels	(2011)	in	Bulkeley	et	al	(2011)	highlights	the	role	of	cities	in	
transitions	to	sustainability	as	being	sites	for	experimentation	for	the	same	reason,	as	well	
as	their	political	connections	to	existing	‘regimes’	and	their	visibility	as	exemplars	(Spath	
and	Rohracher,	2012),	and	Hodson	and	Marvin	(2010a)	describe	cities	as	sites	in	which	
multiple	‘regimes’	or	systems	–	infrastructures	for	energy,	waste,	water,	travel	and	so	on,	
converge,	therefore	offering	a	space	of	opportunities	to	strategically	direct	systemic	change	
rather	than	just	engage	in	a	scattering	of	piecemeal	experiments.		
However,	these	perspectives	also	raise	a	tension	between	localised	activities	and	the	
broader	issues	and	context	that	they	sit	within:	grassroots	projects	‘on	the	ground’	-	
because	of	their	appeal	to	incumbent	governance	networks	-	are	in	danger	of	being	co-
opted	into	broader	strategies	with	mismatched	values	and	priorities,	often	through	
dependencies	on	state	funding	and	pressure	to	align	with	existing	economic,	organisational	
and	technical	priorities	in	order	to	‘upscale’	or	retain	financial	support	(Evans	and	Karvonen,	
2014,	Catney	et	al,	2014).	Radically	inclined	motives,	desires	and	goals	–	particularly	value-
based	ones	that	challenge	powerful	existing	governance	configurations	and	markets	-	can	
be	diluted,	dominated	and	diverted	when	local	initiatives	are	too	inclusive,	not	political	
enough,	and,	particularly	when	they	become	dominated	by	economic	growth	priorities,	
resulting	in	rather	less	radical	changes	than	might	have	been	hoped	(North,	2010,	Mason	
and	Whitehead	2012,	Catney	et	al,	2014).	For	example,	the	LILAC	ecohousing	co-operative	
in	Leeds,	a	radically	different	model	of	low-impact	living,	was	dependent	upon	central	
government	funding	and	had	to	fight	for	its	autonomous	place	amongst	‘normal’	housing	
and	planning	processes	(Chatterton,	2013).	Seyfang,	Park	and	Smith	(2013)	investigate	a	
range	of	community	energy	projects	across	the	UK	and	identify	a	number	of	factors	in	their	
operation	and	success,	one	of	which	is	their	relationship	with	policy	and	funding,	which	
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often	assumes	that	community	energy	projects	want	to	grow	and	expand,	when	some	are	
often	happy	to	remain	at	grassroots	level.	What	kind	of	commitments	and	compromises	are	
localised	initiatives	prepared	to	make	to	attract	continued	policy	support	and	funding	and	
can	they	retain	their	radical	roots	and	strong	values	when	they	‘upscale’	or	are	used	as	
exemplars?		
This	question	demonstrates	the	importance	not	only	of	the	‘horizontal’	relationships	within	
the	initiative	being	studied	but	also	what	we	might	term	the	‘vertical’	relationships	between	
place-specific	actors/processes	and	outside	actors	and	processes,	such	as	state	institutions,	
corporations,	funders,	and	so	on.	Smith	and	Raven	(2012)	articulate	this	tension	between	
radical	change	and	co-option	into	the	existing	norms	beautifully	through	their	distinctions	
between	sustainability	niches	that	‘stretch	and	transform’	existing	regimes	or	those	which	
‘fit	and	conform’	to	adapt	into	the	dominant,	existing	configuration	(Smith	and	Raven,	
2012).		
The	point	is	that	whether	we	view	these	localised	initiatives	as	experiments,	transition	
places,	as	radical	alternatives	or	as	part	of	broader	strategies,	(or	all	of	these	in	different	
measure)	we	ultimately	find	the	local	sustainability	or	energy	initiative	to	be	a	locus	in	
which	the	broad	pressures	of	global	changes,	changes	in	urban	governance,	and	peoples	
genuine	personal	values	and	motives	coalesce.	This	provides	the	perfect	site	for	which	to	
investigate	what	this	coalescence	means	in	practice	for	actors	and	interests	at	these	
different	levels,	and	what	it	means	for	the	effects	these	initiatives	have	on	these	big	issues.	
The	next	stage	of	this	is	to	channel	these	investigations	through	the	specific	topic	of	
domestic	retrofit	
2.3	Socio-technical	issues	in	domestic	retrofit.	
Having	highlighted	that	the	issue	of	domestic	retrofit,	at	any	scale,	is	inherently	a	socio-
technical	one,	it	is	important	to	note	that	there	are	a	number	of	ways	that	the	‘socio-
technical’	approach	has	been,	and	can	be	used,	to	approach	its	study,	illuminating	different	
facets	and	aspects	of	domestic	retrofit.	
2.3.1	Technical	complexity	and	risk		
One	of	the	key	aspects	of	the	domestic	retrofit	‘problem’	though,	at	any	scale,	is	the	
technical	complexity	of	it,	as	highlighted	in	chapter	1,	and	the	risks	and	challenges	this	
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presents	for	the	people	involved	in	retrofit	installations.	At	each	stage	of	the	retrofit	
process,	the	technical	and	the	social	are	entwined	and	interdependent.	Firstly,	at	the	
assessment	stage	there	are	significant	challenges	in	the	surveying	process	measuring	
homes’	energy	consumption,	heat	loss	and	overall	efficiency	performance,	as	highlighted	in	
a	recent	report	by	DECC	(2014a).	The	report,	forming	part	of	the	Green	Deal	and	ECO	
evaluation	process,	showed	a	variety	of	issues	at	the	assessment	stage,	from	trouble	finding	
assessors,	to	inconsistency	(in	the	same	property)	in	basic	input	data	such	as	floor	area,	in	
output	data	and	results	such	as	EPC	ratings	(which	varied	across	two	bands)	and	in	wildly	
varying	recommendations	for	installing	energy	efficiency	measures	as	a	result	of	the	
assessment,	based	on	the	personal	rationales	of	different	individual	assessors.	Additionally,	
certain	surveying	methods	such	as	the	method	preferred	in	the	UK	government’s	Green	
Deal	retrofit	policy	framework	–	Reduced	Data	Standard	Assessment	Procedure	(RdSAP),	
may	fail	to	pick	up	on	particular	house-specific	details.	This	can	result	in	inappropriate	
recommendations	or	energy	saving	predictions	that	produce	different	results	from	those	
intended,	or	cause	practical	issues	such	as	a	lack	of	co-ordination	and	feasibility	when	they	
come	to	the	design	and	installation	stage	(Gupta	and	Chandiwala,	2010,	Baker	et	al,	2013	
and	Fitton,	2013).	There	are	similar	issues	in	installation	as	Baker	et	al	(2013)	illustrate	in	
examples	of	condensation,	building	physics	issues	from	internal	wall	insulation	being	
installed	near	floor	joists,	regulatory	issues	and	lower-than-expected	energy	savings	if	
measures	or	materials	are	inappropriately	ordered	or	applied.	They	advocate	an	integrated	
and	detailed	project	design	and	management	approach	that	is	sensitive	to	these	survey	and	
installation	risks,	highlighting	the	‘human’	decision	making	human	elements	of	the	process	
at	the	design	and	installation	stages.	Davies	and	Oreszczyn	(2012)	similarly	highlight	some	
‘unwanted’	outcomes	emerging	from	retrofit	projects,	in	particular,	poorer	indoor	air	
quality	of	dwellings	and	health	concerns	as	a	result	of	overinsulation,	but	also	the	
differential	impact	of	comfort	‘take-back’	(increasing	the	use	of	heating	after	retrofit	rather	
than	reducing	energy	use	wholesale)	on	those	in	fuel	poverty,	who	may	have	been	
underheating	their	properties	for	cost	reasons.		This	shows	us	the	link	between	a	physical	or	
technical	issue,	and	a	social	or	behavioural	impact,	and	relates	back	to	the	complex	macro-
framing	of	retrofit	-	oversimplifying	energy	efficiency	as	an	issue	can	lead	to	an	ignorance	of	
differential	effects	and	impacts	between	social	groups	and	individual	properties.	
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Investigating	specific	retrofit	measures	such	as	solid	wall	insulation,	Forman	(2013)	
highlights	issues	with	providing	a	consistent	quality	of	solid	wall	insulation	across	the	
retrofit	industry,	from	the	impact	of	short-term	targets,	to	inconsistent	levels	of	training	and	
knowledge	in	practitioners	and	a	lack	of	quality	assurance	processes.	Shipworth	et	al	(2010)	
investigate	the	specific	use	of	controls	and	how	this	impacts	on	energy	performance,	finding	
discrepancies	between	not	only	the	technical	performance	and	actual	impacts	on	energy	
use	in	homes	of	controls,	but	with	assumed	and	actual	heating	controls	behaviours	by	the	
occupants.	For	example,	heating	control	habits	are	primarily	driven	by	comfort	rather	than	
energy	efficiency,	and	the	occupants’	role	is	often	second	to	the	installer’s	in	decisions	
about	which	controls	are	installed	and	where	(DECC,	2014b).	Furthermore,	the	installation	
of	heating	control	technologies	such	as	TRVs,	clocks	and	room	thermostats,	whilst	having	a	
significant	impact	on	the	amount	of	time	and	space	heating	is	used	for,	are	not	the	sole	
factors:	key	behavioural	factors	such	as	a	lack	of	understanding	of	controls,	housing	tenure,	
number	of	occupants	and	occupancy	patterns	as	well	as	comfort	needs	greatly	affect	the	
way	that	heating	is	used,	and	the	authors	of	the	report	deduced	that	there	is	a	significant	
dearth	of	evidence	from	the	UK	about	the	interplay	between	these	factors	(DECC	2014b).	
What	this	suite	of	literatures	do	together	is	to	demonstrate	the	technical	complexity	of	the	
domestic	retrofit	problem	through	interactions	between	specific	measures	and	stages	of	the	
process.	These	complexities	are	unavoidably	linked	to	the	social	‘end’	of	the	socio-technical	
spectrum,	involving	not	only	occupant	behaviour,	but	also	the	behaviours,	experiences	and	
decisions	of	installers	and	designers.	For	the	case	studies	in	this	thesis,	the	resulting	
question	is	of	how	these	socio-technical	issues	such	as	surveys,	heating	behaviours,	risks	
and	unwanted	impacts	are	addressed	or	managed	in	different	contexts,	and	why	they	may	
be	addressed	in	different	ways.	
2.3.2	People,	behaviour	and	motivation		
Complementing	these	studies	above	and	acknowledging	the	‘human’	factors	in	retrofit,	a	
number	of	scholars	have	highlighted	a	fundamental	flaw	in	overly	technical	accounts	of	
retrofit	‘problems’,	that	focus	too	heavily	on	the	technologies	involved	and	assume	that	the	
‘error’	in	the	system	is	in	how	people	are	or	are	not	using	those	technologies.	Some	of	the	
reason	that	this	element	is	of	importance	is	that	with	the	focus	on	carbon	savings,	there	has	
been	a	preoccupation	with	why	actual	savings	don’t	always	match	up	to	predicted	savings	–	
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a	so-called	‘performance	gap’,	that	has	recently	been	attributed	to	a	lack	of	understanding	
of	occupants’	behaviour	(Stevenson	and	Leaman,	2010	and	Gupta	and	Gregg	2012).	
Janda	(2011)	points	out	that	‘buildings	don’t	use	energy,	people	do’,	which,	whilst	
potentially	underplaying	the	role	of	the	technological	elements	of	the	energy	efficiency	
problem,	does	raise	an	important	point	and	a	number	of	attempts	have	been	made	to	build	
on	this	idea	and	better	understand	the	role	of	people	in	this	performance	gap.	Walker	et	al	
(2014)	try	to	tackle	this	using	the	idea	that	energy	efficiency	behaviours	of	occupants	in	
social	housing	programmes	are	a	balance	of	their	competence,	social	image,	and	the	
material	available	to	change	energy	use,	and	that	any	retrofit	design	needs	to	harmonise	
these	three	key	areas	in	order	to	achieve	maximum	energy	savings.	Heaslip	(2013)	uses	the	
concept	of	useability	in	a	similar	way	–	arguing	that	the	performance	gap	often	unfairly	
blamed	on	unsatisfactory	‘user-behaviour’	can	be	better	understood	as	a	mutual	interaction	
between	the	householder	and	the	technology,	and	that	retrofit	programmes	should	be	
designed	for	a	non-expert,	i.e.	a	‘normal’	householder,	rather	than	with	complicated	
interactions	between	measures	and	technologies	and	householders.	These	approaches	
highlight	not	only	the	householder’s	role	in	realising	the	energy	related	benefits	of	retrofit,	
but	again,	that	of	the	designer	as	well.		
Other	approaches	focus	on	another	part	of	the	process:	the	householder’s	fundamental	
decision	of	whether	or	not	to	embark	on	a	retrofit	installation,	or,	in	another	words,	
motivation.	One	of	the	key	issues	with	retrofit	under	the	UK’s	policy	climate	of	the	market-
focussed	‘Green	Deal’	has	been	of	engaging	and	incentivising	householders	with	the	process	
and	purpose	of	retrofit:	in	the	owner-occupied	housing	sector,	each	homeowner	is	the	sole	
decision	maker	and	any	carbon	emissions	savings,	fuel	poverty	impacts	or	economic	
benefits	can	only	be	realised	if	retrofit	gains	the	buy-in	of	multiple	homeowners,	which	has	
proved	very	difficult.	Mallaband	et	al	(2013),	Brown	(2013)	and	Haines	and	Mitchell	(2014)	
all	find	that	policy	approaches	aimed	at	increasing	motivation	and	engagement	through	
financial	incentives	and	information	provision	alone	is	deficient,	with	the	situation	in	
practice	far	more	complex.	Tweed	(2013)	also	supports	the	findings	of	Brown	(2013),	
Mallaband	et	al	(2013)	and	Haines	and	Mitchell	(2014)	that	a	simple	lack	of	capital	cost	
should	not	be	assumed	to	be	the	greatest	barrier	to	retrofit,	with	the	cost	factors	far	more	
nuanced,	ranging	from	prioritising	holidays	over	home	improvements,	to	what	Tweed	
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(2013)	terms	‘affordances’	in	terms	of	daily	experiences	of	the	home	-	decisions	and	
priorities	about	energy	use,	daily	living	and	comfort.	Brown	(2013)	seeks	to	develop	an	
understanding	of	this	situation	by	characterising	the	motivation	to	undertake	retrofit	as	a	
‘complex	purchasing	decision’.	By	understanding	these	decisions	as	an	interrelated	set	of	
psychological	processes	including	social	motives	and	norms,	and	the	way	that	feedback	on	
energy	efficiency	behaviour	changes	or	retrofits	is	provided	(through	energy	bills	and	
monitoring,	for	example),	he	argues	that	better	use	could	be	made	of	psychological	
knowledge,	by	encouraging	and	incentivising	retrofit	through	careful,	accurate	
communication	of	the	issue	and	the	benefits	of	retrofit	that	incorporates	these	many	facets.		
Haines	and	Mitchell	(2014)	and	Mallaband	et	al	(2013)	both	investigate	personal	attitudes	
and	‘personas’	around	home	improvements	and	explore	how	retrofit	is	entwined	with	
attitudes	towards	both	DIY	and	energy	efficiency.	Both	find	that	in	the	home	improvement	
decision-making	process,	energy	efficiency	is	never	a	sole	motivator.	Decisions	can	be	based	
around	social	and	aesthetic	preferences	such	as	not	wanting	to	replace	inefficient	wooden	
windows	with	UPVC	double-glazed	ones	for	style	reasons.	There	are	considerations	around	
selecting	construction	professionals,	the	time	cost	of	retrofit,	life	events,	and	non-standard	
features	of	older	properties	such	as	intricate	brickwork	etc.	that	either	make	retrofit	
measures	undesirable	or	very	difficult	practically.	But	there	are	also	personality	differences	
in	terms	of	motivation	that	do	not	just	involve	information	and	skills	or	cost	or	hassle	but	
also	levels	of	passion	and	inclination	towards	undertaking	large-scale	home	renovations	
(Haines	and	Mitchell,	2014).	These	literatures	advocate	a	retrofit	process	that	is	
sympathetic	and	considerate	of	a	suite	of	socio-psychological	factors,	habits,	norms	and	
preferences.	These	include	preserving	the	character	of	older	properties,	informing	the	
householder	of	realistic	time,	hassle	and	financial	costs	of	retrofit,	being	able	to	incorporate	
trusted	professionals	into	the	process,	and	managing	expectations	of	dramatic,	immediate	
change.	
Again,	for	the	case	studies	in	this	thesis	these	behaviour	and	psychological	elements	raise	
the	question	of	how	–	or	even	whether	–	different	urban	responses	address	these	issues	of	
motivation	and	barriers,	preferences	and	post-retrofit	behaviour	and	why	they	do	so	in	any	
particular	way.	
	
	
49	
These	individualised,	practice-based	approaches	focus	on	behaviours	and	preferences,	
mostly	in	household	micro-contexts.	These	works	highlight	the	importance	of	householder	
experience,	values	and	motives,	the	use	of	technologies	and	buildings,	and	the	interplay	
between	different	parts	of	the	retrofit	process.	However,	other	than	highlighting	the	‘social’	
elements	of	the	designer	and	householder,	they	pay	limited	attention	to	the	wider	range	of	
organisations	and	actors	involved	in	those	decisions	and	processes	of	retrofit,	or	to	the	
dynamics	created	by	the	policy	and	regulation	context	outlined	in	chapter	5.	To	address	this	
gap,	a	more	holistic	view	of	the	issue	in	practice	is	needed.	
2.3.3	Holistic	approaches	to	domestic	retrofit	
One	approach	to	this	is	to	use	a	socio-technical	systems	approach	(Geels,	2002,	2007	and	
2010),	which	will	be	explored	further	in	chapter	3.	There	are	two	such	approaches	relating	
specifically	to	domestic	retrofit	that	attempt	to	capture	the	different	parts	of	the	domestic	
energy/retrofit	issue	and	their	interrelations.	The	first	is	Swan’s	(2013,	p41)	depiction	of	the	
existing	domestic	energy	system	in	the	UK	(for	a	more	detailed	theoretical	exploration	see	
chapter	3).	Figures	5	and	6	below	illustrate	the	multiplicity	of	socio-technical	factors	and	
elements	involved	in	domestic	retrofit,	from	policy	and	subsidies	in	the	government	regime	
to	the	tools	and	processes	involved	in	the	non-government	elements,	the	multiple	
interrelated	components	in	the	manufacturing	and	production	of	domestic	retrofit,	and	the	
research	processes	behind	it.	What	Swan	denotes	as	the	‘technical	regime’	(figure	6	below)	
alone	comprises	multiple	technologies	and	elements	of	the	building	from	its	structure,	
lighting	and	heating,	to	microgen	and	various	materials	and	systems.	Swan	uses	this	
framework	of	elements	to	conduct	a	retrospective	analysis	of	socio-technical	initiatives	
around	retrofit	in	social	housing,	which	demonstrates	firstly	the	immense	complexity	of	the	
socio-technical	system	around	domestic	energy	use,	and	secondly	explores	socio-technical	
experimentation	(in	this	case	in	the	social	housing	sector)	in	creating	innovative	approaches	
to	domestic	retrofit,	particularly	in	the	technical,	research,	production	and	markets	and	user	
practices	elements.	However,	he	finds	that	in	the	absence	of	changes	in	the	other	areas	–	
such	as	the	government,	and	infrastructure	regimes,	these	innovations	tend	to	focus	on	
small	components	of	one	or	two	regimes,	and	be	incremental	in	nature	rather	than	radical.		
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Figure	5	Socio-technical	system	of	domestic	energy	use	(Swan,	2013,	p41)	
	
Figure	6	Technical	regime	for	domestic	energy	use	(Swan,	2013	p42)	
The	second	is	Vergragt	and	Brown’s	(2012)	framework	describing	the	challenges	of	energy	
efficient	retrofitting	of	the	housing	stock,	generated	from	a	case	study	of	Worcester,	
Massachussetts.	Many	of	the	component’s	of	Swan’s	framework	can	be	recognised	here,	
but	the	framework	itself	is	made	up	of	four	broader	elements,	the	purpose	of	which	is	to	
develop	a	more	prospective	view	of	the	problem	in	terms	of	co-ordinating	these	elements	in	
future	responses	to	domestic	retrofit.	The	components	are:	
1. Technology	(which	in	the	case	of	domestic	retrofit	is	shelf-ready	and	has	not	
changed	much	in	recent	years)	
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2. Professional	expertise	and	know-how	(access	to	trustworthy	and	competent	
professionals	–	an	issue	also	raised	by	the	behavioural	approaches	above)	
3. Mandatory	and	voluntary	regulations	and	standards	(tools	for	training	newcomers	
to	the	field	and	building	trust	are	required,	but	by	institutionalising	these	radical	
change	can	be	limited)	
4. Markets	and	consumers:	the	need	for	market-pull	(householders	need	to	want	the	
change)	
	
Their	case	study	again	highlights	that	many	of	the	energy	efficiency	retrofitting	programmes	
in	existence	only	address	one	or	some	elements	of	the	issue,	or	‘system’.	For	example,	many	
top-down	government	programmes	–	like	the	Green	Deal	-	assume	the	barriers	to	energy	
efficiency	to	be	finance-related	issues	in	the	market-pull	component,	and	therefore	only	
address	this,	where	in	fact	the	barriers	are	much	more	complex,	as	mentioned	above.	In	
order	to	effect	a	change	in	the	whole	system,	each	component	should	be	tackled	
harmoniously:	
“Identifying	the	dimensions	of	the	socio-technical	system	of	the	housing	stock	reveals	the	
interdependencies	between	its	elements	and	the	drags	in	the	system.	It	shows	how	
enhancing	market	pull	does	not	work	in	the	absence	of	professional	knowledge	and	know-
how;	and	how	standards	do	not	work	in	the	absence	of	a	market	pull.	It	is	clear	that	change	
in	one	element,	or	one	component	of	an	element,	is	not	sufficient	to	affect	the	system.”	
(Vergragt	and	Brown,	2012,	p414)	
Both	approaches	start	to	bring	together	the	components	of	the	domestic	energy	system	and	
link	some	of	the	issues	emerging	above	together:	from	motivation	(akin	to	market-pull	in	
Vergragt	and	Brown’s	framework	or	user	behaviour	in	Swan’s)	to	inconsistent	installation	
standards	(akin	to	professional	know-how	or	the	production	regime),	to	socio-technical	risks	
(linking	to	both	professional	know-how	and	the	research	and	production	regimes).	These	
linkages,	and	the	illustrated	interdependencies	show	that	the	total	challenge	of	effecting	
change	on	domestic	energy	use	is	more	than	just	the	sum	of	its	parts:	in	order	to	effect	
change	on	the	system	overall,	all	of	these	components	must	change.	In	terms	of	possibilities	
for	achieving	this	kind	of	systemic	change,	both	Swan	(2013)	and	Brown	and	Vergragt	(2008	
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and	Vergragt	and	Brown,	2012)	also	highlight	localised	experiments	as	opportunities	for	
richer	and	more	in-depth,	higher	order	learning,	but	recognise	the	limited	ability	of	localised	
experiments	alone	to	change	the	entire	system,	especially	under	unsupportive	or	limiting	
policy	contexts.		
However,	it	is	important	to	note	that	no	single	response	or	actor	has	control	or	power	over	
all	of	these	elements.	Reddy’s	(2013)	assessment	of	the	barriers	to	energy	efficiency	
highlights	barriers	at	three	levels:	those	at	the	individual	project	or	end-user	level,	those	at	
the	organisational	and	local	governance	level,	and	those	broad	barriers	at	the	state,	civil	
society	or	market	level.	Only	actors	who	actually	have	control	in	those	levels	can	effect	
change	on	those	barriers,	by	either	permanently	removing	them	(e.g.	a	regulation	or	
mandatory	requirement),	reducing	them	(such	as	fast-tracking	planning	applications),	or	
temporarily	avoiding	them	(e.g.	subsidising	expensive	SWI).	This	again	highlights	the	
limitations	of	any	single	response	to	generate	systemic	change,	but	also	highlights	the	
different	possible	roles	and	responsibilities	of	actors	within	a	networked	response,	based	on	
their	position,	capacity	and	capability.	This	helps	us	to	understand	why	many	responses	only	
address	one	or	some	of	the	elements	of	a	system,	depending	on	who	is	involved	and	the	
power/control	they	have.	These	limitations	are	important	to	note	when	considered	in	
contrast	with	the	trends	of	contemporary,	developed	cities	to	‘govern’	change	by	
experiment,	and	start	to	expose	the	strategic	challenges	of	organising	retrofit	responses.	
The	emerging	issue	from	this	exploration	of	both	the	holistic,	systems	approach,	and	the	
opportunities	and	limitations	of	localised	experiments	is	one	of	exploring	firstly	which	
aspects	of	this	multi-faceted	problem	or	system	do	these	experimental	responses	intend	to	
address,	and	secondly,	what	aspects	of	this	problem	do	they	actually	have	the	agency	and	
ability	to	address	with	the	actors	and	organisations	involved.	This	is	essentially	a	question	of	
governance,	and	calls	for	a	more	in	depth	exploration	of	how	retrofit	responses	might	be	
governed	in	city	contexts.	
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2.3.4	Governing	and	organising	domestic	retrofit		
Roles,	responsibilities	and	knowledge	
Some	approaches	to	this	start	by	looking	at	the	actors	in	domestic	retrofit	responses	
themselves,	can	help	to	effect	change	through	their	involvement.	Janda	(2013)	studies	the	
role	of	what	she	calls	‘middle-actors’	particularly	focusing	on	building	professionals	and	
designers	in	the	retrofit	process	who	can	generate	learning	and	change	through	their	
practical	experience	that	can	have	effects	in	many	directions:	upwards	to	policy,	downwards	
to	the	householders	involved	and	sideways	to	other	professionals.	Gupta	et	al	(2014)	and	
Karvonen	(2013)	investigate	‘community-led’	domestic	retrofit	programmes,	with	particular	
attention	on	the	relationship	between	individual	householders’	attitudes	and	practices,	and	
community	organisations	termed	‘intermediaries’.	They	suggest	that	a	prominent,	
instrumental	role	for	local	low	carbon	or	sustainability	related	community	groups	can	both	
enable	the	production	and	distribution	of	relevant	technical,	policy,	financial	and	practical	
knowledge,	and	foster	commitment	and	positive	attitudes	towards	domestic	retrofit	in	their	
local	context.	This	resonates	with	broader	views	on	the	role	of	intermediaries	in	urban	
governance,	who	balance	and	negotiate	the	needs	of	multiple	actors	and	issues	at	different	
levels	(Hodson,	Marvin	and	Bulkeley,	2013	and	Perry	and	May,	2010).	Jones	et	al	(2013)	
discuss	the	financial	elements	of	three	retrofit	programmes	in	South	Wales,	focussing	on	
the	difficulty	of	balancing	the	pros	and	cons	for	external	investors	of	attempting	more	
‘shallow’	retrofits	–	i.e.	single	or	fewer	retrofit	measures	with	lower	energy	savings,	but	at	a	
lower	cost,	or	fewer	‘deep’	retrofits	–	i.e.	whole	house,	comprehensive	retrofits	that	yield	
higher	energy	savings,	but	at	higher	costs.	Their	attempt	to	model	the	economic	viability	for	
investors	from	shallow	to	deep	retrofits	is	less	important	for	this	thesis	than	how	the	paper	
highlights	the	use	of	economic	knowledge	in	strategic	priorities,	decisions	and	trade-offs	
between	carbon	savings	and	capital	costs	in	governing	and	organising	retrofit,	which	could	
be	an	important	factor	in	defining	responses	in	the	case	studies.		
These	approaches	complement	the	systems	approaches	and	issue-based	approaches	above	
firstly	because	they	begin	to	situate	the	domestic	retrofit	problem	practically,	and	secondly	
because	they	highlight	the	importance	of	different	forms,	and	dynamics	around,	knowledge	
and	learning	as	part	of	the	responses.	The	specific	roles	and	elements	focussed	on	provide	
pointers	for	important	elements	of	the	case	studies	in	terms	of	understanding	how	each	
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response	tackles	these	various	parts	of	the	domestic	retrofit	‘problem’,	but	more	is	required	
to	make	sense	of	the	complete	response,	linking	our	awareness	of	the	network	involved	in	
domestic	retrofit	responses,	from	policy	down	to	individual	people.	
Networks	and	relationships	
Eames	and	Dixon	(2013)	look	at	domestic	retrofit	more	broadly	as	part	of	an	integrated	
urban	strategy,	focussing	on	the	development	of	guiding	visions	at	the	city	scale	that	
explicitly	encourage	change	in	all	parts	of	the	system	involving	both	experimental,	
grassroots	activities,	strategic	leadership,	a	supportive	political	and	policy	context,	and	
governance	at	city	scale	as	recommended	above	by	both	Swan	(2013)	and	Vergragt	and	
Brown	(2012).	However,	there	is	little	detail	on	how	a	city-regional	approach	might	
approach	the	detailed	social	and	technical	issues	highlighted	above	at	the	household	level,	
or	practically	organise	and	balance	the	multiple	priorities	of	carbon,	scale	and	fuel	poverty	
through	such	a	framework.	
One	very	helpful	study	instead	does	attempt	to	address	the	governance	issue	in	terms	of	
the	interconnected	roles	of	central	government,	local	actors/government/agencies	and	
householders	involved	in	governing	retrofit	in	a	suburban	space	(Williams	et	al	2013).	The	
study	highlights	the	importance	in	suburban	responses	of	understanding	place-specific	risks	
(e.g.	flooding),	housing	types	and	options	for	action	available,	based	partly	on	the	decision	
making	capacity	and	capability	of	local	citizens.	They	also	find	a	key	issue	to	be	a	lack	of	
awareness	of	who	is	responsible	for	what	–	i.e.	‘weak	or	confused	governance’,	which	
illustrates	in	context	the	ideas	raised	above	about	roles	and	responsibilities	in	retrofit,	but	
this	time	collectively.	The	combination	of	this	with	the	other	issues	they	found:	the	
overwhelming	scale	of	the	‘problem’	(framed	through	carbon	targets	and	large	numbers	of	
retrofits	required	to	address	them),	the	lack	of	public	involvement	with	climate	issues,	and	a	
lack	of	local	resource	(largely	financial),	again	highlights	the	tension	in	the	UK	context	
between	a	lack	of	leadership,	policy	support	and	regulation	at	national	level,	and	the	
expectation	for	innovative	‘solutions’	from	localised	responses	with	limited	resources.		
Williams	et	al	(2013)	present	three	potential	local	governance	scenarios	–	one	‘top-down’,	
led	by	central	government	through	policy	and	regulation	and	‘delivered’	by	local	agencies	to	
households,	one	‘middle-governed’,	led	by	local	agencies	with	more	financial	resources	and	
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greater	remit	to	define	supportive	local	policy,	as	well	as	a	change	in	their	role,	which	would	
move	from	advice	and	information	provision	to	more	active	implementation,	and	a	third	as	
a	‘bottom-up’,	householder-led	scenario	in	which	householders	take	control	of	their	own	
retrofits	which	are	interwoven	with	other	home	renovation	processes,	thus	creating	a	
greater	demand	for	retrofit	services	and	demand	for	how	local	agencies	provide	support	for	
this.	Whilst	somewhat	crude	in	the	delineation	between	these	three	scenarios	(more	
nuanced	accounts	of	urban	governance	-	of	many	issues	besides	climate	-	highlight	the	
messiness	and	contingency	of	place-specific	responses	to	energy	issues	-	see	Bulkeley	and	
Schroeder,	2011	and	North	and	Longhurst,	2013),	these	characterisations	are	helpful	for	
starting	to	identify	the	shape	of	the	network	and	the	balance	of	roles	in	multi-stakeholder	
responses	to	domestic	retrofit.	This	is	valuable	because	one	of	the	most	important	parts	of	
this	thesis	is	to	examine	the	effects	that	these	styles	and	forms	of	governing	and	organising	
retrofit	may	have	had	on	the	strategic	decisions	and	priorities	of	the	organisations	and	
actors	involved.		
Incorporating	greater	attention	to	context	
Hodson	and	Marvin	(forthcoming)	explore	these	different	shapes	of	retrofit	governance	in	
the	specific	context	of	Manchester,	not	just	in	terms	of	domestic	retrofit	but	also	for	
infrastructure	and	energy	system	retrofits	such	as	district	heating	and	redesigned	transport	
routes.	They	also	explore	the	relationships	and	networks	around	these	responses,	outlining	
two	broad	kinds	of	governance	responses:	Retrofit	on	the	city	(similar	to	top-down	
responses),	which	is	the	dominant	response	and	tends	to	be	techno-economic	and	elitist	in	
its	network	of	stakeholders	and	interests,	and	retrofit	in	the	city	(more	bottom-up	
responses)	which	were	highly	localised,	grassroots,	community-embedded	responses	that	
often	struggled	with	capacity	and	resource.	These	were	also	often	excluded	from	broader	
regional	governance	structures	and	processes.	They	offer	a	possibility	for	an	alternative	
response:	retrofit	with	the	city.	Retrofit	‘with’	responses	would	represent	more	networked,	
collaborative	responses,	focussing	on	the	range	and	interests	of	the	stakeholders	involved,	
from	those	very	local	actors	to	those	more	connected	with	regional	governance	and	those	
in	national	policy.	This	chimes	with	the	middle-out	form	of	governance	identified	by	
Williams	et	al	(2013)	and	has	some	synergies	with	the	ideas	above	about	the	importance	of	
functioning,	representative	intermediaries	in	terms	of	inclusivity	and	connectedness.	
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What	this	typology	is	helpful	for	is	in	highlighting	how	the	nature	of	relationships	around	
the	retrofit	responses	both	between	actors	at	the	local	level,	and	between	actors	at	the	
local	and	national	or	even	supranational	level	can	affect	their	shape	and	form	and	the	
effects	that	the	response	has.	
2.4	Conclusion	and	emerging	questions	
We	have	discussed	the	pressures	on	cities	and	activities	within	cities	in	terms	of	addressing	
carbon	and	energy	related	issues,	of	which	retrofit	is	one.	We	have	discussed	how	this	often	
becomes	amalgamated	with	economic	concerns	because	these	are	one	of	the	heaviest	and	
most	immediate	landscape	pressures	of	the	contemporary	time.	We	also	illustrated	a	strong	
argument	for	how	shifts	in	governance	have	resulted	in	two	key	trends:	that	of	
experimentation	as	a	form	of	governance	of	these	issues	and	that	of	uneven	development,	
unevenness	in	the	shape	of	responses	and	unevenness	in	the	resources	available	to	address	
these	issues.	We	have	also	looked,	through	examples	in	the	literature	of	grassroots	
sustainability	or	energy	initiatives,	at	ways	of	identifying	what	it	is	about	places	and	their	
features,	networks	and	resources	that	makes	these	responses	so	uneven	and	context-
specific.	Rather	than	attaching	this	to	a	general	trend	resulting	from	landscape	or	macro-
issues,	it	is	important	to	look	at	the	local	processes,	people	and	roles	that	produce	different	
responses	under	different	local	circumstances	even	in	the	light	of	broadly	similar	landscape	
pressures.	We	also	explored	the	tensions	between	localised	responses	and	dominant	
macro-priorities	in	terms	of	producing	knowledge	and	change,	retaining	their	radical	nature	
and	being	dependent	on,	or	co-opted	by	policy	processes	through	funding	streams	and	
vertical	relationships.	Finally,	we	have	examined	the	problems	and	considerations	in	
addressing	retrofit	outlined	in	the	literature,	from	technical	to	financial,	social	and	
psychological,	and	the	various	ways	that	responses	to	retrofit	can	be	organised,	from	top-
down	policy	responses,	to	bottom-up	community	responses,	and	middle-out	hybrid	
responses.	We	explored	the	kinds	of	organisations	that	might	get	involved	with	this	and	
focussed	on	intermediaries	whose	intention	is	to	bring	together	the	various	stakeholders	
and	interests	around	retrofit	in	an	urban	area.	
Having	come	to	understand	localised	responses	as	experimental,	acknowledging	the	role	or	
potential	of	experiments	or	localised	initiatives	to	generate	change,	this	thesis	seeks	to	
understand	how	these	initiatives	came	to	be,	what	the	challenges	and	dynamics	are	of	
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these	projects	and	responses	that	are	contingent	upon	the	very	context-specific	factors	
connected	to	them,	and	how	they	approach	the	issue	of	domestic	retrofit	specifically.		
A	multitude	of	questions	emerge	from	this	exploration	that	can	guide	the	requirements	of	
the	theoretical	approach	in	the	following	chapter,	and	start	to	generate	a	set	of	themes	to	
guide	the	analysis	of	the	case	study	data	about	urban	domestic	retrofit	experiments.	In	
terms	of	a	general	framing,	it	starts	to	ask	about	what	these	cases	might	tell	us	about	
unevenness	in	urban	responses,	demonstrated	through	the	differences	between	urban	
experiments	and	their	organisation.	Using	the	holistic	approaches	explored	above,	
questions	are	also	raised	about	how	and	why	each	retrofit	‘experiment’	approach	and	
prioritise	the	different	areas	of	the	retrofit	problem,	from	people	and	behaviour	to	technical	
issues	and	organisational	approaches.	From	the	grassroots	niches	literature	encouraging	
considerations	of	context,	people	and	agency,	we	might	want	to	explore	how	local	actors	
and	organisations	in	terms	of	expertise	or	capacity	contribute	to	the	differences	in	place-
based	responses	to	sustainability	and	energy	issues,	and	how		the	different	interests	of	the	
organisations	and	networks	involved	have	been	contested	and	negotiated	over	time.	We	
also	might	ask	whether	there	is	any	evidence	of	co-option	and	limitation	of	the	cases	by	
dominant	priorities	and	what	this	means	for	the	effects	and	changes	they	can	generate.	It	is	
the	task	of	the	theoretical	framework	to	give	a	series	of	lenses	through	which	to	answer	
these	questions	and	it	is	to	that	which	we	now	turn.	
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Chapter	3	-	Experimental	assemblages:	A	hybrid	theoretical	
framework	for	understanding	urban	domestic	retrofit	
responses.	
3.1	Introduction:	Interactions	between	people,	technologies,	and	the	
built	environment.	
This	chapter	will	explore	and	synthesise	a	range	of	theoretical	approaches	into	a	framework	
which	incorporates	the	range	of	overlapping	themes	and	issues	explored	in	the	literature	
review.	The	literature	review	identified	a	number	of	themes	and	issues	surrounding	
domestic	retrofit	in	urban	contexts.	These	ranged	from	the	global	or	macro-societal	issues	
of	climate	change,	energy	security	and	economic	trends,	to	new	forms	of	governance	and	
spaces	of	activity.	It	outlined	particular	pressures	on	contemporary	world	cities,	including	
interurban	competition,	resource	constraint	and	being	responsible	for	finding	solutions	to	
energy	issues	and	highlighted,	as	a	product	of	these	pressures,	a	tendency	towards	urban	
experimentation	and	huge	variation	and	unevenness	in	place-based	responses.	It	also	
highlighted	the	contestation	of	social	interests	involved	in	these	experiments	and	the	
context	specific,	situated	and	personal	–	even	value	based	-	nature	of	localised	activities	
such	as	these,	which	can	become	co-opted	into	broader	policy	processes	when	they	are	
held	responsible	for	finding	solutions	to	issues	such	as	that	of	domestic	retrofit.			
Three	key	areas	of	particular	relevance	to	domestic	retrofit	were	also	identified,	in	order	to	
outline	the	kinds	of	issues	that	any	place-specific	response	might	have	to	tackle.	Firstly,	
there	are	technical	issues	and	risks	with	retrofit,	from	damp	and	poor	workmanship,	to	
inaccurate	predictions	of	energy	savings	and	inadequate	surveying	or	design	processes.	
Secondly,	it	highlighted	the	importance	of	understanding	the	role	of	behaviour,	values	and	
motivation	for	householders	in	enabling	or	preventing	retrofit,	exploring	the	range	of	
factors	involved	in	retrofit	decision-making	processes.	Finally	it	outlined	ways	of	
understanding	the	organisation	and	governance	of	retrofit	in	cities,	from	top-down	policy	
approaches	to	bottom-up	grassroots	approaches,	and	involving	varying	degrees	of	
collaboration	with	local,	national	and	individual	actors.		
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The	framework	adopted	must	be	able	to	accommodate	all	of	these	issues,	from	the	macro,	
through	the	organisation	of	the	issue	and	technical	issues,	to	individuals	and	interests,	
politics	and	urban	pressures.	This	is	a	broad	and	diverse	set	of	issues	and	requires	a	
framework	that	can	bring	a	number	of	heavily	researched	complex	areas	in	their	own	right	
into	the	same	picture.	It	needs	to	allow	an	exploration	of	how	these	issues	are	manifest	in	
policy,	and	how	they	are	approached	and	tackled	through	the	individual	case	studies	and	
through	their	comparison.	
The	aims	of	this	research	are	a)	to	understand	how	and	why	different	kinds	of	domestic	
energy	efficiency	retrofit	responses	emerge	in	different	urban	contexts	within	the	same	
national	policy	context	and	b)	to	understand	how	the	landscape	or	‘macro-context’	in	which	
those	responses	both	enables	and	limits	the	change	that	they	can	effect.	In	order	to	create	a	
framework	that	is	appropriate	for	this	task	it	is	important	to	first	outline	what	it	must	
achieve.		
3.1.1	Requirements	of	the	theoretical	framework	
As	a	starting	point,	it	is	clear	from	the	range	of	themes	emerging	from	the	literature	review	
that	the	research	‘problem’	is,	as	aforementioned,	an	inherently	socio-technical	one,	but	
that	it	leans	towards	the	social	‘end’	of	the	socio-technical	continuum.	Its	focus	is	on	the	
choices,	interactions	and	desires	of	city-based	networks	of	actors,	organisations	and	
institutions	around	the	particular	socio-technical	problem	of	domestic	retrofit.	With	this	in	
mind,	there	are	three	components	to	this	framework	that	are	required	to	satisfy	the	
research:	1)	a	descriptive	tool,	which	seeks	to	capture	and	depict	the	many	human	and	non-
human	elements	of	the	socio-technical	relations	in	each	of	the	domestic	retrofit	initiatives;	
2)	an	explanatory	framework,	which	seeks	to	explain	the	differences	between	the	
initiatives	as	a	product	of	their	multi-level	contexts	and	varying	networked	relationships	and	
3)	a	critical	perspective,	that	can	illuminate	the	dynamics	between	different	sets	of	
priorities	and	interests	surrounding	domestic	retrofit,	focussing	on	the	policy	environment	
as	a	source	of	both	new	opportunities	for,	and	constraints	on	radical	change.	
A	clear	starting	point	emerging	from	the	literature,	though,	is	that	the	three	case	studies	
should	be	broadly	framed	in	the	following	way:	
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Ø They	present	examples	of	urban	experimentation,	because	they	attempt	to	‘try	out’	
in	specific	urban	contexts,	ways	of	responding	to	the	particular	issue	of	domestic	
retrofit,	focussing	on	and	producing	different	forms	of	knowledge	for	different	
purposes.	
Ø We	can	use	the	varied	ways	that	each	case	study	approaches	the	domestic	retrofit-
specific	technical	issues,	the	facets	involving	people	and	individual	behaviour	and	
motives,	and	the	organisational	challenges	and	choices	presented,	to	show	how	
these	trends	manifest	in	practice,	how	geographically	uneven	results	are	produced,	
and	how	the	macro-issues	and	landscape	surrounding	domestic	retrofit	in	cities	both	
enables	and	limits	the	possibilities	emerging	from	the	cases.	
	
However,	despite	this	starting	point	of	accepting	the	case	studies	as	representing	some	
form	of	urban	experimentation,	which	provides	a	loose	framework	from	which	to	start,	
further	conceptual	work	is	needed.	There	is	no	single	framework	for	understanding	the	
socio-technical	complexities	of	domestic	retrofit	in	cities,	with	place	relevance	and	
particular	attention	to	policy	and	economic	context.	The	task	here	is	to	piece	together	
helpful	theoretical	strands	from	different	disciplines	to	create	a	hybrid	theoretical	
framework	that	articulates	and	captures	the	different	components	of	these	urban	
experiments,	in	a	way	that	the	initial	research	aims	can	be	addressed	and	answered.		
3.2.	Socio-technical	relations	
There	are	a	number	of	theoretical	strands	that	attempt	to	find	ways	of	describing	and	
explaining	the	relationships,	interdependencies	and	entwinements	of	people	and	their	
behaviours	and	practices,	institutions	and	organisations,	with	technologies	and	
technological	artefacts,	and	the	peculiarities	of	these	relationships	and	their	many	effects	
and	influences	in	different	contexts	and	situations.	The	three	key	strands:	The	social	
construction	of	technology,	(SCOT),	the	social	shaping	of	technology	(SST)	and	actor-
network	theory	(ANT)	largely	emerge	from	the	science	and	technology	studies	(STS)	
tradition,	and	these	together	provide	a	broad	base	upon	which	to	construct	a	descriptive	
tool	for	understanding.		
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3.2.1	Social	Construction	of	Technology	
Social	Construction	of	Technology	(SCOT)	theory,	introduced	by	Pinch	and	Bijker	(1984),	in	
"The	Social	Construction	of	Facts	and	Artefacts:	Or	How	the	Sociology	of	Science	and	the	
Sociology	of	Technology	Might	Benefit	Each	Other”	was	initially	generated	as	a	response	to	
what	were	perceived	as	narrow	understandings	of	technological	innovation	and	change	–	
generally	termed	technological	determinism.	The	premise	of	the	SCOT	perspective	is	that	
the	emergence	of	technological	products,	or	artefacts,	could	–	and	should	–	be	explained	by	
the	social	processes	surrounding	its	construction	rather	than	by	the	inherent	technological	
characteristics	of	the	artefact	itself.	Traditional	notions	of	technological	determinism	are	
defined	by	a	positivist	attitude	to	knowledge	that	assumes	scientific	data	to	be	absolutely	
‘true’.	The	SCOT	approach,	rather,	assumes	it	to	be	socially	constructed	–	essentially	
applying	a	principle	from	social	constructivism	to	technological	studies	(Pinch	and	Bijker	
1984).	A	number	of	examples	were	used	to	demonstrate	this	perspective	in	a	series	of	
theoretical	and	historical	case	study	essays	in	Bijker	et	al’s	‘The	Social	Construction	of	
Technological	Systems’	in	1987,	such	as	the	development	of	the	lightbulb,	the	development	
of	the	air	tyre	for	bicycles,	and	later	the	development	of	Bakelite	(Bijker,	1997).	SCOT	theory	
highlights	the	personal	and	social	forces	surrounding	the	development	of	technology.	The	
key	concepts	involved	are:	
1. Relevant	social	groups	–	different	groups	involved	with	the	development	of	a	
technology,	artefact	or	system.	Meanings	and	interpretations	vary	between	groups,	
and	technologies,	systems	and	artefacts	are	a	product	of	negotiation	until	a	point	at	
which	the	artefact	or	system	under	consideration	is	deemed	to	meet	the	needs	of	all	
relevant	social	groups.	
2. Interpretive	flexibility	–the	process	by	which	the	above	groups	are	able	to	determine	
different	framings	and	outcomes	of	a	technological	issue.	In	the	Bakelite	example,	
there	was,	for	example,	a	dispute	over	the	patenting	and	development	of	a	key	
chemical	component	of	Bakelite,	cellulose	(Bijker,	1997),	which	was	viewed	
differently	by	two	different	scientists,	thus	affecting	the	production	of	the	final	item.		
3. Stabilization	–	this	is	when	a	particular	technological	option	becomes	more	accepted	
in	a	relevant	social	group,	normalising	its	presence	and	function.	In	the	example	of	
the	bicycle,	Bijker	(1997,	p93)	talks	about	the	reporting	of	the	bicycle	in	an	
	
	
62	
engineering	magazine	which	ceased	to	specify	the	type	of	bicycle,	indicating	that	the	
word	‘bicycle’	denoted,	without	dispute,	a	“low	wheeled	bicycle,	with	rear	chain	
drive,	diamond	frame	and	air	tyres”.	These	details	were	now	deemed	‘normal’,	thus	
demonstrating	stabilization.	
4. Closure	–	different	social	groups	attach	a	consistent	meaning	to	the	item,	resulting	in	
one	‘obvious’	solution,	either	achieved	by	‘rhetorical’	closure,	or	by	redefining	the	
problem	to	suit	the	solution	that	has	emerged,	such	as	when	air	tyres	on	bicycles	
that	started	to	win	road	races,	modifying	the	problem	definition	to	include	racing	
and	speed	(Bijker,	1997).	Closure	is	very	difficult	to	reverse	as	it	marks	a	widespread	
socio-psychological	departure	from	a	previous	‘norm’.	
	
By	explaining	technologies	according	to	their	social	contexts	using	these	four	key	concepts,	
SCOT	advances	the	role	of	agency	and	the	impact	of	both	individual	and	group	
interpretations	and	negotiations	upon	a	technological	development.	For	understanding	
domestic	retrofit	in	cities,	what	is	helpful	about	these	concepts	is	that	they	begin	to	bring	
together	various	heterogenous	components	of	a	socio-technical	change	process	over	time,	
incorporating	social	interests	of	individuals	and	groups,	multiple	interpretations	of	the	same	
phenomena,	key	temporal	events,	an	underlying	challenge	to	the	objectivity	of	scientific	
knowledge,	and	attention	to	the	contexts	in	which	decisions	and	developments	are	made.	
The	concepts	of	stabilization	and	closure	start	to	illuminate	potential	resistances	to	other	
technological	options,	which	is	a	good	starting	point	for	studying	the	possibilities	of	and	
challenges	to	the	kinds	of	experimental	initiatives	that	form	the	case	studies	in	this	thesis.		
However,	when	studying	something	such	as	domestic	retrofit	that	has	a	multitude	of	
technical	components,	from	bricks	and	mortar	to	heating	controls,	insulation	and	
microgeneration,	rather	than	one	particular	component,	the	historical	case	study	SCOT	
approach	is	less	helpful	and	a	somewhat	wider	perspective	is	required.	Hughes’s	(1987)	
contribution	approaches	this	by	theorizing	and	analysing	instead	the	social	construction	of	
large	technological	systems	(the	widespread	adoption	of	the	electric	lightbulb),	which	not	
only	incorporates	the	micro-activities	of	individual	technologies	and	the	peculiarities	of	
decisions	surrounding	them,	but	also	the	economic	and	political	circumstances	surrounding	
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the	item	or	system	being	developed	along	with	all	the	other	components	of	it,	in	a	‘nested’	
hierarchy	of	systems	and	sub-systems.	For	example:	
“people	who	build	electric	light	and	power	systems	invent	and	develop	not	only	generators	
and	transmission	lines	but	also	such	organizational	forms	as	electrical	manufacturing	and	
utility	holding	companies.	Some	broadly	gifted	and	experienced	system	builders	can	invent	
hardware	as	well	as	organisations,	but	usually	different	persons	take	these	responsibilities	
as	the	system	evolves”	(Hughes,	in	Pinch	et	al,	1987,	p	52).	
This	quotation	depicts	a	heterogenous	network	around	electricity,	but	adds	focus	on	the	
wider	infrastructural	developments	surrounding	that	technology.	However,	despite	its	
usefulness,	SCOT	theory	is	not	without	its	criticisms.	The	late	Stewart	Russell	responded	to	
Pinch	and	Bijker’s	initial	paper	with	a	series	of	concerns	over	the	deficiencies	of	the	
approach:	firstly	in	its	lack	of	attention	to	the	politics	of	negotiations	between	‘relevant	
social	groups’	–	highlighting	the	naïve	assumption	that	all	social	groups	were	attributed	the	
same	status	and	degree	of	power	and	control.	Winner	(1993a)	similarly	highlights	the	lack	of	
attention	to	voices	of	social	groups,	technological	framings	and	social	interests	that	were	
not	considered.	Both	Winner	(1993a)	and	Russell	(1986)	and	later,	Klein	and	Kleinman	
(2002)	also	warn	of	an	overly	‘localised’	view	of	the	process	without	adequate	attention	to	
wider	political,	cultural	and	social	structures	and	processes	that	affect	the	various	groups’	
interpretations,	calling	for	a	more	critical	position	regarding	the	after-effects	that	these	
technological	development	processes	may	have	on	society.	Callon	(1987)	also	highlights	the	
inherent	assumptions	that	the	political,	economic	and	social	circumstances	and	pressures	
on	the	development	of	technologies	in	the	SCOT	approach	are	static	and	predetermined,	
rather	than	dynamic	and	interdependent	with	the	technology.	Furthermore,	there	are	
connotations	to	Hughes’	large	technical	‘systems’	approach	that	imply	a	certain	stability	and	
boundedness	that	is	difficult	to	define	in	practice,	especially	when	researching	a	socio-
technical	issue	that	is	emerging,	rather	than	established	(Russell	and	Williams,	2002).	
In	summary,	as	useful	as	the	large	systems	approach	and	the	contextual	detail	of	SCOT	are	
as	a	foundation,	there	is	not	enough	criticism	or	consideration	given	to	either	the	power	
dynamics	at	play	surrounding	socio-technical	change,	or	the	impacts	and	entwinement	of	
the	socio-technical	artefact	or	system	on	and	with	the	wider	world.	Furthermore,	in	the	
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case	of	domestic	retrofit	in	cities,	there	remain	two	key	issues:	firstly,	that	there	are	so	
many	technologies,	actors,	institutions	and	materials	involved	in	domestic	retrofit	–	as	
opposed	to	single	technologies	or	systems	-	that	it	would	be	very	difficult	to	track	and	
account	for	all	of	them	using	a	framework	that	uses	technologies	as	its	starting	point.	
Secondly,	the	focus	of	this	project	is	on	the	decisions,	practices	and	organisation	of	people	
around	a	broad	socio-technical	issue	in	a	particular	place.	SCOT	does	little	to	address	socio-
technical	relations	in	places,	and	this	is	crucial	to	understanding	the	formation	of	domestic	
retrofit	initiatives	in	the	cities	where	they	have	emerged.	Nonetheless,	SCOT’s	approach	
generated	momentum	in	STS	which	produced	more	nuanced	and	politically	sensitive	
approaches,	such	as	the	Social	Shaping	of	Technology	approach	explored	next.	
3.2.2	Social	Shaping	of	Technology	
Alongside	the	development	of	SCOT	theory	emerged	a	slightly	different	view	of	socio-
technical	developments,	broadly	termed	the	Social	Shaping	of	Technology	(SST)	approach.	
SST	is	not	a	single	method	or	approach	but	a	collection	of	approaches	that	share	common	
priorities:	they	are	concerned	with	the	socially	produced	form	and	content	of	technologies	
and	processes	of	innovation	from	a	political	perspective	(Edge	and	Williams,	1996).	What	
distinguishes	this	approach	from	SCOT	is	its	greater	emphasis	on	the	political,	economic	and	
social	structures	embodied	in	technologies	and	artefacts,	and	the	mutually	shaping	effects	
that	those	can	in	turn	have	upon	society	(Mackenzie	and	Wajcman,	1985).		This	
complements	the	internal	relations	that	shape	the	development	of	artefacts,	systems	and	
technologies	as	emphasised	in	SCOT	theory,	arguing	that	those	localised,	internal	processes	
are	also	shaped	and	constrained	by	external	ones,	so	cannot	be	separated	in	analysis	
(Mackenzie	and	Wajcman,	1999).	Langdon	Winner’s	(1993b)	article	entitled	“How	
technologies	reweave	the	fabric	of	society”	uses	the	example	of	the	Clinton	administration’s	
approach	to	redeveloping	infrastructures	–	specifically	highways	and	ICT	networks	-	in	the	
United	States.	It	shows	how	the	narrowly	constituted	assumptions	and	attitudes	of	those	in	
positions	of	power	–	the	administration	-	about	the	functions	and	ends	of	those	
technologies	and	systems	exerted	significant	changes	affecting	those	who	did	not	occupy	
positions	of	power	–	the	citizenry.		
Other	SST	advocates	raise	further	socio-political	issues	in	relation	to	technology	and	society.	
These	include:	Russell	(1993)	who	adopted	a	broadly	Marxist	approach	to	his	analysis	of	the	
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political	shaping	of	decisions	around	technology,	particularly	when	concerned	with	
environmental	issues;	Wajcman	(1991	and	2010)	who	adopted	a	feminist	approach	in	her	
analysis	of	how	male	bias	in	socially	constructed	views	of	technology	has	shaped	the	
perceived	capabilities	of	men	and	women	to	use	and	develop	technologies,	particularly	ICT,	
affecting	work	roles,	practices	and	male-female	power	dynamics	over	time;	and	Mackenzie	
(1990)	who	highlighted	the	impact	both	at	the	time,	and	in	terms	of	the	technological	
trajectory	of	missile	designs,	of	designers	avoiding	politically	sensitive	design	options	when	
developing	U.S.	submarine	ballistics	systems.	Knut	Sorensen	(2004)	and	in	conjunction	with	
others	(e.g.	Gansmo,	Lagesen	and	Sorensen,	2003)		has	been	preoccupied	with	intersections	
between	technology	policy,	culture	and	gender,	particularly	multimedia	and	ICT,	and	later	
sustainability	and	climate	change	and	innovation,	arguing	that	the	role	that	the	SST	
approach	can	play	is	in	exposing	the	power	dynamics	in	the	development	of	new	socio-
technical	systems	and	in	doing	so,	helping	to	focus	technology	policy	on	protecting	and	
nurturing	more	socially	sensitive	and	democratic	innovations.	
In	a	similar	way	to	SCOT,	SST	has	been	used	to	analyse	both	large	socio-technical	systems	as	
well	as	localised,	specific	technologies	or	innovation	processes.	As	Mackenzie	and	Wajcman	
(1999)	argue,	this	is	because	whatever	the	‘size’,	the	processes	and	dynamics	are	still	
between	the	social	and	the	material,	and	are	still	embedded	in	particular	contexts.		They	
point	to	two	particular	case	studies	to	illustrate	this:	firstly,	Cerruzi’s	(2003)	historical	
analysis	of	the	development	and	widespread	adoption	of	personal	computing.	This	was	
shown	to	be	the	result	of	many	parallel	and	enmeshed	factors;	the	behaviour	of	the	
computing	firm	IBM,	the	development	of	programming	languages,	the	political	will	of	
certain	social	groups	to	make	computing	more	accessible	and	less	exclusive	to	industries	
and	corporations,	political	decisions	around	research	and	development	funding	in	ICTs,	and	
many	others.	The	second	case	study,	of	Kranakis’s	(1997)	analysis	of	the	development	of	
designs	for	a	suspension	bridge,	documented	the	process	by	which	two	engineers	in	two	
different	local	contexts	produced	two	different	solutions	to	the	same	problem,	because	of	
different	social	structures	and	interactions	such	as	the	reward	structure	for	professional	
engineering	associations	in	different	places.	The	contrast	between	the	large	system	and	the	
specific	issue	demonstrates	the	broad	applicability	of	the	SST	approach.	
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The	SCOT	and	SST	approaches	both	reject	of	technological	determinism,	acknowledge	a	
range	of	actors	and	factors	involved	in	socio-technical	developments,	as	well	as	the	
competing	interests	and	priorities	of	different	social	groups	at	different	levels.	However,	
whilst	there	are	many	divergences	even	within	the	SST	field	alone,	there	are	some	common	
concepts	and	preoccupations	that	characterise	the	social	shaping,	rather	than	the	social	
construction	approach	to	technology	and	make	it	more	appropriate	for	this	particular	
research:	
1. SST	highlights	the	mutual	shaping	of	society	and	technology,	rather	than	one	on	the	
other,	which	is	a	key	concept	in	terms	of	appreciating	the	effects	that	the	domestic	
retrofit	initiatives	are	intended	to	have,	have	had,	or	may	have,	upon	the	people	
and	places	involved	in	them.	
2. SST	is	more	concerned	with	the	choices	in	and	negotiability	of	socio-technical	
developments,	whether	they	were	selected	or	not,	and	how	those	embody	
contextual	political	and	power	dynamics,	both	locally	and	in	a	broader	sense.	As	
Edge	and	Williams	(1996,	p866)	term	it,	technological	innovation	under	the	SST	
approach	is	“a	garden	of	forking	paths”.	This	begins	to	provide	an	explanatory	
element	to	understanding	why	different	domestic	retrofit	responses	may	have	
emerged	in	different	English	cities.	
3. Alongside	the	acknowledgement	that	socio-technical	developments	are	negotiated,	
non-linear	and	are	a	result	of	more	than	one	factor	or	actor,	there	is	a	greater	
appreciation	of	the	constraints	upon	choices	and	change,	as	a	result	of	political	
contexts.	This	aids	our	understanding	of	how	the	policy	context	and	its	
particularities	shape	and	direct	the	decisions	made	at	individual	levels	within	the	
formation	of	the	domestic	retrofit	initiatives.	
4. Similarly,	there	is	greater	focus	on	the	irreversible	effects	of	lock-in	to	particular	
choices	once	they	are	made	and	a	particular	technological	trajectory	has	been	
adopted	–	not	necessarily	because	that	path	is	‘the	best’,	but	because	of	historical	
events	or	the	‘success	breeds	success’	phenomenon.	This	again	has	a	political	
dimension	in	both	its	construction	and	its	effects	(Russell	and	Williams,	2002	and	
Edge	and	Williams,	1996),	and	addresses	issues	around	why	radical	changes	could	
be	less	accepted	beyond	the	initial	experimental	stage	of	the	domestic	retrofit	
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initiatives	under	question,	or	why	certain	more	conservative	choices	may	be	made	
within	those	initiatives.	
5. The	range	of	SST-based	studies	identify	a	number	of	socio-technical	relationships	
that	shape,	direct	and	constrain	change,	which	connect	well	with	the	broad	
pressures	identified	in	chapters	1	and	2.	These	include	relationships	between	
technological	development	and	the	state,	the	economy	and	the	different	
organisations	that	coalesce	around	it,	and	how	these	relate	to	different	knowledge	
priorities	(Edge	and	Williams,	1996,	Mackenzie	and	Wajcman	(1999)	and	Russell	and	
Williams,	2002).	
6. SST	has	been	particularly	commandeered	by	those	interested	in	‘innovation’,	that	is:	
technologies,	artefacts	or	systems	at	the	beginning	of	their	development,	whether	
that	be	green	‘niche’	technologies,	or	industrial	innovations	(see	Vergragt,	1988,	
Kemp	et	al,	1998,	and	Jorgensen	and	Jorgensen,	2009a	and	2009b)	As	a	result,	it	has	
focussed	on	the	different	routes	and	paths	that	innovations	can	take,	which	can	
have	significantly	different	outcomes	and	effects	both	technologically	and	socially	
for	different	groups	of	society	(Edge	and	Williams,	1996).	If	we	understand	
innovation	as	experimental	and	novel	responses	to	a	particular	‘problem’,	we	can	
see	how	this	perspective	might	highlight	the	different	options	and	opportunities	
that	these	responses	might	face	and	negotiate	in	their	creation.	
	
For	this	research	on	domestic	retrofit	in	cities,	the	increased	focus	of	SST	perspectives	on	
the	political	context	of	the	construction	of,	and	responses	to	socio-technical	issues,	is	most	
welcome.	One	of	the	goals	of	the	research	is	to	examine	why	such	different	responses	to	an	
issue	that	has	been	constructed	by	global	and	national	priorities	have	emerged	in	different	
local	contexts,	and	in	order	to	do	this	a	framework	is	required	that	can	address	the	
interactions	between	the	local	interactions	and	processes	and	their	entanglement	with	
national	and	global	priorities	and	issues,	and	SST	goes	some	way	to	providing	this.	It	is	also	
useful	to	delineate	the	aspects	of	socio-technical	innovations	in	terms	of	contributing	
factors	and	relationships,	as	well	as	in	terms	of	the	different	directions,	forms,	outcomes	
and	impacts	that	these	innovations	may	have,	both	during	their	development,	and	once	
they	are	established.	However,	there	have	been	criticisms	of	the	SST	approach,	there	are	
alternatives,	and	there	have	been	more	recent	developments	and	embodiments	of	it	in	
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newer	theoretical	frameworks.	Mackay	and	Gillespie	(1992)	identified	what	they	felt	to	be	a	
lack	of	attention	on	the	appropriation	or	use	of	the	technologies	as	part	of	the	story,	
particularly	in	relation	to	domestic	technologies,	which	is	a	relevant	and	important	point.	
They	also	point	out	a	lack	of	attention	to	marketing	and	semiotics	around	certain	
technological	artefacts,	and	a	lack	of	attention	to	ideologies	as	the	foundations	that	shape	
choices	and	expectations	during	the	innovation	process.	Furthermore,	there	is	still	an	issue	
with	the	multiplicity	of	socio-technical	elements	to	domestic	retrofit	–	none	of	which	have	
priority	over	the	other	in	a	holistic	study	of	this	nature	(and	in	fact	it	is	the	multiplicity	that	
defines	this	socio-technical	problem	in	this	particular	way),	as	well	as	the	distinct	lack	of	
place	sensitivity	and	focus	on	the	peculiarities	of	urban	contexts	that	has	not	been	
addressed	by	either	the	SCOT	or	the	SST	approaches.	
3.2.3	Actor	Network	Theory	
Another	overlapping	strain	of	STS-based	socio-technical	analysis	is	Actor	Network	Theory	
(ANT),	originating	from	Bruno	Latour	(1987)	and	Michael	Callon	(1986),	who	proposed	that	
the	traditional	sociological	conceptualisation	of	the	‘social’	world	as	a	static,	separate	
material	or	component	of	the	world	was	a	mistake,	ignoring	the	dynamic	nature	of	
interactions	between	human	and	non-human	elements,	associations	and	materials	that	
together	constitute	the	social	world.	Actor-Network	Theory,	whilst	overlapping	considerably	
with	both	SCOT	and	SST,	offers	something	slightly	different.	It	does	not	attempt	to	delineate	
between	people	and	things	–	giving	equal	status	to	both	human	and	non-human	actors	
through	the	principle	of	‘generalized	symmetry’	and	the	effects	that	both	can	have	upon	the	
world	and	upon	each	other,	through	attributing	value	and	meaning	to	people,	things,	and	
the	dynamics	between	the	two.		Law	(2009)	describes	this	as	‘material-semiotic’	–	as	in	
concerned	with	both	things	and	concepts	simultaneously.	
As	Bijker	and	Law	(1992,	p3)	illustrate:	“our	communication	with	one	another	is	mediated	by	
a	network	of	objects	--	the	computer,	the	paper,	the	printing	press.	And	it	is	also	mediated	
by	networks	of	objects-and-people,	such	as	the	postal	system.	The	argument	is	that	these	
various	networks	participate	in	the	social.	They	shape	it.”	
Initially	focussing	upon	nature	as	an	assemblage	of	human	and	non-human	factors,	but	later	
developed	by	others	to	incorporate	elements	of	the	built	environment	as	equal	‘actants’	in	
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a	network	of	components	that	make	up	a	place,	a	phenomenon,	a	social	world,	ANT,	with	its	
roots	in	Science	and	Technology	Studies,	begins	to	give	rise	to	a	much	more	textured	and	
dynamic	depiction	of	the	location	and	identity	of	people,	ideas	and	behaviours	in	their	
environments.	Actors	are	defined	by	the	networks	–	material,	human	and	semiotic,	to	which	
they	belong,	and	in	this	way	act	together	as	a	network	(Law,	1992	and	Callon,	1986).	It	is	an	
inherently	post-structural	approach,	describing	a	dynamic	and	constantly	changing	scenario	
with	little	intention	or	capability	to	explain	rather	than	biographically	describe	the	
configuration	of	actants	or	the	implications	of	this	particular	configuration	(Law,	2009).	
One	of	Latour’s	biggest	gripes	with	the	notion	of	‘the	social’	or	‘society’	as	a	disaggregated,	
static	phenomenon	is	that	it	ignores	the	dynamism	and	constant	remaking	of	any	local	
interaction	and	it	assumes	that	there	is	some	boundary	around	that	interaction.	In	his	view,	
“it	is	perfectly	true	to	say	that	any	given	interaction	seems	to	overflow	with	elements	which	
are	already	in	the	situation,	coming	from	some	other	time,	some	other	place,	and	generated	
by	some	other	agency”.	(Latour,	2005,	p166)	
One	of	the	original	propositions	of	Actor	Network	Theory	was	the	idea	of	allowing	global	
(macro)	and	local	(micro)	actors	and	factors	to	be	considered	in	the	same	way	when	
researching	a	particular	interaction	or	situation	(Latour,	1987,	Law,	1992,	Callon,	1986).	This	
chimes	with	Hughes’s	ideas	of	nested	systems,	although	ANT	differs	in	its	dogmatic	refusal	
to	separate	people	from	things.	When	considering	the	range	of	actors,	factors	and	
influences	in	something	as	complicated	as	a	small	domestic	retrofit	initiative	in	and	English	
city,	what	is	valuable	about	this	idea	is	that	rather	than	picking	a	scale	or	social	‘level’	to	
research	the	problem	at,	the	Actor	Network	incorporates	multiple	scales.	Law’s	(1992)	study	
into	the	development	of	a	new	military	aircraft	in	Britain	in	the	1960’s	demonstrates	how	
political	changes,	technical	failures,	balances	between	local	and	global	networks	of	
resources	and	some	particular	convergences	of	all	of	these	things,	politicised	the	aircraft’s	
development,	modified	confidence	and	localised	decision	making,	and	ultimately	led	to	the	
dissolution	of	the	project.	The	lack	of	separation	of	scales,	technology	and	people	in	this	
way	allows	a	framework	that	can	incorporate	global,	national,	local,	individual	factors	which	
is	compatible	with	the	blurred	and	indistinct	relations	between	actors	at	different	scales	
that	we	find	in	the	multi-level	governance	of	retrofitting	modern	cities.	
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Key	concepts	of	Actor	Network	Theory	are:	
1. Flattening	the	social	–	the	process	of	incorporating	multi-scalar	actants	and	
dynamics	into	the	same	network	without	separating	them.	
2. Actants	–	the	name	given	to	a	component	in	an	actor-network,	which	can	include	
both	humans	and	non-humans.	
3. Translation	–	attributing	value	and	meaning	to	a	technological	system	or	
phenomenon	that	affects	the	choices	that	can	be	made.	According	to	Callon	(1986)	
these	had	different	stages	or	‘passage	points’,	and	in	innovation-based	studies,	these	
can	be	also	considered	as	important	‘temporal	events’	(Vergragt,	1988).	
4. Mediation	–	the	passing	on	of	that	meaning	and	modification	of	translation	through	
the	interpretation	and	actions	of	other	actants	(Latour,	2005)	
5. Intermediation	–	the	passing	on	of	that	meaning	without	modification	(Latour,	
2005).	
The	proposition	of	merging	‘actors’	with	‘context’,	flattening	scales,	and	identifying	key	
decisions	and	points	on	the	journey	of	an	actor-network	at	first	glance	may	seem	helpful	
and	offer	a	politicised	and	power-dynamics	sensitive	approach	to	understanding	socio-
technical	relations.	However,	it	may	be	viewed	that	ANT	is	concerned	with	capturing	
instances:	moments	in	a	process	of	constant	socio-technical	change,	and	that	the	impacts	of	
-	and	effects	upon	-	more	stable	and	obdurate	contextual	power	dynamics	that	these	
moments	sit	within	could	be	missed	if	there	is	too	much	separation	from	context.	Also,	by	
flattening	and	equalising	the	human	and	non-human	agents	one	could	be	forgiven	for	
thinking	that	material	‘things’	or	artefacts,	in	this	theory,	have	as	much	agency	as	people,	
which	ignores	the	cognitive	‘intentionality’	of	human	actors	as	opposed	to	material	ones:	a	
strong	source	of	criticism	of	ANT	(See	Murdoch,	1997,	1998	and	2001	and	Whittle	and	
Spicer,	2008).	Murdoch	(2001)	also	points	out	that	the	significant	difference	between	the	
status	of	humans	and	non-humans	is	that	of	possessing	powers	of	reflection,	language	and	
motivation	that	non-humans	do	not.		
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3.3.	Articulating	socio-technical	relations	
The	three	broad	themes	above	have	spawned	in	contemporary	socio-technical	research	a	
number	of	different	articulations	of	the	relations	between	people	and	things	in	more	recent	
research	and	theoretical	debates	including	socio-technical	webs,	ensembles,	networks,	
systems	and	configurations,	which	are	all	terms	that	are	used	to	describe	very	similar	things,	
but	sometimes	with	different	emphases.	What	is	important	here	is	to	piece	together	the	
relevant	and	useful	parts	of	these	articulations	to	capture	what	it	is	that	the	domestic	
retrofit	initiatives	in	different	English	cities	embody,	and	tell	us	about	socio-technical	issues	
in	cities.	
3.3.1	The	Multi-level	perspective	on	socio-technical	transitions	
The	multi-level	perspective	(MLP)	on	socio-technical	transitions	is	one	of	the	more	recent	
articulations	on	socio-technical	relations,	that	incorporates	macro-factors,	localised	factors,	
a	range	of	human	and	non-human	factors	and	also	focuses	on	the	process	of	transition	–	i.e.	
gradual	and	incremental	change	to	socio-technical	systems	over	time.		It	attempts	to	deal	
with	the	constant	batting	between	socio-technical	approaches	that	focus	on	structure	(SST)	
and	those	that	focus	on	agency	(ANT)	by	combining	the	two	into	one	framework	(Coenen	et	
al,	2012).		
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Figure	7	The	multi-level	perspective	on	socio-technical	change	
It	does	this	through	the	systematic	analysis	of	a	range	of	processes	at	three	‘levels’	(see	Fig.	
7):	the	‘landscape’	–	broad	macro-societal	configurations,	the	‘regime’	–	a	stable	set	of	
existing	configurations	of	people,	technologies,	governance	structures	and	so	forth	that	are	
established	around	a	particular	socio-technical	issue,	and	‘niches’	or	‘niche	innovations’	
which	are	localised,	small	–scale	socio-technical	experiments	that	provide	potential	
alternatives	to	the	existing	‘regime’	(Geels,	2002,	2005	and	Geels	and	Schot,	2007).	
The	idea	behind	these	three	levels	is	that	when	changes	in	the	landscape	combine	with	the	
emergence	of	viable	niches,	the	existing	regime	can	be	altered	and	a	new	stable	norm	
achieved.	A	vast	array	of	case	studies	of	socio-technical	transitions	have	been	conducted	
using	the	MLP,	from	transitions	from	paper	to	email,	from	mixed	farming	to	pig	husbandry,	
and	from	sail	boats	to	engine	ships,	but	of	particular	relevance	to	this	research	because	of	
its	focus	on	sustainability	and	low	carbon	issues,	is	Verbong	and	Geels’	(2007)	case	study	of	
the	transition	of	the	Dutch	energy	system.	It	paints	a	picture	of	the	changes	and	similarities	
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in	key	figures	and	actors	in	the	energy	system	regime	between	the	1970s	and	the	present	
day,	investigates	the	visions	that	have	changed	over	time,	the	drivers	of	a	‘co-evolutionary’,	
incremental	transition	which	they	claim	is	underway,	and	identify	support	for	niche	
alternatives	such	as	CHP	and	changes	in	the	supply	of	electricity	in	a	liberalised	market	as	
key	factors	in	positive	changes	towards	a	more	sustainable	system.	It	also,	however,	
highlights	primary	drivers	for	transitions	in	the	electricity	system	as	being	Europeanisation	
and	liberalisation	rather	than	environmental	concerns,	and	the	resistance	that	this	provides	
to	radical	shifts	towards	sustainability.	
The	MLP,	with	its	focus	on	‘systemic’	change	being	achieved	through	a	change	in	the	
regime,	provides	an	understanding	of	the	difficulties	in	changing	established,	obdurate	
socio-technical	norms,	by	acknowledging	the	issues	of	lock-in	and	path	dependency	(Geels,	
2002,	Sims,	2012	and	Graham	and	Thrift,	2007).	This	is	potentially	helpful	for	assessing	
whether	domestic	retrofit	schemes	actually	contribute	to	low	carbon	transitions,	or	
preserve	the	current	norms,	by	establishing	the	kinds	of	effects	that	each	case	study	has	on	
existing	configurations	around	energy	efficiency.	It	is	also	particularly	helpful	that	the	
perspective	is	well	established	as	a	lens	through	which	to	view	efforts	towards	sustainability	
and	low	carbon	futures,	and	indeed	has	been	used	in	specific	relation	to	domestic	retrofit:	
Swan	(2013)	used	the	MLP	to	firstly	establish	an	existing	energy	efficiency	regime	(See	Fig.	
8)	and	secondly,	to	investigate	innovation	processes	in	domestic	retrofit	in	social	housing,	
finding	that	often	domestic	retrofit	innovations	were	conservative	or	piecemeal	rather	than	
‘radical’,	because	of	the	complexity	of	the	issue	and	the	existing	regime,	effects	of	lock-in,	
risk,	and	the	policy	climate	they	were	acting	in.	He	also	found	that	innovations	formed	in	
networks	rather	than	in	isolation,	as	different	niches	worked	on	different	parts	of	the	
problem	such	as	financing,	technical	issues,	behavioural	change	and	so	on,	concluding	that	
radical	and	speedy	transformation	of	the	existing	domestic	energy	system	would	be	
unlikely.		
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Figure	8	The	socio-technical	system	for	domestic	energy	use	(Swan,	2013,	p	41)	
The	MLP	and	related	literature	also	provides	a	very	useful	differentiation	between	three	
different	kinds	of	change	processes:	transformation,	reproduction	and	transition	(Geels	and	
Kemp,	2007).	Geels	and	Schot	(2007)	also	differentiated	between	different	transition	
pathways,	from	transformation,	technological	substitution,	reconfiguration	and	de-
alignment/realignment.	These	relate	specifically	to	transitions,	however,	and	also	to	more	
specific	systems	or	technologies	than	the	broader	change	processes	in	the	first	example.	
What	both	typologies	have	in	common,	though,	is	an	appreciation	of	different	components	
of	change	–	directions,	degrees	and	speeds,	and	different	distributions	of	agency	and	power	
among	the	levels	in	terms	of	the	changes	generated.	So	a	transformation	–	a	change	in	
direction	-	is	likely	to	originate	from	a	wholesale	change	in	rules	from	within	the	regime	
than	a	reproduction,	which	changes	incrementally,	but	along	the	same	trajectory.	A	
transition	on	the	other	hand	results	from	a	combination	of	landscape	and	niche	pressures	
and	regime	shifts	–	as	previously	described.	(see	Table	2	below)	
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	 Reproduction	 Transformation	 Transition	
Levels	
involved	
Regime	
dynamics	
Pressure	from	
landscape	
Adaptation	and	
reorientation	in	regime	
Pressure	from	
landscape	
Increasing	problems	in	
regime,	and	attempts	
at	re-orientation	
New	innovation	in	
niches	that	eventually	
break	through	
Role	of	
actors	
Incumbent	
regime	actors	
Pressure	from	outsiders	
Incumbent	regime	
actors	respond	through	
re-orienting	innovative	
trajectories	
Pressure	from	
outsiders	
Incumbent	actors	fail	
to	solve	regime	
problems	
Outsiders	develop	new	
innovations	
Table	2	-	Different	mechanisms	in	change	processes.	
(Adapted	from	Geels	and	Schot	(2007)	p414)	
However,	the	MLP	has	been	criticised	for	placing	heavy	expectation	upon	niches	alone	to	
generate	transitions,	being	too	heavily	focussed	on	technological	rather	than	social	
innovation,	and	encouraging	assumptions	that	transitions	can	be	actively	stimulated	and/or	
managed	(Shove	and	Walker,	2007	and	Smith	et	al,	2010).	It	is	also	less	helpful	for	
understanding	place-based	transitions,	due	to	a	distinct	lack	of	context-sensitivity,	little	
clarity	on	spatial	boundaries	of	landscapes,	regimes	and	niches,	or	where	cities	fit	in,	and	
has	been	accused	of	being	inherently	apolitical	(Smith	et	al,	2010,	Hodson	and	Marvin,	
2012,	and	Bulkeley,	2005).	In	later	years	the	perspective	has	developed	a	greater	sensitivity	
to	political	economy	(Geels,	2010	and	2014),	which	acknowledges	that	the	influences	of	
dominant	and	vested	interests	often	prevent	meaningful	systemic	change	because	different	
forms	of	power	from	material	and	instrumental,	to	discursive	and	institutional,	help	to	
reinforce	existing		norms,	habits	and	practices	that	preserve	those	interests	–	usually	
economic	ones.	The	MLP	is	still	lacking	awareness	of	place	(Coenen	et	al,	2012)	in	particular	
of	cities,	apart	from	as	loci	for	experimental	niches	(Geels,	in	Bulkeley	et	al,	2011).	Debates	
using	the	MLP	in	relation	to	cities	as	being	part	of,	or	enacting	for	themselves,	low	carbon	
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transitions	(Hodson	and	Marvin,	2010	and	Bulkeley	et	al,	2011)	tend	to	focus	on	the	
processes	of	constructing	visions	and	intermediaries	that	are	specifically	designed	to	enact	
these	transitions	and	the	voices	and	priorities	that	are	or	aren’t	included	in	these	processes.	
This	is	a	necessary	component	of	the	MLP	analysis,	particularly	when	investigating	
configurations	of	interests	around	socio-technical	issues	in	cities,	but	it	still	finds	place-
based	studies	somewhat	incompatible	with	literal	applications	of	the	MLP:	regimes	can	be	
both	national	and	regional,	or	indeed	multi-scalar,	and	niches	(despite	the	impression	of	
being	‘small’)	have	no	spatial	limits	(Smith	et	al,	2010,	and	Shove	and	Walker,	2007).	
Notions	of	space	and	scale	as	being	politically	or	socio-technically	constructed	or	–	crucially	
–	of	that	construction	being	relevant	to	the	transition	process,	are	also	notably	absent.		
Nonetheless,	the	MLP	provides	many	helpful	concepts,	encouraging	a	generally	multi-level	
approach,	and	in	particular	introducing	the	concept	of	the	‘landscape’	to	capture	the	broad	
pressures	on	domestic	energy	efficiency	schemes	and	how	they	impact	particular	city	
contexts.	It	also	is	helpful	for	exploring	different	forms	of	sociotechnical	change,	and	
especially	for	exploring	resistances	and	obstacles	to	change.	Swan’s	(2013)	findings	that	
innovations	and	processes	of	decision	making	in	social	housing	retrofits	were	conservative	
and	piecemeal	are	helpful	for	articulating	these	effects	on	particular	projects,	and	relating	
them	to	the	issues	of	co-option	and	dependency	emerging	from	the	literature	review.	
Furthermore,	the	concept	of	the	niche	experiment	captures	many	of	the	experimental	
characteristics	of	the	case	study	initiatives	in	this	thesis.	It	is	clear	that,	whilst	working	in	an	
extremely	similar	area,	the	three	case	studies	had	very	different	ideas	about	the	function	of	
their	experimental	activities,	with	different	kinds	of	relations	between	local	actors,	
corporations,	national	policy	and	international	issues/organisations.	There	is	therefore	a	
need	to	explore	further	the	particular	characteristics	of	niche	experiments	and	their	
potential	role	in	providing	explanatory	power	to	this	framework.	
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3.4.	Incorporating	attention	to	context	and	people	–	paying	closer	
attention	to	niche	experiments.	
Having	acknowledged	that	the	case	studies	are	experimental	and	are	therefore	closely	
associated	with	the	‘niche’	concept	of	the	MLP	body	of	research,	but	that	there	is	a	lack	of	
space,	place	and	conceptual	awareness	in	the	MLP,	it	is	wise	to	explore	examples,	different	
forms	and	elements	of	‘niches’	and	their	roles	in	change	processes,	and	then	to	focus	on	
how	people,	place	and	politics	affect	these	roles.		
Holm	et	al	(2011)	for	example,	use	a	variety	of	localised	construction	experiments	in	green	
building	technologies	in	different	places	across	a	region	in	Denmark	to	represent	‘transition	
places’	with	different	orientations,	foci	and	forms	of	knowledge	being	produced.	Their	focus	
on	different	parts	of	the	construction,	energy	efficiency	and	housing	issue	was	a	product	of	
dynamics	at	the	regional	level	as	well	as	the	individual	and	organisational	expertise	available	
in	each	‘niche	experiment’.	The	embeddedness	of	the	experiments	in	places	presented	a	
‘real-life’	demonstration	of	the	challenges	and	successes	of	actual	attempts	to	manage	a	
transition.	
However,	there	is	still	a	lack	of	acknowledgement	of	particular	people	and	their	views	and	
motives	as	part	of	this	view	of	niche	experiments.	Hielscher,	Seyfang	and	Smith	(in	Cohen	et	
al,	2013)	highlight	ideology	as	a	key	aspect	of	grassroots	innovations	for	sustainable	energy,	
demonstrating	that	many	innovative	projects	are	based	on	‘alternative’	visions	of	economic	
life,	such	as	new	economics,	rather	than	the	mainstream.	Part	of	what	makes	grassroots	
innovations	successful	within	their	contexts	is	the	opportunity	for	people	to	engage	
practically	with	something	that	allows	them	to	express	these	ideologies,	so	their	importance	
cannot	be	underplayed	(Hielscher	et	al,	2013).	They	also	highlight	an	oversimplified	
relationship	between	niches	and	regimes	in	the	MLP	and	call	for	a	more	pluralised	account	
that	acknowledges	the	learning	processes	involved	and	the	complexity	of	this	relationship.	
Geels	and	Raven	(2006,	see	Fig	9	below)	produced	a	particular	conceptualisation	of	the	local	
processes	surrounding	niches	below,	that	shows	–	in	an	ideal	world	–	the	aggregation	of	
different	forms	of	learning	from	these	local	niches	as	part	of	a	wider	change	process	that	
actually	produces	a	change	in	technological	trajectory.	Whilst	this	research	is	not	aiming	to	
track	the	process	of	technological	developments	or	trajectories	of	singular	technologies	in	
the	field	of	domestic	retrofit	-	solid	wall	insulation	for	example	-	this	concept	of	an	
	
	
78	
aggregation	of	learning	from	local	processes	is	helpful.	Firstly	it	highlights	the	variation	in	
local	initiatives	and	different	forms	of	knowledge	that	they	can	produce.	Secondly,	it	
encourages	thinking	about	where	the	localised	knowledge	and	learning	from	these	
initiatives	goes	and	what	it	might	contribute	to	in	terms	of	wider	processes	of	change,	and	
secondly	it	highlights	the	presence	of	a	wider	community	or	field	constituted	by	interests,	
expectations	and	ideas	about	a	particular	topic,	as	a	potential	destination	for	this	
knowledge.	
	
Figure	9	How	local	projects	affect	technological	trajectories.		
From	Geels	and	Raven,	2006,	p379	
Similarly,	Seyfang	and	Haxeltine	(2012)	and	Seyfang	and	Smith	(2007)	view	community-
based,	grassroots	innovations	as	particularly	socially	innovative:	part	of	a	civil	society	and	
‘action-oriented’	framework,	rather	than	focussing	on	their	role	in	markets,	systems	and	
technological	innovation	processes.	This	also	draws	attention	to	tacit	social	knowledge	as	a	
key	aspect	of	these	experiments	alongside	technical	knowledge.	Like	Smith	and	Raven	
(2012)	they	highlight	the	need	to	investigate	internal	niche	processes	in	order	to	understand	
identity	and	group	formation	and	the	effects	that	these	have	on	the	shape	and	impacts	of	
the	innovations,	and	therefore	whether	niches	are	effective,	survive	or	not,	and	how	they	
relate	to	more	mainstream	practices.	
	Smith	and	Raven	(2012)	do	this	by	exploring	the	particular	dynamics	within	and	around	
niches	that	can	create	a	‘protective	space’	around	the	experiment,	which	enables	it	to	
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‘break	through’	into	an	established	regime,	usually	depending	on	relationships	with	higher	
level	powerful	actors	and	institutions.	They	articulate	this	protection	in	three	steps:	
nurturing	a	niche	development	through	providing	time,	intellectual	and	financial	resource,	
shielding	it	from	‘selection	pressures’,	and	finally	through	empowering	it	to	grow	and	
establish	itself	as	part	of	mainstream	activity	in	its	field,	be	that	energy,	transport,	or	other	
industries.	This	pays	close	attention	to	the	politics	surrounding	the	development	of	niche	
experiments,	such	as	the	narratives	and	discourses	used	to	generate	priorities,	visions	and	
decision-making,	as	well	as	the	active	or	passive	nature	of	that	protected	space:	for	example	
the	strategic	niche	management	approaches	of	subsidising	particular	technologies	like	solar	
PV	is	an	actively	protective	space,	whereas	an	experiment	with	new	fuels	for	heating	in	a	
location	that	is	off-grid	anyway	would	be	a	passively	protective	space	(Smith	and	Raven,	
2012).	These	dynamics	link	to	the	nature	of	relationships	between	the	experiment	and	its	
wider	context	–	i.e.	vertical	relationships	–	which	can	make	a	difference	to	the	nature	of	the	
innovation	and	experimentation	and	therefore	to	the	outcomes	and	effects	it	may	have	
(Raven	et	al,	2015).	Furthermore,	they	found	that	the	nature	of	these	spaces	and	the	
internal	dynamics	and	visions	of	niches	result	in	a	process	whereby	they	either	‘fit	and	
conform’	to	the	competitive	environment	around	them	(in	which	established	norms	and	
practices	remain	unchanged	and	unchallenged	by	the	development	of	that	niche),	or	they	
‘stretch	and	transform’	–	instead	making	changes	to	the	established	norms	of	production	
and	consumption	around	them	(Smith	and	Raven,	2012).	These	concepts	help	to	highlight	
the	pressures	and	compromises	involved	in	niche	development	processes,	illuminating	in	
detail	the	dangers	of	dilution	and	co-option	raised	in	the	literature	review	and	the	‘socio-
political	work’	needed	to	change	incumbent	regimes	and	ways	of	doing	things	in	order	for	
niche	experiments	to	have	any	significant	effects	(Raven	et	al,	2015).	
Whilst	the	concept	of	the	‘niche’	is	extremely	helpful,	it	is	not	the	only	way	of	viewing	
localised	socio-technical	interventions.	A	similar,	contributing	perspective	is	the	idea	of	the	
Bounded	Socio-technical	experiment	or	BSTE,	proposed	by	Brown	et	al	and	Brown	and	
Vergragt	(2003	and	2008).	In	this	perspective,	a	BSTE	is	a	purposive	attempt	to	generate	
change	and	create	something	new,	whereas	niches	can	be	either	passively	or	actively	
involved	in	change	processes.	A	BSTE	can	be	defined	as:		
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“an	attempt	to	introduce	new	technology	or	service,	on	a	scale	bounded	in	space	and	time”	
(Brown	and	Vergragt,	2008,	p112)		
It	is	recognised	explicitly	that	the	activity	is	experimental,	focuses	on	trying	out	innovative	
ways	of	solving	larger	societal	issues	rather	than	context	specific	issues,	through	a	particular	
configuration	of	people	and	technology	or	materials,	and	through	‘learning	by	doing’.	Brown	
and	Vergragt	articulate	three	potential	elements	of	a	successful	BSTE:	
• That	it	“creates	a	functioning,	socially-embedded	new	configuration	of	
technology	or	service”	that	is	then	replicated	elsewhere.	
• That	there	is	‘higher	order’	learning	among	the	participants	in	terms	of	re-evaluating	
their	view	of	the	societal	issues	and	needs	(e.g.	working	towards	a	sustainable	
society)	that	the	experiment	addresses	and/or	their	role	in	addressing	these	issues.	
• That	there	is	a	change	in	interpretive	frames	or	problem	definitions	in	either	the	
‘users’	of	the	service	or	technology,	e.g.	being	more	open	to	using	new	domestic	
energy	technologies,	or	the	community	of	practice	surrounding	it,	e.g.	builders	and	
designers	changing	design	principles.	
These	successful	elements	of	BSTEs	contribute	to	specific	ways	of	understanding	or	tracing	
how	niches	or	experiments	may	influence	wider	processes	in	different	ways,	e.g.	through	
replication,	learning	in	participants,	or	changing	practices.	
They	identify	four	cognitive	levels	that	they	use	to	articulate	the	differences	in	approaches	
and	perspectives	between	the	participants	in	a	BSTE	(in	this	case	the	design	of	a	zero-
carbon	building):	problem	solving,	problem	definition,	dominant	interpretive	frames	(ways	
of	viewing	the	problem,	usually	defined	by	experience)	and	the	worldview	(an	ideal	view	of	
what	is	possible	and	who	is	responsible	for	acting).	
These	categories	are	primarily	ways	of	capturing	the	different	ways	that	actors	–	in	this	case	
those	actors	being	individuals	–	can	approach	the	same	issue	in	the	same	project.	These	are	
helpful	because	they	relate	to	the	issues	raised	in	the	literature	review	about	the	ideologies	
behind	niche	or	grassroots	level	initiatives,	and	how	these	may	differ	from	ideologies	at	
higher	levels	in	state	organisations	at	larger	scales,	with	different	priorities,	again	linking	to	
processes	of	negotiation	and	compromise	and	the	significance	of	the	relationships	in	and	
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around	the	experiment	for	this.	These	also	present	another	way	of	adding	detail	to	the	
‘internal	dynamics’	of	niches,	and	exploring	the	ideologies	and	group/identity	formation	
highlighted	by	Hieschler	et	al	(2013)	and	Seyfang	et	al	(2013)	above.	This	perspective	is	
helpful	because	it	addresses	the	built	environment	specifically	and	situates	niche	
experiments	in	places	and	spaces	with	clear	ways	of	looking	at	the	impacts	and	effects	
which	have	been	so	heavily	debated	in	the	literature	on	niches	above.	
What	these	socio-politically	focussed	approaches	to	niche	experiments	and	BSTEs	do	is	
threefold:	firstly	they	call	for	greater	focus	on	the	internal	dynamics	of	niches	and	the	
relationships	that	construct	them	in	their	particular	ways.	Secondly,	they	advocate	a	more	
fluid,	contextualised	and	politicised	account	of	the	relationship	between	niches	and	
established	socio-technical	configurations,	in	order	to	better	understand	the	possibilities	for	
and	resistances	to	change,	and	the	outcomes	of	different	experiments.	Finally,	they	pay	
attention	to	the	ideologies	and	problem	definitions	of	individuals	involved	in	the	internal	
decisions	about	the	forms	that	these	experiments	and	initiatives	might	take.	
3.5.	Incorporating	the	urban	dimension	–	assemblage	and	space.	
Up	to	now,	this	theoretical	journey	has	focussed	almost	exclusively	on	the	socio-technical	
relations,	components	and	variants	of	these	perspectives	and	processes	of	change.	What	
has	not	yet	been	satisfied,	however,	is	the	need	to	focus	specifically	on	the	urban	–	as	the	
context	in	which	the	case	studies	are	situated.	
In	order	to	develop	this,	there	are	various	literatures.	Critical	urban	theorists	such	as	
Brenner	(2009)	Marcuse	(2009)	Massey	(2005	and	2007)	and	Harvey	(2005)	view	
developments	in	the	built	environment	predominantly	through	the	lenses	of	capital	
accumulation	and	power	divisions.	The	political	construction	of	space	and	place	are,	to	
them,	a	result	of	redefined	relationships	between	cities,	and	between	states	and	cities,	in	
which	state	roles,	boundaries	and	governance	structures	relating	to	cities	are	being	shaped	
by	global	circuits	of	capital	and	competition	for	investment	in	urban	regions	and	places.	The	
political	economy	of	capitalism	should	not	be	ignored,	because	it	is	undoubtedly	a	huge	
‘landscape’	influence	upon	activities	in	cities,	but	these	perspectives	generally	offer	less	
help	when	investigating	the	details	and	interactions	in	an	urban	environment	around	a	
socio-technical	issue	as	complex	as	domestic	retrofit,	which	Latour	(2005)	warns	leads	
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sociologists’	attention	away	from	local	interactions	to	search	instead	for	grand	explanations	
for	why	things	are	the	way	they	are,	distancing	themselves	from	the	phenomena	under	
question.	Conceptions	of	urban	socio-technical	relations	that	have	a	political	leaning,	but	
are	more	empirically	rooted,	include	the	Splintered	Urbanism	theory	(Graham	and	Marvin,	
2001)	which	introduced	the	idea	of	segmented	and	unequally	positioned	social	groups	
within	cities	as	a	result	of	infrastructural	arrangements	–	privileging	upper	classes	in	terms	
of	access	to	services	and	excluding	poorer	communities	in	literal,	physical	and	political	ways	
simultaneously.	This	begins	to	align	the	situatedness	that	we	now	understand	as	being	
integral	to	the	localised	experiment,	with	broader	political	issues	around	inequality	and	
representation	in	urban	contexts.	
Probably	the	most	helpful	of	recent	theoretical	literature	–	a	partial	derivative	of	both	
splintered	urbanism	and	actor	network	theory	-	is	the	urban	assemblage	literature	
(McFarlane,	2011,	2011a	2011b	and	Farias	and	Bender,	2012,	and	Dovey,	2011),	which	
seeks	to	conceptualise	the	city	as	a	loose	and	dynamic	configuration	of	both	human	and	
non-human	actors	that	constitute	activities	and	practices	in	and	on	the	built	environment	in	
some	way.	This	is	partly	a	specifically	urban-focussed	application	of	Actor	Network	Theory,	
but	it	also	has	elements	of	relational	geography	and	critical	urbanism	entwined	in	it.	
Assemblage	thinking	is	based	on	notions	that	there	can	be	multiple	imaginaries	of	the	same	
city	that	come	into	contact	with	each	other,	sometimes	in	conflict,	sometimes	in	harmony	
and	sometimes	through	a	struggle.	Relational	geography	refers	to	a	particular	way	of	
viewing	places	–	and	in	particular	cities	–	not	as	defined	by	their	delineated	municipal	
boundaries,	or	by	the	edges	of	their	built-up	areas,	but	by	the	networks	and	relationships	
that	constitute	them:		
“The	city	exists	in,	and	manifests,	a	condition	of	relationality	that	defies	territorial	depiction”	
Jacobs	(2012,	p412).		
Hodson	and	Marvin	(2011,	p109)	argue	that	viewing	space	and	place	more	relationally	
allows	a	greater	appreciation	of	the	“dynamism	involved	in	actively	making	and	remaking	
space”	specifically	related	to	the	governing	of	cities,	their	infrastructures	and	their	technical	
and	material	resources.	However,	North	(2010)	and	Rutherford	and	Coutard	(2014)	warn	
against	a	too	heavily	relational	view	of	space,	arguing	that	although	space	is	somewhat	
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socially	constructed,	it	is	still	closely	entwined	with	material	forms.	This	helps	in	
understanding	urban	domestic	retrofit	initiatives	as	a	‘space’	of	activity	constructed	through	
the	relationships	between	people	and	organisations,	as	well	as	the	physical,	built,	fixed	
elements	of	the	housing	on	which	it	actually	works.		
What	is	also	helpful	about	the	term	‘assemblage’	rather	than	‘system’	or	‘regime’,	when	
referring	to	the	socio-technical	relations	defining	an	urban	‘problem’	is	its	openness	and	
dynamism:	urban	assemblages	in	the	way	that	McFarlane	(2011a	and	2011b)	and	Farias	
(2011)	conceptualise	them	allow	a	view	of	how	various	activities,	practices	and	experiences	
of	a	city	can	become	entangled	with	one	another,	whereas	socio-technical	systems	and	
regimes	have	an	impression	of	being	fixed	and	stable:	
	“an	ontological	reading	of	the	city	as	assemblage	underlines	the	potential	of	viewing	
assemblage	thinking	as	both	a	process	of	assembling	urbanisms	through	multiple	socio-
material	histories	and	processes,	and	a	name	for	particular	urban	objects—from	policy	and	
housing	to	social	movements	and	infrastructure:	the	urban	world,	in	short,	composed	by	a	
series	of	overlapping	socio-material	assemblages.”	McFarlane	(2011b,	p377)	
This	openness	and	overlapping	is	appropriate	when	researching	a	problem	that	is	still	
emerging	and	is	constantly	changing	as	a	policy	agenda,	that	is	at	an	experimental	stage	in	
terms	of	its	activity	in	cities,	and	around	which	relationships	are	constantly	evolving	
between	scales,	within	scales	and	between	and	within	places.	
Furthermore,	it	also	allows	an	incorporation	–	like	ANT	–	of	both	the	micro-conditions	in	
which	the	domestic	retrofit	initiatives	have	emerged,	as	well	as	the	macro	contexts	–	the	
‘landscape’	in	the	MLP	–	within	a	place	specific	framework.	McFarlane	(2011a)	
acknowledges	that	there	are	multiple	interpretations	of	assemblage	as	a	term,	but	what	is	
really	important	about	his	version,	as	supported	by	Dovey	(2011),	is	the	way	in	which	he	
uses	specific	contexts,	sites,	and	issues	both	to	tell	a	story	about	that	place,	and	to	illustrate	
wider	struggles	and	processes.	In	response	to	criticism	from	critical	urban	theorists,	who	
argued	that	assemblage	and	critical	theory	could	not	be	combined	because	of	the	ignorance	
of	political	economy	(termed	the	‘context	of	contexts’)	in	such	site-specific	studies	(see	
Brenner	et	al,	2011)	McFarlane	argues:	
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“The	context	of	contexts	is	produced	and	brought	into	question	through	assemblages,	
including	assemblages	that	produce	policy	or	modes	of	economic	disinvestment,	or	the	
enactment	of	policy	through	different	milieu,	or	mobilisation	around	iniquitous	forms	of	
policy	or	development	in	city	streets	and	cyberspace.	Understanding	multiple	sites	allows	us	
to	see	how	the	ordering	of	urban	life	operates	across	differences	and	enables	certain	
possibilities	over	others”.	(McFarlane,	2011b,	p385).	
What	is	so	valuable	about	this	statement	is	that	it	begins	to	develop	the	explanatory	part	of	
our	framework,	moving	beyond	the	descriptive	and	biographical	and	into	the	realms	of	
using	differences	between	context-specific	assemblages	for	meaningful	comparison.	Farias	
(2011)	and	McFarlane	(2011b)	both	feel	that	despite	the	criticism	of	critical	urban	theorists,	
assemblage	as	a	process	rather	than	a	static	entity	allows	an	open	exploration	of	the	urban,	
through	concentrating	on	the	micro-interactions	and	practices	of	particular	sites	and	
networks,	and	of	the	real	experiences	of	specific	urban	contexts	and	wider	political	
pressures,	without	assuming	a	position	on	the	effects	of	capitalism	beforehand.	This	is	
termed	‘thick	description’	and	an	example	is	of	the	destruction	and	reconstruction	of	water	
supplies	to	informal	settlements	in	Mumbai	(McFarlane,	2011b)	in	which	the	state	acted	as	
destroyer	of	illegal	water	connections	and	facilitator	of	new	arrangements	in	which	they	
held	much	greater	power,	mobilising	large	corporations	and	local	slum	dwelling	women	as	
labourers	to	reconstruct	water	supplies	whilst	selling	them	water	from	neighbouring	
villages.	This	illustrates	both	the	site	specifics	and	awareness	of	and	sensitivity	to	general	
issues	around	state	power.		
Key	concepts	and	themes	in	urban	assemblage	include:	
1. The	object	of	study	being	the	place	and	its	networks,	not	capitalism,	whilst	still	
accommodating	the	impacts	of	the	political	economy	of	neoliberal	capitalism	
through	the	socio-material	history	of	the	site	under	investigation	(Farias	and	Bender,	
2012,	Farias,	2011	and	McFarlane,	2011a).	
2. The	explanatory	concept	of	“immanent	causality”:	that	the	causes	of	the	
construction	of	different	assemblages	take	place	within	the	assemblage	not	above	it,	
but	that	relations	with	external	factors	are	part	of	that	causality.	This	chimes	with	
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earlier	points	about	the	importance	of	both	vertical	and	horizontal	relationships	in	
shaping	the	form,	function	and	effects	of	grassroots	initiatves.	
3. “Relations	of	exteriority”	(Anderson	et	al,	2012)	that	a	‘thing’	or	a	component	of	the	
assemblage	is	conditioned	by,	but	not	determined	by	its	relations,	but	that	those	
relations	have	a	unique	autonomy	as	a	collective.	This	concept	is	similar	to	‘the	sum	
of	parts	is	greater	than	the	whole’.	Assemblages	can	in	this	way	explain	actions	and	
impacts	and	change	as	a	result	of	the	connections	and	disconnections	that	
characterise	them,	as	well	as	the	individual	characteristics	of	the	component	parts.	
4. Distributed	agency	(McFarlane,	2011a)	refers	to	the	idea	that	in	a	network,	agency	is	
not	attributed	to	one	central	actor	but	is	contingent	on	the	other	parts	of	that	
network.	Agency	is	not	always	distributed	evenly,	between	both	human	and	material	
elements	of	the	assemblage,	and	this	unevenness	produces	unique	capacities	and	
capabilities	for	action.	
5. Capacity	to	act	–	as	a	product	of	distributed	agency,	when	referring	to	the	resources	
and	capabilities	of	actors,	this	refers	both	to	capacities	generated	from	interactions	
and	the	capacities	of	the	component	parts	of	the	assemblage	(McFarlane,	2011a)		
6. “Territory”	as	an	‘alignment	of	connections’	as	well	as	a	‘hardening	of	boundaries’	
(Dovey,	2011).	This	incorporates	elements	of	relational	space	as	well	as	the	fixed	
physical	aspects	of	urban	contexts,	and	can	include	and	exclude.		
7. “Imaginaries”	of	the	city	(McFarlane,	2011a	and	Dovey,	2011)	being	the	lived	
experiences	of	the	city	by	different	actors	and	different	assemblages,	and	these	
imaginaries	can	overlap	or	be	quite	different	even	within	the	same	place.	This	can	
result	in	different	territories,	different	relationships	between	formal	and	informal	
elements	of	socio-technical	assemblages,	and	different	relationships	with	wider	
political	processes.	
3.6	Connecting	concepts	with	urban	experiments	
It	is	important	at	this	juncture	to	link	together	the	theoretical	perspectives	on	
experimentation	offered	by	the	MLP	and	niches	above,	with	the	urban	context-sensitivity	
and	embrace	of	complexity	and	contingency	offered	by	assemblage	theory.	Returning	to	the	
theme	of	urban	experimentation	explored	in	the	literature	review	we	should	remind	
ourselves	that	this	idea	represents	a	contemporary	urban	trend,	offering	a	broad	framework	
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within	which	these	two	perspectives	can	be	combined	to	capture	the	nuances	of	domestic	
retrofit	in	places.	A	reminder	of	the	key	themes	of	urban	laboratories	and	experiments	
shows	us	that	they	exhibit	the	following	features,	which	dovetail	nicely	with	the	theoretical	
propositions	of	the	MLP,	niches	and	assemblage	theory.	
• Situatedness	–	as	part	of	a	place	and	as	part	of	a	wider	context.	
• Contingency	on	place	and	temporal	events	–	acknowledging	the		messiness	of	urban	
change	and	the	specific	configurations	of	people	and	things	in	a	particular	place	–	
this	chimes	with	both	assemblage	theory	and	grassroots	approaches,	acknowledging	
the	human,	material	and	place-specific	elements	of	domestic	retrofit	in	cities.	
• Change	orientation	and	explicitly	attempting	to	produce	knowledge	for	a	particular	
purpose	–	this	has	both	political	aspect	in	terms	of	the	range	of	interests	involved,	
what	part	of	the	socio-technical	problem	experiments	are	trying	to	address,	and	
what	kinds	of	change	they	wish	to	occur	–	linking	to	forms	of	change	from	the	MLP.	
• Situated	outside	of	‘formal’	policy	processes	–	urban	experiments	are	not	simply	
enacting	or	delivering	policy	or	regulation	according	to	an	established	process	–	
similar	to	the	‘alternative’	nature	of	grassroots	initiatives.	
	
3.7.	Understanding	urban	retrofit	initiatives	as	‘experimental	
assemblages’.	
The	task	of	this	framework	was	to	describe	and	articulate	the	domestic	retrofit	responses	in	
their	urban	contexts,	explain	their	differences,	and	critique	the	processes	surrounding	them.	
In	this	respect,	the	question	is:	what	are	they	cases	of?	As	a	result	of	the	above	exploration,	
it	seems	that	the	most	appropriate	way	to	conceptualise	the	responses	in	their	entirety	is	to	
describe	them	as	experimental	assemblages,	which	incorporates	the	impact	of	landscape	
issues,	relationships	at	and	between	different	levels	and	scales,	with	an	understanding	of	
experimentation	and	change.	
3.7.1	Big	picture,	networks	and	synthesis	thinking	
There	are	two	steps	to	the	conceptual	framework	that	shall	be	used	to	analyse	the	case	
studies	and	generate	discussion	around	the	literature	review	themes.	The	first	is	a	
descriptive	network	diagram	which	captures	who	and	what	is	involved	in	the	case,	or	
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assemblage.	The	second	is	an	explanatory	framework	which	explains	why	the	case	turned	
out	the	way	it	did,	based	on	the	factors	described	in	the	descriptive	framework,	and	
incorporates	a	critical	angle.	
The	conceptualisation	of	experimental	assemblages	utilises	a	broadly	social-shaping	of	
technology	(SST)	perspective,	which	attempts	to	reconcile	structure	and	agency	similarly	to	
the	MLP,	whilst	also	capturing	the	fragility,	messiness	and	complexity	of	place-based,	
politically	heated	and	contested	activities.	Using	assemblage	thinking	captures	the	
messiness	and	contingency	of	place-based	experiments,	and	allows	thick	description	to	be	
used	to	illustrate	the	complex	processes	of	development	involved	in	each	domestic	retrofit	
response.	This	is	different	from	trying	to	describe	or	analyse	each	city,	a	‘system’	or	the	
issue	of	domestic	retrofit	as	a	whole,	and	is	more	sensitive	and	appropriate	for	capturing	
the	complex	and	multi-scalar	issues	involved.	Viewing	the	cases	through	the	lens	of	
experimentation	captures	the	change	orientation	and	intentionality	of	the	case	studies		and	
generates	questions	about	what	is	being	tested	and	produced,	for	whom,	and	why.	It	does	
this	by	concentrating	on	the	varied	relationships,	biographies,	forms	and	effects	of	the	
initiatives	and	how	they	have	tackled	the	particular	aspects	of	domestic	retrofit,	in	their	
particular	contexts.	It	also	presents	an	opportunity	to	explore	and	contribute	to	
understanding	one	of	the	key	trends	in	the	governance	of	climate	and	energy	issues	
identified	in	the	literature.		
3.7.2	Domestic	Retrofit	Experimental	Assemblages	-	Part	1.	
From	the	theoretical	literature,	the	framework	incorporates	multiple	elements.		The	
concept	of	the	‘landscape’	from	the	MLP	is	very	helpful	for	identifying	the	macro-scale	
issues,	actors	and	factors	involved	in	place	specific	domestic	retrofit	experiments,	even	
though	those	issues	may	not	be	place-specific	themselves,	and	retains	a	sensitivity	to	the	
political	economy	of	neoliberal	capitalism	through	the	policy	and	macro-level	actors	
involved.	However,	different	elements	of	the	landscape	for	domestic	retrofit	may	be	more	
or	less	important	and	influential	in	each	case.	It	also	incorporates	spatial	elements	to	a	
modified	multi-level	perspective,	as	shown	in	Figure	10	below,	which	is	important	for	
situating	the	domestic	retrofit	experiments	in	places,	and	acknowledging	the	importance	of	
different	approaches	to	space	and	territory	around	them.	
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It	particularly	focuses	on	the	place-specific	context	and	the	relationships,	issues	and	
organisations	in	that	particular	urban	context	as	being	the	vehicles	for	experimental	activity	
of	different	kinds.	Including	a	micro-level	also	allows	the	analysis	to	recognise	influential	
individual	or	household	specific	decisions,	preferences	and	ideologies,	which	are	not	always	
considered	in	larger	‘systems’	or	political	economy	approaches.	Paying	attention	to	the	
micro-context	of	developing	these	experiments	in	this	way	incorporates	people	and	agency	
as	a	strong	factor	as	they	have	been	in	the	literature	on	niches,	grassroots	initiatives	and	
BSTEs.	
The	experimental	assemblage,	in	network	and	narrative,	also	demonstrates	the	immanent	
causality	of	assemblages,	showing	that	the	causes	of	their	formation	take	place	within	the	
assemblage	itself,	affected	by	factors	and	actors	both	inside	and	outside	of	the	place	where	
the	assemblage	acts.	The	framework	also	shows	us	the	interrelations	between	relations	of	
exteriority	in	assemblages	and	their	capacity	to	act	–	each	actor	is	not	only	defined	by	their	
own	attributes	but	by	their	relationships	to	other	components	in	the	assemblage,	both	
vertically	and	horizontally,	and	these	produce	unique	capabilities	to	do	particular	things	in	
that	place	and	have	particular	effects.		
Figure	10.	below	shows	the	product	of	this	combination	of	concepts:	a	three-level	
framework	incorporating		actors	(white	boxes)	and	factors	(green	and	red	letters)	at	each	
level,	with	the	macro-scale	components	in	the	‘landscape’	at	the	top,	city-regional,	place-
specific	actors	and	factors	in	the	place-specific	context	in	the	middle,	and	micro-scale,	
individual	and	detail-specific	issues	in	the	micro-context	at	the	bottom.	This	multi-level	
framework	acknowledges	that	domestic	retrofit	experiments	are	formed	from	a	
combination	of	elements	at	different	levels,	all	of	which	need	to	be	considered	as	a	whole	
to	properly	understand	and	depict	the	nature	of	the	response.	The	three	levels	are	not	fixed	
and	easily	delineated	(denoted	by	the	dotted	lines),	because	the	assemblage	connects	them	
in	a	network	and	blurs	the	distinction,	but	acknowledging	them	is	important	for	highlighting	
the	presence	of	actors	with	influence	and	power	at	different	scales.	Fig.	10	also	shows	that	
there	are	relationships	between	these	components,	both	within	the	same	levels	(horizontal	
relationships),	and	between	actors	and	factors	in	different	levels.	It	is	the	nature	of	these	
relationships	that	gives	the	assemblage	its	unique	character,	orientation	and	capability.	
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(Please	note	that	some	examples,	not	all	possible	relationships	have	been	shown	on	the	
diagram	for	visual	simplicity).		
	
Figure	10	Experimental	assemblage	as	description	
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3.7.3	Domestic	Retrofit	Experimental	Assemblages	–	Part	2	
This	part	of	the	framework	moves	on	from	a	description	of	who	and	what	factors	hang	
together	in	the	assemblage,	and	moves	into	explaining	why	those	assemblages	and	
processes	of	assembling	the	response	produce	differently	constituted	experimental	
responses	and	effects.	Figure	11	below	shows	how	the	factors	and	actors	at	the	three	
different	levels	described	above	come	together	through	a	process	of	negotiation	and	
internal	dynamics	to	produce	place	specific	responses	that	approach	the	particular	
problems	of	domestic	retrofit	in	urban	contexts	identified	in	the	literature	review	in	their	
own	particular	way,	with	their	own	particular	outcomes	and	effects.	
	
	
Figure	11		Experimental	assemblage	as	process	and	explanation.	
This	second	part	of	the	framework	links	the	helpful	concepts	of	internal	dynamics	from	the	
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literatures	around	urban	experiments.	This	allows	an	explanation	of	why	particular	strategic	
decisions	were	made,	which	produce	the	place-specific	experiment	in	its	particular	form,	
through	these	negotiations	and	internal	dynamics.	Different	degrees	of	influence	of	actors	
and	factors	at	different	levels	can	be	incorporated,	illuminating	the	importance	of	the	
vertical	and	horizontal	relationships	that	are	described	in	part	1	of	the	framework.		
The	framework	also	includes	typologies	of	different	forms	of	change	from	the	MLP	
literature	-transformation,	reproduction	and	transition	-	as	a	tool	for	capturing	both	the	
intentions	of,	and	the	outcomes	and	effects	of	the	cases	in	a	comparative	way.	It	uses	
existing	representations	of	domestic	retrofit	systems	and	the	issues	highlighted	in	the	
literature	review	to	frame	the	form	and	focus	of	each	experimental	response,	giving	a	sound	
basis	for	comparison,	encouraging	questions	such	as:	which	parts	of	this	complex,	multi-
issue	problem	are	the	experiments	addressing?	What	are	its	goals?	How	does	each	case	
approach	technological	risk,	engagement	with	householders,	governance	and	organisation,	
and	engage	with	landscape	issues	and	policy?	These	varied	forms	and	foci	on	different	areas	
are	the	products	of	the	dynamics	and	negotiations	between	multi-level	factors,	actors	and	
interests.	This	then	allows	an	exploration	of	the	nature	of	distributed	agency	from	ANT	and	
assemblage	thinking	–	encouraging	us	to	view	each	network	as	a	series	of	components	
acting	together	to	produce	different	effects	and	outcomes	linking	to	varying	change	
processes.	
The	final	task	of	the	framework	was	to	incorporate	a	critical	element.	Looking	at	the	
outcomes	and	effects	of	the	cases	in	terms	of	whether	they	were	transformative,	
reproductive,	or	contributing	to	transition	processes	allows	an	exploration	of	how	change	in	
different	forms	has	been	encouraged	or	limited	by	the	assemblages,	through	the	
relationships	between	factors	that	has	been	identified	in	the	two	parts	of	the	framework.	
Ideas	around	whether	the	experiment	could	or	did	stretch	and	transform	or	fit	and	conform	
to	existing	norms	are	also	helpful	to	guide	discussions	around	limitations	to	and	enablers	of	
change,	and	for	investigating	the	extent	to	which	local	priorities	and	individual	values	have	
been	compromised	by	their	relationships	with	other	factors	and	actors.	Dominant	interests	
may	be	embodied	in	vertical	relationships	particularly	with	national	policy	and	actors,	but	
balanced	and	negotiated	through	the	configurations	of	people,	organisations	and	funding	at	
other	levels.	This	framework	allows	an	exploration	of	where	the	resistances	and	obstacles	to	
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change	may	have	come	from	in	the	assemblage.	It	is	through	exploring	the	differential	
influences	-	in	terms	of	power	-	of	the	multiple	factors	and	actors	at	different	levels,	that	a	
critical	discussion	of	the	limitations	to	change	can	be	had.	
3.8	Operationalizing	the	experimental	assemblages		framework		
Applying	these	frameworks	to	fieldwork	and	case	study	analysis	requires	a	number	of	steps	
to	be	taken:	
1. Populate	the	Macro-level.	Explain	how	landscape	issues	are	manifest	in	the	policy	
and	political	context	that	the	case	studies	operate	within,	and	the	conditions	it	
creates	for	constructing	retrofit	experiments.	Identify	some	key	actors	at	the	macro	
level.	
2. Populate	the	meso	and	macro-levels	of	each	experiment.	Through	a	biographical	
and	thematic	analysis	of	each	case,	identify	the	range	of	key	actors	and	factors	
involved	and	the	relationships	between	them,	then	produce	a	case	specific	multi-
level	experimental	assemblage	diagram	depicting	these	using		fig.	10	above	as	a	
template.	
3. Use	key	themes	from	the	literature	to	describe	and	then	compare	the	
experimental	assemblages.		Describe	each	case	in	terms	of	its	governance,	
organisational	form,	goals	and	priorities,	experimental	focus,	activities	and	projects	
and	the	strategies	it	used	within	these,	the	influencing	factors	and	relationships	
involved,	and	its	outcomes	and	effects.	Compare	the	initiatives	across	how	they	
approach	the	key	parts	of	retrofit	at	a	practical	level:	socio-technical	issues	such	as	
technical	risk,	organisation	and	roles	in	retrofit,	and	engagement	with	householders.		
4. Explain	why	the	assemblages	produced	different	experimental	responses.	Produce	
a	case	specific	‘assemblage	as	process’	diagram	using	figure	11	as	a	template	to	
depict	the	process	of	assembling	the	experiments	through	their	arrangement	and	
mediation	of	multi-level	factors	and	actors.	Use	concepts	of	internal	dynamics,	
negotiations	of	interests	and	immanent	causality	to	illustrate	how	the	varied	and	
actors	and	factors	and	their	relationships	created	variation	between	the	cases	and	
highlight	the	key	differences.		
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5. Investigate	the	significant	enabling	and	limiting	factors	to	the	changes	that	resulted	
from	the	case	studies,	particularly	through	the	dominance	of	certain	ideologies	and	
approaches	at	the	macro-level.	
This	chapter	has	provided	an	exploration	of	possible	theoretical	approaches	to	the	issue	of	
domestic	retrofit	in	English	cities,	and	settled	upon	a	hybrid	approach	of	experimental	
assemblages	in	two	different	frameworks,	designed	to	synthesise	the	multiple	perspectives	
that	could	be	taken,	as	well	as	incorporate	a	range	of	issues,	scales,	factors	and	actors	into	
the	analysis	process,	with	the	ultimate	purpose	of	explaining	the	differences	between	the	
cases	and	their	outcomes	and	effects.	The	following	chapter	will	outline	the	research	design	
adopted	and	how	this	research	design	has	been	constructed	to	provide	the	depth	and	range	
of	data	to	appropriately	address	the	research	aims	and	objectives,	and	utilise	the	
frameworks	set	out	above	most	effectively.		
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Chapter	4	-	Methodology	
4.1	Realism	–	of	the	critical	kind.		
Before	embarking	on	a	detailed	explanation	of	the	particular	methodology	being	adopted	in	
this	research,	it	is	necessary	to	first	outline	the	ontological	and	epistemological	position	
underlying	the	methodological	decisions	that	have	been	made	(Henn	et	al,	2009).	This	
position	provides	an	intrinsic	logic	to	the	entire	research	process,	allowing	helpful	elements	
from	other	perspectives	to	be	incorporated	into	the	research	design,	whilst	remaining	true	
to	its	identity	and	mindful	of	the	original	motivation	for	bothering	to	undertake	doctoral	
research	in	this	area	in	the	first	place.	That	perspective	is	rooted	in	critical	realism,	as	
espoused	by	Bhaskar	(1997)	and	Sayer	(2000)	in	particular	relation	to	human	geography.	
The	reasoning	behind	this,	and	embracing	the	spirit	of	reflexive	sociology	advocated	by	
Bourdieu	and	Wacquant	(1992)	and	May	and	Perry	(2011)	is	both	personal	and	practical.	
When	reflecting	upon	my	recent	personal	experiences	of	voluntary	and	research	work	in	the	
environmental	sector,	I	noticed	how	issues	that	operated	at	very	large	scales	impacted	a	
small	community	organisation	in	various	different	ways.	For	example:	austerity	governance	
and	budget	cuts	deployed	at	national	level	in	the	UK	resulted	in	a	serious	lack	of	confidence	
in	employees	that	their	jobs	were	safe,	due	to	its	effect	on	funding	streams.	It	prompted	the	
organisation	to	pursue	fields	of	work	that	were	not	originally	part	of	their	vision	or	identity	
in	order	to	secure	funding	and	maintain	stability.	Furthermore,	as	a	key	focus	of	
organisational	activities,	the	global	issue	of	climate	change	affected	(and	continues	to	
affect)	the	staff’s	daily	lives	in	a	number	of	ways,	including	changes	to	organisational	
structure,	resource	use,	mission	statement	and	even	family	lives.	But	these	people	were	not	
simply	passive	receptors	of	big	issues.	There	was	always	a	determination	to	carry	on	
working	towards	change	and	progress	of	various	kinds	in	the	local	community,	relating	to	
the	needs	and	capacities	of	that	particular	place.	Members	of	that	organisation	also	sit	on	
an	advisory	board	designed	to	steer	Birmingham’s	plans	for	reducing	carbon	emissions	and	
energy	use.		The	impact	that	this	will	have	is	uncertain,	but	the	emerging	picture	is	one	of	
an	interesting	set	of	interactions	between	issues,	places,	scales	and	people,	and	a	revolving	
relationship	between	wider	structures,	individual	dispositions	and	organisational	action.	
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These	are	anecdotal	observations	and	personal	interpretations	of	just	one	organisation	in	
one	neighbourhood	of	one	city	in	one	country.	What	these	interpretations	and	observations	
represent,	though,	is	a	world-view	that	there	is	a	set	of	processes	and	forces,	which	connect	
macro-scale	issues	to	micro-scale	individual	and	intentional	action	and	vice	versa,	and	
contribute	to	certain	activities	in	particular	places	or	situations.	These	processes	and	
interactions	have	been	dubbed	as	“often	unseen”	by	Lloyd	(Lawson	and	Staelhi,	1991)	and	
therefore	leave	a	theoretical	chasm	between	human	agency	and	wider	social	structures.		
In	terms	of	an	epistemology	and	rationale,	this	world	view	lends	itself	to	an	investigatory	
approach	that	attempts	to	uncover	the	patterns	of	activity	between	the	micro	and	macro-
scale.	In	terms	of	the	goals	of	this	particular	research,	this	relates	to	a	focus	upon	how	a	
range	of	national	–	and	sometimes	international	-	issues,	agendas	and	policies	relating	
specifically	to	urban	retrofit	are	manifest	in	what	is	actually	happening	in	a	given	context,	
and	perceived	by	the	people	who	are	actually	acting	in	response	to	them.		It	also	includes	a	
desire	to	attempt	to	explain	why	those	actualities	exist,	by	identifying	the	causal	processes	
applying	to	the	activity	under	investigation.	In	this	case	it	is	the	existence	of	different	
responses	to	a	nationally	defined	‘problem’	with	energy-inefficient,	privately	owned	housing	
stock.	By	investigating	the	dynamics	of	initiatives	that	respond	to	these	issues	and	agendas	
and	policies	in	different	places,	we	can	uncover	a	reality	that	is	populated,	but	not	saturated	
by	those	large-scale	issues,	in	which	other,	context-sensitive	issues	combine,	emerging	as	
responses	that	can	illuminate	the	connections	–	and	disconnections	-	between	policy,	
knowledge	and	practical	action.		
The	intention	is	that	by	understanding	what	domestic	retrofit	means	to	the	people	involved	
in	it	in	different	contexts,	and	the	variety	of	forms	and	effects	it	can	have,	we	can	explain	
how	the	construction	of	a	domestic	retrofit	agenda	through	national	policy	has	both	
enabled	and	limited	experimental	retrofit	assemblages	and	different	forms	of	change,	which	
vary	significantly	between	urban	contexts.	
4.2	Origins	of	research	design	and	positionality.	
It	should	be	noted	at	this	point	that	the	construction	of	this	research	design	has	been	a	
cumulative	process	of	incorporating	the	predefined	themes	and	intentions	of	the	wider	
EPSRC	Retrofit	2050	project	from	which	my	funding	is	drawn,	with	my	own	predefined	ideas	
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about	what	is	or	is	not	interesting	and	relevant,	as	well	as	taking	inspiration	and	opportunity	
from	current	changes	and	trends	in	the	UK	political	context.	For	example,	‘retrofitting	the	
city’	was	given	as	a	title,	and	the	general	idea	of	using	a	socio-technical	approach	to	begin	to	
understand	low-carbon	transitions	(Geels,	2010).	The	interpretation	of	these	starting	points	
was	up	to	me.	Many	of	the	guiding	themes	I	used	are	rooted	in	my	own	preoccupations,	
professionally	and	personally,	from	experiences	as	a	buildings	design	engineer	(building	
regulations,	climate	change,	energy	efficiency),	as	a	volunteer	domestic	energy	advisor	
(values,	energy	efficiency,	feed-in-tariffs,	fuel	poverty),	and	from	previous	research	
experience	into	motivations	for	volunteering	(values,	economic	crisis).	Concurrently,	at	the	
time	that	I	was	exploring	the	possibilities	of	this	area	of	study,	the	UK	government	launched	
a	significant	new	policy	instrument:	the	Green	Deal.	This	policy	related	specifically	to	
domestic	energy	retrofit	for	the	purposes	of	reducing	energy	use	and	carbon	emissions,	and	
a	number	of	city-based	initiatives	became	visible,	providing	an	ideal	and	very	timely	
opportunity	to	look	at	examples	of	retrofit	strategies	that	encompassed	my	preoccupations	
as	well	as	tying	in	with	the	predefined	area	of	study.		
My	research	background	has	its	roots	in	policy-oriented	research,	and	a	hope	that	by	
understanding	and	illuminating	the	mechanisms	and	processes	connecting	the	macro	issues	
with	the	micro,	there	is	an	opportunity	to	influence	and	improve	policymaking	and	local-
level	action.	In	particular,	to	broaden	the	range	of	individual	voices,	values,	feelings	and	
motives	heard	and	incorporated	into	policies	and	plans,	along	a	path	that	is	realistic	in	
terms	of	the	capabilities	of	places	to	change	and	adapt	to	the	enormous	pressure	of	climate	
change,	economic	crises	and	the	like.	This	reflection	should	illuminate	the	direction	from	
which	I	approached	the	goals	and	structure	of	the	research,	before	moving	onto	a	
description	and	discussion	of	the	particular	research	design.		
4.2.1	Why	a	comparative	case	study?	
The	research	design	adopted	is	both	an	analysis	of	the	national	policy	context	and	landscape	
for	domestic	retrofit	and	a	comparative	case	study	of	three	domestic	retrofit	initiatives	in	
three	different	cities:	the	Energy	Saving	Co-operative	in	Birmingham,	the	Manchester	
Carbon	Co-op	in	Manchester	and	the	Bristol	Home	Energy	Upgrade	in	Bristol.	For	an	
exploratory	research	project	such	as	this,	highly	structured	surveying	or	quantitative	
methods	would	have	been	inappropriate,	because	they	would	have	stifled	the	ability	of	the	
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research	to	respond	to	themes	and	issues	as	they	emerged	from	the	fieldwork.	A	more	
traditional	qualitative	research	approach	without	the	case	studies	may	have	given	a	good	
overall	impression	of	the	range	of	perspectives	involved	in	domestic	retrofit,	perhaps	at	a	
national	scale,	but	this	would	have	missed	some	of	the	valuable	place-based	and	specifically	
urban	elements	to	the	research.	It	could	be	argued	that	a	single	urban	case	study	could	
have	tackled	these	elements,	but	a	desire	to	take	some	abstracted	lessons	with	a	hope	of	
being	able	to	tentatively	generalize	or	transfer	them	to	other	research	would	have	been	
more	difficult	with	only	one	case.	This	section	will	outline	the	reasons	for	the	comparative	
approach,	the	case-based	approach,	and	the	rationale	behind	selecting	those	particular	
cities	and	those	particular	initiatives.		
Case-based	approach	
The	decision	to	take	a	case-based	approach	derived	from	the	need	for	an	approach	that	
would	allow	the	depth	and	detail	necessary	to	present	a	valid	representation	of	the	
domestic	retrofit	initiatives	emerging	in	each	city	context.	As	Bourdieu	and	Wacquant	
(1992)	describe,	in	relation	to	reflexivity,	it	is	the	totality	of	the	social	phenomena	under	
investigation	that	we	are	interested	in,	including	our	own	ideas	and	views.	Even	at	first	
glance	at	the	community-based	domestic	retrofit	initiative	emerging	in	Birmingham,	the	
network	of	organisations,	resources	and	funding	appeared	extremely	complex.	With	so	
many	different	interests	at	play,	a	case-based	approach	utilising	a	variety	of	data	collection	
methods	allows	the	illumination	of	varying	and	contested	experiences	of	the	same	scenario	
(May,	2011).	Arguably,	it	is	virtually	impossible	to	fully	‘know’	the	social	world	however	we	
approach	the	problem	(Crang,	2002),	but	the	idea	of	aiming	for	as	full,	open	and	frank	an	
exploration	of	a	given	issue	as	possible	is	a	positive	one.	
What	was	sought	was	not	a	consensus	on	the	experience	(unless	it	happens	to	emerge)	but	
to	understand	how	different	social	interests	are	represented	by	or	embodied	in	retrofit-
related	activity	in	different	places	and	in	relation	to	particular	contextual	features	that	are	
multi-scalar	and	interconnected,	such	as	incumbent	organisations,	funding	structures,	
supply	chains,	household	energy	use	and	behaviour.	It	also	seeks	to	clarify	the	relationships	
between	these	contextual	features	and	different	objects	involved	in	the	initiatives,	such	as	
houses,	technologies,	financial	tools,	etc	(Sayer,	2000).	Identifying,	understanding	and	
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explaining	those	complex	interrelationships	would	be	very	difficult	without	gathering	a	wide	
variety	of	viewpoints,	from	within	and	without	the	initiatives,	and	engaging	with	a	variety	of	
sources,	thus	embracing	the	intersubjectivity	that	is	unique	to	the	case-study	process	(Henn	
et	al,	2009).		
But	there	are	key	aims	and	objectives	that	cannot	be	achieved	by	a	single,	in	depth	case	
study,	and	those	relate	to	the	goal	of	moving	beyond	describing	the	initiatives	and	their	
relation	to	contextual	features	and	into	the	realms	of	explaining	the	differences	between	
the	initiatives	as	pertains	to	their	contexts	and	scales	of	action,	which	requires	comparison.	
The	Comparative	Element	
In	keeping	with	the	realist	mantra,	the	case-based	approach	allows	the	data	gathering	
process	to	be	sensitive	to	contextual	intricacies	whilst	retaining	the	relevance	of	‘bigger’	
processes	in	an	‘encompassing	approach’	that	looks	at	instances	in	different	locations	whilst	
reflecting	on	their	relationship	to	the	overall	system	(Ward,	2010).	The	statement	that	
“there	are	shared,	universally	identifiable	pressures	and	trends	working	across	all	
industrialised	societies”(Perry,	in	May	2011,	p86)	captures	the	importance	of	those	wider	
processes	and	structures,	which	the	‘landscape’	concept	is	particularly	helpful	for	
articulating,	without	attributing	a	specific	scale	(national,	international)	to	it	until	the	data	
has	been	collected	and	analysed.		
The	comparative	element	to	the	research	design	thus	enables	an	exploration	of	diversity	in	
outcomes	among	similar	cases	(Ragin,	1994):	the	cases	being	experimental	domestic	retrofit	
initiatives	in	English	cities.	It	is	tentatively	designed	to	allow	the	development	of	middle-
range	theories	about	interurban	diversity	within	the	UK	national	context,	and	deepen	the	
appreciation	for	understanding	the	role	of	context	and	conditions	at	different	scales	within	
the	wider	body	of	knowledge	about	urban	development	(Ward,	2010).		
The	research	does	not	generate	grand	theories	for	generalisation	to	all	domestic	retrofit	
experiments	or	all	urban	contexts,	but	develops	explanations	for	different	outcomes	from	a	
similar	landscape,	using	domestic	retrofit	initiatives	as	a	lens	through	which	to	examine	the	
interactions	between	those	structures,	the	mechanisms	through	which	they	work,	and	how	
the	conditions	and	contexts	that	those	mechanisms	operate	within	affect	the	outcomes	of	
the	entire	process	to	different	extents	and	in	different	ways	(Sayer,	2000).	This	aspect	of	
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theory	development	would	be	impossible	to	do	without	a	comparative	element,	but	
theoretical	aims	are	modest:	the	decision	to	deal	with	fewer	than	Eisenhardt’s	(1989)	
‘optimum’	of	six	cases	has	been	taken	in	favour	of	retaining	a	greater	level	of	depth	and	
familiarity	with	the	cases	(Ragin,	1994),	and	the	explanatory	and	descriptive	concepts	that	
emerge	will	naturally	be	closely	linked	to	the	empirical	data.	However,	these	theoretical	
developments	may	contribute	to	other	comparative	urban	studies,	or	other	forms	of	urban	
retrofit	and	organisational	studies.		
The	need	for	theory	development	of	some	kind	reflects	a	degree	of	Perry’s	(in	May,	2011)	
‘foresight’	type	of	comparative	research,	which	is	designed	for	lesson	learning	and	improved	
understanding	and	is	vital	for	critical	policy-based	research.	However,	lessons	from	this	
research	are	not	meant	to	be	replicated	or	transferred	like-for-like:	they	are	meant	to	
provide	worked	examples	of	attempted		change	processes,	as	well	as	ideas	about	
relationships	that	enable	or	constrain	change	and	transition	in	urban	environments.		
Case	Selection	
Each	case	represents	an	experimental	assemblage	around	domestic	retrofit	in	an	urban	
context.	If	the	aim	of	the	research	is	to	illuminate	the	varying	effects	of	different	urban	
contexts	and	conditions	upon	the	organisation	and	orientation	of	a	domestic	retrofit	
initiative,	then	it	should	follow	that	cases	should	be	selected	for	their	contextual	
differences.	Comparing	cases	with	similarities	in	other	respects	facilitates	more	confident	
pronouncements	about	the	effect	of	context	(Ragin,	1994).	The	relatively	low	number	of	
cases	was	settled	upon	in	order	to	juggle	three	goals:	firstly,	to	enhance	internal	validity	
through	depth,	familiarity	and	closeness	to	the	case	data	(Ward-Schofield,	1993),	enabling	
the	relationships	and	in	and	stories	of	each	assemblage	to	be	understood	to	a	high	level	of	
detail;	secondly,	keeping	the	study	within	manageable	limits	for	a	lone	researcher,	and	
thirdly,	enabling	the	development	of	useful	ideas	and	concepts	through	comparative	
analysis.	
The	selection	criteria	also	balanced	theoretical	and	practical	considerations	(Henn	et	al,	
2009).	Whilst	there	is	an	element	of	convenience	sampling	in	terms	of	a)	what	initiatives	
were	available	and	operational	at	the	time	and	b)	their	location	and	accessibility	(feasible	
for	travelling	between	three	cities	during	the	data	collection	process)	there	are	also	some	
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deliberate	similarities	between	the	cases,	reflecting	the	effort	made	to	distinguish	between	
exogenous,	landscape	factors,	and	endogenous,	context-specific	factors	(Ward,	2010).		
A	number	of	loosely	defined,	desirable	characteristics	between	the	cases	were	sought:	
1. The	initiatives	must	be	in	England,	thus	operating	within	the	same	national	policy,	
cultural	and	political	context,	and	within	an	accessible	distance	and	travel	time	to	
Birmingham,	where	I	am	based.	
2. The	initiatives	must	be	embedded	in	different	urban	contexts,	to	satisfy	the	original	
purpose	and	scope	of	the	research.		
3. The	initiatives	must	concern	the	retrofit	of	privately	owned	or	occupied	domestic	
properties	for	the	purposes	of	improving	energy	efficiency.	
4. The	initiatives	should	be	community-based,	to	some	extent.	The	insight	into	
individual	roles	and	values	as	well	as	their	relationship	to	issues	at	various	scales,	
understanding	the	impact	of	the	landscape	issues	from	macro,	all	the	way	to	micro-
scale	and	the	importance	of	engaging	with	householders	and	their	motives	as	
highlighted	in	the	literature	review,	could	be	more	illuminated	by	focussing	on	
community	based	initiatives	rather	than	large	scale	social	housing	retrofits.	
5. The	cities	should	be	of	a	similar	population	size	to	avoid	reducing	the	causes	of	
difference	to	this	factor.	
	
It	should	be	noted	that	there	were	also	personal	and	external	influences	on	city	and	case	
selection:	Some	of	the	criteria	were	derived	from	initial	observations	of	the	Birmingham	
case	study	(The	Energy	Saving	Co-operative	retrofit	scheme)	in	which	I	was	already	involved	
as	a	volunteer	at	a	partner	organisation.	This	was	the	first	case	to	be	identified,	and	it	was	
partly	from	initial	impressions	of	this	case,	along	with	guidance	from	the	themes	emerging	
from	the	literature,	that	a	tentative	set	of	interesting	features	were	identified,	such	as	
organisational	forms,	the	use	of	networks	of	local	organisations	in	different	roles,	
interactions	with	local	authorities,	etc,	and	from	this	point	the	comparative	framework	was	
built.	The	potential	issues	with	this	in	terms	of	bias	are	acknowledged,	and	strategies	to	
equalise	the	situation	have	been	taken.		
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These	include:		
• The	keeping	of	a	reflexive	journal	of	decisions	made,	reasons	for	doing	so,	and	the	
impact	that	my	position	may	have	had	upon	the	research	trajectory	(Silverman,	
2005,	in	Henn	et	al,	2009).		
• Withdrawal	from	my	voluntary	role	in	connection	to	the	Birmingham	case	study.		
• Allowing	extra	time	(and	effort)	for	building	relationships	and	familiarity	with	
potential	participants	in	Bristol	and	Manchester.	Whilst	my	‘insider’	status	greatly	
facilitated	initial	access	and	familiarity	with	the	first	few	participants	in	Birmingham,	
the	relationships	built	from	that	point	have	been	on	the	basis	of	my	position	as	an	
interested	researcher	rather	than	as	a	volunteer,	which	is	important	in	terms	of	a	
consistent	professional	relationship	with	participants.	
	
It	was	also	partly	a	stroke	of	luck	that	the	Manchester	Carbon	Co-op	initiative	emerged	in	
Manchester	at	the	same	time	as	the	Energy	Saving	Co-operative,	because	in	line	with	the	
body	of	work	to	be	produced	by	the	Retrofit	2050	project,	which	focuses	on	Greater	
Manchester	and	Cardiff,	this	PhD	research	needed	to	include	at	least	one	of	those	places.	
Had	the	Manchester	Carbon	Co-op	and	not	existed,	a	different	initiative	in	Manchester	may	
have	been	selected	and	the	research	design	may	have	taken	a	different	path,	perhaps	
looking	at	very	different	cases	in	different	cities	and	having	a	strategy	that	was	less	
contingent	on	the	similarities	listed	above.	Nonetheless,	the	research	design	settled	on	a	
comparison	between	community-based,	domestic	energy	efficiency	retrofit	initiatives	in	
different	cities,	and	a	focus	upon	the	effects	of	the	different	city	contexts	upon	the	
organisation	and	orientation	of	those	initiatives.	
Furthermore,	the	development	of	these	criteria	has	happened	alongside	a	number	of	
problems	with	selecting	a	comparable	case	in	Bristol,	which	was	the	third	and	final	city	
added	to	the	comparison.	
At	the	time	of	initial	case	selection,	there	was	no	community-scale,	specifically	Green	Deal-
based	retrofit	initiative	emerging	in	Bristol	at	the	time	of	case	selection.	After	a	visit	to	
Bristol	and	a	period	of	familiarisation	with	the	range	of	energy	efficiency	initiatives	in	action	
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in	Bristol,	a	more	similar,	domestic-based	retrofit	initiative	was	targeted.	However,	this	first	
initiative	was	difficult	to	access	for	a	number	of	reasons:		
1)	The	staff	at	the	lead	organisation	were	very	resistant	to	face-to-face	visits	and	to	
taking	part	in	interviews	or	discussions	about	the	project	and	showed	little	interest	in	the	
research	process.	It	was	doubtful	that	a	fair	representation	of	perspectives	of	those	involved	
would	be	gained,	and	after	difficult	initial	contact,	it	might	be	hard	to	build	the	required	
level	of	rapport	with	participants.		
2)	The	particular	funding	stream	for	this	project	ended	soon	after	discovering	the	
scheme	and	the	project	was	in	its	final	stages	when	I	discovered	it,	making	consistent	access	
to	those	involved	a	little	more	difficult.	
In	terms	of	the	Bristol	case	study,	The	Bristol	Home	Energy	Upgrade	scheme	was	city-wide	
and	council-led,	which	was	not	originally	envisaged	to	be	the	scale	of	initiative	that	the	
comparison	would	entail.	It	was	also	time	limited	and	had	ended	by	the	time	data	collection	
started	which	creates	some	differences	in	terms	of	the	kind	of	reflections	and	experiences	
that	will	be	gained	from	interviews,	but	it	encompasses	a	number	of	the	same	themes	and	
foci	that	the	other	two	case	studies	do,	and	its	organisation	is	a	reflection	of	the	existing	
networks	and	arrangements	in	Bristol,	which	is	interesting	in	itself	as	an	element	for	
comparison.	The	section	criteria	listed	above	were	moulded	along	with	the	research,	in	
order	to	create	a	comparison	that	would	best	tackle	the	research	aims	and	objectives.	
Much	like	the	experience	Shurmer-Smith	(1998)	describes	in	her	account	of	researching	
elites	in	the	Indian	Administration	Service,	the	reflexive,	autobiographical	process	of	doing	
the	research	from	my	perspective	shows	a	constant	juggling	of	competing	pressures:	
academic	rigor,	fleeting	opportunities,	personal	values	and	practical	issues,	all	whilst	trying	
to	define	and	redefine	the	actual	focus	of	the	project	as	it	progresses,	without	losing	its	core	
identity	altogether.	
4.2.2	Data	collection	methods	and	analysis.	
Broadly,	data	collection	and	analysis	methods	followed	the	recommendations	of	Yeung	
(1997)	in	his	attempt	to	methodologically	connect	critical	realism	and	human	geography,	
and	Yin	(2013)	who	advocates	the	use	of	the	case	study	method	–	so	long	as	it	is	rigorously	
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done	-	for	explanatory	research	as	well	as	exploratory,	descriptive	research.	It	will	employ	
some	of	the	network	analysis	elements	of	the	MLP	approach	outlined	in	the	previous	
chapter	in	order	to	depict	and	connect	the	multiplicity	of	actors	and	factors	involved	in	each	
case,	but	as	MLP	case	studies	(such	as	Geels,	2002)	tend	to	be	historical	desk	studies,	much	
of	this	approach	is	inappropriate	for	a	comparative	case-study	based	heavily	on	primary	
data.	Hence,	the	majority	of	data	collection	will	follow	the	‘thick	description’	approach	of	
assemblage-based	research	(McFarlane,	2011).	This	will	involve	collecting	rich	primary	data	
in	order	to	illuminate	the	contextual	nuances	of	each	city	context	along	with	its	
interweaving	with	factors	and	actors	outside	of	its	representational	space,	and	bring	the	
lived	realities	of	those	working	within	those	contexts	on	the	particular	problem	of	domestic	
retrofit	to	life.	
Yeung	highlights	three	key	components	to	a	methodology	that	reflects	the	critical	realist	
philosophy.	The	first	is	the	concept-refinement	process	of	iterative	abstraction,	which	goes	
hand-in-hand	with	the	second:	the	grounded	theory	approach	to	data	analysis.	This	involves	
an	oscillation	between	fieldwork	and	adaptation	to	the	conceptual	framework	according	to	
what	is	found,	thus	adding	clarity	and	guiding	subsequent	data	collection.	This	builds	a	
range	of	robust	descriptive	and	explanatory	concepts	closely	linked	to	the	primary	data	but	
which	are	abstracted	enough	to	enable	their	wider	application	(May,	2011	and	Grbich,	
2007).	This	holistic,	back-and-forth	interaction	between	concepts,	method,	data	and	
analysis	results	in	what	is	known	as	retroductive	theory	building	(Yeung,	1997).		
The	last	component	of	Yeung’s	ideal	realist	methodology	is	methodological	triangulation,	in	
terms	of	collecting	data	from	multiple	sources,	or	using	parallel	methods	(Yin,	2013	and	
Grbich,	2007).	Different	sources	and	methods	illuminate	experiences	or	representations	of	
the	same	event	by	different	stakeholders	or	in	different	social	spheres,	uncovering	the	
discrepancies	and	harmonies	between	those	representations.	Additionally,	using	multiple	
data	sources	can	confirm	and	corroborate	strong	or	common	themes	that	may	emerge,	
adding	external	construct	validity	to	the	concepts	and	theories	drawn	from	the	data	(Yin,	
2013).	Using	multiple	sources	also	provides	a	fuller	and	more	textured	picture	of	the	
initiatives	and	the	issues	surrounding	them,	and	therefore	a	better	chance	of	understanding	
the	dynamics	of	their	construction	and	operation	over	time,	both	visible	and	hidden	
(Bourdieu	and	Wacquant,	1992).	Using	only	one	data	source,	such	as	semi-structured	
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interviews,	gives	individual	representations	in	particular	scenarios,	with	particular	pressures	
and	influences	upon	the	kind	of	accounts	given	by	participants,	such	as	the	topics	covered	
by	the	researcher	in	the	interview	schedule,	time	pressures,	perceptions	about	what	it	is	or	
isn’t	acceptable	to	say	about	the	organisation	you	work	for	or	with,	and	so	on.	By	utilising	
different	sources,	particularly	in	the	form	of	participant	observations	of	meetings	and	
content	analysis	of	public	communications,	the	possibilities	for	uncovering	unexpected	and	
less	censored	issues,	themes	and	dynamics,	and	therefore	a	greater	depth	of	understanding,	
is	increased.		
In	addition	to	this,	a	number	of	scholars	advocate	the	use	of	mixed	qualitative	data	sources	
in	relation	to	case	studies	with	an	eye	on	the	intended	data	analysis	techniques,	such	as	
equipping	the	researcher	with	the	necessary	tools	for	qualitative	narrative	analysis	and	
network	analysis,	(Henn	et	al,	2009,	Sayer,	2000,	May,	2011)	which	shall	be	explored	in	
greater	detail	in	the	next	section.	When	viewing	the	methodology	holistically	in	this	way,	
with	the	underlying	epistemology,	ontology,	overall	research	design,	data	collection	process	
and	intended	forms	of	data	analysis	all	being	interdependent,	rather	than	a	linear	process	
(Bourdieu	and	Wacquant,	1992),	a	logic	begins	to	emerge	that	fits	both	the	brief	given	by	
the	broad	aims	of	the	research	(for	a	reminder,	please	see	above),	and	compliments	the	
explicit	commitment	to	reflexivity.	
Data	sources	
The	data	sources	that	were	used	in	both	the	case	studies	and	the	exploration	of	the	macro-
level	include:	
1) Interview	data	(predominantly	one-to-one),	with	a	range	of	individuals	
involved	in	both	national	policy	and	in	each	case.	
2) Participant	observations	of	internal	project	or	organisational	meetings,	and	
external	promotional	or	informative	events,	including	those	at	the	macro-
level.	
3) Policy,	organisational	and	promotional	documents	such	as	websites,	meeting	
minutes,		project	reports	and	promotional	material	from	both	national	
national	government	and	each	case.			
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The	data	sources	for	each	case	and	for	the	macro-level	research	are	listed	in	the	tables	
below,	followed	by	an	explanation	for	the	selection	of	these	sources	and	their	importance	
to	the	comparative	case	study	method.	Eight	interviews	were	completed	for	each	case,	
along	with	a	range	of	organisational	documents	analysed.	For	the	Carbon	Co-op	and	Energy	
Saving	Co-operative	cases,	a	series	of	observations	at	internal	and	external	meetings	were	
made,	but	as	the	timing	of	the	Bristol	Home	Energy	Upgrade	was	that	it	had	ended	by	the	
time	fieldwork	started	in	earnest,	there	is	a	lesser	reliance	on	observations	in	this	case,	and	
a	greater	reliance	on	project	documents.	At	the	national	level,	four	one-to-one	interviews	
were	conducted,	and	experiences	and	opinions	of	the	national	policy	context	were	also	
taken	from	the	case	study	data	as	well,	where	relevant.	These	perspectives	were	designed	
to	add	detail	and	perspective	to	the	range	of	policy	documents	and	academic	analyses	of	
the	policy	climate.	
	
Interviews	ranged	in	length	from	40	minutes	to	two	hours,	both	within	cases	and	between	
participants	at	the	macro-level.	However,	because	of	the	positive	rapport	developed	with	
participants,	further	questions	were	often	asked	by	email	or	by	phone	to	clarify	certain	
elements	of	the	interview	or	issues	that	arose	after	the	event.	
	
Carbon	Co-op,	Manchester	
Organisational	documents	 Observations	 Interviews	
Carbon	Co-op	website	and	
blog	
Cities	@	Manchester	June	
2012	
Board	Member	1/	URBED		
11th	July	2012	
Carbon	Co-op	2012	AGM	
meeting	minutes.	
Carbon	Co-op	and	Go	Early	
Green	Deal	Pilot	launch	
September	2012	Manchester	
Town	Hall	
Board	Member	2/Project	
Manager		
24th	October	2012	
Carbon	Co-op	in	Stockport	
project	plan	
Carbon	Co-op	whole	house	
retrofit	report	
18th	March	2013	Carbon	Co-
op	AGM	
Board	Member	4/SLiH	
10th	May	2013	
Carbon	Co-op	Strategy	day	
2013	meeting	minutes	and	
report.	
26th	June	2013	Carbon	Co-op	
Strategy	Day	
Board	Member	3/Stockport		
24th	May	2013	
	 4th	November	2013	Carbon	
Co-op	Board	Meeting	
GM	Partner	(MoD)	
26th	June	2013	
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	 	 Salford	University	Partner	
(WS)	
8th	November	2013	
	 	 Board	Member	
5/Householder	
12th	December	2013	
	 	 Project	Manager	Follow	
up/progress	interview.	6th	Feb	
2014.	
	 	 Generating	Success	partner	
22nd	November	2013	
Table	3	-	Carbon	Co-op	data	sources	
	
	
Energy	Saving	Co-op,	Birmingham	
Organisational	Documents	 Observations	 Interviews	
Meeting	Minutes	of	AGM	
2012	
Board	Meeting	and	
Management	Team	Meeting	
22nd	May	2013		
Community	Partner/Board	
Member	25th	May	2012	
Financial	reports	and	
projections	April-	November	
2013	
Board	Meeting	and	
Management	Team	Meeting	
11th	July	2013		
ESC	Sales	Manager	23rd	
August	2012	
Board	of	Management	
Meeting	Minutes	April	–	
December	2013	
Board	Meeting/Site	visit	June	
12th		2013	
ESC	CEO	4th	October	2012	
ESC	Website		 AGM	6th	April	2013	 BSeen/Community	Partner	2	
17th	January	2013	
	 	 ESC	CEO	follow	up	interview	
18th	July	2013	
	 	 ESC	Installer	member	1	
24th	September	2013	
	 	 ESC	Installer	member	2	18th	
October	2013	
	 	 Birmingham	Energy	Savers	
Representative	14th	
November	2013	
Table	4	-	Energy	Saving	Co-operative	data	sources	
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Bristol	Home	Energy	Upgrade	
Organisational	Documents	 Observations	 Interviews	
CSE	Final	Report	to	Bristol	City	Council	
2013	
Retro	Expo	November	
2012	
Bristol	City	Council	Project	
Co-ordinator	21st	May	
2013	
CSE	project	website	
https://www.cse.org.uk/projects/view/
1203		
Bristol	Energy	Network	
Meeting	December	
2013	
CSE	Project	Co-ordinator	
21st	May	2013	
CSE	Case	Studies	–	3	experiences	of	
solid	wall	insulation,	1	experience	of	
boiler	installation.	
	 Bristol	Energy	Network	
Representative		17th	July	
2013	
Maintaining	Momentum	in	Bristol	
Community	Energy	Project	Report	
	 CSE	Project	Co-ordinator	
follow	up	interview	17th	
July	2013	
	 	 CSE	Project	Officer	17th	
July	2013	
	 	 Bristol	City	Council	
Technical	Advisor?	29th	
October	2013	
	 	 Bristol	City	Council	Project	
Officer	12th	March	2014	
	 	 Bristol	Green	Doors	
Representative	12th	March	
2014	
Table	5	-	Bristol	Home	Energy	Upgrade	data	sources	
Observations	 Interviews		
Retro	Expo	November	2012	 Third	Sector	Policy	
Perspective	–	Sustainable	
Housing	Action	Project	
(SHAP)	representative		
23rd	September	2013	
Green	Deal	Supply	Chain	
Briefing	Event,	Birmingham,	
September	2012	
Energy	Policy	Perspective	–		
Ex-Energy	Saving	Trust	Policy	
Advisor	25th	November	2013	
Making	Transitions	Happen	
Event,	Brussels,	November	
2014	
Cities	Policy	Perspective	–	
Cities	Policy	Unit	Officer	1st	
January	2014	
	 DECC	Perspective	–	Senior	
DECC	Officer	3rd	February	
2014	
Table	6	-	Macro-level	data	sources	
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Interview	data	
The	first	purpose	of	conducting	interviews	is	to	tell	a	story	or	biography	(Crang	2002),	from	
both	individual	and	collective	perspectives,	of	how	the	initiatives	came	to	be:	e.g.	what	
were	the	processes	of	identifying	a	problem	or	need,	connecting	with	other	stakeholders,	
and	what	were	the	personal	motives	and	values	that	led	certain	people	or	configurations	of	
people	and	organisations	to	come	together	around	the	issue	of	domestic	retrofit.	This	
connects	in	some	senses	to	Sayer’s	(2000)	geohistorical	approach,	which	pays	particular	
attention	not	just	to	the	specifics	of	place,	but	also	to	the	temporal	context	in	which	
decisions	were	made	and	actions	taken.	This	data	was	gathered	largely	through	interviews	
with	participants	working	in	or	with	those	responsible	for	creating	and	enacting	the	retrofit	
experiments.	The	intended	result	is	a	descriptive	presentation	of	the	initiatives,	concerning	
who	is	involved,	in	what	capacity	and	why,	enabling	the	depiction	of	the	retrofit	
experimental	assemblage’s	formation	in	a	diagram	as	explained	in	chapter	3	above.		
The	second	use	for	the	interview	data,	which	includes	all	perspectives,	internal	and	external,	
is	to	identify	the	key	issues	connected	with	domestic	retrofit	at	different	scales	and	in	
different	roles,	and	to	capture	the	range	of	social	interests,	power	dynamics	and	processes	
attached	to	it.	These	include	the	personal	values	and	motives	identified	in	the	biographies,	
but	also	context-specific	issues	from	the	micro	(household)	level	to	the	community	and	city-
regional	‘meso’	levels.	Through	gathering	data	from	a	range	of	perspectives	from	household	
level,	to	community	groups,	funders	and	policymakers,	we	can	identify	primarily	what	
retrofit	means	to	the	people	and	organisations	involved.	The	cases’	connection	to	
landscape,	local	and	personal	issues,	such	as	whether	the	actors	in	the	cases	are	more	
concerned	by	excessive	global	carbon	emissions	or	by	unemployment	in	the	local	area,	
helps	us	identify	which	issues	and	factors	were	the	greatest	priorities	in	each	case,	and	
explore	the	dynamics	of	how	they	are	constructed	and	perceived	at	different	scales	
(Brenner,	2001).		
Style	and	format	of	interviews	
Interviews	were	broadly	semi-structured,	with	loose	topics	to	cover,	and	open-ended	
questions,	with	prompts	to	extract	greater	detail	where	necessary.	For	example,	one	open-
ended	question	such	as	‘tell	me	about	how	you	came	to	be	involved	in	this	project’	actually	
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incorporated	issues	around	motivation,	networking,	skills	and	the	like,	(especially	with	
appropriate	prompting)	without	having	to	ask	those	separately.		
Interview	topics	varied	slightly	according	to	the	participants,	because,	as	mentioned,	they	
were	selected	specifically	for	the	purposes	of	illuminating	different	perspectives,	therefore	
some	questions	for	one	perspective	would	be	entirely	inappropriate	for	another.	For	
example,	there	is	naturally	going	to	be	a	greater	exploration	of	household-specific	issues	
when	asking	why	a	householder	may	have	become	involved	with	the	case	and	probably	a	
lesser	focus	on	professional	skills	than	when	interviewing	a	project	manager.	These	
common-sense	variations,	help	to	explain	the	suitability	of	the	very	loosely	semi-structured	
interview	as	opposed	to	a	more	structured	approach,	primarily	for	the	purpose	of	allowing	
the	participant	to	give	their	own	account	of	the	experience	rather	than	to	categorise	
aspects	of	that	experience	according	to	my	predefined	ideas	about	it	(May,	2011).	
A	list	is	shown	below	of	topics	discussed	with	different	participants,	depending	on	their	
relevance	to	the	participant,	over	the	course	of	a	semi-structured	interview.	
• How	you	got	involved	with	the	initiative;	
• Why	you	got	involved	with	the	initiative;	
• What	your	professional	background	is;	
• What	the	key	challenges	have	been	and	why	they	are	important;	
• Whether	these	issues	are	particular	to	this	place;	
• What	the	project’s	goals	are	in	relation	to	domestic	retrofit,	and;	
• What	has	enabled	or	constrained	the	progress	of	this	case	or	project	
• What	are	your	opinions	on	the	current	policy	context	for	domestic	retrofit?	
	
Along	with	seeking	a	range	of	participants	with	different	perspectives,	such	as	installers,	
designers,	project	managers,	householders	and	community	partners,	it	is	important	to	note	
that	a	number	of	participants	had	multiple	roles	and	views,	such	as	Carbon	Co-op	
participants	who	were	both	householders	and	board	members	or	held	active	positions	in	
the	organisation,	or	a	community	partner	in	Birmingham	who	went	on	to	become	directly	
employed	by	the	case	study	organisation.	Once	again,	this	does	not	necessarily	present	an	
obstacle,	but	shows	another	interesting	facet	to	the	dynamics	of	the	urban	retrofit	arena.		
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Furthermore,	the	positioning	and	perspective	of	participants	in	relation	to	the	initiatives	
was	not	always	clearly	defined	in	terms	of	whether	the	participant	was	representing	
themselves	as	an	individual	or	an	organisation.	There	were	variations	both	within	and	
between	accounts,	with	a	multiplicity	of	positions,	as	Mullings	(1999)	found	in	a	thought-
provoking	discussion	of	positioning	in	interviewing	workers	in	Jamaican	information	
processing	companies.	These	nuanced	differences	are	not	only	important	to	note	for	staying	
true	to	a	reflexive	and	honest	research	approach,	but	also	form	part	of	the	character	of	the	
initiatives	themselves,	providing	even	more	interesting	comparative	elements	to	the	data	
analysis	process.	
Participant	selection	
The	objectives	of	this	research	are	to	describe	and	explore	the	experiences	and	
manifestations	of	domestic	retrofit	activity	in	different	contexts	and	to	investigate	how	the	
relationships	between	actors	in	different	places	produce	retrofit	experiments	with	different	
intentions,	effects	and	outcomes.	As	explained	through	the	concept	of	experimental	
assemblages	in	chapter	3,	these	experiments	are	not	just	the	sum	of	these	varied	actors,	but	
the	sum	of	these	actors	AND	the	processes	that	connect	them	to	each	other	and	to	wider	
social	structures.	As	such,	selecting	participants	who	work	on,	or	perceive	the	issue	at	
different	levels	such	as	the	household,	the	neighbourhood,	the	city	or	regional	level	and	the	
national	level	is	imperative.	Not	only	do	representatives	of	different	types	of	organisations	
working	on	different	aspects	of	retrofit,	such	as	community	organisations,	contractors	and	
suppliers	and	local	authorities	provide	different	accounts	of	the	domestic	retrofit	
experience	at	different	scales,	they	also	represent	incumbent	place-specific	features	and	
embedded	capacities	in	themselves,	so	the	range	of	perspectives	is	also	vital	for	the	
explanatory	element	of	the	research	concerning	the	varying	importance	of	context	and	
conditions	upon	the	nature	of	the	initiatives.		
Access	and	snowball	sampling	
The	initial	points	of	contact	in	each	city	were	through	a	few	key	informants	from	within	
what	are/were	perceived	to	be	the	lead	organisations	in	the	case	study	initiatives	–	namely	
project	managers	and	directors.	In	the	Manchester	case	these	were	selected	both	from	
names	and	contact	details	that	were	made	visible	on	the	initiatives’	websites	and	from	
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people	who	had	been	mentioned	or	recommended	by	other	research	colleagues.	In	the	
Birmingham	case	this	came	through	introductions	from	the	staff	at	the	community	
organisation	that	I	used	to	volunteer	with,	and	in	Bristol	this	came	from	connections	with	
Bristol	City	Council	representatives	made	at	an	open	third	sector	meeting.	From	this	point	a	
snowball	sampling	method	(Henn	et	al,	2009)	was	used.	Each	participant	was	asked	how	
they	became	involved	in	the	initiative	and	by	what	means.	This	naturally	created	
connections	and	relationships	to	be	noted	and	incorporated	into	the	assemblage,	and	
presented	possible	further	contact	and	interview	opportunities.	It	is	acknowledged	that	the	
resultant	representation	of	the	initiative	does,	then,	depend	largely	upon	the	connections	of	
the	initial	participants	(May,	2011),	but,	when	reflecting	on	the	process	if	it	appeared	that	a	
particularly	valuable	viewpoint	or	detail	was	excluded,	further	effort	was	made	to	remedy	
this	and	to	seek	out	other	participants	or	revisit	previous	participants	to	provide	the	
necessary	insight.	Furthermore,	snowball	sampling	resulted	in	selecting	participants	viewed	
as	valuable	informants	from	within	the	world	of	domestic	retrofit	by	their	peers,	rather	than	
attaching	my	own,	less-informed	judgements	to	that	selection.	Another	advantage	of	
snowball	sampling	was	that	it	avoided	undue	pressure	on	one	gatekeeper,	which	is	a	
common	phenomenon	in	organisational	research	(Henn	et	al,	2009).	With	snowball	
sampling,	each	person	acts	a	gatekeeper	to	the	next	rather	than	one	person	being	
constantly	required	to	provide	access	to	others.	
The	macro-level	interview	participants	in	different	positions	and	roles	in	relation	to	the	
retrofit	agenda	at	national	level	were	selected	to	gain	insightful	perspectives	on	the	
creation	and	orientation	of	the	particular	policy	context	for	retrofit	in	the	UK	and	the	
conditions,	both	enabling	and	limiting,	that	it	creates	for	the	case	studies.	These	interviews	
can	also	be	used	to	look	at	whether	the	landscape	and	local	issues	are	shared	and	perceived	
similarly	or	differently	between	the	macro-level	and	the	meso-	and	micro-levels.		
Again,	positioning	and	relationships	in	the	interview	process	is	something	that	should	be	
constantly	borne	in	mind.	In	relation	to	Mullings’	(1999)	findings	that	her	own,	and	her	
participants’	positions	in	relation	to	each	other,	was	both	fluid	and	dynamic	and	often	out	
of	her	own	control,	it	has	been	interesting	to	note	that	many	participants	viewed	me	as	an	
information	resource,	just	as	I	viewed	them.	I	have	been	asked	for	contact	details	for	
potential	business	partnerships,	asked	what	the	other	cases	are	doing	and	how.	This	is	both	
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flattering,	and	enables	easy	and	rich	discussions	about	the	issues	at	hand,	but	it	also	poses	
interesting	questions	for	me	about	confidentiality,	which	is	not	as	clear	cut	as	it	may	have	
seemed	at	the	outset.	What,	for	example,	is	to	stop	me	from	speaking	about	another	
person	or	initiative	when	the	same	information	is	already	in	the	public	domain?	Is	it	helpful	
in	the	process	to	remain	‘unbiased’	and	answer	questions	blandly	and	neutrally	in	pursuit	of	
objectivity?	Well,	perhaps	nothing,	and	probably	not,	but	my	responses	to	such	questions	
may	be	based	upon	interviews	that	are	as	yet,	unanalysed	and	should	not	refer	to	specific	
people,	so	there	is	constantly	a	judgement	to	be	made	about	the	sensitivity	and	the	validity	
of	my	response.	Other	issues	of	this	nature	shall	be	explored	further	in	the	chapter	covering	
ethical	issues	and	reflections.	
Participant	observations:	
The	purpose	of	observations	is	to	understand	the	practices	of	reasoning	and	decision	
making	in	relation	to	the	case	study	initiatives’	progress,	identity,	goals	and	form,	by	key	
actors	in	a	given	time	and	space.	This	allows	a	further	look	at	how	the	initiatives	are	shaped	
both	by	the	people	involved,	and	by	the	key	issues	of	the	moment,	which	could	relate	to	
pursuing	funding	sources,	or	to	marketing	the	scheme,	or	to	building	community	contacts,	
for	example.	As	McCann	and	Ward	(2012)	describe,	this	adds	the	dimension	of	studying	
‘through’	the	subject	under	question	rather	than	looking	at	it	from	outside,	and	brings	the	
detail	of	investigating	what	people	actually	do,	as	well	as	what	they	say	in	an	interview	
setting	(Crang,	2002).	Despite	efforts	to	create	relaxed	and	informal	interview	settings,	
there	is	still	an	unnatural	element	to	being	quizzed	at	length	about	one’s	work	and	personal	
history	and	the	like,	so	even	with	the	possible	‘censorship’	effects	of	having	an	observer	at	a	
board	meeting,	there	is	extra	value	in	seeing	some	of	the	narratives	‘in	action’.	The	limited	
timescale	of	the	data	collection	phase	of	the	PhD	and	the	practical	issues	with	my	location	
and	family	commitments	prevents	participant	observations	from	being	a	more	substantial	
element	to	data	collection.	This	is	a	general	issue	with	long	term	ethnographic	immersion	
research	illuminated	by	Crang	(2002)	who	points	out	that	very	few	research	papers	in	
human	geography	are	based	upon	this	kind	of	research	due	to	the	time	demands	of	the	
method.	Nonetheless,	it	may	still	be	able	to	illustrate	which	values,	knowledge	and	issues	
are	considered	and	prioritised	from	within	the	initiative	and	why.		
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Settings	and	positioning	in	observations	
Observations	took	place	within	meetings	that	concern	the	direction	of	the	initiative	as	a	
whole,	such	as	board	meetings	and	the	annual	AGMs	of	the	Manchester	Carbon	Co-op	and	
Energy	Saving	Co-op.	Observations	concerned	the	language,	gestures,	feelings	and	
relationships	involved	in	these	decision-making	processes,	and	also	the	types	of	knowledge	
and	discourses	that	dominated	in	the	settings.	To	an	extent,	the	analysis	of	observations	
took	place	at	the	time	of	making	the	observations,	in	terms	of	immediate	decisions	to	note	
an	event	or	a	conversation,	to	attach	meaning	to	it	in	this	way	implies	that	it	is	perceived	as	
important	in	that	moment	(Henn	et	al,	2009),	but	the	detailed	thematic	analysis	of	
observations	in	terms	of	categorising	events	and	instances	will	take	place	alongside	the	
analysis	of	interview	data	as	described	below.	
It	is	important,	in	the	interests	of	a	reflexive	research	design,	to	be	aware	of	my	own	
position	during	the	process	of	observing	in	order	to	give	the	proper	context	for	the	data	and	
the	findings	that	are	taken	from	them	(McCurdy	and	Uldam,	2013	and	May,	2011).	There	
are	a	range	of	positions	in	participant	observations	that	relate	to	various	continuums	or	
axes	in	terms	of	relationships	with	participants,	such	as	the	covert/overt	and	
insider/outsider	nature	of	my	role.	These	positions	also	range	in	level	of	activity	from	being	
an	observer	who	does	not	participate	at	all,	and	an	active	participant.	My	positioning	was	
fully	overt	–	all	attendees	at	internal	meetings	were	aware	of	my	presence	and	in	external	
or	public	events	I	explained	to	anyone	who	was	interested	why	I	was	there	and	what	I	was	
researching.	But	whilst	my	level	of	activity	and	my	level	of	familiarity	at	the	start	pitched	me	
somewhere	between	what	May	(2011)	describes	as	‘participant	as	observer’	and	‘observer	
as	participant’:	something	like	becoming	‘a	fan’	of	the	initiative,	my	position	changed	as	the	
research	progressed,	with	increased	familiarity	and	with	views	being	formed	about	the	
value	of	my	emergent	findings.	I	moved	from	being	not	familiar	or	insider	enough	to	be	fully	
participating,	to	being	invited	to	participate	in	events	and	meetings.	On	the	other	hand,	as	
the	Bristol	Home	Energy	Upgrade	was	finished	by	the	time	I	began	intensive	fieldwork,	no	
observations	at	internal	meetings	were	possible,	so	external	meetings	were	used	alongside	
a	greater	focus	on	project	reports	and	interview	data.	
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Documents	
For	the	case	studies,	organisational	documents	such	as	websites,	meeting	minutes,	financial	
reports,	project	evaluation	reports	and	promotional	material	were	used	to	triangulate	
information	such	as	components	of	the	biographies	of	the	retrofit	experiments	and	their	
goals	and	priorities,	to	strengthen	construct	validity	(Yin,	2013).	These	were	also	used	as	
part	of	the	narrative	and	thematic	analysis	detailed	below,	to	identify	key	points	in	the	
process	of	constructing	each	retrofit	experiment	and	priorities.		
For	the	macro-level	analysis,	policy	documents	and	academic	analyses,	combined	with	
interview	data,	were	thematically	analysed	to	identify	whether	and	if	so,	how,	the	themes	
and	issues	identified	in	the	literature	review	were	manifest	in	domestic	retrofit	policy.	These	
themes	included	the	landscape	issues	of	climate	change,	economic	crisis	and	energy	
security,	along	with	the	marketization	of	policy,	shifts	from	central	state	government	to	
localised	governance	of	policy,	the	role	of	technology	and	the	positioning	of	cities	as	
localities	for	experimentation.	
4.2.3	Thematic	Data	Analysis	
The	combination	of	interview	data,	observations	and	documentary	data	was	subjected	to	an	
in	depth	analysis	involving	both	a	form	of	network	analysis	intended	to	assist	in	the	
depiction	of	the	experimental	assemblages	in	terms	of	the	actors	and	factors	involved,	and	
thematic	analysis	to	explore,	refine	and	discuss	the	themes	emerging	from	the	literature	
review.	Combined	with	the	thematic	analysis	of	the	macro-level,	this	analysis	created	an	
explanation	of	why	the	cases	took	the	form	they	did,	as	a	product	of	the	actors	identified	
and	the	relationships	between	them.	
This	involved	taking	a	Straussian,	rather	than	Glaserian	approach	to	grounded	theory	
thematic	analysis	(Henn	et	al,	2009	and	Grbich,	2007)	in	which	there	are	a	set	of	flexible,	
predefined	ideas	and	concepts,	predominantly	rooted	in	existing	literature	and	personal	
experiences	and	observations,		For	example,	originally,	the	research	aims	and	objectives	
were	all	about	local	contexts,	but	have	now	broadened	to	incorporate	contexts	and	
conditions	at	different	scales,	which	upon	analysis	of	the	data	was	considered	a	better	way	
of	understanding	and	representing	the	experiences	and	issues	around	retrofit.	Taking	
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periodical	breaks	from	fieldwork	to	report	on	data	collection	process,	analyse	the	section	of	
data	collected,	and	refine	concepts	and	focus,	was	very	important	in	this	process.	
The	guiding	concepts	at	the	start	of	the	thematic	analysis	were	a	product	of	the	literature	
review:	
• landscape	issues	(economic	crisis,	climate	change,	energy	security)	
• Experimentation,	knowledge	and	learning	(different	forms	e.g.	technical,	procedural,	
legal,	social	and	psychological)		
• Visions	and	goals	(problem	definitions,	targets	and	ambitions,	different	interests)	
• Scale	and	space	
• Governance	and	organisation	(networks,	organisational	form,	relationship	with	
policy,	funding,	local	authority	involvement)		
• Dealing	with	technical	risks	
• Engaging	with	people,	behaviour	and	motives	
	
These	concepts	are	not	independent	of	each	other,	but	interdependent	and	overlapping.	
There	are	scalar	aspects,	for	example,	to	the	landscape	issues	and	these	in	turn	could	be	
influenced	by	the	interests	present	in	the	network	which	influence	the	experimental	
elements	of	each	case.	The	purpose	of	using	these	concepts	to	guide	the	thematic	analysis	
is	to	start	to	thread	them	together	and	form	an	idea	of	how	they	influence	each	other	over	
time	and	in	particular	places.	These	concepts	are	under	constant	review	and	refinement	as	
data	analysis	proceeds,	otherwise	known	as	‘fuzzy’	(Ragin,	in	May,	2011),	enabling	the	
descriptions	and	explanations	that	emerge	to	be	as	close	to	the	data	as	possible.	For	
example,	ideas	around	visions	and	priorities	were	modified	to	become	the	aims	and	
priorities	of	the	cases,	because	visions	and	goals	did	not	capture	the	accounts	of	how	the	
projects	and	organisations	were	orientated	as	hoped.		
The	intended	result	of	the	thematic	analysis	of	the	macro-level	is	both	a	narrative	account	
of	how	the	policy	context	has	been	constructed	over	time,	incorporating	landscape	issues	
and	UK-specific	trends	and	policy	and	regulatory	tools,	as	well	as	a	thematic	account	of	that	
policy	context	in	terms	of	the	issues	and	conditions	it	creates	for	those	working	within	it.	
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The	intended	result	of	the	thematic	analysis	for	the	case	studies	is	a	both	descriptive	and	
explanatory.	
The	descriptive	element	includes	establishing,	through	the	combination	of	data	sources,	a	
biographical	narrative	of	how	each	experimental	assemblage	came	to	be,	identifying	
landscape	factors	and	actors	that	were	particularly	important,	place-specific	actors	and	
factors	that	are	involved	in	the	case,	and	individual/micro	level	factors	including	personal	
interests	and	motives,	all	of	which	contributed	to	the	formation	of	the	initiative.	These	were	
then	combined	into	a	diagram	that	shows	how	those	actors	and	factors	involved	in	the	
initiative	are	distributed	through	the	three	levels	of	the	assemblage,	thus	producing	a	
particular	approach	to	retrofit,	such	as	top-down,	middle-out	or	bottom-up.	
The	explanatory	element	applies	the	second	multi-level	framework	developed	in	chapter	3	
above	to	explain	why	each	initiative	ended	up	the	way	it	did.	This	part	of	the	analysis	
identifies	and	investigates	the	key	interests	and	internal	dynamics	of	the	case,	in	terms	of	
the	ways	in	which	the	relationships	in	the	assemblage,	and	processes	of	negotiation	that	
occurred	within	and	around	the	initiative,	affected	its	approach	to	the	key	themes	listed	
above,	such	as	its	approach	to	technical	risks,	its	knowledge	focus	and	the	scale	at	which	it	
operates.		
This	process	involved	identifying	how	the	actors	and	factors	in	the	assemblage	bring	a	range	
of	interests	to	the	experiment,	which	affect	its	priorities,	especially	in	terms	of	what	it	is	
testing	and	therefore	the	knowledge	it	is	producing,	from	trying	out	specific	policy	tools,	to	
testing	ways	of	‘scaling	up’	or	engaging	with	householders,	looking	for	specific	technical	
solutions	and	learning	about	processes	for	delivering	services.	These	relationships,	interests	
and	negotiations	around	knowledge	also	affect	the	construction	of	a	space	or	‘territory’	of	
activity,	and	contribute	to	strategic	decisions.		
The	data	analysis	process	also	sought	to	critically	assess	the	initiatives	in	terms	of	the	
changes	they	hoped	to	and	did	or	did	not	effect,	using	the	conceptual	tools	from	the	socio-
technical	transitions	literature	to	delineate	between	different	forms	of	change	(or	non-
change):	transformation,	transition	and	reproduction,	to	identify	and	discuss	the	outcomes	
and	effects	generated	by	the	initiatives.	It	looks	for	evidence	of	whether	the	experiment	
changed	aspects	of	the	micro-contexts,	the	local	contexts	or	national	context,	or	different	
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elements	of	the	retrofit	problem	or	‘system’,	both	in	terms	of	physical,	built	environment	
elements	and	in	terms	of	relationships	around,	governance	of	or	approaches	to	the	problem	
of	retrofit,	local	policy	or	any	other	effects	and	outcomes	both	locally	and	at	the	micro	and	
macro-context	levels.	This	part	of	the	analysis	also	identified	whether	the	assemblage	or	
elements	of	it	enabled	or	constrained	different	forms	of	change.		
The	final	part	of	the	analysis	produced	a	framework	2	diagram	depicting	and	recapping	on	
the	key	interests	and	inputs	to	each	case	at	each	level,	summarising	the	key	areas	of	
negotiation	and	influence	in	the	assemblage	and	how	these	have	contributed	to	the	place-
specific	nature	of	the	experiment	and	its	outcomes.	This	methodology	therefore	links	back	
to	the	theoretical	framework	in	the	following	ways:	
• Its	focus	on	networks	of	people,	organisations	and	influences	-	and	the	use	of	
snowball	sampling	and	mixed	methods	to	investigate	these	–	was	designed	to	
capture	the	messiness	and	complexity	of	the	domestic	retrofit	cases	in	the	spirit	of	
employing	an	assemblage-based	theoretical	approach;	
• The	use	of	interviews	in	the	emerging	local	networks	around	each	case,	especially	
interview	questions	that	the	particular	motives,	values	and	views	of	the	people	
involved,	exposed	the	range	of	interests	and	influence	of	the	different	actors	and	
factors	involved.	This	populated	the	bottom	level	of	the	experimental	assemblages	
framework	concerning	the	influence	of	the	individuals	involved,	as	well	as	
contributing	to	a	context-sensitive	appreciation	of	how	each	case	came	to	be	and	
how	it	was	governed;		
• The	use	of	interview	questions,	observations	and	thematic	analysis	pertaining	to	
visions,	goals,	targets	and	learning	are	designed	to	illuminate	the	experimental	
nature	of	the	responses	and	what	various	forms	this	might	take	as	highlighted	
chapter	3;	
• Interviews,	observations	and	documents	that	produced	data	on	the	specific	nature	
of	how	each	case	approached	the	specific	technical	and	social	aspects	of	domestic	
retrofit	were	used	as	the	basis	for	comparison	and	also	to	illuminate	the	challenges	
of	addressing	these	in	urban	contexts,	and;	
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• The	inclusion	of	perspectives	from	policy	and	national-scale	organisationswas	
designed	to	explore	the	landscape	aspect	of	the	experimental	assemblages	
framework	and	its	influence	on	place-specific	urban	activities.	
4.3	Reflections	on	the	methodology	
4.3.1	Access,	rapport	and	relationships	
Access	to	policy	documents	for	the	macro-level	data	was	not	at	all	difficult,	with	these	
documents	publicly	available	and	having	been	analysed	and	scrutinised	by	academics	
already.	However,	access	to	interview	participants	at	national	level	was	far	more	difficult.	
The	policy	and	third	sector	contacts	were	gained	either	through	contacts	within	the	case	
studies	or	through	persistent	emailing	of	Whitehall	departments,	being	referred	to	various	
different	people	and	eventually	managing	to	arrange	interviews.	It	was	also	intended	that	
there	would	be	additional	interviews	with	an	energy	company	representative	and	a	national	
level	installer	or	contractor,	but	after	repeated	emails	with	representatives	from	two	energy	
companies	(Eon	and	Npower)	no	interview	materialised	due	to	both	clashing	schedules	and	
a	plain	lack	of	response.	
For	various	reasons,	accessing	documents,	meetings	for	observations	and	interview	
participants	varied	in	difficulty	between	cases	and	between	groups.	An	excerpt	from	my	
reflexive	fieldwork	journal	details	a	slightly	exasperating	process	of	trying	to	establish	
contact	with	a	Bristol-based	installer,	but	being	refused	once	the	person	I	had	made	initial	
contact	with	realised	that	I	was	not	going	to	be	advertising	the	company	or	promoting	its	
work.	This	process	was	repeated	until	unfortunately	I	was	not	able	to	gain	an	installer’s	
perspective	in	this	context.	However,	employees	at	Bristol	City	Council,	CSE	and	members	of	
Bristol	Energy	Network	were	extremely	welcoming	and	willing	to	discuss	the	Big	Home	
Energy	Upgrade	and	provide	me	with	project	reports	and	evaluations	that	they	were	
working	on	in	lieu	of	opportunities	to	observe	at	meetings.	
In	the	Manchester	context,	everyone	at	Carbon	Co-op	welcomed	me	with	open	arms,	
viewing	my	presence	as	inherently	positive	and	being	interested	in	my	opinion	and	input	
right	from	the	start.	However,	in	the	Energy	Saving	Co-operative	the	relationship	between	
me	and	the	organisation	was	explicitly	conditional	–	they	allowed	me	to	research	them	on	
the	agreement	that	I	gave	something	back	such	as	producing	meeting	minutes	and	writing	a	
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guest	blog	post.	In	terms	of	board	members	of	the	ESC,	many	of	them	were	only	willing	to	
participate	in	an	interview	once	they	had	already	met	me	at	meetings	where	I	was	
observing	and	was	able	to	explain	the	research	to	them	and	build	a	relationship	with	them.	
For	example,	one	installer	member	told	me:	
“It’s	a	good	job	I’d	met	you,	we	get	so	many	requests	for	research	that	I	would	probably	
have	ignored	your	email	if	I	didn’t	know	who	you	were”	
Furthermore,	the	range	of	participants	and	key	informants	in	each	case	was	different,	so	for	
example,	because	the	Carbon	Co-op	was	a	householder	co-op,	I	gained	valuable	
householder	perspectives,	whereas	for	the	BHEU	which	was	local	authority	led,	I	gained	
perspectives	of	different	parts	of	the	local	authority	as	well	as	from	their	partner	
organisation,	CSE,	but	far	fewer	community	perspectives	and	no	installer	perspectives.	From	
the	Energy	Saving	Co-op,	because	some	of	the	board	members	were	installers,	I	was	able	to	
gain	this	perspective,	but	was	not	able	to	gain	a	householder	perspective	other	than	
secondary	data	from	the	Northfield	Ecocentre	website.		
This	does	not	mean	that	the	data	from	any	case	is	more	or	less	valid	than	the	other,	but	is	
important	to	bear	in	mind	when	taking	in	the	case	studies	as	they	are	presented	differently	
according	to	the	data	that	was	available.		
4.3.2	Triangulation,	validity	and	reliability	in	practice	
The	idea	of	triangulation	mooted	above	is	to	get	multiple	sources	of	data	to	corroborate	the	
same	theme	or	category,	but	in	reality	this	was	very	difficult	to	achieve	and	data	sources	
varied	wildly	between	cases.	Some	information	such	as	targets	and	funding	that	I	obtained	
from	interviews	in	Bristol,	I	got	from	documents	in	Manchester	or	observations	in	
Birmingham.	In	reality	it	was	very	difficult	to	get	the	same	information	from	multiple	
sources,	so	instead	I	had	to	make	judgements	about	what	things	to	include	and	exclude	as	
important	parts	of	the	cases.	
The	potential	implications	of	this	for	the	validity	and	reliability	of	the	data	are	significant.	
My	approach	to	this	was	to	try	to	keep	analysis	and	themes	as	close	as	possible	to	the	data	
so	that	it	accurately	reflected	the	accounts	given,	and	to	take	care	in	reporting	so	that	if	a	
theme	was	not	shared	by	other	sources	it	was	either	carefully	illustrated	as	an	individual	
perspective	not	a	shared	perspective	or	was	not	reported	as	a	significant	theme	at	all.	Also,	
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themes	and	concepts	were	modified	as	the	fieldwork	went	along,	so	that	important	issues	
such	as	ECO	troubles	or	different	forms	of	knowledge	(survey	data)	were	included	in	the	list	
of	topics	later	in	the	fieldwork	process,	reflecting	the	emerging	issues	rather	than	just	the	
predefined	ones	from	the	literature	review.	
4.4	Summary		
This	methodology	chapter	has	outlined,	explained	and	justified	the	empirical	approach	and	
research	design	that	has	been	used,	as	well	as	reflecting	on	some	elements	of	the	process	
and	what	these	meant	for	the	reporting	of	data	in	the	empirical	chapters	to	come.	It	has	
explored	the	benefits	of	the	comparative	case	study	approach	and	thematic	analysis,	as	well	
as	explaining	the	process	of	conceptual	refinement	and	negotiation.		
The	methodology	employed	-	particularly	its	focus	on	networks	and	multiple	perspectives	
and	factors	-	incorporated	actors,	concepts	and	issues	operating	at	multiple	scales,	from	
individual	people,	to	local	and	national	organisations,	along	with	national	and	international	
policy.	Its	focus	on	city-based	actors	also	incorporated	the	context	sensitivity	required	for	
examining	the	specifically	urban	elements	of	the	issue.	Despite	the	challenges	of	negotiating	
access,	and	inconsistencies	in	the	data	from	different	contexts,	this	methodology	did	
successfully	allow	the	theoretical	framework	to	be	operationalized	in	a	way	that	met	the	
requirements	set	out	at	the	beginning	of	chapter	3.	It	produced	rich	data	that	represented	a	
holistic	approach	to	the	problem	of	domestic	retrofit,	covering	the	specific	social	and	
technical	issues	with	that	problem,	the	personal	experiences	of	the	people	and	
organisations	involved,	the	broader	‘landscape’	issues	around	domestic	retrofit,	and	the	
messiness	of	the	place-specific,	contingent	elements	of	each	of	the	urban	responses	to	
domestic	retrofit	under	question.	
The	following	chapters	are	the	product	of	this	methodology,	marking	the	beginning	of	the	
empirical	part	of	the	thesis.	
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Chapter	5	-	Macro-level	context	and	conditions	for	domestic	
retrofit	in	English	cities	
5.1	Introduction		
As	detailed	in	chapter	1,	one	of	the	most	prominent	roles	of	improving	the	energy	efficiency	
of	existing	housing	through	domestic	retrofit	in	English	cities,	is	that	of	contributing	to	
carbon	emissions	reduction	targets	both	nationally	and	globally.	However,	energy	security	
and	economic	concerns	are	also	entwined	with	those	of	climate	change,	which	creates	a	
nexus	of	sometimes	competing	and	sometimes	harmonious	macro-scale	–	or	‘landscape’	-	
pressures	acting	on	this	issue	(Bradshaw,	2010,	Pearson	and	Watson,	2012	and	Mallaburn	
and	Eyre,	2014).	Moreover,	the	growing	dominance	of	neo-liberal,	market	ideologies	
globally	has	resulted	in	shifts	in	governance	and	policy	at	multiple	scales,	creating	a	
complicated	interplay	between	policy,	government,	markets	and	publics	in	relation	to	
energy	efficiency	(Mallaburn	and	Eyre,	2014).	This	chapter	will	use	an	overview	and	analysis	
of	the	key	international,	EU	and	UK	policies	and	regulations	relevant	to	domestic	retrofit	to	
show	how	these	issues	above	are	manifest	in	the	UK	policy	context.	It	will	firstly	describe	
the	most	relevant	policy	tools	of	the	Green	Deal	and	the	Energy	Companies	Obligation	and	
explore	how	these	were	produced	over	time	as	a	result	of	landscape	pressures,	and	outline	
the	Localism	Act	2010	to	show	how	the	localism	agenda	has	over	time	interacted	with	the	
domestic	retrofit	agenda	producing	experimental	retrofit	activity	at	various	different	scales.	
Finally	it	will	outline	some	of	the	most	significant	tensions	and	issues	with	this	policy	
context,	supported	by	empirical	material	from	interviews	and	observations	with	actors	
working	in	and	around	retrofit-related	policy	at	the	macro-scale,	and	some	extracted	from	
the	case	study	data	(see	methodology	for	details	of	participants	and	observations).		
This	exploration	is	necessary	to	define	and	populate	the	macro-context	within	which	the	
three	city-based	case	studies	operate	–	i.e.	the	top	level	of	each	experimental	assemblage,	
identifying	the	common	actors	and	factors	that	are	present	for	all	cases.	Each	case	may,	
though,	have	different	connections	with	macro-scale	actors	and	interact	with	landscape	
factors	and	pressures	differently,	or	include	or	exclude	some	from	the	assemblage.				
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5.2	What	was	the	policy	context	for	responding	to	domestic	retrofit	in	
English	cities?	
The	policy	context	for	the	three	domestic	retrofit	case	studies	was	dominated	by	two	key	
policies:	the	Green	Deal	and	the	Energy	Company	Obligation,	both	of	which	were	defined	
and	their	legal	elements	made	explicit	in	the	Energy	Act	2011.	These	entwined	policies	were	
also	heavily	affected	by	elements	of	the	building	localism	agenda	and	some	elements	of	the	
Localism	Act	2010	which	has	influenced	the	range	of	different	spaces	in	which	retrofit	
activity	might	be	governed.	This	section	overviews	these	three	components	of	the	policy	
climate.	
5.2.1	Green	Deal	–	the	Coalition	Government’s	‘flagship’	policy.	
The	Green	Deal	began	operation	between	October	1st	2012	and	January	2013.	It	has	two	
elements:	it	is	both	a	financial	mechanism	which	enables	householders	to	access	loan	
finance	to	pay	for	qualifying	retrofit	measures	and	pay	back	the	cost	through	energy	savings	
(previously	known	as	Pay	As	You	Save),	and	a	framework	for	creating,	supporting	and	
upskilling	a	supply	chain	for	retrofit,	through	defining	a	retrofit	process	and	an	industry	
recognised	process	of	Green	Deal	Accreditation	retrofit	professionals.	The	‘vision’	of	Green	
Deal	was:	
“To	regenerate	whole	areas	and	see	them	having	a	real	facelift	and	looking	nicer,	for	people	
to	be	warmer	and	paying	less	for	their	bills	but	for	that	to	be	integrated	with	other	systems	
like	district	heating:	it	needs	to	be	holistic	and	integrated	so	not	just	a	retrofit	market	on	its	
own,	but	insulation	is	crucial	to	this	because	it	has	to	be	fabric	first.”	DECC	official	
Green	Deal	Finance	
Green	Deal	finance	was	created	as	a	way	of	overcoming	what	was	perceived	by	EU	and	UK	
policymakers	as	the	most	significant	barrier	to	deep	housing	retrofits:	the	upfront	cost.	With	
solid	wall	insulation	installations	costing	upwards	of	£5000	alone,	not	including	any	of	the	
other	measures	required	for	whole	house	retrofits	such	as	heating	upgrades,	floor	or	loft	
insulation,	and	associated	costs	such	as	planning	permission	applications,	domestic	retrofit	
represents	a	significant	initial	outlay.	Green	Deal	finance	is	based	on	the	principles	of	Pay	As	
You	Save,	which	is	designed	on	the	following	principles:	
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1. That	the	cost	of	the	retrofit	can	be	paid	back	using	the	savings	made	on	fuel	bills.		
2. That	the	cost	of	paying	back	the	retrofit	over	time	must	not	exceed	the	fuel	bill	
savings	and	render	the	householder	paying	more	for	their	fuel	bills	than	they	did	
before	the	retrofit	–	this	represents	the	‘Golden	Rule’	of	Green	Deal	finance.	
The	element	of	the	Green	Deal	finance	arrangement	that	was	particularly	unique	to	the	UK	
was	that	the	loan	finance	was	designed	to	be	attached	to	the	house	through	repayments	
attached	to	their	electricity	bills	through	the	meter,	rather	than	a	loan	attached	to	the	
individual,	which	it	was	intended	would	open	up	Green	Deal	finance	to	a	wider	number	of	
householders	who	may	not	wish	to	take	on	personal	debts,	or	may	be	limited	in	their	ability	
to	do	so	due	to	poor	credit	ratings	(Eichammer	et	al,	2013).	
Green	Deal	industry	framework	
The	Green	Deal	industry	framework	was	set	up	to	establish	a	process	by	which	
householders	could	enter	into	the	retrofit	process,	provided	by	professionals	who	were	
accredited	to	an	industry	standard	in	order	to	create	trust	and	confidence	in	them	and	avoid	
the	inclusion	of	‘cowboys’	in	the	industry.	The	process	was	defined	as	follows:	
		
Figure	12	Green	Deal	Process	
As	part	of	this,	new	roles	in	the	industry	were	created.	Green	Deal	Assessors	(previously	
known	as	domestic	energy	assessors)	were	those	responsible	for	visiting	the	homes	
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interested	in	retrofit,	surveying	the	property,	completing	an	EPC	if	required,	and	using	a	
survey	method	created	by	the	Buildings	Research	Establishment	(BRE),	recommending	a	
range	of	retrofit	measures	to	the	householder	to	improve	the	property’s	energy	efficiency.	
Green	Deal	installers	were	installation	companies	who	provided	measures	such	as	wall,	loft	
and	floor	insulation,	windows,	doors,	boilers	and	solar	PV,	but	had	gained	Green	Deal	
Accreditation	through	adhering	to	a	newly	created	industry	standard	called	PAS	2030	which	
is	not	a	technical	standard	but	a	quality	assurance	system	of	reporting	to	the	BRE	who	
would	then	provide	the	installer	with	an	accreditation	certificate.	Green	Deal	Providers	
were	intermediary	organisations	that	provided	a	combination	of	retrofit	services	including	
advice,	assessments	and	installations.	The	Green	Deal	framework	also	involved	a	variety	of	
temporary	financial	incentives	such	as	the	creation	of	funding	streams	for	local	‘Green	Deal’	
projects	such	as	Green	Deal	‘Go	Early’	which	provided	subsidies	for	the	Core	Cities	to	fund	
Green	Deal	measures,	and	schemes	which	paid	householders	back	for	undertaking	domestic	
retrofit	work,	such	as	the	Green	Deal	Home	Improvement	Fund,	running	between	June	and	
July	2014,	then	in	March	2015.		
A	DECC	official	speaking	in	2014	described	the	process	of	developing	the	Green	Deal/ECO	
policy	framework:	
“We’ve	put	a	whole	new	structure	in	place.	I	think	people	underestimate	that	when	they	talk	
about	the	Green	Deal	framework	sometimes.	We’ve	set	up	a	whole	new	standard	in	terms	of	
PAS	2030	for	everyone	to	operate	to,	set	up	a	registration	and	oversight	body	to	see	that	
through,	put	in	place	all	the	IT	structures	that	underpin	all	of	that…		Without	that,	Green	
Deal	wouldn’t	have	happened	–	it’s	the	same	with	Green	Deal	Finance	really,	it’s	an	intrinsic	
part	of	the	offer.	So	all	of	that	had	to	be	set	up	and	in	place	already	-	you	know	-	the	
networking	and	relationships	and	infrastructure	with	the	energy	companies	to	make	the	
money	transfer,	I	mean	all	of	that	is	huge:	massive,	massive	chunks	of	work	and	legislation	
lie	behind	all	of	that	and	that	was	the	early	years	really.	We’ve	put	that	infrastructure	in	
place.	That’s	been	done”.	
5.2.2	The	Energy	Company	Obligation	(ECO)	
Introduced	as	part	of	the	Energy	Act	2011	and	legalised	through	The	Electricity	and	Gas	
(Energy	Companies	Obligation)	Order	2012,	the	Energy	Companies	Obligation	(ECO)	obliges	
large	producers	of	electricity	and	gas	-	i.e.	those	who	have	more	than	250,000	customers	
and	supply	either	400GWh	of	electricity	or	2000GWh	of	gas	to	their	customers	in	a	year	
(OFGEM,	2014)	-	to	provide	funds	to	help	improve	the	energy	efficiency	of	domestic	
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properties	in	the	UK.	The	amount	that	each	energy	company	must	pay	is	cumulative	over	
the	period	of	a	year,	and	is	dependent	upon	both	a	base	level	of	carbon	emissions	
reductions	required	(set	by	the	government),	and	the	market	share	of	the	energy	company	
in	relation	to	the	other	obligated	energy	companies.	The	Office	of	Gas	and	Electricity	
Markets	(OFGEM)	is	responsible	for	administering,	monitoring	and	enforcing	the	ECO	in	the	
UK.		
The	ECO	is	made	up	of	three	components,	each	of	which	contributes	a	different	percentage	
of	the	overall	obligation:	
1. The	Carbon	Emissions	Reduction	Obligation	(CERO),	which	includes	insulation	of	
‘hard	to	treat’	properties	–	particularly	solid	walled	properties	which	are	difficult	and	
costly	to	insulate	because	of	disruption,	the	need	for	scaffolding,	and	the	high	labour	
costs,	as	well	as	‘hard	to	treat’	cavity	walls	that	are	problematic	for	various	reasons,	
incurring	a	higher	than	usual	cost	to	insulate.	The	majority	of	the	CERO	is	directed	
towards	external	wall	insulation.	
2. The	Carbon	Saving	Community	Obligation	(CSCO),	which	directs	funding	towards	
carbon	saving	measures	(mostly	cavity	and	solid	wall	insulation)	and	connections	to	
district	heating	systems	in	low-income	or	deprived	areas,	with	15%	of	this	obligation	
being	to	low-income	rural	areas.	
3. The	Home	Heating	Cost	Reduction	Obligation	(HHCRO),	which	involves	the	
installation	of	heating	systems	(mostly	boilers)	and	controls	in	low	income	
households	that	receive	certain	qualifying	income-related	state	benefits.	(OFGEM,	
2014)	
	
The	ECO	provides	a	specification	of	which	domestic	retrofit	measures	energy	companies	can	
use	to	meet	their	obligation,	under	which	part	of	the	ECO	they	qualify,	and	whether	they	
are	to	be	the	primary	measure,	i.e.	they	count	towards	the	ECO	on	their	own,	or	a	
secondary	measure	i.e.	they	count	towards	the	ECO	only	when	installed	along	with	a	listed	
primary	measure.	The	overwhelming	focus	in	ECO	is	upon	solid	wall	insulation	and	hard	to	
treat	cavity	wall	insulation,	which	are	measures	that	qualify	under	all	three	parts	of	the	
obligation.	For	CERO,	other	measures,	such	as	loft	and	floor	insulation,	draught	proofing,	
and	district	heating	connections	can	qualify,	but	only	as	part	of	an	installation	that	has	
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included	an	aspect	of	solid	wall	insulation	or	hard	to	treat	cavity	wall	insulation.	For	CSCO	
district	heating	connections	qualify	with	or	without	solid	wall/hard	to	treat	cavity	wall	
insulation,	and	for	HHCRO	a	much	wider	range	of	other	energy	efficiency	measures	such	as	
draught	proofing,	heating	controls,	boilers	and	the	installation	of	microgeneration	
technologies	like	air	source	heat	pumps,	CHP,	solar	photovoltaics	also	qualify	as	primary	
measures.	The	CSCO	and	HHCRO	are	the	tools	which	relate	closely	to	fuel	poverty	agendas,	
being	targeted	at	vulnerable	or	low	income	households	and	communities.	CERO,	on	the	
other	hand	is	related	to	the	particular	circumstances	of	solid	wall	insulation	and	is	not	
related	to	income	or	economic	characteristics,	and	for	privately	owned	and	occupied	
properties	is	the	component	of	the	ECO	that	should	be	most	applicable.		
In	December	2013,	however,	a	series	of	changes	were	announced	to	the	ECO:	firstly	the	
CERO	component	of	the	obligation	was	reduced	by	33%,	secondly	the	obligation	period	–	
the	time	allowed	for	the	suppliers	to	spend	their	obligation	–	was	extended	from	two	years	
to	four	years,	and	thirdly	loft	insulation,	cavity	wall	insulation	and	district	heating	systems	
were	deemed	eligible	measures	for	CERO.	The	effect	of	these	three	changes	was	that	the	
amount	of	ECO	money	suppliers	were	offering	for	solid	wall	insulation	was	drastically	
reduced	across	the	industry	(DECC,	2014c).		
5.2.3	The	Localism	Agenda	
Alongside	the	energy-efficiency	specific	issues	and	regulations	there	has	been	an	ongoing	
debate	in	UK	politics	about	localism,	which	has	infused	energy	and	sustainability	debates	in	
various	ways.		
The	Localism	Act	2011	intended	to	devolve	power,	responsibility	and	the	structures	of	
authority	and	decision	making	about	various	aspects	of	local	development	and	regeneration	
and	the	provision	of	public	services	and	infrastructure	away	from	central	government	and	
towards	local	governments	and	communities.	It	intends	to	do	this	by	promoting:	
“•	new	freedoms	and	flexibilities	for	local	government		
•	new	rights	and	powers	for	communities	and	individuals		
•	reform	to	make	the	planning	system	more	democratic	and	more	effective		
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•	reform	to	ensure	that	decisions	about	housing	are	taken	locally”	(DCLG,	2011).		
In	December	2011	the	Core	Cities	Amendment	was	added	to	the	Localism	Bill	which	enabled	
the	ten	largest	UK	cities	outside	of	London	(Birmingham,	Bristol,	Cardiff,	Glasgow,	Leeds,	
Liverpool,	Manchester,	Newcastle,	Nottingham	and	Sheffield)		to	be	awarded	funding	from	
central	government	with	which	came	greater	power	and	control	over	their	economic	
development	and	management	of	resources	and	infrastructures.	In	return	they	had	to	
demonstrate	the	effective	capacity	and	capability	of	the	cities’	or	city	regions’	‘leadership’	
and	the	particular	intentions	and	strengths	of	the	city	in	terms	of	its	potential	for	‘unlocking	
growth’.	This	involved	what	are	termed	‘Local	Economic	Partnerships’	or	LEPs,	which	include	
not	only	local	authorities	but	also	other	public	sector	actors	and	private	and	community	
sector	organisations	as	well	–	intending	to	create	a	‘new	architecture’	that	defined	cities	as	
more	than	just	their	local	authorities,	particularly	embracing	the	involvement	of	the	private	
sector.	
The	overwhelming	focus	of	these	city	deals	is	on	encouraging	city	regions	to	bring	in	
external	investment	to	boost	their	economic	growth	prospects,	both	through	corporate	
investment	and	from	investment	from	supranational	bodies	such	as	the	European	Bank	
(DCLG,	2011),	due	to	a	gap	between	the	economic	performance	of	London	and	the	other	
cities	especially	compared	with	other	European	countries.	However,	the	intention	of	this	is	
not	to	equalise	economic	performance	and	productivity	to	London,	but	to	encourage	
variation	and	difference	in	economic	approaches	and	development:	
	“It’s	not	an	effort	to	equalise	economic	performance	with	London	or	with	each	other,	it’s	
more	about	supporting	local	areas	to	empower	them	to	accelerate	growth	locally	–	in	theory	
if	you	equalise	that	would	bring	down	the	top	performing	cities	and	that	would	hinder	
economic	progress,	so	that	is	not	government	policy…		
….What	the	government	wanted	was	for	city	deals	to	be	bespoke	and	based	on	what	the	
cities	had	identified	as	their	own	key	economic	challenges.”	Cities	policy	unit	representative	
What	this	actually	means	for	domestic	retrofit	is	that	local	decisions	around	economic	
planning,	budgeting,	responsibility	for	managing	social	housing	standards	and	provision	etc.	
and	the	prioritisation	of	retrofit	as	a	local	issue	among	these	varying	local	demands	and	
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pressures,	is	intentionally	more	dependent	on	the	local	governance	network	and	local	
capacities	and	relationships	than	it	may	have	been	in	the	past	(Hildreth,	2010).	These	locally	
context-specific	actors	and	networks	vary	from	place	to	place,	which	means	that	although	
much	of	the	attention	on	the	Localism	Act	is	placed	upon	local	authorities’	changing	roles	
and	responsibilities,	the	influence	of	non-government	actors	is	both	more	prominent	and	
less	prescribed.	Demonstrating	who	government	considered	the	key	actors	to	be	in	relation	
to	energy,	it	was	in	fact	the	private	sector	team	who	oversaw	the	energy-related	areas	of	
the	City	Deals,	with	some	involvement	from	the	infrastructure	team.	
The	Localism	Act	and	the	Core	Cities	Amendment	sit	apart	from	The	Energy	Act	and	the	
Green	Deal	and	ECO	policies	but	over	time	–	both	before	and	after	its	publication	-	aspects	
of	the	localism	agenda	have	become	increasingly	interwoven	with	energy	issues.	More	
locally-focussed	components	of	broader	energy	and	climate	change	related	policy	emerged	
such	as	the	Low	Carbon	Communities	Challenge	in	2008-9,	which	had	particular	spatial	foci	
and	employed	socio-technical	approaches	combining	capital	measures	such	as	solar	PV,	
insulation	and	energy	efficient	lighting,	with	behaviour	change	and	advice	services:	
As	DECC	(2011)	described	them:	
• “The	projects	are	geographically	targeted,	area-based	initiatives		
• They	involve	integrated	packages	that	provide	a	more	joined	up	offering	to	
householders	
• They	are	testing	different	models	of	community-scale	delivery,	from	projects	which	
are	led	by	community	groups	through	to	other	projects	which	involve	existing	
agencies	(e.g.	local	authorities,	energy	utilities)	delivering	their	services	in	a	
geographically-targeted	way.		
• The	approaches	draw	upon	sociological	models	of	behaviour	that	emphasis	the	
potential	for	social	norms	to	nudge	and	trigger	widespread,	community-wide	
behaviour	change.”		
In	a	similar	vein	there	was	the	London	based	Low	Carbon	Zones	programme	in	2009,	and	
the	competitive	Local	Energy	Action	Funds	(LEAF)	in	2011	for	community	projects	
addressing	energy	efficiency	at	the	neighbourhood	or	sub-urban	scale.		
In	specific	relation	to	the	Green	Deal,	though,	the	£10m	Green	Deal	Pioneer	Places	fund	
aimed	at	smaller	local	authorities	(or	consortia	or	local	authorities)	and	the	£12m	Green	
Deal	‘Go	Early’	programmes	specifically	for	Core	Cities	were	introduced	in	2012,	which	were	
specifically	designed	to		‘kick-start’	Green	Deal	activity	in	their	areas,	prioritising	the	number	
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of	Green	Deal	plans,	the	street	by	street	approach	and	the	ability	to	stimulate	further	green	
deals	using	demonstration	projects	and	open	homes,	testing	marketing	approaches	and	
tackling	issues	with	planning	(DECC,	2012)	
As	the	Cities	Policy	Unit	representative	described,	these	programmes	were	the	product	of	a	
‘deal’	between	DECC	and	DCLG,	and	were	not	expected	to	produce	uniform	results	but	a	
variety,	depending	on	decision-making	and	capacity	within	the	cities’	governance	networks:	
	“DECC	identified	that	it	wanted	to	work	with	the	cities	on	testing	certain	areas	and	
negotiated	with	the	DCLG	and	the	Cities	Policy	Unit	on	that	and	then	the	cities	were	
approached	with	that	proposition.	From	then	on	it	was	between	the	cities	and	DECC.	What	
we	would	expect	to	see	is	that	some	cities	will	have	particular	strengths	or	interests	when	it	
comes	to	energy	efficiency,	and	others	will	have	less,	and	it’s	up	to	them	how	much	they	
commit	to	this.”	
The	latest	iteration,	the	Green	Deal	Communities	programme	announced	in	2013	for	any	
local	authority	or	consortium,	running	between	2014	and	2015	was	an	‘upscaled’	version	of	
these	pilot	programmes,	coming	after	the	official	start	of	Green	Deal	in	January	2013.	They	
were	still	experimental:	‘testing’	ways	of	delivering	Green	Deal	and	ECO,	but	at	larger	scales	
in	terms	of	the	targeted	numbers	of	properties,	with	a	total	funding	pot	of	£88m.	The	Green	
Deal	Communities	projects	across	the	country	have	been	delivered	through	various	
partnerships	between	local	authorities	and	third	sector	organisations,	some	in	partnership	
with	energy	companies	such	as	North	London	with	Eon	and	main	contractor	Instagroup,	
some	with	one	large	delivery	partner	such	as	in	Bristol	with	Climate	Energy	or	with	a	
framework	of	three	retrofit	contractors	such	as	in	Manchester.	Some	used	social	housing	
schemes	to	deliver	additional	retrofits	to	privately	owner	occupied	households	such	as	in	
Nottingham	and	others	like	Telford	worked	with	existing	regeneration	schemes.	Most	have	
utilised	local	community	groups	as	‘lead-generators’	–	finding	interested	households	in	
return	for	a	referral	fee.	Whatever	the	partnerships,	the	Green	Deal	Communities	scheme	
prioritised	the	street	by	street	approach	again,	but	also	focussed	heavily	on	the	blending	of	
multiple	sources	of	finance	such	as	Green	Deal,	ECO	and	DECC	grants,	continuing	to	target	
the	privately	owned	and	occupied	market:		
“The	street-by	street	approach	is	really	important	and	we	really	wanted	the	projects	to	test	
that.	We	wanted	it	to	be	that	you	could	walk	down	a	street	and	have	a	universal	offer	of	
some	description	depending	on	what	the	households	need	and	with	different	ways	of	
funding	that	depending	on	their	ability	to	pay.	It	was	trying	to	bring	the	ECO	market	and	the	
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private	market	together	to	unlock	it	and	to	be	able	to	do	more.	ECO	is	still	only	really	
scratching	the	surface	–	somehow	you’ve	got	to	unlock	the	private	market”	DECC	official	
This	series	of	locally-focussed	retrofit	programmes	demonstrate	a	vision	that	DECC	had	
about	engaging	private	homeowners	and	bringing	together	retrofit	for	different	types	of	
tenure	on	a	street-by-street	or	area	based	basis.	They	also	show	how	place-specific	
consortia	–	usually	involving	local	authorities	–	have	been	made	responsible	for	creating	
local	retrofit	markets	and	working	out	how	to	make	the	DECC	vision	of	retrofit	become	
realised.	This	shifting	of	responsibility	to	sub-national	coalitions	of	local	state	institutions,	
non-government	organisations	and	the	private	sector	reflects	quite	clearly	the	trend	
highlighted	in	the	literature	review,	of	the	emergence	of	new	state	spaces,	or	territories	of	
activity	at	the	sub-national,	or	urban	regional	scale	(Brenner,	2004	and	2009	and	
Swyngedouw,	2004	and	2009).		
5.3	Where	did	this	policy	regime	come	from?		
The	intention	of	Green	Deal	and	ECO	was	that	effectively	the	UK	government	was	shifting	
the	responsibility	for	funding	domestic	energy	efficiency	improvements	away	from	taxation,	
levies	on	fuel	bills	and	government	subsidies,	and	towards	individual	homeowners	(Guertler	
et	al,	2013	and	Mallaburn	and	Eyre,	2014).	Green	Deal	finance	was	intended	to	remove	
what	was	thought	to	be	the	most	significant	barrier	to	retrofit	for	private	homeowners	–	the	
upfront	capital	cost	–	with	the	Golden	Rule	protecting	people	against	overly	high	loan	
repayments.	The	CERO	component	of	the	ECO	was	meant	to	supplement	Green	Deal	
finance	to	cover	the	particularly	high	capital	cost	of	insulating	‘hard	to	treat’	properties	
using	solid	wall	insulation	(particularly	expensive	external	wall	insulation)	and	technically	
tricky	lofts	or	cavity	walls,	thus	addressing	the	issues	with	the	large	proportion	of	ageing	and	
solid	walled	housing	stock	in	the	UK.		
However,	many	aspects	of	the	Green	Deal,	ECO	and	the	Localism	agenda	combined	are	not	
novel	or	standalone:	they	are	the	product	of	a	long	and	complex	set	of	policy	shifts	and	
trends	around	climate	change,	energy	security	and	economic	crisis.	They	represent	a	
particular	set	of	priorities	configured	in	a	particular	way	because	of	the	political	and	
economic	circumstances	in	which	they	have	emerged	and	from	which	they	have	been	
produced,	which	heavily	dictates	how	they	are	interpreted	and	responded	to	in	urban	
contexts	such	as	those	of	the	case	studies.	It	is	important	to	explore	the	nature	of	some	of	
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these	shifts	through	some	key	policies	and	tools,	in	order	to	understand	their	impact	and	
influence	on	place-based	activity	and	the	context	that	they	have	created	for	the	case	studies	
to	work	within.	
5.3.1	Peculiarly	British	policy	obsessions:	insulation,	boilers	and	
supplier	obligations.	
It	is	important	to	note	that	there	has	also	been	a	particular	journey	of	peculiarly	British	
energy	efficiency	policy	approaches	relating	to	insulation	and	heating	systems	as	the	
technological	‘fixes’	for	any	of	the	triad	of	energy	related	issues	(but	particularly	in	relation	
to	fuel	poverty-related	risks)	and	a	constantly	evolving	agenda	around	obligations	on	energy	
suppliers	to	provide	funding	for	these	things	(Mallaburn	and	Eyre,	2014).		
The	journey	of	these	two	intertwined	agendas	gives	a	background	to	how	the	Green	Deal	
and	ECO	policy	tools	in	particular	have	been	produced	over	time.	As	far	back	as	the	1970s	
the	‘Save	it!’	and	Home	Insulation	Schemes	focussed	on	both	collective	commitment	to	
using	less	energy	in	the	fact	of	a	national	crisis	of	blackouts	and	energy	supplies	and	on	
protecting	vulnerable	households	from	cold	and	damp	risks	through	insulation.	The	Home	
Energy	Efficiency	Scheme	in	1991	continued	this	provision	to	poor	and	vulnerable	
households,	alongside	an	early	acknowledgement	of	the	potential	risks	of	climate	change	
and	another	behaviour	change	campaign	around	reducing	energy	use.	This	trend	was	
continued	with	the	Home	Energy	Efficiency	Scheme	and	Warm	Front	through	the	2000’s,	
which	consisted	of	state	subsidised	cavity	wall	and	loft	insulation	and	upgrades	to	gas	
central	heating	for	households	on	certain	benefits	and		at	risk	of	health	and	financial	
vulnerabilities,	such	as	the	elderly.	Alongside	this,	the	Decent	Homes	programme	was	
introduced	from	2000	onwards	which	set	standards	of	living	for	social	housing	and	the	UK	
government	committed	to	upgrading	social	housing	nationwide	to	this	standard	for	the	next	
fifteen	years.	Part	of	this	included	addressing	issues	of	damp	and	cold,	which	had	a	natural	
crossover	with	energy	efficiency	and	retrofit	activity.	More	recently,	the	UK’s	boiler	
scrappage	scheme	in	2010	encouraged	people	to	trade	in	their	old	boilers	for	a	£400	
replacement,	instead	of	the	usual	£2000	to	replace	a	boiler,	but	this	did	not	apply	only	to	
the	vulnerable	–	it	was	qualified	for	by	the	age	of	the	boiler.			
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Energy	Supplier	Obligations	(ESO’s),	such	as	the	ECO,	developed	independently	of	EU	policy,	
and	have	now	become	the	single	biggest	way	of	funding	energy	efficiency	improvements	in	
the	UK	,	growing	from	approximately	£25m	per	year	in	1994	to	around	£1.2bn	per	year	in	
2012,	combining	with	government	insulation	schemes	along	the	way.	ESO’s	were	first	
introduced	in	1994	to	incentivise	reduced	energy	use	and	the	delivery	of	energy	services	at	
the	least	possible	cost,	as	part	of	a	process	of	liberalising	electricity	markets	in	the	Thatcher	
era,	according	to	Rosenow	(2013).	The	predecessors	to	ECO	were	the	Carbon	Emissions	
Reduction	Target	and	Community	Energy	Saving	Programme	(CERT	and	CESP)	which	ran	
from	2008-2012,	and	before	that	the	Energy	Efficiency	Commitment	and	Energy	Efficiency	
Standards	of	Performance	(EEC	and	EESoP)	which	ran	from	2002-2008	and	1994-2002	
respectively.		
The	growth	in	supplier	obligations	was	the	result	of	a	number	of	gradual	changes	rather	
than	specific	crisis	events,	with	influences	ranging	from	concerns	over	increasing	energy	
bills,	increasing	incidences	of	fuel	poverty,	changes	in	government	personnel	and	
institutions	dealing	with	the	ESOs,	and	increasing	confidence	in	suppliers	to	meet	higher	and	
higher	obligations	(Rosenow,	2013).	Over	time,	despite	neither	being	the	original	purpose	of	
ESO’s,	fuel	poverty	and	climate	change	wrestled	for	position	as	being	the	main	objective.	
Particularly	in	the	early	2000s	under	the	Labour	government,	fuel	poverty	became	an	
explicit	responsibility	of	the	supplier	obligations,	introducing	the	provision	of	energy	
efficiency	measures	for	both	households	in	receipt	of	certain	benefits	and	certain	
geographical	communities	(particularly	under	CESP),	and	reflecting	the	foci	of	the	previous	
government	insulation	schemes	listed	above	(Mallaburn	and	Eyre,	2014	and	Rosenow,	
2013).	However,	with	the	ratification	of	the	Kyoto	Protocol	in	2005,	although	these	
installations	continued,	carbon	emissions	reductions	once	again	became	the	explicit	primary	
purpose	of	the	EEC	in	its	second	period,	and	as	an	ex-policy	advisor	describes	it:	
“There	had	always	been	two	strands	to	energy	efficiency	schemes:	firstly	issues	around	the	
quality	and	liveability	of	buildings,	which	had	always	been	more	linked	to	housing	standards	
and	more	linked	with	housing	policy	and	then	climate	change.	Setting	that	target	of	80%	[by	
2050]	was	what	really	drove	the	need	for	‘deep’	retrofit”	Former	EST	Advisor	
Furthermore,	the	ESOs	over	their	life	have	created	a	huge	market	for	the	energy	efficiency	
industry:	installations	of	cavity	wall	insulation	are	thought	to	have	increased	from	under	
50,000	per	year	without	the	SOs	to	around	550,000	per	year	under	CERT	(Rosenow,	2013).	
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This	increased	especially	as	the	technical	specificity	of	the	obligations	changed	–	initially	
suppliers	could	choose	what	measures	they	provided	to	households,	but	from	2008	there	
was	a	requirement	for	at	least	two	thirds	of	the	obligation	to	be	met	by	providing	insulation	
measures,	largely	consisting	of	providing	heavily	reduced	or	free	loft	and	cavity	wall	
insulation	to	householders	across	the	UK.		
Where	Green	Deal	and	ECO	differ	from	previous	programmes	is	that	they	have	shifted	the	
technological	focus	from	cavity	wall	and	loft	insulation	to	the	more	complicated	and	costly	
solid	wall	insulation.	Equally	significant	are	the	changes	in	the	financial	elements	of	Green	
Deal	and	ECO:	Gone	are	all	remnants	of	state	subsidised	insulation	programmes	–	this	setup	
presents	loan	finance	as	the	‘solution’	to	a	lack	of	retrofit,	and	the	suppliers	obligation	(ECO)	
as	a	supplement	to	this,	which	is	also	charged	with	tackling	fuel	poverty	through	the	HHCRO	
and	CSCO	components.	There	has	also	been,	rhetorically,	a	shift	away	from	insulation	being	
something	primarily	for	vulnerable	households	and	towards	a	focus	on	the	larger,	owner	
occupied	market,	as	well	as	positioning	retrofit	as	an	economic	fix	for	the	effects	of	the	
financial	crisis	in	2008	through	creating	the	Green	Deal	industry.		
“There’s	the	view	that	markets	are	definitely	being	made	increasingly	responsible	for	energy	
efficiency,	and	with	that	looming	second	period	[of	carbon	emissions	reductions]	it	pushed	
the	focus	on	that	‘middle’	sector	of	society	who	weren’t	poor	enough	to	get	the	subsidies	but	
weren’t	wealthy	energy	efficiency	enthusiasts	either.	There	was	an	acknowledgement	of	the	
need	for	some	element	of	external	financing	to	access	that	sector.”	Former	EST	policy	
advisor			
The	current	policy	climate	for	energy	efficiency	demonstrates	a	hybrid	of	elements	that	
have	been	both	long	established	in	UK	policy,	such	as	the	energy	efficiency	programmes	
discussed	above,	technological	specificity	and	an	obsession	with	insulation,	and	
simultaneously	‘newer’	elements	such	focussing	on	markets	and	private-sector	rooted	
responses	rather	than	service	provision,	and	a	particular	manifestation	of	localism	-	policy	
outlined	at	national	level	but	‘delivered’	by	local	consortia.	The	specific	changes	in	
approaching	insulation	schemes	and	supplier	obligations	demonstrate	how	oscillations	
between	landscape	issues	have	become	embedded	in	the	policy	in	different	ways	over	time:	
in	the	same	way	as	the	previous	programmes	reflected	shifting	agendas	in	terms	of	fuel	
poverty,	energy	security	and	climate	change,	the	current	programmes	very	clearly	reflect	
the	acuteness	of	the	austerity	agenda	post-2010.		
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However,	the	Green	Deal,	ECO	and	Localism	Act	combined	not	only	reflect	the	specific	
context	of	post-2008	economic	crisis,	but	a	long	shift	towards	marketization	of	energy	
efficiency	policy,	and	also	the	shift	towards	localised	implementation	of	national	policy,	as	
shall	be	explored	below.	The	following	section	explores	the	roots	of	many	of	the	elements	
of	the	Green	Deal	and	ECO	through	International,	European	and	UK	policy	and	governance.		
5.3.2	International	commitments	to	climate	change	
Over	a	period	of	time	between	the	first	Earth	Summit	in	Stockholm	in	1972,	and	the	present	
day,	climate	change	and	the	importance	of	reducing	greenhouse	gas	emissions	in	order	to	
mitigate	it	has	become	increasingly	important	as	an	international	political	issue,	marked	by	
particular	events	such	as	the	publication	of	the	Brundtland	report	“Our	Common	Future”	for	
the	UN	World	Commission	on	Environment	and	Development	in	1987,	the	establishment	of	
the	International	Panel	for	Climate	Change	in	1988,	and	the	Earth	Summit	in	Rio	de	Janeiro	
in	1992	which	produced	the	United	Nations	Framework	Convention	on	Climate	Change	
(UNFCCC).	However,	the	most	significant	of	these	occurred	in	1997,	when	the	Kyoto	
Protocol	was	developed	for	the	UNFCCC	as	an	internationally	legally	binding	commitment	
from	participating	nation	states	to	cut	their	carbon	emissions	as	an	effort	to	stem	the	
progress	of,	and	mitigate	against	the	effects	of,	climate	change.	The	Kyoto	Protocol	entered	
into	force	in	February	2005.		
	
The	implications	of	signing	up	to	the	Kyoto	protocol	for	the	UK	were	many,	but	can	be	
summarised	into	three	broad	themes:	firstly,	that	the	commitment	to	reducing	greenhouse	
gas	emissions	was	legislated	by	the	Climate	Change	Act	in	2008,	secondly,	that	the	UK	
entered	into	this	commitment	as	part	of	a	‘bubble’,	sharing	the	commitment	with	other	EU	
countries	and	binding	itself	to	EU	climate	change	policy	and	strategy,	and	thirdly,	that	the	
commitment	to	reduce	greenhouse	gas	emissions	was	organised	by	the	Kyoto	protocol	in	
certain	ways,	such	as	the	definition	of	different	commitments	for	different	periods	of	time,	
and	the	promotion	of	carbon	‘trading’	as	a	key	tool	(amongst	others)	for	reducing	emissions	
(Gupta,	2010).	The	first	period	of	commitment	ran	from	2008-2012,	and	involved	reducing	
greenhouse	gas	emissions	by	5%	from	1990	levels.	The	second	commitment	period	runs	
from	2013-2020	and	involves	reducing	GHG	emissions	by	at	least	18%	of	1990	levels.	
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5.3.3	European	Union	(EU)	Policy	
Being	a	member	of	the	European	Union	impacted	heavily	the	methods,	tools,	organisation	
and	financing	options	available	for	those	involved	in	practices	relating	to	energy	efficiency	in	
the	UK,	partly	because	of	being	part	of	the	EU	‘bubble’	of	climate	change	and	emissions	
reductions	relating	to	Kyoto	as	described	above,	but	also	in	terms	of	an	ideological	
approach.	The	overarching	principles	of	market	liberalisation	and	economic	competitiveness	
in	energy	industries	and	networks	are	embodied	in	some	key	elements	of	EU	legislation	and	
policy	such	as	firstly,	a	focus	on	carbon	pricing	and	finance	options,	and	secondly,	regulating	
the	application	of	State	Aid	–	i.e.	state	funding	-	for	energy	efficiency	projects	(Pearson	and	
Watson,	2012)	by	adopting	the	principle	of	open	competition	for	public	funds	in	providing	
any	public	service.	This	is	intended	to	stimulate	innovative	activity	in	the	private	sector	
without	stifling	‘competition’.	
The	specific	aspects	of	EU	policy	contributing	to	and	emerging	alongside	the	Green	Deal	and	
ECO,	though,	are	the	Energy	Efficiency	Plan	2011,	the	Energy	Efficiency	Directive	2012	and	
the	Energy	Performance	in	Buildings	Directive	2010.	The	Energy	Efficiency	Plan	highlights	
the	broad	priorities	and	objectives	around	energy	efficiency	including	a	deliberate	primary	
focus	on	improving	energy	efficiency	in	buildings	–	particularly	space	heating.	It	also	
proposes	a	set	of	particular	measures	through	which	to	approach	this,	including	
encouraging	Energy	Services	Companies	(ESCos)	to	act	as	intermediaries	for	finance	and	co-
ordination	of	energy	efficiency	works,	changing	energy	and	carbon	taxation	and	carbon	
pricing	to	make	energy	efficiency	more	feasible	as	an	investment,	making	more	sources	of	
loan	finance	and	EU	grant	funding	available	for	energy	efficiency	projects	and	using	
improved	energy	efficiency	to	improve	the	economic	competitiveness	and	energy	
independence	of	EU	member	states.	In	this	plan	the	entwinement	of	economic	concerns,	
energy	security	and	the	focus	of	responses	on	finance	and	pricing	are	quite	clear.		
	
The	Energy	Efficiency	Directive	2012	and	the	Energy	Performance	of	Buildings	Directive	
2010	are	more	prescriptive	and	make	certain	aspects	of	policy	and	practice	in	EU	member	
states	mandatory	although	there	is	some	national	and	regional	variation	in	their	
interpretation.	The	Energy	Efficiency	Directive	2012	in	particular	was	the	legislative	product	
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of	the	Energy	Efficiency	Plan,	and	includes	the	following	stipulations	in	relation	to	domestic	
retrofit,	that	member	states	must	address	(From	ECEEE,	2013):	
• A	long	term	strategy	for	the	renovation	of	domestic	properties,	including	‘deep’	
renovations	(i.e.	whole	house	retrofits).	
• Setting	up	and	providing	a	system	of	‘high	quality,	cost	effective’	energy	audits,	and	
the	associated	training	and	accreditation	for	the	auditing	system.	
• Removing	barriers	to	energy	efficiency,	including	financial	ones,	and	establishing	
effective	financing	facilities	for	energy	efficiency	improvements.	
The	Energy	Performance	in	Buildings	Directive	contains	more	specific	targets	and	
prescriptions	in	relation	to	buildings	in	particular	that	add	technical	detail.	It	sets	out	an	
objective	of	having	all	new	buildings	be	‘nearly	zero’	by	2020	and	requires	specific	
components	and	systems	to	be	considered	in	energy	performance	calculations	of	buildings,	
including:	
• Minimum	energy	performance	standards	for	appliances,	systems	(e.g.	heating)	and	
certain	components	of	buildings	(e.g.	walls	or	glazing)	when	they	are	new	or	
retrofitted.	
• Member	states	to	set	and	publish	minimum	energy	performance	standards	for	
existing	buildings	when	they	are	renovated	or	a	significant	part	of	them	is	renovated	
in	line	with	the	standards	for	components	as	mentioned	above.	
• Energy	performance	calculations	and	inspections	of	these	systems	and	components	
to	be	carried	out	by	accredited	people	and	lists	of	accredited	people	provided	to	the	
public.	
• It	sets	out	the	conditions	upon	which	Energy	Performance	Certificates	are	to	be	
issued	for	buildings,	e.g.	upon	sale	or	transfer	of	the	property.	
It	is	important	to	note	that	there	are	other	directives	and	elements	of	these	directives	that	
are	extraneous	to	domestic	retrofit,	but	that	may	influence	aspects	of	it,	such	as	those	
relating	to	air	quality	or	renewable	energy,	but	-	whilst	the	potential	interplay	is	
acknowledged	-	for	the	purposes	of	bounding	this	chapter,	these	are	not	examined	in	detail.		
In	summary,	EU	policy	and	regulation	has	directly	shaped	certain	key	aspects	of	the	
domestic	energy	efficiency	policy	context	in	the	UK	such	as	the	use	of	carbon	pricing	in	
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addressing	energy	efficiency,	the	prioritisation	of	existing	domestic	buildings	for	energy	
efficiency	improvements,	and	defining	the	kinds	of	tools	and	instruments	that	are	
recommended	to	meet	these	commitments.	There	is	a	clear	request	for	an	accreditation	
system	and	particular	attention	on	the	auditing	and	inspection	–	or	survey	–	process	as	
underpinning	retrofit	–	as	we	see	in	the	Green	Deal	process.	There	is	a	particular	focus	on	
financing	retrofit,	as	well	as	the	specific	standards	and	conditions	of	using	EPCs	being	
applied	to	new	or	significantly	renovated	buildings.	What	this	context	does,	though,	is	leave	
a	significant	regulatory	gap	where	existing,	not	heavily	renovated	buildings	are	concerned,	
i.e.	the	kinds	of	retrofit	promoted	by	Green	Deal/ECO	are	not	supported	by	regulation,	only	
by	financial	incentive	and	industry	accreditation	(Mallaburn	and	Eyre,	2014).	The	key	
themes	and	priorities	of	the	above	policy	and	strategy	instruments	from	the	EU	are	shown	
in	the	diagram	below.	
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Figure	13	EU	Policy	influencing	domestic	retrofit	in	the	UK	
5.3.4	UK	Policy	and	governance	of	energy	efficiency	and	retrofit	
Despite	clearly	adopting	in	Green	Deal	and	ECO	many	of	the	principles	and	tools	featured	in	
the	EU	policy	context,	there	is	a	noticeable	difference	between	EU	and	UK	priorities:	UK	
priorities	include	a	much	stronger	focus	on	fuel	poverty	in	the	wake	of	increasing	energy	
prices	and	an	increase	in	the	number	of	households	in	fuel	poverty.	This	is	alongside	a	
broader,	ongoing	national	debate	on	energy	supply	security	in	the	UK	whereas	EU	policy	is	
almost	exclusively	driven	by	climate	change	concerns	and	targets	(Boardman,	2007).	The	
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tensions	and	shifts	between	agendas	shall	be	outlined	below	through	an	exploration	of	
general	energy	policy	changes	in	the	UK	in	the	last	twelve	years.	
National	energy	policy	strategies	–	shifting	political	agendas.	
National	Energy	Policy	strategies	began	with	the	UK’s	2003	Energy	White	Paper	entitled	
‘Our	Energy	Future	–	Creating	a	Low	Carbon	Economy’,	which	was	the	first	clear	energy	
policy	document	in	twenty	years,	and	it	set	out	a	series	of	principles	and	key	challenges	that	
were	based	around	two	clear	drivers	of	climate	change	and	energy	security.	It	identified	
four	goals:	
• “	to	put	ourselves	on	a	path	to	cut	the	UK’s	carbon	dioxide	emissions	-	the	main	
contributor	to	global	warming	-	by	some	60%	by	about	2050,	as	recommended	by	the	
RCEP,	with	real	progress	by	2020;	
• to	maintain	the	reliability	of	energy	supplies;	
• 	to	promote	competitive	markets	in	the	UK	and	beyond,	helping	to	raise	the	rate	of	
sustainable	economic	growth	and	to	improve	our	productivity;	and	
• to	ensure	that	every	home	is	adequately	and	affordably	heated.”	
DTI	(2003,	p11)	
What	this	strategy	did	for	UK	energy	policy	was	to	make	climate	change	a	very	serious	
political	priority,	and	define	the	principles	underlying	energy	policy	as	a	unique	policy	area	
as	opposed	to	amalgamated	into	other	departments	(Bradshaw,	2010,	Mallaburn	and	Eyre,	
2014	and	Boardman,	2007).	In	2006,	an	Energy	Review	was	consulted	on	and	in	it	a	clearer	
set	of	proposals	were	made,	in	the	three	broad	themes	of	saving	energy,	cleaner	energy,	
and	the	energy	security	challenge	due	to	the	new	and	–	to	some	-	worrying	position	of	being	
a	net	energy	importer.	Domestic	energy	efficiency	emerged	as	a	prominent	component	of	
the	proposals,	with	attention	on	energy	pricing	markets	to	solve	issues	of	fuel	poverty,	and	
all	other	consumers	viewed	as	rational	actors	who	could	be	expected	to	invest	their	own	
capital	in	energy	efficiency	measures	in	order	to	achieve	lower	running	costs	and	meet	the	
objective	of	reducing	household	energy	consumption	(Boardman,	2007).		
Subsequently,	a	further	energy	White	Paper	entitled	“Meeting	the	Energy	Challenge”	was	
published	in	2007,	which	built	upon	progressions	in	European	Policy	(those	issues	
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contributing	to	the	Energy	Efficiency	Directive	outlined	above),	results	of	the	Energy	Review	
in	2006,	and	added	some	specificity	to	the	principles	outlined	in	the	2003	version.	This	
white	paper	is	thought	to	have	been	published	in	response	to	the	highly	contentious	public	
and	political	debate	around	the	potential	for	nuclear	power	to	meet	energy	efficiency	
challenges	(Boardman,	2007	and	Mallaburn	and	Eyre,	2014).	Whilst	not	directly	impacting	
domestic	retrofit	per	se,	the	nuclear	debate	did	boost	the	visibility	of	energy	as	a	political	
issue.	
Around	the	same	time,	in	July	2007,	a	draft	Climate	Change	Bill	was	published	which	
detailed	how	the	UK	would	go	about	setting	statutory,	mandatory	climate	change	targets.	It	
included	the	concept	of	five-year	carbon	budgets	in	line	with	Kyoto	and	EU	policy	with	
interim	targets	for	those	periods.	In	terms	of	principles,	it	continued	to	discuss	energy	
efficiency	as	a	requirement	for	meeting	carbon	emissions,	to	promote	market	liberalisation	
in	line	with	the	EC’s	approach,	emissions	trading	schemes	for	both	small	and	large	
businesses,	and	continued	to	prioritise	existing	households	as	a	focus	area	for	improving	
energy	efficiency.	However,	in	the	detail	of	the	White	Paper,	there	were	more	specific	
proposals	for	improving	household	energy	efficiency,	such	as:	
• Improving	energy	efficiency	of	components	e.g.	lightbulbs	and	appliances.	
• Incorporating	and	increasing	energy	suppliers’	obligations	in	a	Carbon	Emissions	
Reduction	Target	(CERT)	–	which	later	became	the	ECO,	targeting	assistance	
towards	those	in	fuel	poverty	and	encouraging	suppliers	to	becoming	broader	
energy	services	providers	rather	than	just	selling	units	of	energy.	
• Rollout	of	smart	meters	and	clearer	billing	to	consumers	to	give	information	on	
energy	use/carbon	emissions	(so	they	can	switch	suppliers,	change	behaviour	and	
so	on)	
• Introducing	EPCs	for	assessing	household	energy	
• Making	new	homes	carbon	zero	(or	nearly)	from	2016	
	
These	proposals	show	that	despite	attention	on	appliances,	billing	and	metering	in	existing	
homes,	there	is	a	lack	of	attention	on	existing	homes’	energy	efficiency	performance	
overall,	as	opposed	to	new	homes,	which	have	strict	standards	and	targets.	Also,	despite	
the	imminent	arrival	of	the	Climate	Change	Bill,	there	was	an	increase	in	attention	on	
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energy	security	and	fuel	poverty	in	the	UK	specific	context:	By	this	point,	the	number	of	
households	spending	more	than	10%	of	their	income	was	calculated	to	have	increased	
considerably,	up	from	7%	in	2003	to	over	15%	in	2007	(DECC,	2012)	and	fuel	poverty	was	
becoming	a	serious	political	problem.		
By	the	time	the	UK	Low	Carbon	Transition	Plan	(LCTP)	was	published	in	2009,	the	Climate	
Change	Bill	had	been	consulted	on	and	brought	into	force	through	the	Climate	Change	Act	
in	2008	and	the	UK	was	committed	to	a	legally	binding	target	of	reducing	its	carbon	
emissions	reductions	by	80%	of	1990	baseline	levels	by	2050.	The	LCTP	marked	a	
progression	from	previous	strategies	because	it	attached	specific	targets	to	homes	and	
committed	a	large	sum	of	funding	specifically	towards	energy	efficiency	improvements.	It	
made	a	priority	of	the	pay	as	you	save	(PAYS)	method	of	retrofitting	houses	–	what	became	
the	Green	Deal	-	in	order	to	overcome	upfront	cost	barriers	for	households	(where	the	
upfront	cost	of	energy	efficiency	improvements	–	i.e.	retrofitting	measures	are	paid	for	
through	the	savings	made	on	energy	bills),	introduced	the	Feed	in	Tariff	–	a	payment	for	
people	who	used	low	carbon	sources	to	generate	heat	and/or	electricity,	and,	crucially,	
began	to	acknowledge	the	role	of	energy	efficiency	related	efforts	at	different	spatial	scales.	
Communities,	cities	and	towns	became	the	locus	of	‘green	innovation’	and	sustainability	
strategies.	This	was	a	departure	from	the	attitude	of	previous	policy	styles,	which	largely	
viewed	energy	efficiency	primarily	as	a	relationship	between	individual	households	and	
national-scale	regulation,	intervention	or	provision	(Kern	et	al,	2014).	It	was	at	this	time	that	
the	localism	agenda	in	the	UK	was	building	momentum	prior	to	the	Localism	Act	2010	and	
ideas	around	decentralisation	and	devolution	of	power	to	localities	in	the	wider	political	
sense	as	well	as	in	relation	to	energy	and	energy	efficiency,	were	taking	hold.	
Furthermore,	there	was	a	clear	prioritisation	of	‘demand-pull’	policies,	i.e.	market	
mechanisms	that	‘tweak’	relationships	between	suppliers	and	consumers	rather	than	
‘supply-push’	policies	that	directly	regulate,	or	support	technological	development,	research	
and	learning,	reflecting	the	increasingly	neoliberal	nature	of	policy.	Nonetheless,	the	LCTP	
marked	an	explicit	effort,	in	the	light	of	the	recent	Climate	Change	Act,	to	meet	the	national	
commitment	to	reducing	carbon	emissions	and	ensuring	better	energy	security.	The	
creation	of	the	dedicated	Department	for	Energy	and	Climate	Change	(DECC)	brought	these	
concerns	together	into	a	coherent	department	that	recognised	the	entwinement	between	
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supply	and	demand	side	policies,	and	the	general	commitment	to	energy	efficiency	was	
strong	(Mallaburn	and	Eyre,	2014).		
The	Low	Carbon	Plan	and	Economic	Crisis			
The	Carbon	Plan	(HM	Government,	2011)	was	the	next,	and	is	the	most	recent	overall	
energy	and	climate	change	policy	document.	In	many	ways	it	continued	the	aims	of	the	
LCTP,	covering	electricity	generation	including	a	reinstatement	of	nuclear	power,	plans	to	
stimulate	and	encourage	the	use	of	low	carbon	heat,	reducing	emissions	from	industry	and	
transport,	and	a	whole	chapter	dedicated	to	‘Homes	and	Communities’.	In	the	Carbon	Plan,	
buildings	and	retrofit	are	even	more	prominent,	with	specific	emphasis	on	cavity	wall	
insulation,	solid	wall	insulation,	and	smart	meters.	This	plan,	along	with	the	legal	tool	of	the	
Energy	Act	2011	also	made	explicit	the	Green	Deal	and	the	Energy	Companies	Obligation.	
The	Carbon	Plan	also	has	a	particular	focus	on	technological	and	design	innovation	and	on	
financial	support	for	such	initiatives	provided	by	the	Green	Investment	Bank.	There	is,	
though,	a	new	and	strong	focus	on	the	role	of	domestic	retrofit	in	generating	jobs	and	
developing	the	‘green’	industry	and	on	the	role	of	local,	‘community’	embedded	activity	in	
stimulating	demand	for	energy	efficiency	services,	which	reflects	a	far	more	economically	
driven	agenda	than	the	largely	climate	change	driven	LCTP,	which	was	largely	climate	
change	driven,	and	previous	strategies	which	concerned	energy	security.		
One	of	the	major	differences	between	the	Carbon	Plan	and	the	LCTP	is	the	political	context	
in	which	it	was	produced:	of	post-economic	crisis	austerity	measures	and	severe	budget	
cuts.	Austerity	resulted	in	the	disbanding	of	key	NGO’s	such	as	the	Sustainable	Development	
Commission	and	removed	central	government	funding	from	the	Energy	Saving	Trust	and	the	
Carbon	Trust,	who	were	key	actors	in	the	provision	of	energy	efficiency	advice	in	previous	
energy	efficiency	programmes.	It	is	also	manifest	in	the	specifics	of	the	Green	Deal	and	ECO	
in	a	drastic	reduction	in	central	government	funding	for	energy	efficiency,	instead	
promoting	private	loan	finance	in	Green	Deal,	and	in	the	explicit	expectation	of	‘industry’	
and	‘market	led’	organisation	and	‘delivery’	of	the	Green	Deal/ECO.		
This	results	in	a	conundrum	for	the	local	actors	working	on	retrofit,	as	described	by	the	GM	
retrofit	partner:	
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“This	government	is	not	really	about	true	localism	and	empowering	cities	but	is	more	
about	pushing	pressures	and	issues	back	onto	localities	and	not	really	bringing	the	
funding	with	it	which	is	what	we	have	with	Green	Deal.	GM	is	supportive	of	a	shift	in	
resource	and	governance	to	a	sub-regional	city	focus…	but	it’s	happened	at	the	same	
time	as	a	huge	retrenchment	in	public	expenditure.	So	it’s	been	part	of	a	local	
government	reduction	plan	at	the	same	time	which	puts	us	in	a	really	difficult	
position.”		
It	is	under	this	context	that	the	aforementioned	competitive	place-based	funding	schemes	
such	as	the	LEAF	funds	for	community	projects,	and	the	Green	Deal	Pioneer	Places,	Go	
Early,	and	Green	Deal	Communities	schemes	were	created.	Bearing	in	mind	the	
acknowledgement	from	those	involved	in	the	City	Deals	and	localism	agenda	that	there	
would	be	local	variation	in	responses,	and	that	this	was	to	be	expected	and	even	desired,	
this	creates	a	context	for	uneven	responses	and	progress	around	domestic	retrofit.	This	
scenario	reflects	the	landscape	trend	towards	the	positioning	cities	and	regions	in	
competition	with	one	another,	encouraged	by	neoliberalised	policy	and	competitive	funding	
(Brenner,	2004	and	2009,	Jonas	et	al,	2011,	Gossop,	2011	Swyngedouw,	2004,	Massey,	2007	
and	Marcuse	and	Van	Kempen,	2000).	
The	product:	varied	policy	experimentation	
These	shifting	national	energy	strategies	and	devolved	power	to	cities	and	places,	as	well	as	
the	emergence	of	the	PAYS	financial	mechanism,	increasing	focus	on	surveying	or	‘auditing’	
tools	such	as	the	EPC	and	other	forms	of	home	energy	assessment	from	EU	policy,	and	the	
anticipation	of	the	Green	Deal	framework,	created	a	spate	of	activity	between	2010	and	
2014	in	the	form	of	projects	testing	various	aspects	of	this	emerging	policy	regime	at	varied	
spatial	scales.	DECC’s	Pioneer	Places	and	‘Go	Early’	schemes	mentioned	above	are	one	
example,	but	other	activities	at	various	spatial	scales	have	been	attempting	to	‘try	out’	
elements	of	the	emerging	policy	context.	The	LEAF	projects	launched	in	2011	supported	
sub-urban	scale	projects	such	as	delivering	EPCs,	energy	advice,	and	installing	solar	PV	
panels	on	community	buildings	to	generate	electricity.	At	a	national	scale	the	Superhomes	
network	was	established	to	demonstrate	and	share	experiences	of	successfully	retrofitted	
individual	homes,	and	Forum	for	the	Future,	a	project	supported	by	the	Technology	Strategy	
Board	(TSB)	and	Innovate	UK	was	developed	between	2011	and	2013	to	‘test’	the	
possibilities	of	whole	house	retrofit,	providing	funding	to	retrofit	100	test	homes	nationwide	
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to	80%	carbon	emissions	savings.	A	PAYS	pilot	was	undertaken	in	Sutton,	North	London,	
which	tested	the	takeup	and	practicalities	of	the	finance	mechanism	for	retrofits.	
These	projects,	along	with	many	others,	display	a	trend	of	experimentation	with	various	
aspects	of	the	policy	from	the	financial	to	the	technical,	to	the	assessment	process	or	the	
management	of	networks,	at	various	scales.	They	often	employ	multi-actor,	cross	–sector	
collaborations,	involving	a	range	of	actors	from	grassroots	environmental	organisations,	
local	authorities	and	housing	associations	to	energy	companies.	This	policy	approach,	which	
views	places	as	‘test	beds’	for	low	carbon	or	energy-related	activities	is	akin	to	the	
theoretical	concept	of	‘strategic	niche	management’	(Kemp	et	al,	1998):	encouraging	
experimentation	and		innovation	in	hyperlocal,	specific	contexts	in	the	explicit	hope	that	
‘models’	or	‘lessons’	can	be	used	from	these	experimental	activities	to	transfer	or	replicate	
to	other	contexts	and	generate	regime.		
5.4	Policy	analysis	–	regulatory	gap,	expensive	finance,	lack	of	clarity	
and	consistency.	
In	reality,	the	Green	Deal	and	ECO	combination	has	struggled	to	deliver	the	widespread	
commitment	to	energy	efficiency	in	the	British	public	that	it	was	intended	to,	with	only	1612	
Green	Deal	Plans	(loan	finance	repayment	plans)	in	place	at	the	end	of	December	2013,	a	
far	cry	from	the	government’s	predicted	10,000	in	the	first	year	of	the	scheme	(Construction	
Index,	2014).	The	Green	Deal/ECO	has	suffered	from	a	lack	of	political	confidence	and	
consensus	from	within	the	government	and	the	energy	efficiency	industry,	and	changes	in	
personnel	dealing	with	it	–	most	notably	the	resignation	of	Chris	Huhne	in	2012,	who	
designed	the	scheme	(Guertler	et	al,	2013).	It	also	suffered	from	a	lack	of	clarity:	about	who	
was	going	to	provide	finance	beyond	a	vague	combination	of	private	financiers,	about	
exactly	how	and	by	whom	ECO	would	be	blended	with	Green	Deal	finance	to	meet	the	high	
costs	of	external	wall	insulation,	and	about	what	kinds	of	organisations	would	become	
‘Green	Deal	Providers’	and	from	the	start,	sign	ups	to	become	Green	Deal	Providers	were	
well	behind	what	was	expected	(Guertler	et	al,	2013).	There	were	delays	and	confusion	
around	when	Green	Deal	Finance	would	become	available	–	the	date	changed	from	Autumn	
2012	to	early	2013,	and	what	was	meant	to	be	a	public	launch	in	October	2012	became	a	
‘soft	launch’	and	then	a	‘gradual	rollout’	of	the	scheme.	All	of	this,	combined	with	poor	
	
	
145	
media	representation	of	the	scheme,	with	numerous	‘horror	stories’	of	Green	Deal	retrofits	
emerging	(see	‘British	Gas	botched	our	insulation’	in	the	Telegraph,	2104)	and	continuous	
question	marks	about	whether	the	Green	Deal	would	tackle	fuel	poverty	(Independent,	
2013)	meant	that	the	Green	Deal	framework	has	struggled	continuously.	Very	recently	in	
July	2015	funding	for	the	Green	Deal	Finance	Company	has	been	cut	by	the	newly	elected	
Conservative	government,	with	no	replacement	energy	efficiency	scheme	on	the	horizon.		
Some	of	the	most	commonly	raised	issues	with	working	with	Green	Deal	and	ECO	are	
explored	in	further	detail	below.	
5.4.1	Complexity,	inconsistency	and	lack	of	clarity	around	policy.	
Despite	the	technical	specificity	and	the	shifting	of	responsibility	from	state	to	local	
networks	and	markets,	there	was	still	an	expectation	from	actors	on	the	ground	that	there	
would	be	more	guidance	and	advice	from	DECC	about	how	the	green	deal	process	would	
work	in	practice.	Observations	at	a	Green	Deal	briefing	day	in	October	2012	at	the	point	at	
which	Green	Deal	should	have	been	launched,	showed	an	Eon	representative	speaking	
publicly	about	his	struggle	to	comprehend	exactly	how	ECO	money	would	interact	with	
Green	Deal	Finance,	what	the	role	of	the	Green	Investment	Bank	was,	and	whether	their	
ECO	money	should	be	awarded	directly	to	partners	or	brokered.	This	was	in	response	to	
suggestions	from	DECC	that	a	certain	proportion	of	ECO	money	should	be	put	into	a	‘blind	
brokerage’	system,	which	never	materialised.	This	view	was	supported	by	members	of	the	
audience,	and	also	emerged	in	an	interview	with	a	key	third	sector	organisation:	
“The	trouble	is	none	of	us	know	how	much	ECO	is	going	into	brokerage.	We’ve	
always	known	that	not	all	of	it	would,	but	for	companies	and	projects	trying	to	access	
it	it’s	impossible	–	especially	when	you	see	British	Gas	doing	a	lot	of	the	work	
themselves.”	–SHAP	representative	
	
Some	industry	actors	also	struggled	to	make	sense	of	the	Green	Deal	offer	and	process,	
unclear	who	was	responsible	for	which	parts	and	what	it	was	offering	in	terms	of	a	financial	
product	or	an	installation	service:	
“We	are	used	to	working	with	people	either	who	know	what	they	want	or	if	they	don’t	we	
tell	them	what	they	want	and	they	listen	to	us.	We	have	that	relationship	directly	with	them.	
With	this,	it’s	something	else	entirely.	Am	I	supposed	to	know	how	their	finance	
arrangement	works?	I’m	a	building	contractor!	Who’s	dealing	with	the	customer?	I’m	in	the	
industry	every	day	and	I	don’t	understand	it	so	how	is	a	homeowner	with	no	expertise	meant	
to	understand	it?”	Energy	Saving	Co-op	installer	member	2.	
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In	terms	of	the	ECO	there	were	also	ongoing	issues	and	inconsistencies	with	accessing	and	
spending	the	ECO	money	which	emerged	as	the	cases	progressed,	exposing	the	lack	of	
clarity	at	national	level:	
“ECO	is,	as	you	know,	ridiculously	complicated.	We	had	thought	it	would	all	be	
available	in	a	pot	to	dip	in	and	out	of	–	but	that	turned	out	not	to	be	the	case.”	–	BCC	
project	co-ordinator	
	
Furthermore,	the	accreditation	framework	set	up	for	the	industry	(PAS	2030	accreditation),	
which	installers	were	required	to	have	if	they	wanted	to	access	ECO	or	Green	Deal	related	
work,	as	well	as	the	reporting	and	auditing	process	required	for	installations	to	qualify	for	
ECO	subsidies	–	presented	some	significant	administrative	challenges:	
“For	every	boiler	we	install	we	have	to	upload	30	documents	to	get	the	ECO.	We’ve	
done	20	boiler	installs	this	week	–	that’s	600	documents!!	I	do	realise	the	need	to	
stop	cowboys	but	this	is	ridiculous.”	Energy	Saving	Co-op	installer	member	1.	
	
Compounding	these	issues	with	a	lack	of	clarity	around	ECO	and	Green	Deal,	there	was	a	
persistent	lack	of	trust	in	the	energy	policy	climate,	which	was	seen	as	being	sporadic	and	
unstable.	The	Feed-in-tariff	introduced	in	2009	had	contributed	to	the	rapid	growth	of	the	
solar	PV	industry,	but	was	abruptly	slashed	in	2011,	from	46p	per	kWh	to	21p	per	kWh.	This	
created	significant	problems	for	community	schemes	and	installers	alike,	whose	incomes	
depended	on	the	FiT’s	attractiveness	as	an	investment,	which	left	a	feeling	of	uncertainty	
throughout	the	emerging	energy	efficiency	industry.	Alongside	the	inconsistent	media	and	
government	support	and	endorsement	of	Green	Deal,	and	followed	by	the	changes	to	ECO	
in	late	2013,	this	created	a	very	uncertain	atmosphere	for	retrofit	installers,	advisors	and	
intermediaries	alike:		
“Our	turnover	went	from	£3.1m	to	£800k	in	2012.	The	work	just	fell	through	the	floor	
when	they	cut	it,	and	you	know	as	that	agenda	moved	away	from	PV	it	became	
about	the	whole	house,	and	we	needed	to	be	prepared	for	that	like	we	always	try	to	
be	but	we’re	worried	that	something	similar	will	happen.”		
	
The	quote	above	is	from	an	ESC	installer	member,	who	demonstrates	this	issue	as	he	
describes	the	effect	of	the	FiTs	cut	on	his	small	business.	
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5.4.2	Difficulties	transitioning	from	social	housing	to	privately	owned	
and	occupied	market:	
Other	difficulties	with	the	Green	Deal/ECO	policy	regime	focussed	on	the	shift	from	social	
housing	to	privately	owned	and	occupied	housing.	Previous	schemes	such	as	CERT	and	CESP	
had	created	existing	relationships	and	infrastructure	between	social	housing	providers	
energy	companies	and	contractors,	and	much	of	the	ECO	was	far	easier	for	energy	
companies	to	deliver	at	scale	in	social	housing	or	deprived	communities,	which	also	often	
offered	measures	with	100%	funding	so	there	was	no	upfront	cost	to	the	homeowner,	
landlord	or	provider.		One-by-one	arrangements	with	privately	owner-occupied	housing	in	
which	every	homeowner	represents	an	asset	holder	with	complex	life	circumstances,	
preferences	and	motives,	and	in	which	they	must	usually	contribute		a	significant	sum	of	
their	own	capital	and/or	be	willing	to	take	on	a	significant	level	of	disruption,	which	makes	
engagement	a	greater	challenge:	
“The	trouble	with	the	private	properties	is	that	you’ve	got	to	draw	people	in.	You	
can’t	just	say	we’re	going	to	do	this	to	your	house,	they’ve	got	to	volunteer	to	have	it	
done	and	[SWI	is]	a	fairly	unknown	technology	-	people	aren’t	that	familiar	with	it	so	
it’s	not	an	easy	sell.”	BHEU	project	co-ordinator	
This	view	was	supported	by	an	ESC	community	partner’s	experience	of	trying	to	engage	
householders	with	retrofit	through	the	ESC’s	pilot	project:	
“The	whole	process	with	the	householder	is	a	nightmare	–	this	is	not	a	lean	process!	
There’s	a	ridiculous	amount	of	work	that	needs	to	be	done	for	each	household	before	
anything	gets	installed,	and	the	installation	itself	is	ridiculously	expensive	as	it	is.”		
ESC	Community	Partner	
These	perspectives	suggest	that	engaging	the	owner	occupied	housing	sector	requires	a	
much	more	intensive	level	of	engagement,	handholding	and	reporting	than	the	social	
housing	sector	to	achieve	any	increase	in	the	prevalence	of	retrofit.	
5.4.3	Lack	of	regulatory	mechanisms	
A	significant	feature	of	the	policy	climate	is	that	despite	promoting	particular	technologies	
and	creating	incentives	and	tools	such	as	PAYS,	and	an	industry	standard	around	domestic	
retrofit	to	be	able	to	provide	the	works,	there	is	very	little	regulation	of	retrofit	in	the	
privately	owned	and	occupied	housing	-	the	sector	that	incorporates	the	vast	majority	of	
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people	in	the	UK	(Swan,	Wetherill	and	Abbott,	2013).	At	the	time	of	the	study,	the	only	
regulations	for	existing	homes	were	the	requirement	to	make	available	the	EPC	for	the	
property	upon	it	being	built,	sold	or	being	let,	and	Part	L1B	of	the	building	regulations,	
which	set	minimum	standards	for	different	parts	of	a	home,	including	‘thermal	elements’	–	
i.e.	walls,	windows	and	doors	–	that	are	being	renovated,	or	their	fabric	altered	over	25%,	or	
a	significant	heating	system	change	is	made.	This	means	that	there	are	performance	
standards,	such	as	particular	u-values	(calculations	of	heat	loss	through	a	material)	which	
retrofitted	elements	must	meet,	as	well	as	when	an	extension	over	a	certain	size	is	built,	or	
when	the	building’s	use	changes.	However,	there	is	no	regulatory	imperative	for	retrofit	for	
the	majority	of	existing	homes	that	are	not	being	renovated	or	significantly	altered.	This	
policy	and	regulation	gap	means	that	the	rhetoric	of	prioritising	energy	efficiency	in	climate	
change	strategies	is	not	matched	by	a	regulatory	structure,	thus	lacking	the	‘push’	factors	
required	for	a	functioning	socio-technical	transition	to	improved	energy	efficiency,	relying	
only	on	the	market	‘pull’	factors	(Vergragt	and	Brown,	2012).		
5.4.4	Lack	of	alignment	with	planning	
The	technological	focus	of	the	policy	climate	–	external	wall	insulation	-	is	not	automatically	
supported	by	the	National	Planning	Framework	which	is	often	interpreted	differently	by	
individual	authorities	and	even	by	individual	planning	officers	(Friedman	et	al,	2013).	This	
issue	is	illustrated	by	the	following	perspective	from	a	previous	energy	efficiency	policy	
advisor:	
	
“It’s	getting	less	and	less	joined	up	with	planning	–	DCLG	are	not	on	the	same	agenda	
and	they’ve	been	backtracking	on	building	regs,	on	the	energy	efficiency	obligation	
as	part	of	major	renovations	in	planning	permission	–	it’s	clearly	not	a	priority	for		
them.”	–	Ex-EST	policy	advisor.	
	
Approaches	to	planning	consider	multiple	factors	including	preserving	buildings	with	
heritage	status	and	the	appearance	of	conservation	areas,	and	the	aesthetic	qualities	of	a	
neighbourhood,	street	or	building.	This	means	that	deciding	firstly	whether	does	require	
planning	permission,	or	secondly	if	planning	permission	should	be	granted	when	it	is	
deemed	that	a	full	application	must	be	made,	is	not	a	simple	decision.	Some	local	
authorities	have	defined	external	wall	insulation	as	a	‘permitted	development’,	and	some	
have	defined	partial	installations	(external	wall	insulation	on	the	back	of	the	property	and	
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internal	wall	insulation	on	the	front,	to	preserve	the	appearance	of	the	property).	Many	
other	external	wall	installations	do	require	full	planning	permission	which	adds	considerable	
cost	and	time	to	an	installation,	and	even	then,	applications	of	planning	guidelines	vary	
(Friedman	et	al,	2013).	This	results	in	a	clear	picture	of	the	policy	areas	of	planning	and	
energy	efficiency	being	poorly	aligned.	
5.4.5	Neglecting	householders:	finance	and	technical	fixes.	
Another	issue	concerns	the	interest	rates	offered	by	the	Green	Deal	Finance	Company	for	
retrofit-based	loans.	Although	being	accessible	to	a	wide	range	of	people	including	those	
who	may	not	be	able	to	access	traditional	personal	loans	(Guertler,	2013),	rates	are	high	
compared	to	mortgages,	at	around	7%	interest,	appearing	as	an	expensive	investment	over	
time,	and	presenting	difficulties	with	making	solid	wall	insulation	-	which	can	cost	between	
£5000	and	£20000	per	property	fit	into	the	‘golden	rule’:	
“We	know	from	the	research	that	we’ve	done	that	Green	Deal	and	ECO	don’t	actually	
cover	the	cost	of	the	work	if	there’s	external	wall	insulation	involved,	so	there	still	has	
to	be	a	contribution	or	a	top	up	from	somewhere.	Either	the	householder	puts	in	their	
own	cash	or	they	get	another	loan	or	something,	which	is	a	real	challenge.	So	the	
finance	provision	hasn’t	actually	solved	the	issue	it	was	meant	to	solve.”	SHAP	
Representative		
	
Combined	with	the	uncertainty	and	inconsistency	around	how	ECO	combines	with	Green	
Deal	Finance	which	is	very	complex	for	private	owner	occupiers,	and	the	changes	to	ECO	in	
December	2013	which	reduced	the	amount	of	subsidy	available	to	householders,	this	has	
created	a		very	unclear	situation	in	terms	of	predicting	costs	for	householders.		
	
What	we	also	see	in	both	the	previous	government	programmes	and	the	ESOs	is	that	there	
is	a	long	history	of	technological	specificity	around	insulation	and	boilers	manifest	in	a	
measures-based,	‘technology	first’	approach:	
“The	issue	is	that	policy	is	directed	at	‘things’	not	people,	and	it	fails	to	acknowledge	
that	finance	isn’t	always	the	barrier	–	there	are	social	differences	and	different	values	
between	places	and	households	even	for	the	same	property	and	tenure	type,	so	the	
idea	that	you	just	provide	loan	finance	and	people	will	come	flocking	is	very	
shortsighted.	Energy	policy	has	always	struggled	with	people.”		Ex	EST	policy	advisor	
	
This	approach	assumes	that	solving	the	problems	associated	with	poor	energy	efficiency		
can	be	achieved	through	marketing	these	particular	products	(in	Green	Deal	and	ECO	this	
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relates	specifically	to	external	wall	insulation)	available	to	the	public,	rather	than	
embedding	behaviour	change	or	understanding	of	energy	usage	and	practices	into	retrofit	
schemes	alongside	or	even	instead	of	technical	measures.		
“The	Green	Deal	is	the	mechanism	we	have	to	work	within.	But	it	seems	to	have	been	
set	up	by	financiers	to	support	large	businesses,	sell	products,	and	put	financial	
mechanisms	in	place.	Now	if	you	really	want	to	help	people,	make	their	homes	more	
energy	efficient	and	reduce	their	bills,	your	best	bet	is	to	go	around	and	do	behaviour	
change	with	them…	how	to	use	their	boilers,	how	putting	all	their	clothes	to	dry	on	
the	radiators	is	contributing	to	black	mould	growth.	Help	them	understand	the	
difference	between	ventilation	and	air	leakage.	That	will	save	people	more	money	
than	putting	external	wall	insulation	on	when	they’ve	got	massive	holes	in	their	wall	
that	aren’t	dealt	with,	or	when	they’ve	still	got	single	glazing.”	BHEU	retrofit	officer.	
This	quotation	both	questions	the	underlying	motives	of	the	Green	Deal	and	rues	the	
missed	opportunity	to	combine	an	understanding	of	householders	behaviour	with	the	
technological	and	financial	elements	of	Green	Deal	and	ECO.	
5.4.7	Ideological	gaps	between	policy	and	practice	
Overall,	there	seems	to	be	a	considerable	gap	in	perception	of	what	the	retrofit	industry	
and	people	working	within	it	and	around	it	think	that	national	policy	should	be	trying	to	do,	
and	the	context	that	it	has	actually	created.	The	tensions	caused	by	tackling	fuel	poverty	
and	climate	change	as	joint	objectives	generates	significant	frustrations	for	those	enacting	
policy,	as	demonstrated	by	this	quotation	from	a	representative	of	a	national	sustainable	
housing	charity:	
	“There	is	a	moral	issue	here	with	ECO.	A	lot	of	people	have	been	approaching	this	
from	a	fuel	poverty	perspective	and	there	is	a	huge	target	group	for	that,	who	should	
be	first	in	line	for	ECO	because	they’re	the	most	vulnerable.	But	if	you	really	want	to	
get	a	supply	chain	going	and	tackle	carbon	you	really	need	to	look	at	the	Green	Deal	
side	of	things	too	and	many	of	those	people	will	be	eligible	for	ECO	too,	and	there	
isn’t	enough	ECO	to	go	round.	So	what’s	more	important?	That’s	something	I	find	
very	difficult	to	reconcile.”	SHAP	representative	
	
An	installer	also	laments	a	feeling	of	injustice	about	how	the	policy	context	directs	funding:	
	
“People	are	making	life	decisions	about	whether	to	turn	on	the	electricity	or	feed	
their	children.	That’s	disgusting	in	the	year	2013.	The	government	thinks	ECO	will	
sort	that	out,	but	it’s	not.	It’s	as	if	they’ve	deliberately	made	it	unnecessarily	hard	to	
get	the	money	to	the	people	who	need	it	the	most.”	ESC	installer	member	1		
	
And	finally,	a	council	officer	questions	the	ideological	premise	of	the	Green	Deal	as	a	market	
mechanism	and	its	ultimate	effectiveness:	
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“The	fundamental	flaw	in	this	is	that	Green	Deal	is	a	market	mechanism.	There’s	a	
very	good	argument	for	why	a	national	scheme	of	just	fully	funding	it	would	pay	for	
itself	and	more	in	social	benefits,	employment	and	so	on,	but	there’s	no	room	for	
that	in	the	conversation.”	BHEU	retrofit	officer.	
	
Together,	these	perspectives	demonstrate	a	significant	scepticism	of	and	challenge	to	the	
ideological	foundations	of	the	Green	Deal	and	ECO	policy	context,	by	those	charged	with	
delivering	and	implementing	these	policy	tools	at	the	local	level,	indicating	an	ideological	
divide	between	the	problem	definitions	at	national	and	EU	policy	level	and	at	the	local	level.	
5.5	Summary	
This	chapter	has	presented	an	overview	of	the	three	key	policies	affecting	domestic	retrofit	
of	privately	owned	and	occupied	homes	in	UK	cities.	It	has	outlined	Green	Deal,	ECO	and	the	
Localism	Act		and	has	demonstrated	how	the	agendas	behind	these	policies	have	been	
produced	and	entwined	over	time,	reflecting	competing	landscape	issues	from	economic	
crisis,	climate	change	and	energy	security,	to	shifting	forms	of	urban	governance.		This	suite	
of	policies	reflect	the	political	priorities	and	context	of	the	specific	temporal	zone	in	which	
they	were	produced,	reflecting	particular	contemporary	ideological	and	technological	
priorities	in	their	focus	on	local	economic	growth,	market-making	and	finance	provision,	
solid	wall	insulation	and	boilers	and	a	degree	of	devolution	of	decision	making	away	from	
central	government	and	both	upwards	towards	EU	policy	and	downwards	to	local	
governance	coalitions.	
The	function	of	this	exercise	was	to	populate	some	of	the	key	issues	and	actors	that	may	be	
common	across	the	macro-level	of	the	three	case	study	experimental	assemblages.	This	
chapter	has	ascertained	that	this	particular	policy	context	created	space	and	possibility	for	
localised	experimentation,	and	an	expectation	of	variation	between	places.	It	also	
necessitated	the	involvement	of	networks	of	actors	crossing	multiple	scales	and	with	
various	areas	of	expertise	in	responding	to	the	different	parts	of	the	domestic	retrofit	
problem.	Furthermore,	it	fixed	certain	aspects	of	supranational,	i.e.	EU	policy	in	the	
architecture	of	the	retrofit	process,	thus	setting	significant	rules	and	boundaries	around	
retrofit	practices,	such	as	the	mandatory	Green	Deal	Assessment	which	starts	the	retrofit	
process	for	the	householder,	the	Pay	As	You	Save	mechanism,	creating	industry	
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accreditation	for	practitioners	and	prioritising	solid	wall	insulation	and	boilers	as	
technological	fixes	–	with	other	measures	often	conditional	on	these.		
What	it	also	created,	though,	is	a	set	of	particular	challenges	for	retrofit	stakeholders	
ranging	from	complex	financial	issues	with	aligning	Green	Deal	Finance	and	ECO	to	moral	
and	ideological	issues	with	what	policy	priorities	should	be,	as	well	as	an	uncertain	context	
for	practitioners	to	work	within	due	to	previous	experiences	of	abrupt	policy	changes.	There	
were	also	challenges	in	the	retrofit	supply	chain	around	overly	onerous	accreditation	and	
reporting	for	ECO,	as	well	as	inconsistency	in	accessing	it,	and	a	persistent	lack	of	
confidence	in	the	Green	Deal	policy	rhetoric	from	both	government	and	the	media.	In	
system	terms,	the	Green	Deal/ECO	framework	represents	an	effort	to	create	a	new	system	
for	retrofit	similar	to	that	depicted	by	Swan	(2013).	But	the	focus	on	the	financial	and	
technological	aspects	of	the	socio-technical	system	for	domestic	energy	use	and	the	lack	of	
attention	to	the	social,	cultural	and	people-focussed	elements		-	along	with	a	lack	of	
regulation	-	produces	an	imbalanced	or	incomplete	system.	This	significantly	limits	the	
possibilities	for	change	that	localised	experiments	can	effect	because	in	transitions	thinking,	
change	can	only	be	effected	if	all	the	levels	and	parts	of	the	system	work	in	harmony	to	do	
so	(REF	again).		
The	entwinement	of	places	and	spaces	within	this	as	loci	for	experimentation	and	the	
positioning	of	localised	urban	networks	as	becoming	responsible	for	acting	on	retrofit	
through	the	city	deals	and	DECC-combined	funding,	adds	another	critical	factor	to	the	
possibilities	for	change:	the	place-specific	nature	of	those	networks	and	the	particular	
capacities	and	skills	that	they	encompass.	This	makes	highly	relevant	the	observations	of	
Brenner	(2004	and	2009)	and	Swyngedouw	(2010)	of	the	varying,	place-specific	and	often	
temporary	configurations	that	coalesce	around	such	issues	in	urban	spaces,	with	networks	
often	engaging	directly	from	local	level	with	global	circuits	of	capital	and	governance	
structures,	and	the	differential	levels	of	influence	of	different	interest	groups	that	are	
created	by	these	coalitions	of	actors	under	the	conditions	of	economic	competition.		
Having	populated	the	landscape	area	of	the	assemblage	the	thesis	will	now	examine	three	
different	experimental	urban	responses	to	the	issue	of	domestic	retrofit,	and	how	they	each	
connect	with	and	navigate	that	landscape.	
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Chapter	6	-	Case	study	#1:	Carbon	Co-op,	Manchester	
Carbon	Co-op	in	itself	was	a	grassroots	movement	consisting	of	householders	who	were	
committed	to	fighting	climate	change	through	the	particular	vehicle	of	domestic	retrofit,	
but	its	projects	embedded	it	into	a	broader	suite	of	local	and	city-regional	government	
retrofit	efforts.	For	Carbon	Co-op,	this	meant	balancing	the	expectations	of	multiple	local	
organisations	as	well	as	individuals,	and	navigating	new	working	relationships	whilst	
retaining	its	grassroots	identity,	through	the	high-end,	whole	house	retrofit	of	eight	homes	
in	Greater	Manchester.	The	table	below	shows	some	of	its	key	features	and	the	rest	of	the	
case	study	explores	the	factors	and	actors,	issues	and	pressures	that	contributed	to	the	
story	of	Carbon	Co-op.		
Tagline	 An	experiment	in	co-operation	between	a	
grassroots	movement	and	local	government.	
Defining	features	 Grassroots	householder	co-operative	
providing	whole	house	surveys,	technical	
support	and	practical,	experiential	support	
for	householders	wishing	to	make	their	
homes	more	energy	efficient.		
Key	Activities	 Greater	Manchester	‘Go	Early’	Green	Deal	
pilot,	Stockport	community	engagement	
projects,	Developing	survey	method	
Developing	energy	monitors		
Key	priorities	 Tackling	climate	change,	technical	
excellence,	survey	methods,	peer	to	peer	
support.	
Key	relationships	 GM	local	authorities	–	at	city-regional	and	
individual	council	level,		
URBED	architectural	solutions,		
Personal	relationships	and	shared	history	of	
environmental	activism.	
Outcomes	and	effects	 8	whole	house	retrofits	completed,	self-
assessment	survey	method	developed,	60	
whole	house	surveys	completed	and	
community	advice	and	support	networks	
developed.	
Table	7	-	Key	features	of	Carbon	Co-op.	
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6.1	What	is	Carbon	Co-op?		
Carbon	Co-op	is	a	householder	co-operative	characterised		by	its	provision	of	very	detailed		
whole	house	surveys,	its	peer-to-peer	retrofit	support	approach	and	its	engagement	with	
multiple	projects	at	once.	It	runs	community	engagement	workshops	and	events	relating	to	
various	aspects	of	retrofit	and	improving	domestic	energy	efficiency	across	Greater	
Manchester,	such	as	bus	tours	of	retrofitted	houses	in	the	region,	sharing	advice	and	
information	both	online	and	between	neighbours,	and	developing	open	source	energy	
monitors.	It	covers	an	area	ranging	right	across	the	493	square	miles	of	Greater	Manchester,	
from		Bury	and	Rochdale	in	the	NorthEast	to	Wigan	in	the	West	and	Stockport	in	the	
SouthEast	of	the	region.	Its	primary	activity	through	2012-2014	was	conducting	whole	
house	surveys	and	project	managing	whole-house	retrofits,	working	with	the	Greater	
Manchester	Combined	Authority	(GMCA)	as	part	of	one	of	the	core	cities’	‘Go	Early’	pilot	
projects	for	the	government’s	Green	Deal,	delivering	twelve	whole	house	retrofits	aiming	
for	high	carbon	reductions	(80%	in	each	house)	across	the	Manchester	region,	including	a	
suite	of	measures	in	each	house	such	as	loft	and	solid	wall	insulation	–	both	internal	and	
external,	new	boilers,	heating	controls,	passive	stack	ventilation	systems,	microgeneration	
technologies,	underfloor	insulation,	triple	glazed	windows	and	doors,	and	others.			
6.1.1	Organisational	form	and	governance	
The	organisation’s	membership	is	comprised	by	likeminded	and	professionally	or	socially	
connected	individuals	in	the	Manchester	area,	many	of	whom	worked	at	some	stage	for	
URBED,	or	had	been	involved	in	environmental	activism	or	the	city-regional	network	of	
environmental	organisations	at	some	stage,	including	many	who	had	been	involved	in	other	
co-operatives.	Members	were	able	to	vote	on	matters	concerning	what	projects	and	
activities	Carbon	Co-op	took	on,	who	it	worked	with	(e.g.	which	accountants	it	chose)	and	
who	sat	on	its	board	of	directors.	Much	of	the	running	of	Carbon	Co-op	was	done	by	
members	on	a	voluntary	or	at	least	partly	voluntary	basis,	such	as	website	upkeep,	
promotional	events,	administration,	newsletters	and	so	on.	The	decision	to	be	a	co-op	was	
based	both	on	market	research	around	retrofitting	showing	that	co-ops	were	one	of	the	
most	trusted	kinds	of	organisations,	and	a	shared	belief	the	co-operative	form	as	an	
emblem	of	independence	and	social	justice,	with	a	particular	focus	on	the	lack	of	external	
shareholders	and	interests	as	shown	by	the	quotations	below:	
	
	
155	
“One	of	the	biggest	barriers	is	disruption,	and	if	you’re	going	to	venture	into	that	
level	of	disruption,	you	really	want	to	have	absolute	confidence	in	the	people	who	are	
knocking	down	your	walls	and	so	on.	And	the	ethical	and	mutual	underpinning	[of	
carbon	co-op]	has	got	to	increase	your	confidence.”		Board	member	4/Sustainable	
Living	in	the	Heatons	(SLiH)	
There	is	an	element	of	trust	that	people	have	towards	something	that	is	independent	
and	impartial….	So	instead	of	being	visited	by	the	council	by	someone	you’ll	never	see	
again,	it’s	your	neighbour.”	Board	member	3/Stockport	
The	other	significant	element	of	being	a	householder	co-operative,	as	opposed	to	a	worker	
co-operative	or	a	supplier	co-operative,	was	the	principle	of	being	better	able	to	take	action	
on	climate	change	or	social	justice	collectively	rather	than	as	individuals.		
6.2	Carbon	Co-op’s	goals	and	priorities:	ambitious	vision,	modest	
targets		
When	asked	about	what	might	constitute	a	success	for	Carbon	Co-op,	interview	participants	
consistently	stated	that	their	aims	were	modest,	and	that	their	visions	of	success	were	
based	more	on	principles	than	numerical	targets.	The	following	quote	illustrates	this	
approach:	
“We	don’t’	really	have	targets…	We	have	a	trajectory	that	we’d	like	to	be	on…”		
Project	Manager	
Where	‘numbers’	did	come	into	the	goals	and	targets	of	Carbon	Co-op,	this	was	in	relation	
to	growing	the	membership	base,	and	even	then	were	flexible:	
	“We	don’t	know	what	we	can	say	about	scale,	but	our	targets	are	informed	by	what	
we	can	see	in	front	of	us	–	in	the	first	year	we	would	like,	say,	40	or	50	members,	in	
the	second	year	maybe	200.	And	maybe	10%	of	those	will	be	retrofitting”.	Board	
Member	3/Stockport	
There	was	a	shared,	long	term	vision	of	the	Co-op	as	facilitating	the	growth	of	retrofit	
locally,	with	lots	of	households	communicating	the	retrofit	‘message’	to	each	other,	a	series	
of	retrofit	showhomes	demonstrating	the	possibilities	of	retrofit,	and	the	involvement	of	
local	colleges	and	other	organisations	in	progressing	the	agenda.	This	vision	included	
encouraging	a	change	in	frame	of	mind	to	more	people	becoming	motivated	to	retrofit	by	
protecting	the	environment	instead	of	by	saving	money.	
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But	there	were	also	goals	that	related	to	products	and	the	local	economy,	such	as	the	hope	
to	boost	local	employment	and	generate	a	local	retrofit	economy	instead	of,	for	example,	
sourcing	timber	window	frames	from	Scandinavia.	There	were	long	term	goals	of	
incorporating	ethical	conditions	in	contracts	when	selecting	suppliers,	and	an	even	broader	
goal	of	replicability	-	creating	an	organisational	model	–	in	terms	of	Carbon	Co-op’s	
approach	to	community	engagement	and	membership	-	that	can	be	replicated	and	self-
sustaining	in	other	communities	than	just	Manchester:	
[When	asked	if	the	issues	Carbon	Co-op	are	working	on	are	Manchester	specific]	“Oh	
no,	definitely	not.	Part	of	its	attractiveness	is	that	you	can	do	this	anywhere….	If	it’s	
not	replicable,	it’s	failed.”	Board	member	4/SLiH	
However,	the	individual	projects	that	Carbon	Co-op	was	involved	in	did	have	specific	
targets,	such	as	the	Go	Early	project	targets	of	twelve	whole	house	retrofits,	and	the	Carbon	
Co-op	in	Stockport	project	targets	of	holding	ten	community	champions	workshops	in	local	
residents	houses	and	getting	ten	people	signed	up	to	have	whole	house	assessments.	These	
targets	were	negotiated,	such	as	the	original	twelve	Go	Early	homes	being	increased	to	
fourteen	with	the	addition	of	extra	funding,	(but	reduced	to	8	as	practical,	financial	and	
motivational	issues	prevented	some	of	the	houses	from	proceeding),	and	the	ten	whole	
house	assessments	being	conditional	on	the	households	being	prepared	to	have	some	of	
the	recommended	retrofit	measures	installed	within	a	year.		
6.2.1	Experimental	orientation	–	what	is	it	testing	and	why?		
Carbon	Co-op	does	not	have	one	priority	area	that	it	is	testing	through	its	retrofit	work,	
focussing	on	technical,	social/motivational,	practical	and	processual	and	experiential,	tacit	
knowledge	all	at	once,	as	shown	in	the	table	below,	and	with	different	knowledge	interests	
for	different	partners.	The	knowledge	focus	for	URBED	was	heavily	technical	–	with	one	
respondent	describing	the	Go	Early	scheme	as	a	“technical	playground	for	URBED”	.	It	
provided	valuable	technical	data	to	URBED	in	terms	of	assessing	techniques	of	applying	
external	wall	insulation	and	their	relationship	to	condensation,	or	testing	the	actual	in-situ	
thermal	performance	of	different	insulant	materials.	A	perceived	shortage	of	specialist	
knowledge	about	the	after	effects	of	retrofit	drove	a	collaboration	with	University	of	Salford	
and	the	Greater	Manchester	Low	Carbon	Hub	on	monitoring,	sharing	data	from	the	Go	Early	
pilot	houses	which	showed	energy	use	before,	during	and	after	the	retrofit	process.	For	
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Stockport	and	Manchester	Councils,	Carbon	Co-op’s	value	was	in	its	socially-focussed	
knowledge	–	its	approach	to	community	engagement	and	sharing	information	between	
householders,	and	in	the	eyes	of	the	GMCA	the	function	of	Carbon	Co-op	was	in	producing	
demonstrations	of	successful	retrofit,	playing	a	role	in	kickstarting	a	market.	Recognition	
within	the	Carbon	Co-op	of	the	need	for	multiple	forms	of	knowledge	to	approach	this	is	
also	shared	by	its	partners:	
“What	we	are	going	to	have	is	a	lot	of	technical	problems	that	have	social	fallout,	if	
we	don’t	do	it	properly.	You	get	damp,	you	get	mould	growth,	you	get	systems	not	
working	properly	and	people	living	in	cold	houses,	you	get	illnesses.	It’s	quite	
fashionable	intellectually	to	say	oh	but	it’s	not	just	a	technical	problem	it’s	a	social	
problem,	but	it	isn’t	just	a	social	problem	either,	it’s	both.”		Salford	university	partner	
Knowledge	focus	 Example	and	source	
Testing	technical	elements	
of	retrofit	as	part	of	a	city-
regional	approach.	
“This	is	basically	a	technical	playground	for	URBED.”	
Salford	University	partner	
“This	is	a	learning	period…	It’ll	change	how	we	engage	
with	residents,	both	before,	during	and	after,	how	we	
evaluate,	how	do	we	make	those	savings,	what	works	and	
what	doesn’t,	who	is	best	to	communicate	that	message,	
how	we	bring	in	innovation,	so	we	can	understand	
technologies	that	aren’t	mainstream	now	they’re	too	
expensive	–	and	this	is	something	that	Carbon	Co-op	might	
be	able	to	do	because	their	people	are	sometimes	
prepared	to	pay	a	bit	more	for	these	technologies.”	GMCA	
partner	
Demonstrating	the	retrofit	
process		
“We	want	to	rehearse	the	whole	Carbon	Co-op	process	
from	recruitment,	assessment,	recommending	measures,	
going	through	the	whole	process	with	the	householder,	
modelling,	how	much	money	it’s	going	to	cost	them,	what	
kind	of	loan	repayments	they	can	afford,	during	the	works,	
arranging	the	finance,	project	managing	the	works…err,	
and	then	evaluation.”	Project	manager	
	
“Part	of	it	is	proof	of	concept	–	households	who	have	done	
it	and	are	happy	with	the	product,	hasn’t	created	any	
problems	with	the	home,	happy	with	the	quality	of	work,	
and	who	feel	as	though	they	have	played	their	part.”	
GMCA		Partner	
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Testing	open	source,	
collaborative	approach	to	
knowledge	generation	
“..this	idea	about	the	energy	monitors	is	a	key	thing	–	we	
needed	that	tool	so	rather	than	try	and	buy	it,	we’ve	
invented	and	developed	it,	a	new	technology.	Not	only	that	
but	it’s	open	source,	so	lots	of	people	can	participate	in	it.	
It’s	a	big	problem	this,	we	need	lots	of	minds	on	it,	not	a	
closed	approach.”	Project	manager	
Generating	and	sharing	
technical	and	experiential	
knowledge	of	retrofit	
“One	of	the	best	things	about	having	your	own	home	is	
experimenting	in	your	home,	you	know	testing	things	out.	
And	as	we	were	all	doing	different	things	we	were	all	
understanding	the	difficulties.	Whether	it	was	choosing	
what	thing	to	do	to	the	house,	how	to	do	it,	is	it	insulation?	
How	do	you	apply	it	to	the	wall?	What	product	–	you	know	
out	of	a	hundred	products	out	there	–	so	it	was	about	
thinking	blimey	–	and	feeling	like	you	were	doing	it	a	little	
bit	blindly…		So	it	made	sense	to	get	together	and	share	
this	knowledge	so	that	whoever	is	doing	it	next	doesn’t	
have	to	go	through	the	same	mistakes	and	can	do	it	right	
straight	away.”		Board	member	3/Stockport	
Table	8	-	Carbon	Co-op	perspectives	on	knowledge	and	experimentation	
Many	of	Carbon	Co-ops	activities	were	connected	to	a	clear	idea	of	what	Carbon	co-op	
wished	to	do	with	the	learning	afterwards.	For	example,	Carbon	Co-op	has	a	clear	stance	on	
the	need	to	make	technical	information	about	retrofit	accessible	to	non-experts,	both	in	
terms	of	communicating	complicated	information	clearly	to	householders	through	the	
Carbon	Co-op	whole	house	survey	report,	and	in	terms	of	‘demystifying’	technical	language:	
“	Language	is	used	to	create	a	hierarchy	and	give	different	positions.	So	say	a	
representative	of	an	energy	company	comes	along	and	…	they	are	all	about	using	the	
technical	language	to	try	and	get	you	to	trust	them	…	well	we	don’t	think	that’s	the	
right	way	to	go	about	it.	It’s	actually	by	explaining	the	complexity	of	technical	
problem	in	an	accessible	way	that	people	can	understand	what	those	things	mean.”	
Board	member	3/Stockport	
Similarly,	developing	the	energy	monitors	did	not	only	perform	an	instrumental	function	but	
an	ideological	one	too:		the	value	of	the	technology	and	the	knowledge	it	generated	being	
‘open	source’	rather	than	exclusive	–open	for	development	by	anyone	-	chimed	with	the	
Carbon	Co-op’s	organisational	values	of	co-operation.			
6.3	What	contextual	factors	influenced	Carbon	Co-op’s	priorities?		
As	identified	in	the	literature	review	and	theoretical	exploration	of	chapter	three,	multiple	
factors	and	actors	operating	at	various	different	scales	can	influence	experimental	
assemblages	at	the	local	level,	from	macro-level	landscape	issues	to	meso-level	issues	in	the	
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broader	urban	context	and	factors	at	the	micro-level	–	shown	in	red	and	green	in	figure	14	
below.	The	following	sections	seek	to	identify	the	factors	and	issues	at	these	three	levels	
that	were	significant	for	Carbon	Co-op,	and	conditioned	and	shaped	its	approach	and	
priorities.		
Figure	14	Carbon	Co-op	Assemblage	as	description	
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6.3.1	Macro-level	factors	
The	single	biggest	factor	driving	Carbon	Co-op	was	concern	for	climate	change.	When	one	
founder	member	was	asked	why	he	felt	retrofit	was	important,	he	answered,	in	relation	to	
the	issue	of	climate	change:	
“Because	I	want	to	be	able	to	sleep	at	night	knowing	I’ve	done	something	to	help	my	
kids	and	their	kids	have	an	inhabitable	world	to	live	in”	Board	member	1/URBED	
This	was	an	explicit	and	shared	motivation	for	the	organisation	and	its	members,	and	its	
strong	commitment	was	seen	as	a	particular	characteristic	of	the	organisation:	
“What’s	unique	about	Carbon	Co-op	is	that	it’s	committed	people	[to	climate	change]	
who	do	things	differently”	Board	member	5/householder.	
There	were	also	some	concerns	around	social	justice	linked	to	energy	security,	with	a	
fundamental	desire	to	empower	communities	and	reduce	dependency	upon	energy	
companies	both	by	the	instrumental	effects	of	retrofit	on	reducing	bills,	and	through	the	
principle	of	using	the	co-operative	model,	but	there	was	no	mention	of	the	economic	crisis.	
6.3.2	Meso	level	factors	-	supportive	governance	context	and	lack	of	
supply	chain.	
The	GMCA	city-regional	governance	structure,	with	ten	local	authorities	of	roughly	similar	
sizes,	who,	according	to	the	Salford	University	partner	“all	play	together	quite	well”,	and	are	
interested	in	and	committed	to	retrofit,	created	a	supportive	context	in	which	
experimenting	with	retrofitting	whole	houses	became	acceptable:	
[when	asked	about	the	role	of	Carbon	Co-op	in	relation	to	the	planned	mass	market	
green	deal	programme	in	Greater	Manchester]	–	“The	GM	view	is	that	it	is	supportive	
of	those	co-operative	approaches,	recognising	that	they	won’t	all	work,	that	that	is	a	
part	of	a	normal	market.	But	these	social,	environmental	issues	are	too	important	to	
wait	around	for	the	bottom	up	approach	to	work,	so	we	need	to	help	it	get	going	
really	quickly,	so	we	can	get	competitive	advantage	and	make	sure	that	we	are	on	
trajectory	with	our	carbon	emissions.	In	3-5	years	time,	if	we’re	sat	here	and	I	can	say	
we’ve	done	what	we	wanted	to	do,	we’ve	created	a	viable	market	in	GM,	it	could	be	
that	GM	can	back	out.	But	we	want	to	drive	it	early.”		GM	low	carbon	buildings	
director	
Furthermore,	this	supportive	environment	enabled	continuous	discussions	with	planners	in	
all	the	different	authorities	which	resulted	in	a	GM-	wide	guidance	note	advising	which	
installations	of	solid	wall	insulation	would	come	under	permitted	development	and	which	
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would	require	planning	permission	(external	wall	on	the	rear	and	side	of	properties,	with	
internal	wall	insulation	on	the	front	was	generally	agreed	to	be	permitted	development).	
This	knowledge	enabled	greater	awareness	in	design	and	projecting	timescales	for	works	for	
the	pilot	houses,	and	in	exploring	other	options	beyond	external	wall	insulation:		
“With	planning	the	more	you	communicate	right	from	the	start	the	better	the	
chances	are.	But	then	there	are	conservation	areas	–	there’s	no	point	asking	for	
external	wall	insulation.	So	with	the	whole	house	approach	that’s	a	battle	you	won’t	
win,	so	we	look	together	at	other	solutions	for	reducing	energy	use	that	will	still	help	
the	household	but	won’t	give	them	problems	with	planning	approval”		Board	
member	1/URBED	
However,	a	feature	of	the	GM	context	that	was	discovered	as	the	project	progressed	was	
that	there	was	a	distinct	lack	of	specific	retrofit	installers	in	the	city	region.	This	meant	that	
finding	accredited,	capable	and	experienced	contractors	to	carry	out	the	works	was	very	
difficult	for	Carbon	Co-op,	and	they	ended	up	working	with	a	standard	building	contractor	
instead.	
6.3.3	Micro-level	factors	
The	original	ideas	for	Carbon	Co-op	were	centred	on	community	empowerment	and	
ownership,	and	a	transition	in	energy	use	and	generation	as	a	way	of	achieving	that	
empowerment.	Through	the	personal	networks	and	open	conversations	between	the	
founder	members	these	concepts	connected	to	other	ideas	around	the	concept	of	mutual	
support	in	living	sustainably	and	a	consumer	co-operative	providing	a	vehicle	for	engaging	
more	people	at	once.	One	of	the	founder	members	had	also	retrofitted	his	own	house	to	
the	highest	possible	carbon	savings	as	an	experiment,	which	brought	a	particular	domestic	
retrofit	focus	to	these	general	ideas:	
“One	person	-	one	family	bought	this	Victorian	house	and	did	a	lot	of	work	to	it	and	I	
think	that	was	a	starting	point,	you	know,	for	realising	this	is	not	straightforward!	So	
he	was	a	big	driver	for	that.”	Board	member	3/Stockport	
The	presence	of	other	specific	individual	expertise	and	capacities,	though,	had	a	significant	
effect	on	the	initial	form	and	focus	of	Carbon	Co-op	and	its	strategies,	such	as	the	particular	
approaches	of	the	Project	Manager,	whose	particular	attributes	were	a	huge	factor	in	its	
approach	to	attracting	funding.	His	skills	in	bid	writing	and	and	his	ability	to	mobilise	and	
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engage	people	was	mentioned	numerous	times	throughout	the	fieldwork	process,	one	
example	being:	
“Everyone	knows	[Project	Manager].	He’s	got	about	8	million	fans	on	his	facebook	
and	about	4000	connections	on	LinkedIn...”	–	Generating	Success	Partner	
Furthermore,	the	involvement	of	open	source	energy	monitors	in	the	process	was	built	on	a	
particular	interest	of	one	of	the	board	members	in	open	source	technology,	showing	how	
individual	interests	shaped	and	interacted	with	the	Co-op’s	other	activities.	
6.4	How	did	Carbon	Co-op	go	about	meeting	its	goals	and	objectives?	
6.4.1	Funding	
Carbon	Co-op	received	funding	from	various	sources	over	its	development,	each	step	
piecing	together	to	create	the	organisation	and	its	activities	as	it	is	now.		In	2009	the	co-op	
won	£3000	from	NorthWest	Climate	Foundation	to	run	development	workshops	and	later	in	
2009	NESTA	invited	the	co-operative	to	bid	for	Big	Green	Challenge	funding	on	the	basis	of	a	
previous	failed	bid.	They	were	awarded	£10,000	plus	some	additional	funding	from	
Manchester	City	Council	to	run	a	pilot	in	Moss-side	over	2009-2010	which	focussed	on	
community	engagement.		In	2010	they	received	further	funding	from	NESTA	and	the	GM	
Innovation	Fund	to	do	a	feasibility	study	for	the	co-operative,	and	in	2011	the	co-operative	
received	£10k	of	funding	from	Manchester	City	Council	on	behalf	of	GMCA	to	develop	the	
rules	for,	officially	set	up	and	register	the	Carbon	Co-op.	At	this	time	they	also	wrote	a	share	
issue	to	attract	investment	to	fund	the	works.	However,	this	share	issue	was	based	on	
revenue	generated	from	Feed-in	–tariffs	paid	for	electricity	generated	from	installing	solar	
PV	panels	on	community	buildings.	In	2011	the	UK	government	halved	the	feed-in	tariff	for	
small	renewables	from	43.3p	to	21p	per	kWh,	which	rendered	the	share	offer	and	business	
plan	unfeasible	due	to	the	comparatively	poor	return	on	investment.	The	co-operative	then	
started	to	seek	other	sources	of	funding	including	community	projects	from	Manchester	
City	Council	and	investigating	the	possibilities	of	Green	Deal.	The	Green	Deal	Go	Early	
programme	–	a	pilot	of	large	scale	citywide	retrofitting	that	the	Greater	Manchester	
Combined	Authority	(GMCA)	had	at	this	precise	time	been	awarded	£2m	of	funding	from	
DECC	for	-	emerged	in	early	2012,	and,	in	the	words	of	Board	member	2/Project	manager:	
“it	just	fitted	with	everything	we	were	trying	to	do	really”.	
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It	was	at	this	point	that	Carbon	Co-op	became	primarily	involved	with	whole	house	retrofits:	
GMCA	awarded	Carbon	Co-op	£200,000	of	the	£2m	to	carry	out	the	private	sector	element	
of	this	project.	
6.4.2	Carbon	Co-op’s	activities	and	projects:	
Green	Deal	Go	Early	
The	twelve	houses	Carbon	Co-op	was	responsible	for	were	the	only	part	of	the	GM	pilot	
project	that	was	focussed	on	owner	occupied	housing,	with	the	high-cost	works	funded	by	
zero-interest	loans	from	the	DECC	money.	Their	task	was	to	recruit	participants,	perform	
household	surveys	and	assessments	and	design	packages,	and	project	manage	the	whole	
house	retrofits	at	the	installation	stage.	It	did	this	by	first	conducting	a	launch	event	in	
September	2012	that	combined	the	first	round	of	promotion	for	Green	Deal	Go	Early	with	
the	public	launch	of	the	Carbon	Co-op	and	a	drive	to	recruit	new	members	–	both	as	
potential	candidates	for	the	Go	Early	retrofits	themselves	and	for	their	support,	both	
financially	through	membership	fees	and	in	terms	of	voluntary	capacity	and	contribution	to	
running	the	organisation.	
Through	the	course	of	2013	Carbon	Co-op	narrowed	down	around	forty	possible	applicants	
to	the	twelve	homes	it	was	intending	to	use	for	the	Go	Early	pilot	project.	This	selection	was	
based	on	a	number	of	factors:	firstly,	the	twelve	pilot	homes	were	partly	selected	in	
geographically	diverse	locations	to	represent	the	whole	of	Greater	Manchester	region,	and	
to	encourage	engagement	in	communities	and	spaces	that	were	not	currently	engaged	with	
retrofitting.	Secondly,	the	houses	were	selected	to	represent	different	types	of	housing:	
“we’ve	tried	to	select	them	so	we’ve	got	a	semi-detached,	a	victorian	terrace,	
different	types	of	house	like	this,	so	there	is	an	understanding	that	if	someone	comes	
and	says	I’ve	got	a	1930’s	semi-detached,	they	can	go	to	a	manual	which	has	tested	
it	and	has	a	proven	solution	that	works.”		Board	member	2/Project	manager	
A	third	factor	in	selecting	the	pilot	houses	was	the	commitment	of	the	householder.	
Producing	successful	demonstration	projects	required	that	the	householders	receiving	the	
whole	house	assessments	or	the	0%	grant	from	DECC	via	GMCA	were	very	motivated	to	
carry	on	and	do	the	works	that	were	recommended	and	unlikely	to	pull	out.	This	meant	that	
they	needed	to	meet	certain	socio-economic	criteria	as	well,	such	as	owning	their	own	
house	rather	than	being	a	tenant,	and	being	able	to	make	the	loan	repayments	comfortably.	
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Over	the	course	of	2013	Carbon	Co-op	conducted	the	whole	house	surveys,	made	the	
recommendations	and	calculated	packages	of	works	and	costs,	procured	a	single	contractor	
(Jackson	and	Jacksons)	through	the	GM	Procure	Plus	resource,	utilised	URBED	for	
architectural	specifications	for	works	and	negotiated	a	series	of	obstacles	to	the	works	
being	completed.	There	were	significant	issues	with	acquiring	an	ECO	contribution	–	
specifically	for	the	solid	wall	insulation	-	to	reduce	the	overall	costs	of	the	works	because	of	
the	changes	to	the	ECO	in	2013	which	reduced	the	amount	available	from	energy	
companies	and	created	inconsistent	pricing	in	the	industry.	There	were	issues	with	some	of	
the	homes	requiring	planning	permission	and	significant	contractual	problems	between	
URBED,	Jackson	and	Jackson	and	Carbon	Co-op,	which	resulted	in	inconsistent	costings	for	
some	of	the	householders,	and	although	Carbon	Co-op	received	extra	funding	from	GMCA,	
a	number	of	householders	withdrew	from	the	scheme	and	only	eight	houses	remained.		
The	eight	houses	that	remained	had	their	measures	installed	throughout	January	2014,	with	
works	each	costing	£40,500	on	average	and	including	the	full	range	of	technical	measures	
listed	above.	Figures	15	and	16	below	show	some	of	the	works	in	progress:
	
Figure	15	Completed	External	Wall	Insulation	on	Carbon	Co-op	house	
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Figure	16	Internal	wall	insulation	being	applied	to	Carbon	Co-op	house	
Whilst	the	whole	house	retrofits	became	the	Carbon	Co-op’s	main	activity	in	2012	it	was	
also	engaged	in	a	number	of	other	energy-efficiency	related	activities,	in	order	to	avoid	
dependency	on	single	funding	sources	and	protect	against	policy	vulnerabilities.	
Generating	Success	
In	Generating	Success,	Carbon	Co-op	provided	technical	and	project	management	support	
through	workshops	and	feasibility	studies	for	a	series	of	four	renewable	energy	retrofit	
installations	in	community	buildings	in	the	rural	areas	around	Greater	Manchester,	including	
one	biomass	boiler	and	three	solar	PV	arrays.	This	was	done	in	partnership	with	the	Greater	
Manchester	Centre	for	Voluntary	Organisations	(GMCVO).	The	projects	were	intended	to	
produce	lessons	and	build	extra	capacity	in	the	Greater	Manchester	voluntary	sector	about	
how	to	manage	and	complete	community	renewable	projects.	
Energy	Monitors		
In	2012	Carbon	Co-op	also	became	involved	with	developing,	and	testing	open	source	
energy	monitors,	running	a	series	of	workshops	building	the	monitors	with	members	and	
interested	parties,	and	installing	them	in	the	GM	Green	Deal	pilot	houses.	This	monitoring	
data	is	being	used	and	interpreted	not	only	by	Carbon	Co-op	but	also	by	Salford	University,	
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to	support	other	retrofit	projects	in	Greater	Manchester	through	its	involvement	in	the	
retrofit	advisory	group	to	the	Low	Carbon	Hub.	
Community	Champions	and	Carbon	Co-op	in	Stockport	
In	2012	and	2013	Carbon	Co-op	ran	community	engagement	programmes	funded	by	
Manchester	City	Council	and	then	Stockport	Council,	along	with	Network	for	Social	Change,	
to	recruit	ten	‘community	champions’	for	retrofit	and	energy	efficiency,	promoting	the	idea,	
the	service	and	increasing	membership.	The	intention	was	to	“get	people	to	network”	
(Carbon	Co-op	board	member).	This	was	based	around	a	strategy	of	residents	hosting	
advice	sessions	in	their	homes,	with	their	neighbours.	This	included	sharing	experiences	of	
retrofit,	providing	technical	advice	–	or	access	to	it	through	Carbon	Co-op	–	about	retrofit	
measures	and	potential	issues	such	as	preserving	heritage	features,	and	practical	
information	about	costs,	suppliers	and	installers	and	planning	permission.	The	Carbon	Co-op	
in	Stockport	programme	also	offered	a	competition	for	ten	free	whole	house	assessments,	
on	the	condition	that	within	a	year	the	households	receiving	those	assessments	would	start	
some	of	the	works	recommended.		
6.4.3	Strategy	and	identity	
Technical	approach	–	survey	method,	monitoring	and	knowledge	sharing.	
Carbon	Co-op’s	unique	whole	house	assessment	method	is	one	of	its	defining	features:	
“Green	Deal	Assessments	are	so	generic,	this	is	why	we	need	a	tailored	approach	–	
on	this	street	the	houses	are	exactly	the	same,	but	our	energy	use	is	completely	
different.	But	the	RdSAP	assessment	doesn’t	even	take	into	account	behaviour.	
Whereas	when	you	come	into	peoples’	houses	and	really	understand	how	people	use	
their	homes	you	can	really	make	a	difference	to	their	energy	use.”	(Board	member	
1/URBED)	
Set	against	the	Green	Deal	Assessment,	which	costs	approximately	£150	and	takes	
approximately	two	hours,	and	is	based	on	the	BRE’s	reduced	data	Standard	Assessment	
Procedure	(RdSAP),	the	Carbon	Co-op	survey	costs	around	£450	and	takes	an	entire	day	to	
complete.	It	incorporates	a	much	higher	level	of	individual	property-specific	detail	than	the	
Green	Deal	approved	RdSAP	method	which	bases	a	lot	of	its	recommendations	on	
assumptions	and	standard	details.	The	whole	house	assessment	method	has	been	under	
continuous	review	as	the	Carbon	Co-op’s	actual	retrofits	and	monitoring	proceeded,	and	
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has	been	further	developed	using	funding	from	Innovate	UK	into	a	self-assessment	online	
home	energy	planner’	tool	that	householders	can	use	themselves,	bringing	down	the	cost	
and	time	required	for	the	whole	house	assessment.	
The	Carbon	Co-op’s	approach	to	the	technical	risks	and	issues	around	retrofit	concerning	
mould,	damp	and	build	quality	were	approached	in	a	number	of	strategic	ways.	Firstly,	by	
incorporating	such	a	high	level	of	detail	and	thoroughness	into	the	whole	house	survey,	
these	issues	are	intended	to	be	designed	out	from	the	start.	URBED	technical	advisors	also	
make	specifications	for	particular	products	such	as	porous	insulators	that	are	better	at	
preventing	mould	and	damp	than	non-porous	ones,	and	including	a	ventilation	strategy	as	
part	of	the	assessment.	Concerns	over	the	moisture	performance	of	brick	slips	(placed	over	
external	wall	insulation	to	create	the	illusion	of	a	brick	house)	precluded	URBED	and	Carbon	
Co-op	from	recommending	these	measures,	even	when	they	may	assist	with	planning	
approval,	and	they	have	lobbied	GM	partners	on	this	issue.	
Carbon	Co-op	also	deliberately	took	a	small	number	of	houses	and	a	range	of	house	types,	
as	a	way	of	slowly	continuing	to	test	and	monitor	the	design	and	installation	issues	involved	
in	a	whole	suite	of	measures,	rather	than	rushing	into	‘scaling	up’	straight	away:	
“We’re	doing	a	small	number	of	houses,	but	really,	really	well”	Board	Member	2/Project	
Manager		
Incorporating	a	strong	focus	on	monitoring	into	the	whole	process	is	how	Carbon	Co-op	
approached	the	risk	of	the	‘performance	gap’.	This	is	teamed	with	incorporating	behaviour	
and	occupancy	into	the	survey	method,	thus	allowing	a	far	more	accurate	picture	of	what	
has	changed	in	each	house	as	a	result	of	the	retrofit.	
Finally,	the	presentation	of	survey	reports	(see	Fig	17	below),	which	includes	a	glossary	and	
detailed	commentary	about	the	specific	characteristics	of	that	house	and	its	occupants,	and	
along	with	support	from	the	Carbon	Co-op	community	regarding	the	processes	and	
experiences	of	retrofit	of	other	householders	(peer-to-peer),	makes	it	easier	for	households	
to	access	and	understand:	
“The	thing	is	that	retrofit	works	–	it’s	great	for	reducing	energy	use.	But	some	of	the	
things	you	do	might	create	other	problems	such	as	how	you	apply	internal	wall	
insulation,	there	are	certain	ways	that	cause	condensation	to	get	trapped	and	can	
cause	damage	to	the	house.	There	are	other	ways	which	might	be	more	complicated	
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and	expensive	but	are	more	foolproof.	So	it’s	also	doing	things	that	we	can	monitor	
and	understand	whether	it	was	the	right	thing	to	do.	There’s	a	commitment	that	we	
don’t	just	do	it	and	leave.	And	because	it’s	us,	we	are	all	doing	it	on	our	own	houses,	
you	can	go	back	and	check	over	a	period	of	years,	and	the	idea	is	it’s	somebody	you	
know.”	Board	member	5/householder	
	
Figure	17	Carbon	Co-op	whole	house	assessment	report	
Carbon	Co-op	also	alleviates	some	of	the	financial	and	technical	decision	making	elements	
by	sharing	technologies	such	as	light	fittings	(mostly	LEDs)	and	energy	monitors,	through	
their	community	champion	household	workshops.	The	LED	library	gives	householders	the	
opportunity	to	test	different	light	fittings	to	see	if	they	work	with	the	connection	in	their	
homes,	rather	than	purchasing	them	and	risking	them	being	incompatible	or	impractical.	
Borrowing	LEDs	helped	two	householders	to	make	a	decision	to	replace	all	their	light	fittings	
with	LED	lights,	and	combined	their	purchases	to	get	a	15%	discount.	Loaning	energy	
monitors	allowed	people	to	identify	particular	patterns	in	their	household	energy	use,	and	
select	appropriate	retrofit	measures	e.g.	discovering	that	heating	costs	were	higher	than	the	
average	house	of	their	type,	so	investing	in	draughtproofing	and	later,	insulation.		
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Addressing	householder	motivation	and	engagement	
What	emerges	from	the	Carbon	Co-op’s	website	and	promotional	literature,	interview	and	
observation	data	is	a	strong,	consistent	vision	of	the	Carbon	Co-op’s	“peer-to-peer”	method	
of	engagement	and	support	in	the	technical	decisions	around	domestic	retrofit,	and	a	
shared	vision	of	action	on	climate	change	at	the	household	and	local	level:	
There	are	Green	Deal	providers	who	have	just	been	created	because	people	think	
there	is	a	gap	in	the	market	and	employment	can	be	created	out	of	it	which	is	no	bad	
thing,	but	the	motivation	for	that	is	very	different	for	that	is	very	different	to	our	
motivation,	which	is	our	homes,	and	how	they	can	contribute	to	tackling	this	massive	
problem.”		Board	member	3/Stockport	
As	previously	mentioned,	Carbon	Co-op’s	approach	to	the	varied	and	complex	motives	and	
feelings	around	retrofit,	both	positive	and	negative,	is	dealt	with	by	focussing	on	those	who	
are	already	committed	to	environmental	values	and	carbon	reductions,	rather	than	trying	to	
persuade	people	to	adopt	these	values,	or	sell	something	to	those	who	are	not	motivated	
by	this.		
“Our	whole	marketing	strategy	is	based	on	community	advocates	really.	We	identify	
people	who	are	really	pro-environmental	and	want	to	do	the	stuff,	and	get	them	to	
spread	the	word	in	their	local	area.”		Board	member	2/Project	manager.	
A	good	example	of	how	this	works	is	shown	below:	
So	because	our	houses	are	all	identical	on	our	street,	and	we	had	an	assessment,	our	
next	door	neighbours	wanted	to	do	a	bit	more,	so		they	had	an	assessment	too,	and	
then	a	new	neighbour	two	doors	down	the	road	also	became	interested.	Then	we	
had	a	community	champion	workshop	in	our	house	and	four	neighbours	came	along,	
and	we	realised	that	because	we	have	to	re-felt	our	roof	every	seven	years	and	it’s	an	
expense	and	a	hassle,	we	are	looking	at	possibly	doing	a	street	approach.	And	
Carbon	Co-op	because	of	the	community	gives	us	better	buying	power,	so	we	can	go	
to	a	contractor	and	say	we	are	not	doing	one	roof	we	are	doing	four	roofs,	so	as	a	
street	this	is	working	as	a	really	good	example	of	that”	Board	member	3/Stockport	
This	is	not	just	an	avoidance	of	those	who	are	not	already	motivated	by	environmental	
values	or	those	who	are	sceptical	about	retrofit.	Engaging	already	enthusiastic	people	has	a	
deliberate	function	in	terms	of	providing	demonstrations	of	retrofit	for	the	wider	‘market’:	
“We	have	always	been	very	clear	that	we	are	starting	with	pioneers	–	people	who	
already	want	to	do	it	for	reasons	that	are	more	connected	to	the	environment.	But	to	
go	to	people	who	are	motivated	by	money,	we	have	needed	these	pioneers	to	test	
this	process	–	at	financial	risk	–	because	that	is	not	their	primary	motive.	But	they	
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can	show	the	savings	like	I	used	to	spend	£600	on	gas	and	now	I	spend	£300.”	Board	
member	4/SliH	
6.5	What	relationships	affected	Carbon	Co-op’s	activities	and	
progress?	
Not	only	do	multiple	factors	and	issues	affect	the	goals,	priorities,	strategy,	funding	and	
organisation	of	experimental	assemblages,	but	as	discussed	in	the	literature	review	and	
theoretical	chapters,	so	do	the	actors	and	organisations	that	are	involved.	The	following	
sections	explore	the	significant	and	influential	actors	and	relationships	operating	at	the	
macro,	meso	and	micro-levels	of	Carbon	Co-op’s	assemblage,	and	the	particular	interests,	
approaches	and	priorities	they	bring	to	the	case.	
6.5.1	Macro-level	relationships	–	mediation	and	selectiveness	
Carbon	Co-op’s	relationships	with	the	state	at	a	national	level	have	been	turbulent.	
Between	2008	and	2011,	Carbon	Co-op	experimented	with	different	elements	of	energy	
efficiency	but	policy	changes	helped	steer	them	towards	whole	house	retrofit.	The	
connections	between	Carbon	Co-op	and	GMCA	provided	access	to	larger	national	funding	
sources	connected	to	Green	Deal,	offering	increased	stability,	enabling	the	Co-op	to	
continue	its	work,	and	raising	its	profile	regionally.	However,	there	are	mixed	views	about	
working	under	this	policy	climate.	These	range	from:	
	“I’m	really	chuffed	about	the	green	deal	[go	early]	project,	because	it	shows	that	
DECC	is	listening	and	interested	in	community	innovation.	We	don’t	know	what	effect	
green	deal	will	have	–	it	might	kick	start	it	or	it	might	put	people	off,	we	don’t	know.	
I’m	just	glad	we’re	part	of	it.”	Board	member	2/Project	Manager	
To:		
“We	have	big	reservations	about	how	Green	Deal	is	being	designed	and	delivered	in	
the	UK.	Especially	the	finances.	Simply	put,	you’re	looking	at	an	interest	rate	of	
around	7%.	When	a	householder	sees	a	direct	impact	on	their	energy	bills,	and	a	
direct	improvement	in	their	comfort,	it’s	a	much	better	understanding	of	‘when	I	do	
this	it	has	an	impact	on	that’.	Whereas	when	the	loan	is	attached	to	your	bill,	you	are	
still	seeing	an	energy	bill	that	is	exactly	the	same.	It	becomes	difficult	to	make	that	
link.”	Board	member	3/Stockport	
Among	other	issues	with	the	policy	climate	that	the	Carbon	Co-op	identified	were	serious	
administrative	problems	with	actually	getting	the	technical	measures	on	the	pilot	homes	to	
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qualify	for	the	ECO	money	according	to	OFGEM’s	criteria	and	clear	issues	around	trust	in	the	
green	deal	assessment	process:	
“I	went	to	Carbon	Co-op	because	I	didn’t	trust	Green	Deal	basically.	I	don’t	think	the	
Green	Deal	Assessment	is	much	good	and	I’m	not	interested	in	7%	loans.	I	felt	like	
they	[Carbon	Co-op]	at	least	had	a	bit	more	technical	know-how.“		Board	member	
5/Householder	
Carbon	Co-op		attempts	to	balance	these	issues	and	tensions	by	maintaining	a	certain	
degree	of	independence	from	national	policy	and	regional	strategies,	for	example	using	its	
own	survey	method,	and	rejecting	the	national	policy	suggestion	of	paying	community	
groups	for	retrofit	referrals.	It	also	directly	sourced	funding	from	other	national	sources	
such	as	NESTA	and	TSB	on	the	basis	of	its	other	activities	outside	of	Green	Deal,	and	
continues	to	maintain	and	build	links	with	other	grassroots	movements	in	order	to	retain	its	
identity	and	function	as	an	alternative:	
“Because	the	way	we’re	doing	it	is	very	thorough	and	we’re	not	afraid	of	that,	every	
time	we’ve	gone	for	funding	-	from	DECC	or	anybody	else,	we’ve	been	very	clear	that	
this	is	not	a	quick,	go	out	and	do	what	you	can	and	come	back,	it	is	a	step	by	step	
approach	until	we’ve	found	a	good	tested	strategy.	Board	member	3/Stockport	
Additionally,	Carbon	Co-op	continued	to	directly	provide	retrofit	services	outside	of	the	
Green	Deal,	whilst	maintaining	contact	and	conversation	with	the	GM	local	authorities,	thus	
playing	a	key	mediating	role	between	the	values	and	priorities	of	its	members	and	the	city	
region’s	priorities	which	are	closely	tied	to	policy.		
6.5.2	Meso-level	relationships	–	GMCA,	local	authorities,	environmental	
networks	and	URBED.	
A	number	of	place-specific	existing	relationships	and	capacities	significantly	influenced	the	
identity	and	approach	of	the	Co-op,	as	well	as	enabling	its	activities.	Previous	URBED	retrofit	
projects,	for	example,	provided	technical	expertise,	and	their	role	as	technical	advisors	to	
Carbon	Co-op	strongly	embedded	the	focus	of	technical	excellence	into	their	activities.		
Many	participants	separately	acknowledged	that	Carbon	Co-op’s	relationships	at	GM	level	
prevented	the	Green	Deal	Go	Early	project	from	collapsing,	for	example,	URBED	and	Carbon	
Co-op	board	members	liaised	with	GMCA,	resulting	in	being	able	to	use	their	‘Procure	Plus’	
framework	to	procure	a	contractor	to	undertake	the	retrofit	installations.	The	framework	of	
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contractors	for	the	wider	GM	project	also	mobilised	an	ECO	commitment	from	building	
contractor	Keepmoat	for	Carbon	Co-op’s	twelve	Go	Early	installations.		
Relationships	at	the	meso-level	also	resulted	in	a	concentration	of	membership	and	interest	
in	whole	house	assessments	in	the	South	of	Manchester	and	the	‘Heatons’	and	Marple	
areas	of	Stockport.	This	is	because	these	areas	happen	to	house	a	particularly	active	
movement	of	environmental	groups	and	households	such	as	Sustainable	Living	in	the	
Heatons.	
Furthermore,	relationships	between	local	authorities	at	the	meso-level	encouraged	and	
supported	Carbon	Co-op’s	Community	Champions	programme	in	Stockport:	
	“They	[Stockport	council]	had	seen	that	in	the	Manchester	postcode	the	uptake	was	
a	lot	more	successful	and	wanted	to	bring	that	interest	and	that	dynamic	to	our	end	
[Stockport]	as	well”	Board	member	3/Stockport.	
Even	within	the	Stockport	project,	Carbon	Co-op’s	relationships	with	planners	and	
sustainability	officers,	as	well	as	existing	fuel	poverty	and	energy	efficiency	outreach	
projects	in	Stockport	Council	facilitated	its	work.	The	Council	officers’	support	at	
promotional	events	helped	alleviate	householders’	concerns	about	the	viability	of	the	works	
in	terms	of	planning	permission,	and	making	them	feel	that	the	service	was	supported	by	
their	council.	
“people	tend	to	create	small	groups	like	existing	projects	and	events	with	
Groundwork	and	Stockport	council	around	sustainability…	so	when	she	[Groundwork	
employee]	does	her	presentations,	she	also	has	a	couple	of	slides	about	Carbon	Co-
op.		Where	there	is	already	a	good	existing	interest	I	go	along	as	well	and	do	ten	
minutes.	It	works	so	much	better	when	you	work	together.”		Board	member	
3/Stockport	
6.5.3	Micro	level	relationships	–	personal	reputations	and	
circumstances	
Many	of	the	Carbon	Co-op	board	members	were	either	contract,	self-employed	or	part	time	
workers,	often	occupying	multiple	overlapping	roles,	such	as	the	lecturer	in	architecture	
who	was	also	a	householder	and	ran	the	Carbon	Co-op	in	Stockport	project,	the	
householder	board	member	who	also	worked	as	a	sustainability	officer	at	Salford	Council,	
and	the	board	member	who	was	involved	with	a	local	community	group.	This	created	both	a	
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high	level	of	personal	commitment	and	voluntary	capacity,	as	well	as	a	number	of	personal	
connections	that	were	mobilised	as	part	of	the	Carbon	Co-op’s	work:	
“It’s	all	about	communication	–	there’s	a	few	of	us	who	wear	different	hats	–	but	it	
works	well	because	we	create	those	links	and	it	all	works	better	when	it’s	joined	up.”		
Board	member	4/SLiH	
“We	knew	about	it	through	friends,	and	both	myself	and	my	husband	at	different	
times	worked	for	URBED,	so	we	were	already	part	of	that	network	of	people	already	
interested	in	buildings,	and	environmental	issues,	and	from	our	studies	–	you	know	
we	both	studied	architecture	–	so	it	was	something	we	were	already	interested	in.”	
Board	member	3/Stockport	
The	project	manager’s	personal	relationships	were	extremely	significant	in	maintaining	the	
momentum	of	the	Go	Early	project.	He	himself	commented	on	this	at	the	Carbon	Co-op	
strategy	day,	just	prior	to	the	installation	phase,	when	there	were	multiple	issues	around	
accessing	funding,	timings	of	works	and	accurate	pricing:	
“A	lot	of	people	told	me	that,	basically,	they	were	doing	it	for	me.	It	was	such	a	
nightmare	that	they	would	have	pulled	out	if	we	hadn’t	had	that	connection.	I	don’t	
think	I	realised	how	important	that	was.”	–	board	member	2/Project	manager	
Similarly,	the	householder	who	undertook	extensive	retrofit	works	on	his	own	house	prior	
to	the	existence	of	Carbon	Co-op,	who	is	also	an	URBED	employee,	has	a	strong	reputation	
based	on	his	technical	knowledge.	His	previous	experiences	of	retrofit	enabled	the	
connections	between	Carbon	Co-op	and	Salford	University’s	involvement	in	monitoring,	
through	mutual	involvement	in	the	GM	Low	Carbon	Hub.		
“I	mean	he’s	like	this	regional	expert,	it’s	just	one	guy	in	the	whole	of	Greater	
Manchester,	and	people	trust	him	to	know	what	he’s	talking	about.”	Board	member	
2/Project	Manager	
The	importance	of	these	personal	relationships,	though	is	in	the	relationships	they	then	
generate	at	other	levels.	As	the	Salford	University	partner	describes:	
“Caring	isn’t	enough	-	you	need	processes	to	deliver	things.	That	relationship	with	
AGMA	and	Carbon	Co-op	–	over	four	years	they	have	developed	systems,	built	
knowledge	about	the	technical	stuff,	how	to	engage	with	people,	how	to	tell	a	story,	
how	to	build	networks.	It’s	about	having	these	partnerships	and	processes.	Some	of	
that	is	linking	with	external	bodies.	Engaging	with	planning,	working	with	local	
authorities,	building	political	capital.	Connecting	to	New	Economy.	But	it’s	a	complex,	
personally	driven	series	of	relationships.	People	having	pints	with	each	other,	and	
those	people	actually	get	on.”	
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6.5.4	Internal	dynamics	and	negotiations	
The	combination	of	interests,	factors	and	relationships	at	multiple	scales	results	in	a	number	
of	tensions	and	negotiations	within	the	Carbon	Co-op	itself,	from	its	ideological	roots	and	
strategies	through	to	particular	roles,	responsibilities	and	processes.																																		
Identity	and	priorities	
Views	varied	regarding	the	extent	to	which	Carbon	Co-op	should	engage	with	broader	
sustainability	and	climate	change	activities	as	opposed	to	just	concentrating	on	retrofit,	
which	emerged	in	discussions	in	board	meetings	and	the	strategy	day,	especially	when	
discussing	the	redefinition	of	the	Carbon	Co-op’s	official	mission	statement.	This	linked	to	
negotiations	in	internal	meetings	concerning	how	closely	Carbon	Co-op	should	stick	to	its	
target	of	80%	on	each	house.	Some	argued	that	in	the	spirit	of	inclusivity	a	target	of	60%	
would	reach	more	people	and	prevent	the	biggest	gains	from	energy	efficiency	being	made	
by	those	who	already	have	a	lot	of	wealth.	Others	felt	that	if	the	commitment	to	climate	
change	was	serious,	reducing	this	target	would	make	it	impossible	to	contribute	to	national	
and	global	emissions	targets	enough	to	prevent	the	serious	effects	of	climate	change.	
Further	questions	were	raised	about	the	future	trajectory	of	Carbon	Co-op,	regarding	how	
quickly	it	should	seek	to	grow	and	progress.	This	debate	was	heavily	influenced	by	the	
tension	between	a	desire	to	have	a	greater	impact	on	carbon	emissions	through	retrofitting	
more	houses,	and	caution	about	growing	‘too	quickly’	and	losing	some	of	the	technical	
rigorousness	and	professional	reputation:	
With	the	funding	we	have	and	the	partners	we	have	at	the	moment	we	can	do	about	
ten	a	year	[retrofits],	if	we	want	to	do	say	30	or	40	a	year	we	will	need	extra	capacity	
and	we	will	have	to	grow.	But	there’s	a	big	debate	about	whether	or	not	we	want	to	
grow	and	do	more,	or	should	we	just	stick	with	the	ten	a	year,	then	assess	ourselves	
and	monitor	what	we	are	doing	first	a	little	bit?	Board	Member	3/Stockport	
Roles	and	responsibilities		
There	were	also	internal	debates	around	roles	and	responsibilities,	especially	relating	to	the	
risk	of	burnout	of	the	core	members	of	Carbon	Co-op	in	terms	of	their	capacity	to	continue	
to	manage	the	organisation	largely	on	a	voluntary	basis.	The	relationships	and	projects	at	
GM	level	had	widened	Carbon	Co-op’s	scope	and	scale	from	the	grassroots	to	the	city-
regional,	and	placed	heavy	expectations	on	an	organisation	staffed	by	part-timers	and	
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volunteers,	creating	something	of	a	mismatch	between	capacity	and	scale,	which	was	
discussed	at	board	meetings	and	at	the	AGM	in	March	2013.	As	a	result	key	priority	in	
recruiting	members	became	to	encourage	existing	and	new	members	to	take	a	more	active	
role	in	promoting,	in	administration,	and	in	dealing	with	governance	issues	such	as	writing	
or	modifying	policies,	mission	statements	and	rules,	to	share	the	load.	
At	the	installation	stage	of	the	Go	Early	project,	technical	difficulties	and	conflicts	over	the	
roles	and	responsibilities	of	different	members	of	the	project	team	also	produced	serious	
divisions	in	the	team.	Approaches	to	the	level	of	involvement	on	site	and	who	was	
responsible	for	project	management,	advising	the	contractor	and	assisting	the	householder	
were	not	clear	and	were	contested	on	site,	leading	to	confusion	and	disruption	for	the	
householders.	The	installation	phase	also	created	significant	problems	for	the	relationship	
between	Carbon	Co-op	and	the	main	contractor,	whose	struggles	on	site	resulted	in	them	
litigating	Carbon	Co-op	for	a	significant	sum	of	money	and	holding	them	responsible	for	loss	
of	revenue.	
Overt	or	covert	experimentation	
Another	interesting	tension	emerging	in	both	public	and	internal	meetings	was	a	
negotiation	around	the	experimental	nature	of	Carbon	Co-op’s	work,	particularly	at	the	
installation	stage.	Some	board	members	were	very	explicit	about	the	nature	of	the	works	as	
being	experimental,	testing	how	to	deal	with	certain	details	and	negotiate	certain	parts	of	
the	process	such	as	applying	for	the	ECO	funding.	However,	other	board	members	and	
participants	felt	that	being	so	explicit	about	the	experimental	elements	and	uncertainties	in	
the	process	could	put	householders	off,	or	compromise	the	Co-op’s	reputation	for	
robustness,	arguing	that	they	did	not	want	people	to	“feel	like	guinea	pigs”.	
Territory	
There	was	also	negotiation	around	constructing	the	territories	for	Carbon	Co-op’s	work:	in	
the	Community	Champions	project,	even	though	an	initial	desire	had	been	to	move	beyond	
the	areas	of	Stockport	that	had	plenty	of	interest,	this	process	relied	on	existing	projects	
and	outreach	as	described	above,	and	realistic	expectations	about	what	could	be	achieved	
in	these	areas:	
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	“There	are	ten	boroughs	in	Stockport	and	eight	are	not	really	engaged	in	any	way.	
Originally	they	[Stockport	Council]	wanted	ten	workshops	and	ten	assessments,	one	in	
each	of	the	ten	boroughs.	But	that	was	not	possible	-	you	have	to	generate	interest	first.	
To	go	into	totally	new	areas	is	arrogant	and	a	waste	of	energy.	It’s	not	about	persuading	
people	–	telling	them	they	really	should	do	this,	it’s	about	them	already	wanting	to	do	it	
and	connecting	them	up.”	Board	member	3/Stockport	
Thus,	partly	due	to	the	ethical	position	that	the	Co-op	took,	much	of	the	interest	was	still	
based	primarily	upon	an	existing	desire	to	do	the	work	rather	than	an	element	of	persuasion	
from	Carbon	Co-op.	
6.7	What	were	Carbon	Co-ops	achievements	and	outcomes?	
To	date,	Carbon	Co-op	has	completed	60	whole	house	surveys,	which	give	long-term	
recommendations	which	are	likely	to	lead	to	more	households	retrofitting.	It	developed	a	
new	energy	monitor	which	could	measure	gas	and	moisture	as	well	as	electricity	use,	and	
through	the	Go	Early	project	it	completed	eight	full	whole	house	retrofits	resulting	in	
considerable	visual	and	material	changes	to	the	properties.	These	retrofits	precipitated	–	
yet	to	be	confirmed	through	monitoring	–	high	carbon	emissions	reductions	from	those	
homes	as	well	as	improved	comfort	and	dramatically	reduced	energy	use	for	the	8	
householders,	some	of	whom	are	now	generating	electricity	as	a	result	of	solar	PV	panels.		
The	evaluation	and	monitoring	process	that	Carbon	Co-op	is	in	the	process	of	carrying	out	is	
intended	to	produce	detailed	information	about	the	technical	intricacies	and	effects	of	the	
installations	which	will	add	to	previous	projects	such	as	the	TSB	Retrofit	for	the	Future	
Homes	and	the	national	Superhomes	network,	building	richer	knowledge	of	retrofits	over	
time.	The	evaluation	also	gives	a	clear	voice	to	the	householders	involved,	enabling	them	to	
describe	in	detail	the	disruption,	difficulties	and	frustrations	around	the	process,	with	many	
of	the	householders	stating	in	evaluation	interviews	(results	observed	at	Carbon	Co-op	AGM	
in	June	2015)	that	they	were	surprised	by	how	disruptive	the	process	was,	but	pleased	with	
the	overall	results	and	have	noticed	significant	improvements	in	comfort	post-retrofit.	This	
contributes	to	Carbon	Co-op’s	own	goals	of	sharing	knowledge	and	experience	around	
retrofit	processes.	
Other	successes	include	that	the	detailed	whole	house	survey	method	has	been	developed	
into	a	new	self-assessment	tool	which	allows	householders	to	produce	some	elements	of	
the	survey	data	themselves,	reducing	the	cost	of	the	full	assessment	and	enabling	people	
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who	may	not	be	able	to	have	a	whole	survey	at	all,	and	that	a	few	new	community	
champions	have	been	recruited	and	have	held	events,	gradually	engaging	more	people	with	
retrofit	as	an	issue.	The	guidance	note	produced	regarding	planning	permission	opened	up	a	
regional	dialogue	about	retrofit	measures	and	provided	a	basis	upon	which	all	the	Greater	
Manchester	local	authorities	could	work.	
However,	observations	from	the	AGM	in	2015	show	some	less	favourable	outcomes.	Firstly,	
the	core	group	of	people	promoting,	volunteering	and	networking	is	largely	the	same,	and	
the	load	of	responsibility	on	them	is	still	heavy.	Furthermore,	issues	with	the	installation	
phase	resulted	in	relationships	between	Carbon	Co-op	and	the	contractor	souring,	and	a	
litigation	against	Carbon	Co-op	which	is	ongoing.	As	a	result	of	this,	the	local	retrofit	
industry	is	no	better	established	or	expanded	as	a	result	of	Carbon	Co-op’s	activities.	An	
unintended	consequence	of	this	is	that	considerable	internal	learning	about	legal	processes	
and	contract	forms	has	been	gained:	
“They	didn’t	really	know	what	they	were	doing	with	domestic	retrofit	at	all	and	we	
took	bad	advice	about	contracts.	We	never	should	have	used	that	framework.	
Thankfully	we’ve	learned	loads	and	are	fully	up	on	contract	forms	now	and	we	have	
good	support	and	advice	so	I’m	confident	it	won’t	stick.”	Project	Manager	
The	same	issues	resulted	in	ructions	within	Carbon	Co-op	over	how	best	to	deal	with	the	
situation	with	one	member	wanting	to	attempt	to	resolve	the	issue	informally	and	most	
others	wanting	to	address	it	formally	and	factually.	A	number	of	board	members	resigned	
over	this	disagreement	but	were	later	reinstated,	and	the	first	individual	–	the	founder	
member	and	URBED	employee	who	had	retrofitted	his	own	house	as	an	experiment	–	left	
Carbon	Co-op	and	URBED	to	set	up	another	retrofitting	co-operative	on	his	own.	Due	to	the	
stress	of	the	situation,	both	Carbon	Co-op	and	URBED	decided	not	to	get	involved	with	the	
next	DECC-funded	GM	retrofit	project	-	Green	Deal	Communities,	thus	being	unable	to	
maintain	the	new	intermediary	relationship	between	the	’alternative’	environmental	
movement	and	regional	authority	that	they	had	established.	Carbon	Co-op	has	since	moved	
on	from	the	Go	Early	Projects,	pursuing	new	experimental	activities	involving	smart	
networks	as	part	of	a	comparative	European	project.		
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6.8	Theoretical	reflections	from	Carbon	Co-op	
This	case	study	has	explored	the	multiple	factors	and	actors	that	were	involved	in	the	
Carbon	Co-op	at	the	three	levels	of	its	assemblage,	finding	that	climate	change	was	by	far	
the	most	dominant	macro-level	factor	in	its	development,	and	this	was	prioritised	by	the	
personal	motives	and	values	of	actors	at	the	micro-level,	who	had	significant	influence	over	
Carbon	Co-op’s	direction.	It	also	found	that	Carbon	Co-op	had	multiple	priorities	for	
experimentation	and	knowledge,	with	a	particularly	strong	focus	on	technical	excellence	
and	peer-to-peer	knowledge	exchange	as	part	of	the	organisation’s	identity.	Actors	specific	
to	the	local	context	of	Manchester	such	as	URBED	and	a	supportive	local	governance	
context	helped	to	embed	these	priorities	into	Carbon	Co-op’s	operations,	and	enable	them	
to	experiment	in	a	particular	way	with	a	small	number	of	highly	technical,	‘deep’	retrofits.	
However,	other	local	factors	such	as	a	lack	of	an	appropriate	supply	chain	and	national	
factors	such	as	a	complex	and	problematic	policy	context	caused	significant	problems	for	
Carbon	Co-op’s	progress	and	its	potential	to	stimulate	systemic	change	in	the	prevalence	of	
housing	retrofit	is	questionable.		
This	raises	questions	for	the	next	case	study	of	the	Energy	Saving	Co-operative	in	
Birmingham	about	whether	the	landscape	factor	of	climate	change	is	also	such	a	dominant	
force,	or	whether	other	factors	at	other	levels	have	a	significant	influence.	It	also	raises	
questions	of	how	its	knowledge	and	experimentation	focus	compare	to	Carbon	Co-op,	and	
whether	these	priorities	and	factors	are	embedded	into	the	case	by	actors	at	the	macro	
meso	or	micro	levels.	
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Chapter	7	-	Case	Study	#2:	The	Energy	Saving	Co-operative,	
Birmingham	
A	business	experiment	with	bold	intentions	that	failed.	
The	Energy	Saving	Co-op	was	launched	in	April	2012	and	ceased	trading	in	January	2014.	It	
attempted	to	create	a	new	co-operative	business	delivering	domestic	retrofit	and	build	a	
new	network	of	retrofit	organisations	in	the	Birmingham	city	region.	It	positioned	itself	as	
being	‘better	than’	or	‘different	from’	Green	Deal,	and	operated	in	the	Birmingham	context	
in	competition	with	a	large	Birmingham-wide	Green	Deal	retrofit	scheme.	Unfortunately,	
despite	its	challenge	to	national	policy,	the	forging	of	new	relationships	and	its	novel	
organisational	approach	to	retrofit,	it	completed	far	fewer	retrofits	than	it	intended	and	was	
unable	to	survive	as	a	business.	The	table	below	shows	some	of	its	key	features	and	
activities,	and	the	rest	of	the	case	explains	those	features,	how	they	came	about	and	what	
happened	to	the	Energy	Saving	Co-operative	during	its	short	life.	
Key	features		 Multi-stakeholder	co-operative	providing	
surveying/assessments,	retrofit	project	
management	and	building	supply	chain	
networks.	
Key	Activities	 Business	development	and	marketing	in	
Birmingham,	recruiting	staff	and	growing	the	
organisation	and	its	membership,	building	a	
local	supply	chain	network	and	relationships	
with	local	authorities	and	community	
groups.		
Key	priorities	 Building	a	profitable,	ethical	business,	
building	local	partnerships.	
Key	relationships		 Birmingham	City	Council	(‘competitors’),	
Northfield	Ecocentre	(community	partner),	
local	suppliers	and	installers,	other	co-
operatives	(funders	and	board	members).	
Outcomes	and	effects		 Approx.	100	retrofits	completed	nationally,	
27	in	or	near	Birmingham	(including	
Lichfield).	New	organisational	form	and	
Birmingham-based	network	created.		
Severe	financial	losses	and	closing	of	the	
business.	
Table	9	-	Snapshot	of	The	Energy	Saving	Co-operative.
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7.1	What	was	the	Energy	Saving	Co-operative?	Retrofit	networks	and	
project	management.	
The	Energy	Saving	Co-operative	(ESC)	was	a	multi-stakeholder	co-operative	launched	in	
April	2012	providing	retrofit	co-ordination	services	in	various	English	locations,	but	with	a	
particular	focus	in	Birmingham.		
ESC	offered	two	interdependent	services.	The	first	was	for	local	authorities	or	community	
projects,	involving	a	networking	role	that	agglomerated	retrofit	installers	and	tradespeople	
in	different	locations	in	the	UK,	then	managed	and	delivered	whole	house	retrofit	services	
to	privately	owned	and	occupied	homes.	Having	recruited	and	vetted	tradespeople	against	
certain	ethical	and	quality	standards	to	become	supplier	members,	local	community	groups	
were	then	responsible	for	finding	interested	householders	(referrals)	for	which	they	were	
paid	a	fee.	The	Energy	Saving	Co-op	then	linked	these	householders	to	its	network	of	
installer	members	who	would	quote	for	and	carry	out	the	retrofit	installation	under	a	
contract	between	the	householder	and	the	ESC.	The	second	was	a	project	management	
service	for	the	householder,	based	on	a	house-by-house,	approach,	offering	a	bespoke	
package	of	retrofit	measures	from	the	installer	network.	Figure	18	shows	a	home	visit	in	
progress	and	the	following	quotation	explains	this	service	further	
“	The	process	for	the	ESC	is	that	we	get	the	referral,	[an	assessor]	or	whoever	goes	
round	and	does	the	EPC	if	they	want	one,	but	really	we	start	off	doing	the	ESC	survey	
when	we	sit	with	the	homeowner	and	we	have	a	look	and	a	chat	around	their	house.	
And	the	thing	about	retrofit	is	that	every	house	is	different.	Trying	to	archetype	the	
houses	doesn’t	work…	And	when	you	start	to	look	at	demographics	and	different	
peoples	finances,	and	aesthetics	as	well,	you	know,	architectural	features,	trying	to	
batch	works	is	impossible.	So	it’s	room	by	room,	element	by	element,	so	walls,	floors,	
ceilings,	roofs,	renewables,	heat	and	light,	power,	you	go	through	it.”		-	ESC	Sales	
manager.	
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Figure	18	Competition	winner	sits	with	ESC	sales	team,	discussing	possible	retrofit	measures	for	her	home.	
This	project	management	service	provides	householders	with	a	detailed	household	survey,	
information	and	advice	on	the	measures,	then	connected	them	to	the	local	suppliers	who	
could	do	this,	and	managed	the	costing,	quotation	and	on-site	process	of	installation.	The	
technical	measures	on	offer	were	dependent	on	the	measures	that	installer	members	in	the	
different	local	areas	were	able	to	provide,	but	were	generally	a	broad	range,	including:	
• Cavity	wall	insulation	
• Solid	wall	insulation	(internal	and	external)	
• Solar	thermal	(hot	water)	
• Solar	PV	
• Double	or	triple	glazed	windows	and	doors	
• Boilers	and	heating	controls,	e.g.	thermostatic	radiator	valves.	
The	Energy	Saving	Co-operative	business	model	was	based	upon	a	profit	of	20%	of	the	total	
cost	of	the	works	for	each	household,	with	cash	flow	maintained	by	receiving	a	30%	deposit	
for	the	total	costs	upon	the	customer	signing	a	contract	for	works	with	them,	and	then	
receiving	the	remaining	70%	upon	completion,	at	which	point	the	ESC	then	paid	its	sub-
contractors	for	the	work.	
7.1.1	Organisational	form	and	governance	
ESC	was	a	‘multi-stakeholder’	co-operative	with	three	different	kinds	of	members:	it	had	
installer	members	(tradespeople),	individual	homeowners	or	supporters	(people	who	
automatically	became	members	upon	contracting	works,	or	people	who	invested	in	ESC	
shares	individually)	and	community	members	which	included	other	organisations	connected	
with	the	ESC	and	its	projects	such	as	community	group	partners	like	Northfield	Ecocentre,	
and	funders	like	the	Midlands	Co-op	and	the	Phone	Co-op.	Membership	of	the	ESC	allowed	
organisations	and	individuals	alike	to	impact	the	running	of	the	co-operative	through	voting	
on	matters	of	strategy	and	finance	such	as	sales	strategies,	what	to	do	with	investments,	
profits	and	dividends,	and	on	matters	relating	to	internal	rules	and	governance	such	as	who	
sat	on	the	board	of	directors	and	what	should	their	responsibilities	be.		Being	a	co-operative	
was	a	core	part	of	the	organisation’s	identity	because	of	its	perceived	value	in	creating	a	
trusted	‘brand’	in	the	retrofit	industry:	
	
	
183	
	“There	is	a	trust	issue	about	who	do	you	trust	to	give	advice	–	and	you’re	more	likely	
to	accept	an	offer	for	solid	wall	insulation	if	it’s	a	co-op	than	if	it’s	Mark	group	or	
some	other	big	business	knocking	on	your	door.”	ESC	Community	partner	2.	
The	Energy	Saving	Co-operative	was	answerable	to	its	board	of	directors,	which	in	2013	
consisted	of	ten	of	its	community	and	installer	members,	particularly	those	from	the	
Birmingham	and	Midlands	area.	These	included	representatives	from	three	of	its	funders:	
the	Midlands	Co-operative	(the	main	funder),	the	Midcounties	co-operative,	and	the	Phone	
Co-op;	a	representative	of	Co-operatives	UK	who	largely	took	an	advisory	role,	
representatives	from	its	installer	members	such	as	Jericho	Construction,	REco	and	New	
World	Home	Energy,	and	representatives	of	community	group	members	such	as	Northfield	
Ecocentre	and	South	Staffordshire	Community	Energy.	
7.2	The	Energy	Saving	Co-op’s	priorities:	profit,	and	‘being	a	co-op’.	
Priorities	and	targets	
The	Energy	Saving	Co-op’s	key	priorities	were	related	to	its	organisational	form.	Its	primary	
goal	was	to	be	a	profitable	business,	but	it	was	equally	important	to	the	ESC	to	do	this	in	an	
ethical	way,	in	line	with	its	co-operative	‘branding’	and	its	perception	of	‘being	a	co-op’	as	
its	unique	selling	point.	This	priority	was	embedded	in	the	ESC	in	the	vetting	of	its	installer	
members	on	ethical	credentials,	and	its	particular	governance	structure:	
It	creates	a	peer-to-peer	relationship	where	everyone	benefits	and	contributes	to	the	
running	of	the	business,	the	future	projects	we	take	on,	and	what	we	do	with	our	
money”.	-	ESC	CEO		
However,	in	terms	of	the	ESC’s	objectives	in	Birmingham	specifically,	its	targets	were	
initially	to	retrofit	twenty	properties	in	its	first	partial	year	(2012),	and	then	to	retrofit	200	
properties	in	its	first	full	year	of	operation	(2013).	This	was	based	on	a	calculation	of	how	
many	installations	would	be	needed	to	keep	the	business	running,	which	included	an	
assumption	that	as	a	new	business	they	would	operate	at	a	significant	loss	for	the	first	year.	
7.2.1	Experimental	focus	–	what	was	it	testing	and	why?		
The	view	of	the	ESC’s	CEO	was	that	the	ESC	was	“beyond	technical	experimentation”	(ESC	
CEO)	and	in	terms	of	the	knowledge	being	produced,	was	more	concerned	by	learning	
about	the	‘how’	of	retrofit	–	mostly	in	terms	of	how	to	run	a	retrofit	business	and	how	best	
to	deliver	a	product	or	service	to	householders.	The	CEO’s	vision	was	largely	based	upon	the	
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awareness	of	upcoming	Green	Deal	policy,	and	on	previous	commercial	sector	research	
projects	he	had	been	involved	in	which	posited	that	the	technology	to	achieve	the	transition	
to	zero	carbon	housing	stock	was	available	but	that	the	transition	was	not	happening	due	to	
householders’	lack	of	trust	in	suppliers	and	installers,	and	that	the	most	trusted	
organisations	included	co-operatives	alongside	local	councils.	These	convictions	were	based	
largely	on	commercial	or	business-based	knowledge,	rather	than	technical	knowledge	or	
experiential	knowledge	at	the	household	level:	
“Oh	that	project	was	mostly	B	to	B.	You	know	they	asked	businesses,	specifiers,	
installers,	architects	that	kind	of	thing.	Not	householders	directly,	no.”	(CEO,	ESC)	
	
What	this	meant	was	that	the	ESC’s	experimental	focus	was	on	testing	out	a	business	
proposition,	a	brand,	and	the	governance	or	organisation	of	a	process	for	retrofit,	priorities	
which	had	significant	implications	for	what	ESC	and	its	partners	intended	to	learn	from	its	
projects	and	activities	and	how	these	learnings	could	be	used.	The	table	below	shows	some	
examples	of	perspectives	from	different	members	of	the	ESC	network	on	the	knowledge	
being	produced	and	the	experimental	focus	of	the	ESC’s	work,	which	generally	leans	
towards	learning	about	the	process	and	organisation	of	retrofit.	 	
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Knowledge	focus	 Example	and	source	
Testing	a	business	model	 “We	are	testing	a	business	design	not	a	technology.	We	
are	operational,	and	doing	a	lot	of	learning-by-doing	which	
makes	us	different	from	the	projects	that	are	still	tinkering	
with	external	wall	insulation	on	individual	houses.”	(CEO)	
Testing	and	demonstrating	
the	retrofit	process		
“The	problem	is	there’s	been	a	lot	of	money	dished	out	to	
do	exemplar	retrofits	that	cost	a	hundred	and	fifty	grand	
and	the	house	is	carbon	neutral.	Great.	Who	cares?	No-
one	is	going	to	do	that	apart	from	you	because	you’ve	had	
funding.	Give	me	an	exemplar	that	cost	ten	grand	for	an	
average	house	and	you	can	take	that	learning	to	the	mass	
market	-	and	we’ll	have	that	from	this.”	(Sales	manager)	
Testing	roles	and	
relationships	in	retrofit	
delivery.	
“There	has	to	be	a	need	for	people	[intermediaries]	like	
ESC.	We	don’t	want	to	work	with	the	likes	of	British	Gas	
and	Carillion,	we’d	much	rather	work	with	someone	with	
some	integrity,	and	I’m	hoping	that	ESC	shows	us	a	way	of	
doing	that”	(Installer	member	1)	
What	we’ve	always	hoped	is	that	we	could	take	people	
right	from	coming	to	us	with	an	idea	about	what	to	do	
with	their	house,	all	the	way	through	to	the	installation.	
Until	now	we’ve	not	been	able	to	do	that,	whereas	people	
like	Eon	and	Carillion	are	doing	this	for	a	living.	But	now	
with	this	we	can.	We’ve	got	a	lot	of	learning	to	do	in	order	
to	be	able	to	compete	with	them.”	Community	member	
Table	10	–	Energy	Saving	Co-op	perspectives	on	knowledge	and	experimentation	
These	knowledge	priorities	were	also	evident	observations	at	the	ESC’s	AGM	in	July	2013,	
with	the	key	‘learnings’	communicated	to	members	regarding	business	and	operational	
strategy,	such	as	slow	sales	being	due	to	longer	than	expected	time	taken	to	develop	supply	
chain	capability	in	project	areas.	In	recruitment	strategies	the	focus	was	similar,	with	
appointments	of	senior	staff	members	largely	being	on	the	basis	of	their	previous	
experience	either	in	running	co-operatives,	other	businesses	deemed	‘ethical’	e.g.	Cadburys,	
or	from	sales	or	general	construction	management	backgrounds.	Detailed	knowledge	about	
retrofit	specifically	was	seen	as	less	of	an	important	feature	than	these.	
7.3	What	contextual	factors	conditioned	and	shaped	The	Energy	
Saving	Co-op’s	priorities?		
As	identified	in	the	literature	review	and	theoretical	exploration	of	chapter	three,	multiple	
factors	and	actors	operating	at	various	different	scales	influence	experimental	assemblages	
at	the	local	level,	from	macro-level	landscape	issues	to	meso-level	issues	in	the	broader	
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urban	context	and	factors	at	the	micro-level.	The	following	sections	seek	to	identify	the	
factors	and	issues	at	these	three	levels	-	shown	as	red	and	green	text	in	figure	19	below	-	
that	were	significant	for	The	Energy	Saving	Co-operative,	and	how	these	conditioned	and	
shaped	its	approach	and	priorities.	
Figure	19	The	Energy	Saving	Co-operative	assemblage	as	description	
Dept.	of	Energy	and	
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UK	(Advice)	
Midlands	Co-op	(funder,	
board	member)	
Northfield	Ecocentre	
(marketing,	board	member)	
New	World	Home	
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board	member)	
Other	Community	
Groups	(referrals)	
Jericho	Construction	
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BSeen/Localise	West	
Midlands	(networking)	
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7.3.1	Macro-level	factors:	finding	‘solutions’	to	climate	change	and	
economic	crisis.	
ESC	was	heavily	influenced	by	two	key	macro-priorities	simultaneously:	firstly	of	national	
climate	change	targets	of	reducing	carbon	emissions	by	80%	by	2050,	and	simultaneously	by	
the	prediction	and	expectation	(shared	among	the	stakeholders	of	the	ESC)	of	a	macro-
societal	change	of	attitude	in	relation	to	the	financial	crisis.	This	change	in	attitude	was	
thought	to	be	twofold:	firstly	that	people	would	become	more	interested	in	energy	
efficiency	as	a	means	of	securing	themselves	economically	against	exposure	to	fuel	price	
hikes,	and	secondly	that	people	would	cease	to	trust	banks	and	commercial	entities	for	
services,	instead	flocking	to	more	ethical	forms	of	business	such	as	co-operatives:	
“People	like	co-ops	at	the	moment.	You	know	with	all	the	banking	crisis	I	think	the	
co-op	bank	membership	has	increased	tremendously”	–	ESC	Sales	Director	
The	ESC’s	particular	area	based	approach	to	retrofit	was	also	driven	by	a	desire	to	boost	
local	economies	by	creating	jobs	both	in	the	construction	industry	and	for	energy	efficiency	
specialists	at	the	local	level.		
“The	[construction]	industry	has	been	brought	to	its	knees,	and	there	are	all	these	
highly	qualified	energy	people	walking	around	basically	doing	work	for	free	because	
they	need	the	industry	to	need	them.	They	just	need	someone	to	throw	them	a	
bone.”	–	Community	partner	1	
The	quotation	above	shows	that	there	was	a	shared	awareness	among	its	partners	that	both	
the	construction	industry	and	the	environmental	sector	had	been	severely	damaged	by	the	
economic	crisis	and	that	domestic	retrofit,	under	the	context	of	the	upcoming	Green	Deal	
being	launched,	could	provide	an	opportunity	to	replace	some	of	the	jobs	lost	in	both	
sectors.	
7.3.2	Meso-level	factors	and	issues	–	funders’	requests,	supply	chain,	
competition	and	unemployment.	
Local	carbon	targets	made	very	little	difference	to	the	strategy	and	activities	of	ESC.	Instead,	
local	factors	leading	the	ESC	to	focus	on	Birmingham	in	the	initial	stages	of	its	business	were	
industry	and	interest-based.	Firstly,	the	main	funder,	Midlands	Co-operative,	had	its	offices	
near	Birmingham	in	Lichfield,	and	expressed	a	preference	for	the	business	to	focus	at	least	
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some	of	its	efforts	on	the	area	local	to	them	in	return	for	their	funding	contribution.	
Secondly,	the	CEO	felt	that	there	was	a	strong,	well	developed	supply	chain	which	had	been	
operating	in	the	energy	retrofit	field	for	some	time	in	the	Birmingham	area,	including	PV	
installers,	insulation	installers	and	highly	regarded	small	works	contractors	with	energy	
retrofit	capabilities.	Thirdly,	there	were	high	numbers	of	ageing	properties	with	solid	walls	
that	it	was	thought	could	benefit	from	external	wall	insulation	(EWI)	–	the	focal	technical	
measure	of	the	policy	climate.	
Furthermore,	at	the	same	time	as	the	Energy	Saving	Co-op	was	being	developed,	so	was	a	
£100m	scheme	in	Birmingham	called	Birmingham	Energy	Savers,	a	citywide	domestic	
retrofit	programme	delivered	for	Birmingham	City	Council	by	multi-national	energy	services	
company	Carillion	addressing	retrofit	in	council	owned	stock	as	well	as	privately	owned	and	
occupied	housing.	Whilst	there	were	many	other	connotations	of	the	presence	of	
Birmingham	Energy	Savers	(BES)	in	the	Birmingham	context	at	the	same	time	as	ESC,	one	of	
the	key	ones	was	that	the	presence	of	BES	raised	the	general	awareness	of	and	interest	in	
domestic	retrofit	in	the	city	region,	which	was	a	benefit	to	ESC.	
Suppliers	and	community	partners	in	the	Birmingham	region	also	were	keen	to	drive	ESC’s	
development	because	they	foresaw	domestic	energy	efficiency	and	retrofit	as	a	growth	
industry	and	wanted	to	be	involved	in	it,	seeing	the	ESC	as	a	way	to	do	that,	especially	when	
situated	against	the	model	of	BES	which	was	perceived	to	be	less	supportive	to	local	
organisations.	
The	issue	of	unemployment	in	the	Birmingham	region	also	became	a	driver	as	the	ESC	
developed,	largely	due	to	the	input	of	local	installer	members.	Observations	from	board	
meetings	ranging	from	February	2013	to	July	2013	show	that	this	progressed	from	a	fringe	
issue	to	the	business	to	becoming	a	more	prominent	part	of	the	ESC	agenda	resulting	in	a	
proposal	to	the	board	that	upskilling	and	job	creation	in	the	supply	chain	be	explicitly	
included	in	the	ESC’s	mission	statement.	
7.3.3	Micro-level	factors	and	issues:	One	man’s	co-operative	vision.	
One	of	the	most	significant	things	about	the	Energy	Saving	Co-operative	was	the	fact	that	it	
was	so	strongly	the	brainchild	of	one	person.	The	CEO’s	own	personal	interests,	first	in	
‘branding’,	second	in	the	upcoming	Green	Deal	policy,	and	third	in	a	somewhat	evangelical	
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view	of	the	co-operative	organisational	form	as	a	vehicle	for	social	change	and	promoting	
sustainable	development,	defined	the	direction	and	vision	of	the	ESC.	For	example,	an	
important	personal	viewpoint	was	that	being	a	co-op	would	strengthen	the	appeal	of	the	
initiative	and	its	services:		
“The	change	will	come,	we	just	haven’t	seen	it	yet…	people	will	shop	around	–	and	
the	co-op	is	a	powerful	idea	and	brand.”	(CEO).		
It	was	also	the	CEO’s	personal	experience	in	a	commercial	research	project	about	the	
retrofit	industry	that	led	him	to	the	conviction	that	the	co-operative	form	would	help	to	
address	issues	around	trust	in	the	construction	industry.	In	seeking	funding,	partners	and	
support,	the	ESC’s	strategy	was	almost	entirely	defined	by	the	CEO.	He	‘designed’	the	
business	around	these	personal	beliefs	and	experiences,	then	set	about	looking	for	partners	
who	shared	his	beliefs.	Naturally,	the	strength	of	his	belief	in	the	co-operative	form	led	him	
to	seek	funding	and	partnerships	mainly	from	other	co-operatives.		
7.4	How	did	the	Energy	Saving	Co-op	approach	its	objectives?	
7.4.1	Funding	
In	late	2011	the	CEO	felt	that	with	the	experience,	knowledge	and	analysis	he	had,	the	idea	
was	good	enough	to	seek	investment	for.	The	CEO	established	contact	with	the	then	chair	
of	The	Co-operative	Bank,	who	also	shared	his	passion	for	sustainability	and	had	recently	
completed	his	own	‘superhome’	whole	house	retrofit,	who	became	the	Chair	of	the	Board	
of	the	Energy	Saving	Co-operative.		Together	they	lobbied	and	pitched	to	various	wings	of	
The	Co-operative	UK’s	investment	society,	and	eventually	gained	significant	investment	of	
£200,000	from	the	Midland	Co-op,	along	with	smaller	investments	from	other	co-operatives	
such	as	Midcounties	Co-op	(£50,000),	the	Phone	Co-op	(£70,000),	and	a	U.S.	based	co-
operative	(£50,000)	to	start	up	and	establish	the	business.	It	also	issued	a	share	offer	in	
2013	from	which	it	gained	approximately	£180,000	of	investment.	
7.4.2	Projects	and	activities	
The	ESC’s	first	active	effort	to	establish	its	business	took	place	in	Birmingham,	launched	in	
2012,	involving	a	partnership	with	local	environmental	charity	Northfield	Ecocentre	who	
undertook	a	marketing	effort	in	order	to	generate	leads	for	the	ESC	of	interested	
households.	This	also	involved	a	competition	for	two	‘demonstration’	homes	to	be	
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retrofitted	for	free,	partly	funded	by	the	ESC	and	partly	by	funding	from	the	UK	
government’s	Local	Energy	Action	Fund	(LEAF).	(Figures	20	and	21	below	show	one	of	the	
competition	winning	houses	in	the	process	of	being	fitted	with	external	wall	insulation,	and	
the	completed	installation.	
	
Figure	20	ESC	Competition	winner’s	external	wall	insulation	in	progress	(Northfield	Ecocentre,	2015a)	
	 	 	
Figure	21	ESC	Competition	winner’s	completed	EWI	installation	–	front	and	rear	facades	(Northfield	
Ecocentre,	2015)	
The	first	competition	winning	householder	received	external	wall	insulation	to	the	whole	of	
her	semi-detached	property,	a	damp-proofing	membrane,	two	new	radiators,	thermostatic	
radiator	valves	and	room	thermostats.	She	also	self-funded	a	new	boiler.	The	total	cost	of	
the	installation	was	approximately	£13,800.	
The	second	competition	winning	household	received	external	wall	insulation	to	the	rear	of	
their	terraced	property,	insulated	boarding	in	their	loft,	and	internal	wall	insulation	on	the	
ceiling	of	their	extension.	The	total	cost	of	works	was	approximately	£7500.		
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ESC	also	attempted	to	establish	community	energy	projects	in	different	locations	in	the	UK	
including	one	in	Barton,	near	Oxford,	with	a	project	involving	a	neighbourhood	of	
approximately	100	steel	framed	homes	which	it	was	intended	would	be	retrofitted	with	
solid	wall	insulation	using	ECO	funding	and	the	ESC	would	provide	project	management	and	
access	to	local	suppliers	and	installers.	Other	project	areas	included	Nottingham,	South	
Staffordshire,	in	partnership	with	South	Staffordshire	Community	Trust,	and	Brighton.	
The	ESC’s	staffing	structure,	with	approximately	thirty	people,	some	part	and	some	full-
time,	some	on	temporary	consultancy	contracts,	was	divided	into	two	teams:	‘sales’	and	
‘delivery’	and	supported	by	a	partnerships	officer	who	worked	with	the	CEO	in	connecting	
with	community	organisations	and	local	authorities,	and	an	administrator	who	worked	on	
‘back	of	house’	issues	such	as	data	management.	Each	of	these	teams	had	representatives	
who	were	working	in	the	different	project	areas	in	the	UK.	
Its	main	activities	consisted	of:	
• Recruiting	and	vetting	local	suppliers	and	installers	as	members	of	the	co-operative	
(delivery)	
• Market	and	acquire	leads	for	the	Co-op’s	services	through	local	community	groups	
(sales)	
• Follow	up	leads	gained	from	community	groups	(sales)	
• Develop	internal	processes	such	as	CRM	systems	for	keeping	track	of	leads,	
customers	and	costings,	and	home	visit	survey	tools	(admin	and	delivery).	
• Recruit	staff	to	increase	capacity	and	grow	the	business	(CEO	and	chair	of	board)	
7.4.3	Strategy	and	identity	
In	terms	of	delivering	its	services,	the	ESC’s	vision	was	that	it	would	be:	
	“combining	the	best	of	‘Big’	with	the	best	of	‘Local’	–	i.e.	the	strengths	of	a	lean	
national	organisation	with	the	adaptability	of	our	local	co-operative	and	community	
partners.”	(Energy	Saving	Co-operative	website,	2013).	
What	this	meant	is	that	ESC	provided	a	structure	that	it	believed	allowed	place-specific,	
localised	relationships	to	flourish	in	different	places	on	the	basis	of	existing	capacity	in	those	
places.		
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	“There	are	things	that	local	groups	do	really	well.	Like	understanding	how	buildings	
are	different,	like	knowing	where	local	tradespeople	are	because	you	don’t	want	
people	travelling	miles	to	do	the	work	you	want	it	to	stay	in	the	local	economy.	But	
there	are	things	we	can	do	above	that	like	bring	an	efficient	model	that	can	be	varied	
and	integrated	through	the	local	groups.	So	it’s	about	a	balance	between	the	two.	
Northfield	are	different	to	the	[Oxford]	Low	Carbon	Hub	who	are	different	to	
Nottingham	and	so	on.	They’re	all	different	but	we	can	make	use	of	that	and	work	
with	them.”	CEO	
As	a	result	of	this,	the	ESC	prioritised	partnership	building	strongly,	with	particular	standards	
and	stipulations	about	who	they	would	work	with	and	why.	Generally,	the	ESC	prioritised	
working	in	areas	with	supportive	local	authorities	and	well-established	community	groups:	
“I	very	deliberately	selected	established	community	groups		-	they	have	to	employ	
people,	they	can’t	be	all	voluntary	because	you	can’t	rely	on	voluntary	groups	to	
deliver”	CEO	
The	ESC	also	recruited	installer	members	with	both	ethical	and	quality	credentials,	to	match	
its	strong	identity	in	being	pro-social,	but	also	with	a	strong	local	reputation	of	being	
established	and	experienced	in	the	industry,	and	of	delivering	high	quality	installations	–	in	
order	to	avoid	using	‘cowboys’	and	try	to	increase	trust	in	the	retrofit	part	of	the	
construction	industry.	
The	ESC’s	‘branding’	not	only	as	a	co-op	but	also	as	something	distinct	from	policy-related	
‘Green	Deal’	was	a	key	part	of	its	identity,	and	this	connected	to	how	it	promoted	its	
services	to	householders,	choosing	to	focus	not	on	technical	exemplars	or	the	mass	market,	
but	on	those	who	were	already	motivated	and	engaged	in	the	retrofit	agenda,	hence	using	
environmental	or	energy-focussed	community	groups	to	find	leads:			
“The	market	we’re	looking	at	is	what	I	call	real	people,	real	homes.	Instead	of	being	
about	PassivHaus	which	is	the	top	end,	or	Green	Deal	cookie	cutter	which	is	basically	
the	stuff	you	can	get	for	free	plus	boilers,	this	is	about	what	do	you	want	to	do	to	
your	property?	Is	it	an	extension?	Is	it	insulation?	And	coming	up	with	a	package	for	
that	that	deals	with	what	people	want	but	with	energy	efficiency	as	a	priority.	So	this	
is	for	people	with	particular	values	–	not	the	mass	market	yet	–	that’s	the	wrong	
approach,	but	the	first	movers	who	are	already	interested	and	committed.”	
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7.5	What	relationships	affected	Energy	Saving	Co-operative	‘s	
activities	and	progress?	
Not	only	do	multiple	factors	and	issues	affect	the	goals,	priorities,	strategy,	funding	and	
organisation	of	experimental	assemblages,	but	as	discussed	in	the	literature	review	and	
theoretical	chapters,	so	do	the	actors	and	organisations	that	are	involved.	The	following	
sections	explore	the	significant	and	influential	actors	and	relationships	operating	at	the	
macro,	meso	and	micro-levels	of	Energy	Saving	Co-op’s	assemblage,	and	the	particular	
interests,	approaches	and	priorities	they	bring	to	the	case.		
7.5.1	Macro-level	actors	and	relationships	
National	policy	and	the	Department	of	Energy	and	Climate	Change	
The	Energy	Saving	Co-op’s	push-pull	relationship	with	national	policy	and	related	tools	
created	a	variety	of	issues.	On	the	one	hand	ESC	was	both	inspired	by,	and	emerged	in	
anticipation	of	the	upcoming	Green	Deal	policy	being	launched:	A	national	policy	shift	
towards	PAYS	(now	the	‘Green	Deal’	finance	mechanism)	was	beginning	to	address	one	of	
the	most	commonly	perceived	barriers	to	retrofit	–	the	high	upfront	cost.	All	the	
stakeholders	in	ESC	were	aware	of	the	developing	policy	around	this	mechanism	and	
believed	that	whether	Green	Deal	was	effective	or	not,	the	policy	climate	created	a	context	
into	which	a	retrofitting	business	could	step:.		
“The	Co-op	came	along	as	a	precursor	to	Green	Deal.	The	original	concept	came	out	
of	Green	Deal	and	how	it	was	going	to	work.	We’ve	known	about	it	for	two	years	
now,	we	knew	it	was	coming,	but	at	the	beginning	of	2012	it	started	to	get	some	
structure”.-	ESC	Sales	director	
However,	the	relationship	was	in	tension	–	there	were	multiple	problems	and	issues	with	
the	financial	elements	of	Green	Deal	nationally,	yet	being	Green	Deal	accredited	remained	
the	only	mark	of	quality	assurance	or	reputability	for	retrofit	professionals,	which	was	
important	for	leveraging	funding	and	building	partnerships.	Consequently,	the	ESC	
attempted	to	tread	a	fine	line	between	working	with	policy	–	making	contact	with	the	then	
Energy	and	Climate	Change	minister,	and	gaining	media	representation	in	the	Guardian’s	
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Green	Deal	section	(citation)	-	and	remaining	independent	of	it,	being	acutely	aware	that	a	
lot	of	media	attention	on	Green	Deal	was	very	negative.	
	“We	are	more	driven	by	the	broader	energy	transition	than	the	Green	Deal	
specifically.	Green	deal	is	not	a	good	proposition	for	customers	–	so	we	will	become	a	
GDP	but	we	will	be	working	on	offering	other	financial	incentives	and	products.”	-	
ESC	CEO	
Certain	key	differences	between	the	ESC’s	services	and	the	‘Green	Deal	proposition’	
included	offering	reduced	mortgage	rates	linked	to	improved	energy	efficiency	from	The	
Ecology	Bank	instead	of	loan	finance,	and	not	limiting	technological	measures	to	those	
prioritised	at	national	level	(EWI,	boilers	and	heating	controls),	allowing	householders	
greater	choice	and	better	incorporation	of	energy	efficiency	with	broader	home	
improvement	plans.	This	attempted	independence	from	Green	Deal	was	enabled	by	the	
substantial	initial	funding	sources	ESC	gained	which	allowed	it	to	build	a	stable	workforce	
and	business	plan	rather	than	relying	on	conditional	central	government	grant	funding.	
ESC	also	had	a	turbulent	relationship	with	the	ECO.	Ongoing	attempts	to	negotiate	a	price	
for	ECO	from	the	energy	companies	fell	flat,	especially	after	changes	published	by	DECC	in	
guidance	to	suppliers	in	March	2013	significantly	reduced	the	level	of	obligation	on	
suppliers.	This	caused	significant	problems	for	ESC	and	resulted	in	them	having	to	end	one	
of	their	key	projects	in	Oxfordshire:	
“British	Gas	gave	us	an	offer	of	£7000	a	home	which	gave	us	enough	confidence	that	
we	could	fully	fund	it.	Then	when	the	ECO	changed	in	March	they	brought	it	down	to	
£5400	which	wasn’t	really	enough.	And	the	question	from	the	council	was:	is	it	fully	
funded	or	not?	And	we	couldn’t	give	them	that,	so	over	the	course	of	a	month,	we	
had	to	pull	out	and	we	lost	the	ECO	offer	and	the	opportunity	to	use	the	money.”	ESC	
CEO	
Co-operatives	UK	and	the	wider	co-operative	movement	
The	ESC’s	relationship	with	the	wider	co-operative	movement	provided	force	and	
motivation	behind	this	fundamental	aspect	of	ESC’s	branding	and	identity,	which	was	
designed	with	the	goal	of	appealing	to	consumers	who	appreciated	the	values	embodied	in	
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the	co-operative	organisational	form.	Internally,	building	connections	with	other	co-
operatives	such	as	gaining	funding	from	a	U.S.	based	co-op,	having	ESC	partners	nominated	
for	awards	at	the	UK	co-operatives	awards,	and	having	the	global	president	of	the	
International	Co-operative	Alliance	give	a	speech	at	the	ESC’s	own	AGM	were	all	part	of	
both	building	a	visible	reputation	and	providing	motivation	to	the	staff	and	the	members	
that	they	were	‘part	of	a	good	thing’.	These	relationships	were	also	useful	in	terms	of	
funding,	advice	and	organisational	and	administrative	resources	such	as	templates	for	co-
operative	rules,	defining	roles	and	responsibilities	of	board	members	and	structuring	the	
ESC’s	share	offer	and	reward	structure.	
However,	this	reliance	on	co-operatives	as	the	primary	source	of	support	exposed	the	ESC	
to	issues	in	the	wider	co-operative	group:	at	the	same	time	as	the	ESC	began	to	lose	the	
faith	of	its	board,	the	co-operative	group	ran	into	a	number	of	public	scandals	and	funding	
for	struggling	startups	such	as	the	ESC	became	much	harder	to	justify.	With	poor	sales,	no	
other	source	of	financial	support	or	funding	in	place	and	withdrawal	of	the	Midland	co-
operatives	funding,	the	ESC	was	no	longer	able	to	continue	as	a	business.	
7.5.2	Meso-level	actors	and	relationships	–	Birmingham’s	organisations	
and	influences	
Through	representation	on	ESC’s	board	of	executives,	funders,	community	partners	and	
suppliers	from	the	Birmingham	area	(as	well	as	other	areas)	were	able	to	actively	negotiate	
their	own	particular	interests	into	the	organisation’s	characteristics.	Observations	at	board	
meetings	and	management	team	meetings	show	how	different	influences	and	interests	
described	below	were	discussed	and	then	translated	into	organisational	changes	such	as	
increased	attention	to	the	skills	and	training	provision	of	suppliers	they	work	with,	
recruitment	of	(perceived)	‘better’	sales	staff	and	improved	financial	reporting	tools,	and	
simplifying	surveying	methods	for	better	communication	with	householders.	Some	
examples	of	these	relationships	are	given	below.	
Northfield	Ecocentre	
“We	give	them	customers,	that’s	the	deal.	And	later	on	we	might	help	them	with	
other	bits	of	the	customer	process	as	well.”	–	Commmunity	member	1	
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Northfield	Ecocentre	is	an	environmental	community	organisation	promoting	and	
encouraging	sustainable	living	in	and	around	the	South	Birmingham.	It	employs	two	
domestic	energy	assessors	and	prior	to	working	with	the	ESC	it	was	already	engaged	in	
outreach	to	households	providing	home	energy	assessments	and	linking	households	to	
previous	government	retrofit	schemes	Warm	Front,	CERT	and	CESP.	ESC	contracted	
Northfield	Ecocentre	to	promote	and	market	its	services	during	a	pilot	phase	between	
January	and	April	2012,	in	which	its	targets	were	to	generate	leads	leading	to	twenty	
retrofits.		
Working	through	community	organisation	Northfield	Ecocentre	defined	the	scale	and	space	
in	which	ESC	was	working,	simply	because	of	the	capacity	that	Northfield	had	and	the	
location	it	was	in,	where	it	was	already	doing	energy	efficiency	work	with	householders:	
“Where	we	work	depends	on	who	our	partners	are.	So	with	Northfield	it’s	generally	
South	Birmingham,	or	a	large	part	of	South	Birmingham”	CEO	
For	example,	this	resulted	in	the	two	competition	winners,	who	were	found	through	the	
Ecocentre’s	outreach,	being	located	in	Northfield.		
The	ESC’s	relationship	with	community	groups	also	changed	as	a	result	of	working	with	
Northfield	as	its	first	community	partner.	After	the	pilot	period	ESC	created	a	simpler	‘deal’	
for	community	groups	and	also	realised	that	it	could	not	rely	on	one	organisation	in	an	area.		
Furthermore,	Northfield	Ecocentre’s	close	links	to	householders	brought	feedback	to	the	
board	about	the	frustrations	of	householders	who	had	been	contacted	as	part	of	the	
marketing	strategy	but	left	waiting	for	further	information,	or	who	had	been	given	a	quote	
but	were	confused	about	the	rest	of	the	process,	such	as	who	was	going	to	do	the	works	for	
them.	Their	presence	on	the	board	brought	particular	attention	to	the	‘customer	
experience’	and	influenced	changes	to	the	ESC’s	strategy	which	were	intended	to	make	the	
link	between	the	sales	and	delivery	parts	of	retrofit	much	smoother	for	the	householder.	
Other	local	networks	
A	local	business	network	connecting	social	enterprises	involved	in	energy	related	work	
(BSEEN),	and	the	Localise	West	Midlands	(LWM)	network	of	community	organisations,	
businesses	and	local	authority	representatives,	were	also	helpful	for	ESC,	making	the	
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connection	between	the	CEO	and	Northfield	Ecocentre,	as	well	as	the	local	installer	
members	described	below,	and	with	local	environmental	community	groups	Kings	Heath	
Transition	and	Balsall	Heath	is	my	Planet,	who	signed	up	to	provide	the	ESC	with	
householder	referrals.		
Local	installers	
Birmingham	based	installer	members	Jericho	Construction	and	New	World	Solar	both	
became	involved	with	the	ESC	because	they	felt	that	their	organisations	and	the	ESC	shared	
a	value	position	in	terms	of	a	commitment	to	developing	local	supply	chains	and	avoiding	
working	with	large	commercial	entities	such	as	Carillion	and	some	of	the	big	six	energy	
companies:	
“We	hold	a	strong	belief	in	integrated	local	supply	chains	instead	of	these	big	
companies	screwing	the	little	guy	all	the	time	and	energy	saving	co-op	really	get	
that.	We	also	believe	that	jobs	are	really	a	way	of	strengthening	communities	and	
preventing	anti-social	behaviour	and	we’re	really	committed	to	helping	
disadvantaged	jobseekers	–	you	know,	it’s	a	bit	like	‘get	a	job,	or	go	on	the	rob’,	and	I	
like	to	think	this	industry	might	be	able	to	help	stop	people	going	on	the	rob!”		
Installer	member	1	
These	members	also	brought	particular	issues	to	the	table	and	represented	the	interests	
and	perspectives	of	installers	with	practical	experience.		
“We	tell	them	how	it	is	from	the	supply	chain	point	of	view	–	this	process	really	needs	to	be	
installer	led	as	the	advisors	just	don’t	have	the	technical	expertise	that	we	have.”	–	Installer	
member	1	
However,	they	also	got	involved	to	represent	training	and	unemployment	as	an	issue	and	
make	sure	this	was	at	the	forefront	of	any	strategy	that	is	being	developed	in	the	
construction	industry.		
“One	of	the	main	reasons	that	I’m	there	is	to	wave	the	banner	for	trade	and	
employment	in	industry.	Jericho’s	core	mission	is	about	employment	and	training	and	
providing	opportunities	to	people	who	have	been	disadvantaged	in	the	labour	
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market.	So	I’m	there	to	make	sure	there’s	a	strong	focus	on	employment	and	training	
in	the	business	as	it	develops.”	Installer	member	2	
However,	one	of	the	key	tensions	in	the	relationship	between	ESC	and	its	installer	members	
is	that	these	installers	became	members	on	the	expectation	that	they	would	get	installation	
work,	but	this	expectation	was	not	realised	and	both	installer	members	grew	increasingly	
frustrated	at	the	slow	progress	ESC	was	making	in	terms	of	converting	leads	to	installations,	
ending	up	feeling	like	they	were	doing	the	ESC	a	favour	by	being	on	the	board	of	directors	
and	providing	advice,	without	receiving	much	in	return.		
“I’m	disappointed	really…	I	don’t	like	to	use	that	word	because	I’ve	been	involved	
since	the	start	but	it’s	just	been	much	slower	than	I	expected.	We	trained	ourselves	
up	on	the	technology,	got	ourselves	into	the	supply	chain	and	then…	Where	did	it	all	
go	wrong?	I	haven’t	done	a	single	solid	wall	[insulation]	job	since	last	year	when	we	
did	the	demonstrations,	none	from	Birmingham	Energy	Savers	and	none	from	Energy	
Saving	Co-op	either.”	–	Installer	member	2	
Midlands	Co-op	
As	the	ESC’s	main	funders,	Midlands	Co-op	had	a	significant	impact.	Their	presence	and	
contribution	contributed	to	the	focus	of	the	business	initially	being	in	Birmingham	and	its	
surrounds,	and	also	meant	that	internally	in	board	meetings	as	the	main	funder	with	the	
biggest	stake,	the	Midlands	Co-op	board	member	largely	took	the	lead	in	holding	the	
management	team	to	account,	quizzing	the	ESC	CEO	and	Chair	about	progress	and	
persistently	focussing	discussions	on	profit	and	sales	targets.	This	prompted	a	strategic	shift	
within	the	ESC	in	prioritising	sales	activity	and	recruiting	staff	to	support	this.	However,	as	
the	ESC	continued	to	struggle	to	meet	its	financial	projections	and	reduce	its	losses	during	
the	latter	half	of	2013,	the	Midlands	Co-op	board	member	was	losing	faith	in	the	ESC	as	an	
investment.	This	meant	that	the	decision	to	continue	to	fund	a	struggling	business	was	
under	pressure	in	and	of	itself,	and	because	of	additional	scrutiny	from	the	broader	co-
operative	group	under	the	conditions	of	a	reputational	crisis	and	group	restructuring.	The	
Midlands	Co-op’s	decision	to	withdraw	funding	from	the	ESC	and	additionally	not	to	buy	the	
business	when	it	became	insolvent	ultimately	resulted	in	its	demise	and	the	ceasing	of	
trading.	
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Birmingham	Energy	Savers	
The	relationship	with	the	large	Green	Deal	scheme	Birmingham	Energy	Savers	(BES),	led	by	
Carillion	in	partnership	with	Birmingham	City	Council	was	somewhat	conflicted.	There	was	a	
certain	dependency	on	the	presence	of	BES	in	terms	of	the	awareness	of	retrofit	that	it	
raised	in	the	city-region,	but	there	were	some	customers,	local	installers	and	community	
groups	that	were	uncomfortable	with	BES	because	of	concerns	over	power	and	
representation.	This	tension	is	represented	perfectly	in	this	perspective	from	one	of	ESC’s	
community	members,	who	also	worked	with	BES:	
“The	better	situation	is	definitely	the	co-op	because	we	are	an	equal	partner	and	we	
have	a	say	in	the	rules.	But	we	wouldn’t	be	involved	in	Green	Deal	at	all	if	it	wasn’t	
for	BES.	The	overall	picture	in	Birmingham	would	look	very	different”	–	community	
member	1	
Generally	speaking,	both	the	leaders	of	BES	from	Birmingham	City	Council,	and	the	ESC	
shared	a	viewpoint	that	they	supported	each	other’s	goals	and	aims,	but	that	they	were	not	
interested	in	working	together	due	to	fundamental	differences	in	their	approaches.	Indeed,	
both	parties	alluded	to	‘healthy’	competition	being	a	positive	thing	for	progressing	in	
retrofit	in	Birmingham.		
	“Birmingham	is	big	enough	for	both	models	as	long	as	they’re	both	looking	after	the	
customer”	–	Birmingham	Energy	Savers	manager,	Birmingham	City	Council	
“On	BES	my	position	on	Birmingham	Energy	Savers	has	always	been	very	clear	–	we	
are	trying	to	achieve	the	same	thing.	We	will	work	alongside	them	but	not	get	
subsumed	by	them.	Our	structure	and	our	process	is	better,	we	just	need	to	prove	it.”	
–	ESC	CEO		
However,	this	situation	resulted	in	a	compromise	in	ESC’s	strategy	in	terms	of	how	it	
wanted	to	work,	having	identified	a	supportive	council	as	one	of	its	important	strategic	
priorities	in	areas	it	worked	in.	In	Birmingham	this	was	compromised	in	favour	of	other	
factors	such	as	core	funders	the	Midlands	Co-op’s	preference	for	working	in	Birmingham,	
the	strong	supply	chain	presence,	and	the	particular	strengths	of	Northfield	Ecocentre.	As	
time	progressed,	it	became	evident	that	there	were	serious	problems	in	the	BES	scheme,	
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with	rumours	of	poor	surveying	and	assessments,	technically	suspect	recommendations	and	
poor	communication	with	householders.	This	resulted	in	not	quite	the	relative	knock	on	
that	ESC	might	have	hoped,	with	the	reputational	risk	not	only	of	BES	being	damaged,	but	
potentially	of	retrofit	as	a	whole:	
“To	be	honest,	BES	is	a	nightmare,	it’s	a	disaster…	And	people	are	getting	really	fed	
up.	I	do	think	you	know	that	if	people	are	looking	around	and	they’re	after	quality	
and	something	a	bit	more	personal,	they’ll	go	for	the	Energy	Saving	Co-op,	but	the	
damage	might	have	been	too	great	for	people	to	even	consider	going	somewhere	
else.”	–	Community	Member	2	
7.5.3	Micro-level	relationships	
The	importance	of	individual	personal	connections	were	very	important	to	the	ESC	in	its	
initial	stages.	Networking	at	local	events	and	personal	introductions	between	one	
particularly	active	individual	in	the	Birmingham	region	who	managed	both	BSEEN	and	LWM,	
and	the	CEO,	were	the	primary	source	of	initial	partnerships	and	members	such	as	the	
Northfield	Ecocentre,	Jericho	Construction	and	New	World	Home	Energy.			
7.5.4	Internal	dynamics	and	negotiations	
Financial	concerns	and	forecasting	
Whilst	the	ESC’s	vision,	strategies	and	identity	were	externally	well	defined	around	its	
organisational	form	and	structure,	observations	from	internal	management	team	and	board	
meetings	showed	a	gap	between	these	intentions	and	the	realities	of	the	business.		
Over	the	period	between	February	and	July	2013,	questions	from	the	board	to	the	CEO	
repeatedly	involved	concerns	over	how	far	behind	financial	forecasts	the	ESC	was,	largely	
due	to	difficulties	converting	‘pipeline’	works	and	leads	to	actual	sales	and	installations.	
Despite	a	temporary	reprieve	after	financial	reforecasting	in	April	and	an	overhaul	of	the	
ESC’s	business	plan	based	on	more	modest	targets	and	fewer	sales,	the	ESC	had	done	very	
few	or	no	installations	in	many	of	the	ESC’s	project	areas,	and	in	comparison	with	its	targets	
of	200	in	Birmingham	in	the	first	year	(which	had	long	passed	by	this	point),	progress	was	
slow.	This	bred	further	concerns	over	the	nature	of	financial	reporting	to	the	board	and	
explicit	requests	for	sales	figures	to	be	clearer.	
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Fears	were	also	raised	in	board	meetings	repeatedly	about	waning	support	from	the	wider	
co-operative	group,	with	some	divisions	about	how	to	approach	this:	some	board	members	
preferred	informal	verbal	conversations	with	senior	members	of	the	co-op	bank	and	others	
suggested	formal	communications	requesting	support.	These	discussions	ignited	additional	
questions	about	whether	business	risks	were	being	effectively	identified	and	communicated	
to	the	board,	with	subsequent	requests	for	a	risk	register	to	be	presented	to	the	board.		
Staffing	and	organisational	structure.		
The	CEO	and	Chair’s	response	to	the	concerns	raised	about	poor	sales	figures	was	to	enact	a	
recruitment	drive	and	restructure	the	business.	A	greater	drive	on	building	external	
partnerships	was	made,	and	an	existing	member	of	staff	was	promoted	to	a	role	of	‘head	of	
customer	experience’	–	and	a	previous	construction	manager	was	promoted	to	manage	the	
‘delivery’	team	nationally.	A	temporary	Chief	Operations	Officer	was	recruited	to	remove	
some	management	strain	from	the	CEO	and	allow	him	to	concentrate	on	sourcing	extra	
funding.	These	were	all	based	on	the	CEO’s	perspective	that:		
“The	big	challenge	is	about	people.	Early	on	we	had	lots	of	customers	and	not	
enough	supply	chain	–	so	our	stress	was	in	the	community	groups	having	fed	up	
people.	Now	the	stress	in	the	business	is	that	we	have	a	great	supply	chain	and	we’re	
not	giving	them	enough	work	so	we	really	need	to	get	our	sales	and	our	operations	
team	working	much	better	together	and	we	need	the	right	people	for	that.”		
However,	these	staff	changes	caused	internal	disquiet,	with	some	staff	resigning	over	the	
changes	and	numerous	members	of	the	board	airing	concern	over	the	high	earnings	
packages	being	offered	to	new	members	of	staff	in	the	context	of	poor	financial	
performance,	without	consultation	with	the	board.	Consequently,	the	board	requested	that	
the	CEO	and	Chair	provide	them	with	CVs	of	senior	management.		
Further	internal	disharmonies	as	a	result	of	fears	of	poor	financial	performance	also	
resulted	in	a	withdrawal	of	the	share	offer	funds	from	being	used	for	business	development,	
which,	along	with	the	Midlands	Co-op’s	withdrawal	of	funding,	contributed	to	the	ESC	being	
unable	to	continue	trading.		
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7.6	What	were	Energy	Saving	Co-op’s	achievements	and	outcomes?	
During	the	18	months	of	its	life,	ESC	managed	to	gain	over	£500,000	of	funding,	create	a	
new	business	and	pioneer	a	new,	multi-stakeholder	organisational	form	for	delivering	
domestic	retrofit.	It	attracted	100	individual	members	and	13	organisational	members,	was	
tweeted	by	the	then	Secretary	for	Energy	and	Climate	Change,	and	was	featured	in	a	
national	newspaper.	It	also	created	new	connections	and	a	network	between	community	
organisations	and	retrofit	installers	in	the	Birmingham	area.	
The	number	of	homes	retrofitted	in	the	West	Midlands	over	the	whole	of	2013	was	18.	The	
majority	of	these	were	in	what	the	ESC’s	project	team	called	‘Greater	Birmingham’,	which	
included	West	Bromwich,	Walsall	and	as	far	as	Lichfield.	Two	competition	winning	
showhomes	were	also	completed	in	Birmingham	with	Jericho	construction	in	2012	and	the	
total	of	20	homes	in	the	region	is	clearly	significantly	less	than	the	target	of	200	in	the	first	
year.	However,	one	of	the	showhomes	was	revisited	by	Northfield	Ecocentre	a	year	later,	
and	the	householder	was	able	to	demonstrate	a	rise	in	her	EPC	rating	from	D	to	C,	and	
report	great	improvements	in	comfort	and	significantly	reduced	damp.		
However,	despite	predicting	a	significant	financial	loss	in	its	first	year	of	operation,	accounts	
showed	a	much	greater	than	expected	loss	from	the	West	Midlands	region,	alongside	
greater	than	expected	losses	in	all	regions	of	the	business.		
The	pipeline	of	sales	shown	on	management	accounts	had	increased	in	the	latter	half	of	
2013,	and	a	number	of	deposits	for	work	had	been	paid	across	the	region,	but	there	was	a	
persistent	lack	of	installations	and	the	ESC	was	receiving	complaints	about	delays	in	the	
process.	The	organisation	was	struggling	to	keep	up	with	the	promotions	and	increased	
sales	efforts	that	it	had	made.	Changes	at	macro-level	to	the	ECO	dramatically	reduced	the	
levels	of	subsidy	available,	and	alongside	internal	conflicts	and	inaccurate	financial	
predictions	this	made	it	very	difficult	for	ESC	to	present	an	attractive	package	in	terms	of	
combinations	of	services	and	subsidies	to	local	partners	and	householders	alike	as	well	as	to	
funders	in	reassurance.	With	the	withdrawal	of	the	Barton	project,	and	much	slower	sales	
elsewhere	including	in	Birmingham,	cash	flow	became	an	enormous	issue	and	the	
organisation	relied	entirely	on	direct	funding	rather	than	its	own	revenue	to	pay	salaries	and	
cover	its	operational	costs.		
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Between	October	2013	and	November	2013	the	board	had	become	increasingly	concerned	
about	the	lack	of	sales	and	the	ESC	falling	further	and	further	behind	its	projections.	In	late	
December	2013,	an	emergency	board	meeting	was	called	in	which	insolvency	practitioners	
were	present,	and	the	decision	was	made	to	dissolve	the	ESC	and	pay	back	the	shareholders	
investments.		
There	were	a	number	of	effects	of	this:	Many	of	the	ESC’s	staff	were	not	paid	over	the	
Christmas	period.	One	of	the	ESC’s	board	members	who	had	been	promoted	to	the	Chair	of	
the	Board	of	UK	Co-operatives	on	the	basis	of	a	recommendation	from	the	ESC,	was	forced	
to	step	down	as	a	result	of	the	insolvency.	In	an	unexpected	connection	between	cases,	
another	effect	was	that	members	of	the	Carbon	Co-op	in	Manchester	became	increasingly	
concerned	about	the	reputational	damage	to	retrofitting	co-ops:		
“I’m	so	fed	up.	They’ve	sunk	half	a	million	of	funding	in	creating	this	huge	
organisation	and	we’re	busy	doing	this	mostly	voluntarily,	and	now	people	are	
wondering	whether	they	can	trust	us	or	whether	we’ll	do	the	same”	–	Carbon	Co-op	
project	manager	
Overall,	the	concept	of	the	Energy	Saving	Co-operative	created	by	the	CEO,	which	gained	
much	support	locally	and	nationally,	did	not	connect	to	the	operational	reality	of	running	
the	business,	resulting	in	a	story	that	tells	us	of	the	rapid	rise,	then	the	rapid	fall,	of	an	
organisation.		
7.7	Theoretical	reflections	from	The	Energy	Saving	Co-operative	
In	relation	to	the	multiple	factors	and	actors	that	involved	in	the	ESC’s	assemblage,	this	case	
study	found	that	although	climate	change	a	dominant	macro-level	factor,	the	economic	
crisis	also	had	a	significant	influence	on	its	development.	In	terms	of	the	influence	of	actors	
and	factors	at	the	different	levels,	there	was	really	only	one	significant	actor	at	the	micro-
level	who	furthered	this	cause.	In	comparison	to	Carbon	Co-op’s	technical	and	peer-to-peer	
experimentation	and	knowledge	priorities,	ESC	was	more	concerned	with	testingh	a	
business	model	or	brand,	and	a	retrofit	process.	Actors	specific	to	the	Birmingham	context	
had	a	significant	influence	on	the	ESC’s	priorities	and	vision	initially,	but	internal	dynamics	
alongside	changes	at	the	macro-level	to	policy	and	the	ECO	contributed	significantly	to	its	
downfall,	rendering	its	contribution	to	any	systemic	change	minimal.			
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For	the	final	case	study	of	the	Bristol	Home	Energy	Upgrade	questions	are	raised	around	
whether	these	issues	with	the	problematic	national	policy	context	are	shared	among	all	
three	cases,	whether	its	landscape	priorities	and	experimentation	focus	differ	again	or	are	
shared	with	Carbon	Co-op	and	ESC,	and	whether	individuals	at	the	micro	level	also	have	a	
significant	level	of	influence	on	the	development	of	the	case	as	they	have	done	for	the	first	
two	cases,	or	whether	actors	at	the	other	levels	are	more	significant.		
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Chapter	8	-	Case	Study	#3:	Bristol	Home	Energy	Upgrade	
A	tightly	controlled	local	government	policy	experiment.		
The	Bristol	Home	Energy	Upgrade	was	a	short	term	grant	scheme	as	part	of	a	DECC	and	City	
Deals	combined	initiative	piloting	the	Green	Deal	before	its	official	launch.	The	BHEU	was	
successful	in	retrofitting	single	measures	to	a	significant	number	of	privately	owned	and	
occupied	properties	in	a	short	period	of	time,	and	providing	clear	lessons	to	local	
government	in	navigating	different	aspects	of	Green	Deal	and	ECO.	However,	its	tight	
adherence	to	policy,	limited	supply	chain	and	its	reproduction	of	existing	governance	
networks	in	the	city	region	limited	learning	and	transformation	in	retrofit	practices	beyond	
the	narrow	policy	lens.	The	table	below	shows	some	of	its	key	features	and	the	remainder	
of	the	chapter	will	explore	the	factors	and	actors	that	contributed	to	the	BHEU’s	formation	
and	orientation.	
Defining	features	 Short-term,	local	authority-led	scheme	
piloting	Green	Deal	and	ECO	policies	in	
practice.	Providing	subsidised	solid	wall	
insulation	and	boilers	for	homes	in	Bristol.		
Key	Activities	 Creating	a	delivery	partnership,	marketing	
and	promoting,	advising	and	identifying	
eligible	householders,	identifying	accredited	
installers,	acquiring	ECO	subsidies	for	
installations,	managing	grant	funding.	
Key	priorities	 Meeting	government	targets,	addressing	
climate	change	targets,	‘testing	the	market’,	
testing	policy.	
Key	relationships		 Bristol	City	Council,	Centre	for	Sustainable	
Energy	(CSE)	(delivery	partner),	with	Scottish	
and	Southern	energy	(ECO	provider),	OFGEM	
(ECO	regulator)	Bristol	Energy	Network	
(BEN)	and	local	community	groups.	
Outcomes	and	effects		 157	households	retrofitted.	23	with	solid	
wall	insulation,	134	with	boilers,	central	
heating	or	heating	controls.	Contributed	to	
further	Bristol	retrofit	scheme	and	wider	
Bristol	Energy	Strategy.	
Table	11	-	Snapshot	of	The	Bristol	Home	Energy	Upgrade.	
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8.1	What	was	the	Bristol	Home	Energy	Upgrade?		
The	Bristol	Big	Home	Energy	Upgrade	(BHEU)	was	a	local	authority-led	pilot	programme	of	
domestic	retrofit	delivery	to	owner	occupiers,	in	anticipation	of	the	national	Green	Deal	
policy	being	launched	in	the	UK.	It	provided	subsidised	domestic	retrofit	measures	to	
households	across	the	whole	Bristol	city	area	using	grant	funding	from	central	government	
and	supplemented	by	householders’	own	capital	or	loan	finance.	It	ran	between	December	
2012	and	May	2013	and	was	managed	and	provided	by	partnership	between	Bristol	City	
Council	(BCC),	and	the	Centre	for	Sustainable	Energy	(CSE).	The	main	focus	of	the	initiative	
was	to	“kick-start	the	Green	Deal	in	the	region”	(CSE,	2013,	p1)	and	to	test	out	the	
practicalities	of	Green	Deal	and	ECO	at	household	level,	including	funding	structures,	
capacity	in	the	local	supply	chain	and	the	take-up	for	Pay	As	You	Save	loans.	It	focussed	
specifically	on	privately	owned	and	occupied	homes,	unlike	other	Go	Early	schemes	in	the	
country	which	either	focussed	on	social	housing	or	had	private	housing	as	a	small	
component:	
The	technical	measures	on	offer	were	limited	to:	
• Solid	wall	insulation	(internal	or	external)	
• Boilers	and	heating	controls,	e.g.	thermostatic	radiator	valves,	and	one	upgrade	from	
electric	heating	to	gas	central	heating.	
This	was	largely	because	of	a	lack	of	accredited	suppliers	and	installers	for	other	measures	
such	as	underfloor	heating	or	hard	to	treat	loft	insulation.	Furthermore,	only	single	
measures	were	installed	in	each	property,	due	to	complications	with	getting	hybrid	or	mixed	
installations	to	qualify	for	ECO	subsidies.		
8.1.1	Organisational	form	and	governance	
The	Bristol	Home	Energy	Upgrade	was	not	an	organisation	in	and	of	itself	but	a	time-limited	
scheme	comprising	a	partnership	between	Bristol	City	Council	(BCC)	and	CSE,	supported	by	
Scottish	and	Southern	Energy	(SSE)	(as	the	ECO	provider)	and	Wessex	Home	Loans	(as	the	
finance	provider).	The	partnership	between	BCC	and	CSE	was	a	standard	contractual	
relationship	which	had	been	competitively	tendered,	with	roles	and	responsibilities	
between	BCC	and	CSE	clearly	defined	from	the	outset.	BCC	were	responsible	for	‘scheme	
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management’,	which	involved	contracting	partners,	managing	the	grant	monies	from	DECC,	
defining	the	scheme	strategy	(e.g.	what	was	being	offered,	marketing),	seeking	out	installers	
in	the	region,	defining	a	marketing	strategy,	monitoring	progress	and	reporting	to	DECC.	
CSE	was	responsible	for	‘scheme	delivery’,	which	consisted	of	the	following:	
“If	someone	was	interested	they’d	phone	up	CSE	and	somebody	would	have	a	chat	
with	them	for	about	twenty	minutes	[…]	finding	out	whether	[the	scheme]	was	right	
for	them.	If	the	people	then	said	yeah	this	sounds	good,	they	would	get	sent	an	
information	pack	and	be	invited	to	get	a	GDA.	Then	they	get	an	EPC,	so	we	can	
calculate	the	level	of	grant	and	loans.	They	then	communicate	that	back	to	the	
customer	who	can	then	decide	whether	to	proceed	with	the	installation	if	they	want	
to.	We	as	CSE	are	facilitators	not	managers	–	we	give	the	householders	a	list	of	
people	who	can	do	installs,	the	customer	then	chooses	who	does	the	install.”	CSE	
project	officer	
Ultimately,	BHEU	was	answerable	to	DECC	through	a	two-weekly	reporting	process	on	its	
progress,	and	the	release	of	funds	for	installations	was	dependent	upon	this	reporting.	
Figure	22	below	shows	the	process	for	the	householder	and	which	organisation	is	involved	
at	which	stage.	
	
Figure	22	BHEU	Customer	journey	and	process.	
1.	Customer	
fills	in	online	
questionnaire	
or	phones	CSE	
advice	line
2.	CSE	advise	about	
measures	available,	
costs,	grants	and	
loans	and	screen	for	
eligibility
3.	Customer	
chooses	from	a	list	
of	accredited	
assessors	 and	
EPC/Green	Deal	
assessment	 is	
completed.
4.	Customer	
chooses	 installer,	
accepts	quotation,	
signs	contract	with	
installer
Customer	applies	for	
grant	through	CSE	
and/or	loan	through	
Wessex	Home	Loans
5.	When	finance	
application	is	
approved,	
installation	begins	
6.	Installation	is	
completed.	Customer	
fills	in	paperwork	to	
prove	details	and	
cost	and	returns	to	
CSE
7.	CSE	files	
paperwork	to	BCC	
who	report	to	
DECC.	DECC	
releases	grant	to	
BCC	who	pay	CSE
8.	Grant	is	paid	
to	householder	
who	pays	
installer.
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8.2	The	Bristol	Home	Energy	Upgrade’s	priorities:	Policy	and	delivery	
testing.	
8.2.1	Priorities	and	targets	
The	Bristol	Home	Energy	Upgrade’s	priorities	were	to	test	policy	processes,	contribute	to	
future	retrofit	schemes	and	scenarios	for	Bristol,	investigate	the	levels	of	interest	in	Bristol	
in	solid	wall	insulation	and	to	provide	demonstrations	-	particularly	of	installations	of	
external	wall	insulation	–	which	normalised	it	as	a	process	so	that	when	the	Green	Deal	
started	officially	the	product	would	not	be	considered	unusual:	
	“What	we’re	trying	to	do	is	kind	of	normalise	this	installation	within	Bristol.	To	make	
people	think	actually	this	is	something	I	can	do.	You	go	to	a	house	in	your	neck	of	the	
woods,	similar	to	your	house,	where	it’s	been	done	and	you	think	maybe	this	is	
achievable	for	me	so	that	was	always	part	of	the	legacy	plan.”	BCC	Project	co-
ordinator	
The	BHEU’s	initial	targets	were	to	complete	approximately	150	solid	wall	insulation	retrofits	
and	around	150	heating	system	retrofits.	
8.2.2	Experimental	focus	–	what	was	it	testing	and	why?	
There	was	from	the	outset	an	explicit	acknowledgement	of	the	experimental	nature	of	the	
BHEU	in	many	ways,	related	to	specific	components	of	the	national	policy	framework	as	
part	of	a	national	transition	between	one	retrofit	policy	regime	–	the	previous	CERT	and	
CESP	schemes	–	and	another:	the	Green	Deal	and	ECO.		These	‘tests’	were	largely	being	
undertaken	to	inform	future	retrofit	schemes	in	the	Bristol	city	at	a	larger	scale	under	the	
new	policy	context.	The	table	below	shows	some	examples	of	the	BHEU’s	experimental	
focus.	
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Knowledge	focus	 Example	and	source	
Testing	ECO	and	Green	Deal	 “the	pilot	aimed	to	test	the	underlying	principles	of	the	
Green	Deal	and	build	the	local	market	in	advance	of	its	
formal	launch	in	early	2013,	utilising	the	emerging	Green	
Deal	supply	chain	(installers,	advisors)	and	pay-as-you-
save	style	finance	to	replicate	Green	Deal	finance	as	
closely	as	possible.”		CSE	final	report,	2013.	
““We	were	testing	everything	really:	how	to	get	ECO	
signed	off,	whether	ECO	rates	were	enough	for	people,	
how	ECO	interacted	with	Green	Deal	and	the	PAYS	
finance	mechanism,	how	to	get	payments	to	people…	
Every	aspect	from	understanding	the	consumers	to	
knowing	how	to	use	the	software	and	calculating	the	
grants,	getting	the	right	installers.	It	was	an	introduction	
to	the	logistics	of	delivery	so	that	when	the	Green	Deal	
and	ECO	starts	for	real	they	know	what	they	are	looking	
at.”	CSE	Project	co-ordinator	
Testing	the	market	 “We	were	really	looking	into	consumer	interest.	Whether	
this	was	what	people	in	Bristol	wanted.”	BCC	Project	co-
ordinator	
Testing	delivery	of	energy	
services.	
“It	was	a	free	for	all	pilot	really.	Looking	at	the	form	that	
delivery	could	take	down	the	line,	whether	the	council	
might	want	to	be	a	provider,	or	a	facilitator	or	what.”	
BCC	Technical	project	manager	
Testing	methods	of	
community	engagement	
“Bedminster	Energy	Group	were	involved	really	to	test	
different	ways	of	engaging	communities	with	energy	
efficiency	and	whether	having	a	community	group	there	
added	value	or	not.”	CSE	project	officer	
Table	12	–	BHEU	Perspectives	on	knowledge	and	experimentation	
8.3	What	contextual	factors	shaped	the	Bristol	Home	Energy	
Upgrade’s	priorities?	
As	shown	in	the	assemblage	diagram	in	figure	23	below	and	like	the	previous	cases,	the	
BHEU	and	its	particular	focus	is	the	product	of	a	range	of	issues	and	factors	operating	at	at	
multiple	levels,	from	the	macro,	through	the	meso-level	down	to	the	micro	or	individual	
level.	These	are	shown	as	red	and	green	text	in	Figure	23	below	and	this	section	will	explore	
how	they	conditioned	and	shaped	the	BHEU’s	priorities	and	approach.	
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Figure	23	Bristol	Home	Energy	Upgrade	Assemblage	as	description	
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8.3.1	Macro-level	factors	–	climate	change,	interurban	reputation,	and…	
policy	again.	
The	presentation	of	Bristol’s	upcoming	retrofit	activities	by	a	Bristol	City	Council	officer	at	
the	RetroExpo	event	–	a	conference	for	retrofit	professionals,	workers,	manufacturers	and	
enthusiasts	at	the	NEC	in	October	2012	positioned	retrofit	firmly	as	part	of	the	climate	
change	agenda	and	much	less	than	other	cities	as	part	of	an	agenda	around	fuel	poverty	or	
unemployment,	and	most	interview	participants	specifically	mentioned	climate	change	
targets	as	the	key	motivation	behind	the	scheme.	However,	despite	this	being	a	‘macro-
level	issue’	the	connection	with	this	issue	was	made	through	Bristol’s	specific	climate	
change	targets	rather	than	the	UK’s	climate	change	targets,	as	explored	further	below.	
Bristol’s	engagement	with	the	European	Green	Capital	award,	funded	by	the	European	
Bank,	also	brought	another	supranational	issue	into	the	picture	of	BHEU,	which	was	its	
position	as	a	demonstrator	of	‘best	practice’	in	sustainable	living	and	governance	to	other	
European	Cities.	Retrofit	was	situated	as	one	component	of	this,	creating	an	outward-
looking	emphasis	on	the	results	of	the	scheme	in	terms	of	Bristol’s	reputation	amongst	
other	European	cities.		
“Bristol	is	increasingly	recognised	across	the	UK	and	Europe	for	our	work	on	
renewable	energy,	Green	Deal	and	retrofit	programmes,	and	thriving	low	carbon	
economy.	
“However,	we	need	to	up	our	game	and	ambition,	and	I	am	determined	that	Bristol	
becomes	an	environmental	role	model	to	inspire	other	cities	around	the	globe.	
“To	win	this	time	we	all	need	to	rally	round,	and	I	urge	people	to	visit	the	Bristol	
Green	Capital	website	and	back	the	bid.”	
	(Bristol	Green	Capital	2013)		
However,	the	most	dominant	macro	driver	for	the	BHEU	was	the	change	in	policy	regime:	
the	anticipation	of	the	launch	of	Green	Deal	and	ECO	as	shown	by	the	following	quotation:	
“So	obviously	Green	Deal	is	going	to	start	in	earnest	soon	and	one	of	the	things	we’re	
doing	is	that	we’re	quite	interested	in	implementing	a	Bristol	Energy	Company.	And	
that	has	a	number	of	possibilities	and	it	could	be	that	we	become	a	green	deal	
provider,	or	we	could	be	providing	other	energy	services	but	we	don’t	know	exactly	
yet	until	we’ve	had	a	go.”	BCC	Technical	project	manager	
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This	also	illustrates	that	many	of	the	experimental	features	of	the	BHEU	revolved	around	
how	Bristol’s	network	and	future	plans	(in	the	local	authority	in	particular)	would	engage	
with	retrofit	under	the	Green	Deal	and	ECO,	and	define	its	role	under	this	particular	policy	
context.	
8.3.2	Meso-level	factors:	Bristol’s	targets,	reputation,	and	political	will.	
A	number	of	Bristol-specific	factors	relating	to	broader	energy	and	sustainability	issues	had	
a	significant	impact	on,	firstly,	the	perceived	need	to	act	on	retrofit	and	engage	with	the	
Green	Deal	in	general,	and	secondly,	the	need	to	act	on	it	in	Bristol	specifically,	resulting	in	
what	the	BCC	energy	services	officer	termed	a	“concerted	effort	within	the	city	around	the	
whole	sustainability	and	resilience	thing.”		
Firstly,	Bristol’s	Climate	Change	Security	Framework	published	in	2010	set	citywide	carbon	
emissions	targets	of	a	reduction	of	40%	of	baseline	levels	by	2020	and	an	associated	30%	
reduction	in	energy	use.	These	targets	were	consistently	cited	as	part	of	the	rationale	
behind	tackling	retrofit	in	a	general	sense,	but	particularly	in	relation	to	certain	technical	
aspects	of	Bristol’s	housing	stock:	
	“A	large	chunk,	like	about	30%	is	solid	walled	and	20%	is	conservation	so	that	
presents	a	unique	issue	for	Bristol	in	terms	of	its	housing	stock	and	getting	that	
consumption	down.	We	have	more	listed	buildings	here	than	in	Bath.	You	just	don’t	
get	damp	problems	in	the	East	like	you	do	in	the	West	–	it’s	just	so	much	wetter	here.	
Bristol	has	so	many	damp	problems	from	basically	concreting	up	walls	they	shouldn’t	
have	done.	And	it’s	really	important	not	to	dumb	this	information	down	too	much.	
We	need	to	know	this	stuff	to	get	quality	installs	done.”	–	BCC	Energy	Services	officer	
However,	these	carbon	and	technical	factors	in	the	rationale	behind	BHEU	were	very	much	
seen	as	components	in	a	series	of	Bristol-based	projects	around	climate	change	and	
sustainability	more	generally.	Bristol	City	Council	was	already	engaged	in	a	citywide	
investment	programme	focussed	on	energy	(which	shall	be	detailed	below)	and	in	addition,	
after	applying	twice	previously,	Bristol	was	eventually	awarded	the	title	of	‘European	Green	
Capital‘	for	2015.	The	quotation	below	illustrates	the	importance	placed	on	this	award	and	–	
particularly	through	reference	to	being	a	‘role	model’,	Bristol’s	role	as		a	demonstrator	of	
good	practice	to	the	European	community.	The	effort	that	had	been	made	to	gain	the	
award,	and	the	reputational	elements	to	achieving	this	award	such	as	a	‘well-established	
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record’	in	the	green	sector	(which	in	more	detailed	documents	referred	explicitly	to	Green	
Deal	and	retrofit)	all	added	impetus	to	the	BHEU.	
Why	Bristol?	
On	the	third	attempt,	Bristol	was	awarded	2015	Green	Capital	status	as	a	city	that	
can:	
Demonstrate	a	well-established	record	of	achieving	high	environmental	standards	
Commit	to	ongoing	and	ambitious	goals	for	further	environmental	improvement	and	
sustainable	development	
Be	a	role	model	–	part	of	an	ever	growing	group	of	cities	that	aim	to	inspire	and	
promote	best	practices	to	all	European	cities.	
Excerpt	from	http://bristolgreencapital.org/about/european-green-capital-award/		
A	key	factor	in	the	‘collective	effort’	in	Bristol	is	the	presence	of	a	strong,	active	
environmental	network	and	lobbying	in	the	city	region.	The	context	of	the	Green	Capital	
Award	also	created	a	self-image	of	being	a	pioneer	among	Bristol’s	‘green	network’	(in	
terms	of	the	local	authority,	community	organisations	including	CSE,	small	and	medium	
businesses,	and	the	citizens	who	supported	the	bidding	process).	But	in	this	‘green	network’	
was	also	entwined	a	specific	energy	network.	The	Bristol	Energy	Network	comprises	
community	or	third	sector	groups,	small	businesses	and	individuals	working	on	energy	
related	issues	and	projects	in	and	around	Bristol.	Contributing	to	BEN	were	groups	with	a	
range	of	retrofit	interests,	ranging	from	Bristol	Green	Doors,	an	open-home	retrofit	
demonstration	network,	Transition	Montpelier,	who	had	completed	a	number	of	EPCs	in	
their	community,	and	Bedminster	Energy	Group,	who	provided	energy	efficiency	advice	in	
their	local	area	and	were	engaged	in	a	LEAF	project	testing	community	engagement	with	
retrofit.	A	research	project	conducted	by	The	University	of	Bristol	specifically	investigated	
the	role	of	BEN	and	CSE	in	contributing	to	the	success	of	Bristol	based	community	groups	in	
securing	funding	for	community	energy	projects	and	contributing	to	Bristol’s	reputation	as	a	
‘pioneer’	in	climate	and	energy	related	issues	(Bird	et	al,	2013).	
Together	these	factors	create	a	scenario	of	high	political	will	around	sustainability	and	
retrofit,	a	view	strongly	held	by	the	council	officers,	as	shown	in	the	following	example:	
“One	of	the	biggest	strengths	of	Bristol	is	the	community	energy	network.	We	have	
got	quite	a	lot	of	grassroots	organisations	here	pushing	the	agenda,	or	even	what	
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are	now	large	organisations	that	came	up	from	grassroots.	We’ve	got	the	soil	
association,	we’ve	got	CSE,	Sustrans…There’s	definitely	something	about	Bristol	that	
has	this	kind	of	alternative,	counterculture	ambience	to	it”	BCC	Retrofit	officer	
This	view	was	shared	by	the	wider	network,	and	the	next	quotation	describes	not	only	the	
presence	of	the	various	organisations	but	also	how	this	translates	into	a	supportive	context	
for	practical	action:	
“Out	of	the	LEAF	funding	Bristol	won	more	projects	than	anywhere	outside	the	M25,	
which	is	really	incredible.	And	a	lot	of	it	was	down	to	having	the	resources,	the	
people	and	the	ideas	in	the	network,	having	CSE	there	supporting	people	with	bids,	
and	people	just	being	informed	about	what	was	coming	up	–	sharing	information.”		
BEN	representative	
It	was	also	felt	that	the	presence	of	a	supportive	mayor	who	was	also	the	‘portfolio	holder’	
for	low	carbon	and	energy	issues	in	the	Core	Cities	group,	provided	some	certainty	around	
political	support	for	retrofit:	
“Because	he’s	there	for	four	years	it	gives	us	some	consistency.	We	know	it’s	not	just	
going	to	drop	off	the	agenda	suddenly	and	because	he’s	the	portfolio	holder	as	well,	
it	gives	us	a	voice	outside	of	Bristol.”	Technical	project	manager	BCC	
On	top	of	this,	issues	around	unemployment	and	economic	decline	seemed	to	be	less	of	a	
factor	in	the	Bristol	context	than	in	other	urban	contexts	which	allowed	the	environmental	
agenda	to	be	the	primary	local	driving	force	behind	retrofit:	
“Bristol	unlike	other	cities	hasn’t	suffered	a	major	recession,	it’s	a	relatively	wealthy	
city,	we	only	have	four	or	five	wards	in	the	lower	25%	of	the	deprivation	indices.	So	of	
course	it’s	an	issue,	but	really	that	means	the	environmental	imperative	is	strongest.”	
BCC	Technical	project	officer	
8.3.3	Micro-level	factors	–	protecting	householders.	
Whilst	most	of	the	strong	drivers	were	already	defined	for	the	team	working	on	the	scheme	
by	both	national	and	local	targets	and	drivers	related	to	policy,	there	were	some	personal	
factors	that	provided	additional	motivation.	For	example,	a	number	of	the	project	officers	
from	both	CSE	and	BCC	had	previous	working	roles	in	housing	services.	This	gave	them	a	
particular	feeling	of	responsibility	towards	householders,	creating	a	particular	drive	to	“get	
the	best	possible	deal	for	the	householder”	(CSE	project	officer	1).	This	protective	attitude	
towards	householders	extended	into	various	financial	aspects	of	the	scheme	such	as	great	
efforts	to	make	sure	that	works	weren’t	disrupted	even	when	there	were	cash	flow	issues	
between	DECC,	BCC,	CSE	and	the	installers	behind	the	scenes.		
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8.4	How	did	BHEU	address	its	priorities?	
8.4.1	Funding	
The	BHEU	originated	from	an	award	of	£2m	funding	from	the	Department	for	Energy	and	
Climate	Change	(DECC)	that	was	connected	with	the	Core	Cities’	City	Deals,	agreed	in	July	
2012.	Bristol	City	Council	(BCC)	was	awarded	this	funding	and	a	further	£800k	was	offered	
by	SSE	for	ECO	funding.	Attached	to	that	funding	were	conditions	from	the	UK	government	
treasury	that	the	total	fund	had	to	be	used	in	particular	ways,	with	90%	of	it	for	capital	
spend	(i.e.	actual	retrofit	measures	and	works)	and	10%	for	staff	overheads,	which	impacted	
the	nature	and	form	of	the	scheme	significantly	in	terms	of	its	marketing	as	described	
below.	
8.4.2	Activities	
The	funding	for	the	project	awarded	to	Bristol	City	Council	by	DECC	was	conditional	on	it	
being	spent	by	31st	March	2013,	which	meant	that	the	project	operated	on	a	very	short	
timescale.	The	BHEU’s	main	project	activities	consisted	of:	
• December	2012	–	February	2013:	Marketing.	Because	of	the	treasury’s	rules	of	using	
no	more	than	10%	of	funding	for	overheads	(which	were	paying	for	staff	time)	
marketing	the	scheme	had	to	be	done	in	ways	that	did	not	incur	additional	costs.		
• December	2012	–	February	2013:	Finding	accredited	installers	for	the	scheme	(BCC	
and	CSE).	Communicating	with	installers	about	what	is	expected	of	them,	signing	
them	up	to	project	code	of	practice.	
• January	–	February	2013:	Receiving	calls	to	CSE	advice	line	and	online	applications,	
processing	applications.	During	this	period	the	volume	of	calls	and	interest	in	solid	
wall	insulation	was	so	high	in	comparison	to	the	number	of	accredited	installers	that	
were	available,	that	BCC	closed	the	scheme	to	SWI	applicants	after	the	first	two	
weeks.	Applications	for	heating	system	upgrades	were	received	until	the	end	of	
February.	
• February	–	March	2013:	Managing	installations	and	grant/loan	applications.		
• March	–	May	2013:	Extension	granted	to	BCC	by	DECC	until	the	end	of	May,	
installations	continue	to	this	point	(two	installations	are	shown	in	figure	24	below).	
• May	–	July	2013:	CSE	complete	project	evaluation	and	report.	
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Figure	24	Two	case	study	external	wall	insulation	properties	in	Bristol	-	installed	in	April	2013	(Jackson,	
2014,	and	Gitsham,	2014)	
8.4.3	Strategy	and	identity	
Household	chooses	assessor	and	installer	
Letting	the	householder	choose	their	assessor	and	installer	and	set	up	the	contract	directly	
between	them	rather	had	a	number	of	functions.	This	was	partly	to	protect	the	council	and	
CSE	against	liability	(in	this	model,	the	installer	held	the	liability	for	any	issues	with	the	
installation)	and	was	partly	because	under	the	timescales	of	the	project	it	would	have	taken	
too	long	to	procure	a	single	contractor	to	do	the	installations.	It	was	also	designed	to	test	
out	the	relationship	between	the	householder	and	the	green	deal	installers	for	future	
schemes,	setting	it	up	as	though	it	was	a	‘normal’	home	improvements	process	facilitated	
by	rather	than	provided	by	the	council,	which	CSE	termed	‘householder	led’:	
“The	Bristol	Home	Energy	Upgrade	(BHEU)	project	was	designed	to	trial	a	‘householder	
led’	approach	to	energy	saving	home	improvement	initiatives	and	retrofit	measures.	
Central	to	this	aim	was	customer	choice	of	both	the	assessor	and	the	installer	who	were	
selected	to	undertake	work	at	their	property.”	From	CSE	report	p7.	
As	part	of	this	process,	householders	were	also	provided	with	a	brochure	to	answer	
important	questions	about	the	scheme,	shown	in	figure	25	below,	and	providing	a	list	of	
accredited	organisations	to	choose	from.	As	part	of	CSEs	evaluation	process,	it	was	found	
that	the	vast	majority	of	householders	found	this	brochure	very	useful	as	part	of	the	
process.	
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	Figure	25	Contents	page	from	20	page	CSE	information	brochure	for	householders	(CSE,	2013)	
Protecting	the	householder	
One	of	the	key	elements	of	the	scheme	from	CSE	and	BCC’s	point	of	view	was	that	the	
project	officers	involved	were	determined	that	the	complications	with	ECO	and	Green	Deal	
happening	behind	the	scenes	would	not	impact	on	the	householders:	
	“The	thing	is	that	systems	weren’t	in	place,	they	were	being	designed	as	we	were	
delivering	the	scheme.	Any	scheme	you	deliver	in	that	fashion	–	there	are	going	to	be	
changes.	But	those	changes	are	going	to	be	expensive	and	can	filter	down	into	a	
confusing	process…	It	has	to	be	a	bulletproof	‘if	you	do	this	you’ll	get	this	grant’	–	you	
can’t	mess	that	amount	around.	We	managed	it	in	a	way	that	we	knew	we	had	the	
customer’s	interests	at	heart	and	we	would	never	let	that	happen	to	them.”	CSE	
project	co-ordinator	
This	meant	that	significant	issues	with	software,	costing	discrepancies	and	negotiations	over	
grants	and	targets	were	kept	away	from	the	actual	installation	process	and	this	was	done	
largely	using	financial	‘buffers’	such	as	CSE	paying	grants	to	the	householder	out	of	their	
own	accounts	whilst	they	waited	for	negotiations	over	grants	from	DECC	and	ECO	to	be	
finalised.	Furthermore,	project	officers	were	very	keen	to	make	sure	that	what	they	were	
offering	to	householders	in	terms	of	a	price	represented,	in	their	eyes	‘value	for	money’.	
This	was	fixed	into	a	condition	on	measures	and	finance	offered	that	it	had	no	longer	than	a	
15	year	payback	period:	
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	“You’ve	got	to	give	somebody	an	offer	that	means	that	the	payback	for	them	in	
terms	of	their	bill	savings	is	reasonable	you	know,	around	15-20	years.	So	if	you’ve	
got	an	install	cost	of	£12k	and	a	grant	of	£6k,	that	means	that	they’ve	still	got	to	find	
£6k	of	their	own	money	or	loan,	and	if	that	saves	them	maybe	£200	a	year	that’s	
what,	30	years?	It’s	too	long.”	BCC	Project	co-ordinator.	
Single	measures	only	
It	is	important	to	note	that	notions	of	‘householder	led’	and	‘getting	a	good	deal’	for	the	
householder	were	set	within	a	context	in	which	the	technical	measures	and	financial	
assistance	–	i.e.	the	‘offer’	to	the	householder	–	had	already	been	defined.	Householders	
had	virtually	no	choice	about	what	they	might	install	in	their	home	beyond	it	being	either	
solid	wall	insulation	(either	internal	or	external,	not	both)	OR	a	new	boiler,	radiators	or	
heating	controls.	
Deciding	to	install	single	measures	only	was	a	strategic	decision	that	was	linked	to	both	
technical	issues	with	the	software	tools	being	used,	and	the	principle	of	protecting	the	
householder	from	scheme	complications:		
“The	software	being	used	to	convert	the	EPCs	couldn’t	cope	with	the	idea	of	hybrid	
installations”	–	CSE	project	co-ordinator.	
This	situation	meant	that	either	the	householder	would	get	less	grant	and	subsidy	for	their	
installations	than	they	had	originally	been	promised,	or	that	they	would	only	be	allowed	to	
install	one	measure.	It	was	decided	that	the	priority	was	to	fix	the	price	for	the	householder,	
and	only	to	install	single	measures.		
‘Free’	marketing	
The	limits	on	overhead	spending	from	the	DECC	grant	meant	that	BHEU	had	to	find	free	
ways	of	marketing	the	scheme.	This	consisted	of	BCC	creating	a	scheme	website	and	emails	
sent	internally	around	the	council,	CSE	using	social	media	and	mailouts	to	existing	contacts	
to	promote	the	scheme,	using	BEN	to	disseminate	information	about	BHEU	on	its	
newsletters	and	other	communications	with	its	members,	a	radio	appearance	from	the	
Energy	Services	team	manager	at	BCC	and	a	press	release	with	support	from	the	Mayor:	
“One	of	the	other	really	good	things	that	we	did	was	we	got	George	Ferguson	who’s	
the	mayor	of	Bristol	and	in	his	first	week	of	post	one	of	the	first	things	he	did	was	to	
launch	and	support	the	scheme	which	was	really	good	because	he’s	a	good	person	to	
	
	
219	
have	backing	the	scheme	at	the	start.	Hes’	very	high	profile	-	quite	visible.”	BCC	
project	co-ordinator		
The	scheme	was	not	targeted	at	people	with	particular	motivations	for	undertaking	retrofit	
(e.g.	environmental	or	comfort),	and	was	instead	promoted	to	any	interested	parties	
through	various	outreach	routes,	with	promotional	material	largely	highlighting	the	financial	
assistance	available.	This	resulted	in	applicants	who	had	varied	underlying	motives	for	
wanting	to	undertake	retrofit	ranging	from	an	elderly	couple	with	concerns	about	having	a	
cold	house	during	the	winter,	to	a	married	couple	who	were	concerned	about	their	rising	
energy	bills,	and	a	young	couple	who	were	already	committed	to	retrofit	for	carbon	savings	
(CSE,	2013).	
8.5	Who	was	involved	in	the	Bristol	Home	Energy	Upgrade	and	how	
did	they	influence	it?	
As	discussed	in	the	previous	cases	and	shown	in	figure	23,	multiple	actors,	factors,	
processes	and	issues	that	involved	in	each	case.	This	section	will	overview	the	contribution	
of	the	significant	actors	and	relationships	involved	in	the	Big	Home	Energy	Upgrade	at	all	
levels	and	the	negotiations	of	interests	that	influenced	the	case.	This	is	not	intended	to	talk	
through	all	of	the	actors	(shown	in	figure	23	in	white	boxes),	but	to	highlight	the	key	
influences,	the	particular	interests	and	priorities	they	brought	to	the	BHEU	and	how	they	
affected	its	composition	and	orientation.	
8.5.1	Macro-level	relationships	
Department	for	Energy	and	Climate	Change	
As	described,	the	BHEU	was	largely	based	upon	experimentation	with	Green	Deal	and	ECO.	
DECC	clearly	enabled	this	through	the	provision	of	funding,	but	it	also	had	the	role	of	the	
rule-maker,	with	certain	stipulations	and	expectations,	such	as	the	very	short	term	nature	of	
the	scheme	being	set	by	their	own	budget	spending	deadline	of	March	31st.	Many	of	these	
rules	and	stipulations	were	not	co-ordinated	with	one	another,	resulting	in	a	constant	back	
and	forth	between	BCC	and	DECC	in	negotiations.	
For	example,	stipulations	of	only	a	10%	spend	of	the	grant	on	overheads	altered	the	
strategy	from	the	original	bid	significantly:		
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“Originally	there	was	a	lot	more	funding	allocated	for	communicating	the	scheme,	
engaging	with	householders,	reaching	out	to	households	who	might	not	otherwise	be	
able	to	access	it.	Testing	installations	to	make	sure	they	were	high	quality,	and	for	
making	sure	that	the	supply	chain	were	ready	and	prepped	for	it.	But	because	there	
was	only	10%	for	non-capital	spend	we	had	to	roll	back	a	lot	of	that.”	CSE	officer	
Both	the	timescale	and	the	budgetary	‘rules’	also	had	implications	not	only	for	the	cost	of	
the	retrofitting	process	for	the	householder,	but	also	the	likelihood	of	them	being	able	to	
get	their	retrofit	done	within	the	timescale.	Target	numbers	of	homes	were	based	on	grants	
covering	only	materials	and	installations	rather	than	the	retrofit	processes	as	a	whole:	
“The	problem	is	it’s	all	focussed	on	the	measure,	so	all	the	other	preliminary	costs	get	
added	to	the	bill	–	so	if	you’ve	got	a	party	wall	issue,	or	a	damp	issue,	or	a	wall	needs	
pinning,	or	whatever,	there’s	a	lot	of	work	that	goes	into	that	to	sort	it	out	and	it’s	
expensive,	especially	if	you	need	planning	permission	which	costs	you	another	£500	
or	whatever	it	is	these	days.	All	of	that?	Not	funded.	Who	bears	the	cost?	The	
householder.	And	these	are	things	that	we	have	to	co-ordinate	and	inform	about	and	
there	is	no	budget	or	time	built	in	for	that.”		Technical	project	manager,	BCC	
DECC	also	required	that	as	a	pilot	scheme	for	Green	Deal,	the	scheme	had	to	use	Green	Deal	
accredited	contractors	and	assessors	to	do	the	work,	which	resulted	in	a	lack	of	suppliers	for	
the	scheme	and	an	inability	to	meet	the	BHEU’s	targets.	At	the	same	time,	despite	the	focus	
on	Green	Deal	accreditation	and	the	lack	of	funding	for	marketing,	DECC	also	dictated	the	
way	that	the	scheme	was	communicated,	insisting	that	it	did	not	refer	to	the	Green	Deal.	
“There	were	only	two	accredited	solid	wall	contractors	in	the	whole	of	the	city	region	
and	talking	to	one	of	them	they	said	they	might	be	able	to	do	something	like	ten	
installations	by	the	end	of	March	–	our	target	was	150	–	you	know	–	it’s	pretty	clear	
that	we’re	not	going	to	be	hitting	targets	if	the	supply	chain	is	not	there.”	
	“We	weren’t	allowed	to	use	the	term	Green	Deal	in	our	marketing…	it	was	a	green	
deal	pilot	scheme	but	DECC	didn’t	want	us	to	do	that	in	case	it	caused	confusion	
about	when	the	Green	Deal	proper	came	along.”	BCC	Project	officer	
ECO	structure	–	OFGEM	and	CSE.	
As	the	ECO	regulators,	OFGEM	defined	the	reporting	requirements	for	ECO	to	be	awarded	
for	different	installations.	This	included	the	need	for	installations	to	be	reported	within	the	
month	they	were	done	and	it	included	the	signing	off	and	ratification	of	different	softwares	
and	calculation	programmes	for	converting	survey	and	installation	data	into	a	calculation	of	
ECO	subsidy.		Some	of	these	rules	were	unexpected	for	both	SSE	and	for	CSE	and	BCC.	These	
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misunderstandings	and	stipulations	for	reporting	and	qualification	made	it	very	hard	for	
BHEU	to	use	the	ECO	from	SSE	as	they	had	intended:	
“ECO	is,	as	you	know,	ridiculously	complex.	Not	to	put	too	fine	a	point	on	it	the	view	
was	that	ECO	would	be	available	at	the	start	of	the	scheme	to	be	used	in	tandem	
with	the	DECC	subsidy	all	in	this	pot	we	could	kind	of	dip	into.	As	it	turned	out	none	of	
that	was	ready.	SSE	brought	in	£800,000	to	go	along	in	the	bid	but	the	ECO	didn’t	
become	available	until	the	end	of	January.	So	ultimately	we	used	DECC	funding	for	all	
of	it	and	we	didn’t	really	use	that	much	ECO	funding.	It	was	only	going	to	be	used	for	
the	solid	wall	insulation	because	ECO	can	be	used	for	that,	but	almost	all	the	solid	
wall	insulation	applications	came	in	within	the	first	couple	of	weeks,	and	you	can’t	
apply	ECO	retrospectively.”	BCC	Project	co-ordinator	
This	situation	required	significant	adjustments,	sometimes	of	thousands	of	pounds,	to	the	
levels	of	grants	being	offered	to	households,	and	worries	on	the	part	of	CSE	and	BCC	that	
households	would	be	vulnerable	to	price	increases	on	their	installations.	However,	for	both	
CSE	and	SSE	experiencing	these	issues	with	the	process	of	reporting	and	what	was	needed	
for	installations	to	count	as	part	of	the	ECO	was	considered	valuable	learning:	
“Working	with	SSE	was	better	than	expected	to	be	honest,	their	role	was	really	in	
helping	us	through	those	ECO	issues	–	helping	us	understand	how	our	reporting	
needed	to	be	different	or	changed,	but	also	us	helping	them	from	a	delivery	
perspective	saying	you	know	this	isn’t	information	we	can	get	–	and	them	telling	us	
they	need	it	for	OFGEM,	and	trying	to	find	ways	of	dealing	with	that.”	CSE	project	co-
ordinator	
8.5.2	Meso	level	actors	and	relationships	–	Bristol’s	specific	capacity	
and	influences.	
The	BHEU	scheme	was	comprised	of	a	small	number	of	different	actors	at	the	meso	level.	
Their	roles	in	the	project	and	impacts	that	they	had	on	it	are	outlined	below.	
Bristol	City	Council	
Bristol	City	Council	as	the	grant	holder	and	leader	of	the	BHEU	inevitably	had	the	single	
biggest	influence	on	its	form	and	orientation	locally.	One	aspect	of	this	was	that	in	2012	
Bristol	City	Council	was	awarded	a	£2.5m	technical	assistance	grant	from	the	European	Bank	
as	part	of	its	European	Local	Energy	Assistance	(ELENA)	programme.	The	conditions	of	the	
grant	were	that	in	the	three	year	ELENA	programme	BCC	had	to	attract	investment	from	
elsewhere	of	at	least	25	times	the	value	of	the	grant,	or	£62.5m.	This	provided	an	incentive	
to	start	work	on	creating	partnerships,	projects	and	activities	which	would	enable	them	to	
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meet	this	condition.	The	ELENA	programme	was	made	up	of	three	strands,	one	of	which	
involved	the	creation	of	a	‘Bristol	Energy	Company’	which	would	potentially	provide	energy	
supplies	to	domestic	and	commercial	properties,	and	energy	efficiency	services	such	as	
retrofit.	This	meant	that	BHEU	was	not	only	piloting	the	Green	Deal,	but	its	own	model	
under	the	ELENA	programme	and	beyond,	which	heavily	shaped	the	experimental	focus	of	
the	BHEU	in	terms	of	testing	the	council’s	role.	
Existing	relationships	that	BCC	had	also	allowed	it	to	mobilise	a	quick	response	to	the	
invitation	to	bid	for	the	Go	Early	funding	that	DECC	issued	–	previous	partnership	work	with	
CSE	on	CERT	and	CESP	meant	that	there	was	a	familiar	working	relationship	between	the	
two	organisations	and	BCC	was	already	working	with	Wessex	Home	Loans,	a	not-for-profit	
company	operating	across	the	SouthWest,	providing	low	cost	subsidised	loans	to	people	
whose	privately	owned	and	rented	homes	were	in	a	poor	condition	but	who	couldn’t	afford	
to	upgrade	them.	This	meant	that	BCC	was	able	to	circumvent	broader	issues	around	Green	
Deal	in	terms	of	the	cost	of	loan	finance	and	where	it	would	come	from:	
“I’ve	worked	with	them	on	my	other	job	actually	–	in	private	housing	where	I	do	
surveys	and	if	people’s	houses	aren’t	ok	they’re	offered	the	opportunity	to	take	the	
loan.	We	were	very	lucky	to	have	that	company	and	that	mechanism	already	working	
locally.”	BCC	Project	co-ordinator.	
Furthermore,	by	far	the	largest	proportion	of	completed	installations	–	over	100	-	originated	
either	from	BCC	staff,	or	from	direct	communications	between	BCC	staff	and	their	own	
personal	connections,	and	BCC	were	responsible	for	firstly	consulting	and	secondly	
procuring	CSE	as	the	project	delivery	partner	for	BHEU,	which	defined	the	scheme.	
Centre	for	Sustainable	Energy	
CSE	is	a	national	charity	focussed	on	policy	research	and	community	projects	relating	to	
energy,	including	energy	efficiency.	CSE	shaped	the	design	of	the	scheme	from	the	outset	by	
assisting	with	the	original	bid	to	DECC	with	Bristol	City	Council	as	a	consultant,	and	were	
awarded	the	tender	on	the	basis	of	their	existing	expertise	in	the	policy	area	and	their	
willingness	to	share	and	disseminate	learning	in	the	wider	Bristol	network,	all	of	which	were	
built	into	the	principles	and	experimental	approach	of	the	BHEU	as	detailed	above:	
“because	we’ve	been	looking	at	and	analysing	ECO	and	Green	Deal	as	a	policy	area	
for	a	few	years	now,	we	have	that	in-house	expertise	in	terms	of	a	true	
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understanding	of	being	able	to	deliver	it	in	the	way	that	ECO	is	designed	–	we	
understood	what	that	entailed”	CSE	project	co-ordinator	
“CSE’s	knowledge	of	ECO	was	far	superior	to	mine	so	really	I	let	them	take	the	lead	
on	that”	BCC	project	co-ordinator	
CSE’s	capacity	provided	considerable	staff	resources	with	five	permanent	project	staff	and	
an	advice	line	staffed	by	around	ten	people,	who	provided	the	first	level	of	advice	to	
interested	householders.	CSE	were	also	able	to	build	on	an	existing	relationship	with	Regen	
South	West	to	try	to	address	the	lack	of	accredited	retrofit	installers,	and	connect	with	their	
initiative	which	supported	small	works	contractors	in	gaining	Green	Deal	accreditation.		
Bristol	Energy	Network		
Observations	from	the	Bristol	Energy	Network	meeting	in	December	2013	showed	the	
interactions	between	the	council	and	the	network	at	the	start	of	BHEU,	with	a	council	
officer	there	informing	them	about	the	scheme,	seeking	assistance	from	the	community	
groups	present,	offering	referral	fees	for	those	who	referred	people	who	went	onto	have	
installations,	and	discussing	ways	of	sharing	or	piggybacking	onto	existing	outreach	capacity	
such	as	an	emerging	‘Green	Doctor’	scheme	of	street-based	energy	advisors.	
Bristol	Energy	Network’s	monthly,	face-to-face	meetings	of	multiple	community	groups,	and	
the	existing	tools	of	their	newsletter	and	email	list	provided	CSE	and	BCC	with	ready-made	
channels	of	communication	into	communities	that	were	engaged	with	and	interested	in	
energy	and	retrofit	related	issues.	Using	community	groups	for	referrals	generated	55	
applications	and	11	installations	which	was	the	second	biggest	proportion	of	installations,	
behind	those	originating	from	BCC	staff.		
Some	specific	examples	of	community	group	engagement	include	Bristol	Green	Doors,	who	
communicated	the	scheme	through	their	own	newsletter,	generating	11	referrals	and	3	
installations.	BHEU	also	utilised	Bedminster	Energy	Group,	who	had	already	gained	LEAF	
funding	for	a	project	testing	community	engagement	strategies,	incorporating	this	
experiment	into	BHEU	to	conduct	a	neighbourhood	to	neighbourhood	comparison	of	
whether	there	was	a	difference	in	the	number	of	leads	gained	from	outreach	in	an	area	with	
an	active	community	group	(Bedminster),	and	an	area	without.	The	experiment	concluded	
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that	there	was	indeed	a	larger	number	of	referrals	in	Bedminster	than	the	area	without	the	
community	group	(CSE,	2013),	learning	which	was	incorporated	into	CSE’s	final	report.	
However,	community	groups	were	not	able	to	shape	the	design	and	implementation	of	the	
scheme	in	any	way	and	were	passive	conduits	of	the	scheme	rather	than	active	participants,	
simply	passing	on	information	that	grant	subsidised	boilers	and	solid	wall	insulation	(largely	
external	wall)	were	available.	Their	role	had	been	predefined	by	the	structure	and	offer	of	
BHEU	rather	than	them	having	any	contribution	to	defining	that	offer.	
8.5.3	Micro-level	relationships	
Micro-level	relationships,	other	than	the	word	of	mouth	communication	of	the	BHEU	
between	BCC	staff	and	their	friends,	did	not	emerge	as	a	particularly	important	element	of	
the	development	of	the	BHEU.	Because	the	scheme	was	so	closely	tied	to	existing	
organisational	relationships	and	tightly	bounded	by	its	policy-testing	approach,	individual	
personal	interactions	were	largely	sidelined.	(It	should	be	noted	though	that	this	
observation	could	be	a	product	of	having	conducted	the	case	study	data	collection	largely	
after	the	initiative	had	ended,	rather	than	being	there	‘in	the	thick	of	the	moment’	when	
these	things	could	be	perhaps	more	readily	discussed.)		
8.5.4	Internal	dynamics	and	negotiations	
There	were	a	series	of	internal	struggles	with	the	BHEU,	particularly	around	ECO	and	a	lack	
of	supply	chain,	that	although	CSE	had	committed	to	protecting	the	customer	from,	placed	
considerable	strain	on	the	scheme.		
ECO	woes:	availability,	software	and	misunderstandings.	
The	CSE	were	using	a	particular	software	tool	to	score	the	potential	carbon	savings	for	a	
household	from	particular	measures,	because	they	were	under	the	impression	that	this	
software	was	an	ECO	compliant	tool	for	scoring.	However:	
“They	sort	of	went	back	on	that	and	it	turned	out	that’s	no	longer	a	signed	off	
methodology.	It	all	filters	through	so	when	you	do	the	green	deal	assessment	report	
you	need	to	be	able	to	manipulate	the	data	to	score	it	appropriately,	so	everything	
that	OFGEM	require	at	the	end	is	really	required	right	at	the	beginning	built	into	the	
property’s	data.	And	all	of	that	was	misunderstood	at	the	outset...	We	wanted	to	use	
multiple	assessors	with	different	data	and	we	had	different	streams	of	data	coming	
into	us	that	required	different	scoring	and	it	transpired	that	for	ECO	compliance	we’d	
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need	to	have	a	different	system.	So	that	meant	the	ECO	jobs	that	we	did,	we	said	
we’d	give	the	customers	a	certain	grant,	and	we	could	only	claim	less	of	a	grant	from	
SSE	because	of	the	difference	between	how	we	scored	it	and	how	the	signed	off	
scoring	was.	So	we	had	to	supplement	that	gap	with	our	own	project	finance.”	CSE	
project	co-ordinator.	
These	complications	with	ECO	meant	that	CSE	operated	almost	continually	in	a	position	of	
financial	risk.	It	was	paying	the	grants	to	the	householders	in	order	for	them	to	pay	the	
installers,	while	it	waited	for	the	reports	through	both	the	reporting	to	DECC	to	receive	the	
grant	and	through	the	ECO	qualification	process	with	OFGEM.	This	positioned	CSE	as	a	
financial	buffer	for	the	householder	against	ECO	issues,	but	also	for	the	installers	as	well	–	
protecting	them	against	cash	flow	issues.	As	the	installations	progressed,	CSE	began	to	insist	
that	customers	returned	their	ECO	paperwork	within	three	days	so	that	reporting	to	OFGEM	
was	done	by	the	end	of	the	month	that	the	measures	were	installed	in,	otherwise	the	
installation	wouldn’t	qualify,	and	their	financial	risk	was	further	increased.	
“We	had	to	take	huge	risks	to	be	able	to	deliver	the	project	in	that	way.	We	drew	the	
line	at	where	those	risks	were.	We	knew	we’d	be	able	to	get	the	grant	from	DECC	but	
with	ECO	it	was	never	guaranteed.	We	had	an	alarmingly	huge	float	for	a	charity	
operating	on	a	NFP	basis”	CSE	project	officer.	
ECO	funding	not	being	available	early	on	also	meant	that	in	order	for	BHEU	to	stick	to	its	
commitment	to	a	fixed	price	and	level	of	subsidy	for	the	householders,	it	would	need	to	use	
more	of	the	funding	from	DECC	to	fill	the	gap	where	ECO	was	missing.	This	meant	getting	
approval	from	DECC	to	use	the	funding	in	this	way	which	resulted	in	a	constant	process	of	
negotiation:	
“We	had	to	chip	away	at	that	–	DECC	kept	granting	us	a	week’s	leave	to	use	their	
funding	at	a	time,	and	another	week	and	then	another	week,	expecting	it	to	be	
resolved.	And	there	was	always	a	risk	that	they’d	say	no	and	there’d	be	a	problem	
with	the	cost	of	the	installs.	As	a	project	co-ordinator	this	puts	you	in	a	position	of	
some	anxiety.”	Project	co-ordinator,	BCC	
Further	negotiations	with	DECC	involved	an	extension	on	the	finishing	time	of	the	project	
from	the	end	of	March	to	the	end	of	May	2013,	and	for	some	of	the	project	funding	to	be	
carried	over	for	this,	because	of	the	lack	of	supply	chain	and	other	delays	in	the	scheme.	
“It	was	pivotal	really.	If	we	hadn’t	got	the	extension	we	would	have	got	maybe	five	
solid	wall	installs	done.”	Project	co-ordinator,	BCC	
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Lack	of	accredited	installers	
BCC	also	took	on	a	much	more	active	role	than	it	had	intended	in	terms	of	building	a	supply	
chain	for	retrofit	–	they	had	not	realised	there	would	be	so	few	Green	Deal	accredited	
installers	locally	and	ended	up	having	to	compromise	on	their	intentions	of	using	Bristol-
based	firms	–	only	four	of	fifteen	installers	were	Bristol	based,	with,	for	example,	one	of	
their	SWI	installers	coming	from	Plymouth,	which	is	121	miles	away.	Furthermore,	this	lack	
of	installers	particularly	for	SWI	meant	that	the	scheme	had	to	be	closed	to	solid	wall	
insulation	applicants	after	just	two	weeks:	
“We	decided	that	we’d	got	to	stop	taking	applications	for	SWI.	We’d	got	maybe	100	
applications	in	and	only	two	people	on	the	list.	The	worry	was	that	we’d	have	
massive	reputational	damage	if	we	didn’t	stop	it	there….	There	were	one	or	two	
people	saying	this	is	idiotic	–	you’re	running	the	scheme	and	there’s	nobody	to	do	the	
work.	It	looks	foolish.	So	we	had	to	kind	of	pull	the	plug	while	we	tried	to	rectify	
that.”	Project	co-ordinator,	BCC		
Community	benefit	
Among	the	much-hailed	Bristol	Energy	Network	there	were	also	question	marks	about	the	
benefit	that	the	scheme	really	brought	to	the	community	groups	charged	with	marketing	it	
for	free.	As	a	Bristol	Green	Doors	representative	stated	about	the	£450	that	the	
organisation	received	in	referral	fees	(for	three	referrals):		
“it’s	hardly	world	changing,	is	it?”.		
More	seriously,	Bedminster	Energy	Group,	which	had	received	the		LEAF	funding	to	
experiment	with	outreach,	felt	that	it	had	been	put	in	a	position	where	it	was	very	stressed	
by	the	work,	especially	in	extremely	short	timescales.	The	group	was	run	by	volunteers	who	
felt	overwhelmed	by	the	responsibility	and	this	caused	scepticism	within	that	group	about	
working	with	policy	schemes	in	the	future.		
8.6	What	were	BHEU’s	achievements	and	outcomes?	
BHEU	completed	23	external	wall	insulation	jobs	in	four	months,	which	both	CSE	and	BCC	
considered	a	significant	achievement.	It	also	installed	heating	system	upgrades,	including	
one	entirely	new	gas	connection.	Through	the	process	of	the	scheme	BHEU	also	increased	
the	number	of	accredited	solid	wall	insulation	installers	in	the	area	from	two	to	twelve.	
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However,	the	expectations	on	BHEU	were	that	it	would	make	a	significant	contributions	to	
Bristol’s	future	schemes.	In	2014	Bristol	embarked	on	a	scheme	entitled	Warm	Up	Bristol,	
which	was	funded	from	DECC’s	Green	Deal	Communities	programme.	There	were	some	
notable	contributions	to	this	from	the	BHEU:	
Community	Groups:		
BCC	continued	to	use	community	groups	and	the	BEN	in	Warm	Up	Bristol	but	acknowledged	
the	need	to	focus	not	only	on	using	but	also	supporting	community	groups.	These	intentions	
were	written	into	the	procurement	for	Warm	Up	Bristol’s	main	delivery	partner	as	KPIs	that	
the	partner	must	adhere	to,	although	the	form	that	this	support	might	take	is	unclear.		
Learning	about	lack	of	supply	chain:		
BCC	took	very	seriously	the	issues	with	a	lack	of	accredited	installers	and	took	action	to	
increase	this	and	communicate	the	scheme	differently	to	installers	for	Warm	Up	Bristol,	
stressing	the	amount	of	work	that	would	be	available	and	making	it	more	appealing	to	those	
small	works	contractors	that	may	not	yet	be	accredited	but	could	make	use	of	the	
opportunity:	
	“It	showed	us	that	there	was	a	serious	lack	of	solid	wall	insulation	installers	in	the	
area	and	what	we’ve	now	done	is	to	go	along	to	events	that	Regen	South	West	or	the	
Local	Economic	Partnership	are	doing	and	telling	them	what	we’re	up	to	–	what’s	
coming	up	in	terms	of	other	programmes,	and	really	highlighting	the	demand	for	
their	services	and	giving	them	everything	they	need	to	know	about	how	to	get	
accredited	so	they	can	access	some	of	that	work.”	Technical	project	manager,	BCC	
Unmet	expectations	
There	were,	however,	a	series	of	intentions	that	did	not	come	to	fruition	and	some	unmet	
expectations	across	the	network.	From	the	website	of	the	newly	approved	Bristol	Energy	
Company	–	the	energy	services	company	that	learning	from	BHEU	was	supposed	to	
contribute	to	-	it	appears	that	the	only	energy	efficiency	retrofit	services	the	company	offers	
are	those	of	Warm	Up	Bristol	–	another	policy-bound,	grant	funded	scheme.	Intentions	to	
create	a	‘Bristol	Installer	Group’	to	aggregate	small	suppliers	to	create	volume	and	prevent	
them	from	being	carved	out	of	the	ECO	market	by	larger	companies	never	materialised.	
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There	were	also	disappointed	householders	due	to	the	installation	of	single	measures	only,	
which	was	seen	as	a	significant	hindrance	to	the	scheme:	
“One	of	the	problems	that	we	had	within	Bristol	is	that	you	couldn’t	do	hybrid	
installations	under	this	scheme.	Lets	say	a	house	in	Bristol	has	got	a	mixed	finish	with	
a	nice	brick	finish	on	the	front.	So	what	you	would	ideally	do	is	externally	insulate	the	
back,	which	is	relatively	easy	to	do,	and	then	internally	insulate	the	front,	so	you	
don’t	lose	the	façade,	the	nice	aspect	of	your	house.	And	we	couldn’t	offer	that	under	
the	scheme.	There	were	some	disappointed	householders	who	were	really	interested	
but	it	just	couldn’t	provide	for	them	because	we	couldn’t	do	internal	and	external	
wall	insulation	at	the	same	time.”	–	BCC	Energy	Services	officer.	
Furthermore,	a	number	of	concerns	were	raised	about	the	assessment	and	EPC	process,	
which	was	seen	very	much	as	a	‘tick	box’	exercise	using	rudimentary	techniques	and	not	as	
an	in	depth,	useful	household	survey.	
Persistent	policy	issues:	
BHEU	acquired	some	significant	learning	about	the	policy	context	for	retrofit	and	achieved	a	
number	of	things	in	this	regard.	It	overcame	one	of	the	most	noted	issues	with	the	Green	
Deal	policy	framework	which	was	the	high	cost	of	green	deal	finance,	by	using	Wessex	
Home	Loans,	who	offered	loans	at	4%	to	Green	Deal	Finance’s	7%.	However,	by	piloting	this	
loan	mechanism,	BHEU	was	able	to	highlight	that	the	combination	of	ECO	and	Green	Deal	
finance	(even	with	ECO	working	effectively)	would	not	cover	the	costs	of	the	installations	
that	the	national	policy	agenda	was	promoting,	thus	not	addressing	its	goal	of	alleviating	
upfront	costs	(CSE,	2013).	It	also	successfully	qualified	4	installations	for	ECO	subsidies,	
despite	significant	setbacks	with	software,	calculation	processes	and	reporting	
requirements.	However,	this	low	number,	given	the	high	amount	of	ECO	funding	pledged	by	
SSE	demonstrates	the	significant	problems	with	getting	ECO	to	qualify.	Consequently,	the	
Warm	Up	Bristol	Scheme	does	not	attempt	to	utilise	any	ECO	subsidies	for	its	measures.	
Other	issues	that	were	still	a	problem	for	the	Warm	Up	Bristol	project	include	a	lack	of	
clarity	around	how	to	integrate	retrofit	with	planning:		
“We	are	still	in	discussions	with	planners	about	a	resource	for	householders	where	
they	could	find	out	what	is	acceptable	to	do	to	different	property	types	in	terms	of	a	
finish,	in	terms	of	living	in	conservation	areas,	types	of	roads	and	residential	areas.	
We	need	guidance	for	things	like,	are	you	permitted	development,	do	you	need	it	
checking,	or	do	you	need	full	planning	permission?”	Energy	Services	Officer,	BCC	
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Overall,	the	outcomes	of	BHEU	focus	on	small	steps	towards	a	vision	of	citywide	retrofit	that	
is	enacted	almost	entirely	by	the	local	authority’s	delivery	of	national	policy.	Whilst	there	is	
sustained	and	serious	commitment	by	BCC	and	its	officers	to	retrofit	as	a	significant	part	of	
its	energy-related	activities,	the	BHEU	and	its	successor,	Warm	Up	Bristol,	present	no	
possibility	beyond	these	types	of	schemes,	of	other	forms	of	governing	retrofit	activity	in	
Bristol:	
“It’s	really	shown	us	that	the	demand	is	there,	particularly	for	solid	wall	insulation	–	
it	was	heavily	oversubscribed	for	that.	And	we	are	now	doing	a	housing	stock	model	
for	the	whole	city	and	we	can	tell	that	nearly	40%	of	the	city	is	solid	walled,	whether	
or	not	those	properties	have	already	been	caught	by	previous	schemes	like	the	Bristol	
Energy	Efficiency	Scheme	which	was	free	stuff,	and	then	by	BHEU,	so	it	contributes	to	
that	too,	seeing	where	the	opportunities	remain.”	Technical	project	manager,	BCC	
In	this	vein,	BHEU	didn’t	establish	any	new	relationships	or	include	any	other	actors	into	the	
process	of	defining	and	governing	retrofit	in	the	city	region:	community	groups,	suppliers	
and	installers	had	no	active	part	in	defining	this	or	any	future	scheme,	and	with	single	
measures	installed,	there	was	minimal	technical	learning	in	terms	of	the	complexity	of	
whole	house	retrofit.		
8.7	Theoretical	reflections	from	the	Bristol	Home	Energy	Upgrade.	
Compared	to	the	ESC	and	the	Carbon	Co-op’s,	BHEU’s	influential	factors	and	actors	at	
different	levels	of	the	assemblage	differed	somewhat.	Whilst	climate	change	was,	again,	a	
significant	issue,	there	were	also	other	macro-level	factors	influencing		this	case	study	not	
present	in	the	other	two.	Interurban	competition	and	reputation	across	Europe	was	
manifest	in	the	influence	of	the	Green	Capital	award,	and	national	policy	and	government	
actors	–	particularly	DECC	–	had	a	much	stronger	direct	influence	on	the	case’s	organisation	
and	orientation.	Whilst	local,	meso-level	actors	specific	to	the	Bristol	urban	context	were	
significant	in	enabling	BHEU,	they	had	less	influence	on	the	form	and	shape	it	took	than	in	
the	other	two	cases,	and	personal	values	at	the	micro-level	were	far	less	significant	in	this	
case	than	Carbon	Co-op	and	ESC.	However,	the	experience	of	the	policy	context	as	being	
complex	and	problematic	was	very	much	shared	between	the	three	cases.	BHEU’s	
experimental	and	knowledge	priorities	differed	from	the	other	two	though,	with	a	much	
more	obvious	focus	on	policy	learning	than	governing	or	technical	experimentation.		 	
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Chapter	9	–	Discussion:	Assembling	urban	domestic	retrofit	
experiments	–	what	do	they	tell	us?	
Before	the	discussion	proceeds	it	is	necessary	to	recap	on	the	original	questions	of	the	
thesis.	These	are:	
• How	and	why	do	such	different	responses	to	‘the	same’	issue	of	domestic	retrofit	
emerge	from	different	urban	contexts?		
And;	
• How	are	these	different	place-specific	responses	both	enabled	and	limited	in	their	
transformative	potential	by	the	macro-context	in	which	they	operate?		
	
The	purpose	of	this	thesis	was	to	investigate	how	and	why,	despite	operating	within	the	
same	national	policy	context,	very	varied	responses	to	the	‘problem’	of	domestic	retrofit	
might	emerge	in	different	urban	contexts.	This	discussion	has	three	components.	Firstly	it	
uses	the	examples	of	three	different	responses	–	the	Carbon	Co-op	in	Manchester,	the	
Energy	Saving	Co-operative	in	Birmingham	and	the	Bristol	Home	Energy	Upgrade	in	Bristol	
to	illuminate	and	explore	different	experimental	approaches	to	addressing	the	key	socio-
technical	issues	around	domestic	retrofit.	These	variations	tell	us	about	the	importance	of	
context	and	how	the	agency	of	people	and	organisations	come	together	to	create	place-
specific,	unique	capabilities	to	act,	and	demonstrate	different	forms	of	localised	
experimentation	and	unevenness	in	urban	responses.	
	
Secondly,	this	discussion	also	uses	the	differences	in	priorities	and	approaches	in	the	cases	
to	contribute	to	an	understanding	of	how	macro-level	pressures	on	contemporary	energy	
issues	in	cities	such	as	climate	change,	energy	security	and	economic	concerns	can	be	
mediated	and	interpreted	differently	as	a	result	of	the	specific	features,	relationships	and	
interests	in	and	around	the	different	cities	they	operate	in,	alongside	mediating	local	or	
meso-level	pressures	and	personal	interests.	
	
Finally,	the	discussion	will	establish	the	forms	of	change	that	were	intending	to,	and	did	
occur	as	a	result	of	the	three	cases,	and	explore	the	enablers	and	limitations	to	these	
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changes,	specifically	returning	to	the	macro-level,	or	landscape,	and	its	particular	role	in	
shaping	the	nature	of	the	responses	and	their	effects	and	outcome.			
9.1	Cross	case	analysis	
Table	13	below	shows	the	key	differences	between	how	each	case	has	approached	the	key	
aspects	of	domestic	retrofit	identified	in	the	literature	review:	technical	issues	people,	
behaviour	and	householders’	motives,	and	organising	or	governing	retrofit.	
	 Carbon	Co-op,	
Manchester	
Energy	Saving	Co-
operative,	
Birmingham	
Bristol	Home	Energy	
Upgrade	
Technical	issues	
	
Top	priority:	
Rigorous	survey	
method,	detailed	
design	and	post-
installation	
monitoring.	Fewer,	
high	quality	retrofits.	
‘Beyond	technical	
experimentation’	–	
technical	risks	
assumed	to	be	dealt	
with,	but	survey	and	
vetting	process	
designed	to	ensure	
quality	and	accuracy.	
Lesser	priority:	Many	
technical	challenges	
avoided	by	single	
measure	
installations.		
People	and	
behaviour	
(householders’	role	
and	motives)	
Active	role	in	
organisation,	design	
and	experimentation	
process.	Builds	on	
ethical	and	value	
based	motivation	for	
retrofit.		
Active	through	
membership,	but	
seen	as	a	‘market’.	
Tried	to	
accommodate	hybrid	
motivations	for	
retrofit.	
Passive	recipients,	
seen	as	a	‘market’.	
Mostly	appealed	to	
financial	and	
comfort-based	
motivations	for	
undertaking	retrofit.	
Organising	and	
governing	retrofit:	
	
Bottom-up	
organisation,	middle-
out	projects.	
Attempted	retrofit	
‘with’	the	city	but	
ended	up	retrofit	
‘in’.	
Top-down	
organisation,	middle-
out	projects.		
Attempted	retrofit	
‘with’.	
Top-down	project	
delivered	by	local	
actors.	Retrofit	‘on’	
the	city.		
Table	13	-	Cross	case	comparison	
9.1.1	Technical	issues	with	retrofit	
Carbon	Co-op	made	technical	issues	a	distinct	priority,	with	great	attention	on	survey	
methods,	detailing	and	the	preference	to	retrofit	a	small	number	of	homes	to	a	high	
technical	standard,	using	a	wide	range	of	interrelated	measures	as	well	as	using	specific	
insulation	materials	that	presented	lower	hygrothermal	risks.	They	also	sought	to	add	to	
knowledge	about	the	‘performance	gap’	by	installing	energy	monitors	in	each	of	the	homes	
before	and	afterwards,	in	order	to	accurately	assess	the	reductions	in	energy	use	from	
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retrofitting.	BHEU	sidestepped	these	issues	of	technical	risk	and	complexity	through	the	
single	measures	strategy	they	adopted	in	their	scheme,	offering	either	internal	or	external	
solid	wall	insulation	–	not	both	-	or	heating	upgrades,	and	only	one	measure	in	each	home,	
and	did	not	have	a	monitoring	strategy	in	place.	Energy	Saving	Co-operative,	on	the	other	
hand,	were	not	limited	to	offering	solid	wall	insulation	and	boilers,	also	offering	a	broad	
range	of	technical	options	including	windows,	floor	insulation,	microgeneration,	heating	
controls	and	others,	but	did	not	engage	with	the	specific	issues	around	detailing,	moisture	
risks	and	the	performance	gap,	assuming	that	these	issues	were	less	important	than	
addressing	the	business	and	operational	elements	of	the	problem.	In	the	BHEU	the	
responsibility	for	installation	quality	was	placed	on	the	installers	through	direct	contracts	
between	themselves	and	the	householders,	whereas	for	Carbon	Co-op,	the	single	contract	
with	the	contractor	on	behalf	of	the	householders	positioned	them	and	URBED	with	this	
responsibility.	ESC	also	took	direct	contractual	responsibility,	and	attempted	to	ensure	
quality	in	installations	through	a	vetting	process	for	its	installer	members.	
These	differences	were	a	direct	result	of	the	levels	of	influence	and	power	that	different	
actors	in	the	assemblage	had:	one	of	the	actors	with	the	greatest	influence	on	Carbon	Co-
op’s	strategy	was	URBED	and	many	of	the	householder	members	were	technically	minded,	
having	worked	at	URBED	or	in	other	technical	professions,	providing	a	high	level	of	technical	
–	particularly	design	-	knowledge	in	the	micro-	and	meso-levels	and	embedding	this	priority	
and	sense	of	responsibility	into	Carbon	Co-op.	In	the	ESC’s	case,	its	approach	was	so	heavily	
defined	by	one	person	at	the	micro-level,	who	had	decided	they	were	‘beyond	technical	
experimentation’,	that	there	was	little	strategic	room	given	to	the	exploration	of	technical	
risks.	In	BHEU’s	case,	rather	than	a	conscious	decision	to	avoid	technical	risk,	their	technical	
approach	was	heavily	affected	by	internal	software	issues	and	efforts	to	comply	with	ECO.	
The	added	meso-level	issue	of	a	lack	of	accredited	installers	in	the	Bristol	area	added	further	
limitations	to	the	technical	capacity	of	the	BHEU	experiment.	
9.1.2	People	and	behaviour	
The	different	ways	that	each	case	engaged	with	householders’	motivations	and	issues	of	
behaviour	also	illustrate	the	variation	and	unevenness	in	responses.	Carbon	Co-op	dealt	
almost	exclusively	with	pro-environment	motivations	and	values:	each	whole	house	strategy	
was	based	on	meeting	the	UK’s	80%	reduction	in	carbon	emissions	in	each	house,	showing	
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the	combined	influence	of	the	interests	of	its	activist	founders	and	members	at	the	micro-
level,	and	the	macro-level	issue	of	climate	change	and	the	UK’s	specific	emissions	reduction	
target.	ESC	approached	this	differently,	trying	to	engage	with	different	motives	through	a	
bespoke	package	offering	a	range	of	technical	measures,	financial	incentives	and	project	
management	services	to	address	the	issues	that	Brown	(2013)	and	Haines	and	Mitchell	
(2014)	raise	of	the	complex	decisions	that	householders	make	about	retrofit.	This	‘bespoke	
customer	service’	element	of	ESC	had	been	made	a	priority	by	a	combination	of	the	CEO’s	
vision,	as	well	as	meso-level	factors	such	as	competition	with	Birmingham	Energy	Savers	
and	Green	Deal,	and	the	influence	of	Northfield	Ecocentre	representing	householders	
needs.	Unlike	BHEU	which	largely	promoted	itself	using	a	simple	financial	incentive	of	
subsidies	for	solid	wall	insulation	and	heating	systems,	ESC	engaged	with	varying	motives,	
focussing	on	comfort	and	reduced	bills	for	the	competition	winner,	for	example,	and	at	the	
same	time	appealing	to	pro-environment	and	ethical	motives	through	its	co-operative	
branding.	The	BHEU’s	simple	marketing	strategy,	though,	was	a	result	of	its	dependency	on	
DECC’s	funding	-	budget	rules	reduced	the	initiative’s	ability	to	act	on	issues	of	motivation,	
even	though	Bristol	City	Council	and	CSE	would	have	liked	to.		
Furthermore,	because	Carbon	Co-op’s	board	and	membership	consisted	mostly	of	
householders	with	retrofitting	experience	there	was	continuous	and	open	discussion	about	
issues	and	problems	between	stakeholders	of	all	the	bumps	in	the	road	such	as	issues	with	
ECO	and	difficulties	with	contractors,	and	efforts	to	understand	householders’	retrofitting	
experiences	through	detailed	feedback.	But	because	of	the	influence	of	CSE’s	protective	
attitude	towards	customers,	BHEU	took	the	opposite	approach	to	Carbon	Co-op	in	relation	
to	communicating	difficulties	with	ECO	and	pricing,	with	CSE	accepting	considerable	risk	to	
act	as	a	buffer	against	these	financial	issues.		
In	terms	of	local	factors	enabling	and	limiting	these	approaches,	Carbon	Co-op’s	
relationships	with	other	community	groups	and	previous	experience	of	community	
engagement	meant	they	had	considerable	capacity	in	engaging	householders,	and	similarly	
in	the	context	of	Bristol	-	despite	BHEU	having	no	marketing	or	community	engagement	
budget	-	both	internal	local	authority	communication	channels	and	the	existing	network	of	
community	energy	groups	offered	routes	to	communicate	their	promotional	message.	This	
differed	from	the	Birmingham	context	in	which	ESC	had	to	establish	these	relationships	and	
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seek	out	routes	for	marketing	and	community	engagement	from	scratch	–	discovering	
limited	capacity	in	the	kinds	of	environmental	organisations	it	wanted	to	work	with	and	
therefore	struggling	to	engage	householders	in	the	area	and	pursue	its	ambitious	vision.		
These	different	approaches	to	householders,	motivation	and	engagement	also	reflect	
different	roles	and	levels	of	input	of	householders	–	in	the	case	of	Carbon	Co-op,	
householders	are	active	participants	in	both	the	definition	and	execution	of	the	experiment	
and	its	links	to	other	householders,	whereas	in	BHEU	and	ESC	householders	were	more	
passive	recipients	of	predefined	services	–	viewed	as	a	‘market’	to	be	developed.	ESC	did	
intend	that	through	membership	householders	could	actively	shape	the	co-operative,	but	in	
fact	most	of	it	had	already	been	defined	by	the	CEO	and	it	did	not	last	long	enough	to	
observe	this	influence.	This	connects	to	the	next	aspect	of	comparison	-	by	whom	and	how	
domestic	retrofit	has	been	organised	and	governed	differently	in	different	contexts	–	and	
what	this	tells	us	about	localised	capacity	to	act.	
9.1.3	Organisation	and	governance	of	retrofit	
Beyond	simply	supporting	a	narrative	of	each	case	study,	the	function	of	producing	an	
assemblage	diagram	depicting	Carbon	Co-op,	Energy	Saving	Co-operative	and	Bristol	Home	
Energy	Upgrade	in	turn	is	that	it	becomes	possible	to	compare	both	the	range	and	the	
position	–	in	terms	of	what	level	they	operate	at	-	of	the	actors	and	factors	involved	in	each	
experiment.	Some	clear	differences	and	similarities	emerge	when	one	compares	the	three.	
Firstly,	the	network	of	the	BHEU	appears	to	have	far	fewer	actors	and	factors	involved	in	it,	
as	opposed	to	the	ESC	and	Carbon	Co-op,	which	incorporate	a	much	greater	range	of	actors	
and	factors	–	and	therefore	perspectives	and	issues	to	be	negotiated	-	at	all	levels,	
especially	the	meso-level.	The	ESC	network	includes	fewer	actors	and	factors	at	the	micro-
level	than	Carbon	Co-op	and	a	range	of	influences	at	the	meso-level	and	landscape	level,	all	
of	which	impacted	on	its	approach	as	described	above.		
What	these	diagrams	also	illustrate	–	but	only	alongside	a	discussion	of	the	nuances	behind	
them	-	is	different	forms	of	organisation	of	retrofit	and	therefore	differences	between	the	
levels	of	influence	of	actors	and	factors	at	different	levels	of	the	assemblages.	Using	
Williams	et	al	(2013)’s	models	of	top-down,	bottom-up	and	middle-out	retrofit,	and	Hodson	
and	Marvin’s	typology	of	retrofit	‘on’,	‘in’	and	‘with’	the	city,	the	three	cases	illustrate	how	
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the	power	and	drive	for	each	of	the	cases	comes	from	different	levels	of	the	assemblage.	
For	example,	the	range	of	actors	at	the	meso-level	of	Carbon	Co-op	would	suggest	that	
Carbon	Co-op	is	a	middle-out	response.	In	fact,	there	was	an	almost	evolutionary	process	of	
development	of	the	Carbon	Co-op	–	a	grassroots,	bottom-up	organisation	that	grew	from	a	
series	of	personal	connections	and	shared	values	at	the	micro-level,		responding	to	different	
national	policies	and	the	interests	of	different	local	actors,	enabling	connections	that	led	to	
middle-out	projects,	represented	by	the	range	of	actors	at	the	meso-level:	the	relationships	
and	partnerships	at	this	level	enable	their	activities	to	take	place,	but	don’t	necessarily	
govern	the	organisation	itself.	BHEU	on	the	other	hand	is	the	opposite:	we	know	from	the	
lack	of	actors	and	influence	at	the	micro-level	that	it	is	not	a	bottom-up	response,	and	that	
the	direct	reflection	of	policy	processes,	and	central	government	rules	and	stipulations	
shows	the	characteristics	of	a	top-down	response	–	or	in	Hodson	and	Marvin’s	
(forthcoming)	terms,	retrofit	being	done	‘on’	the	city	from	above	or	outside.	However,	
BHEU’s	activities	are	carried	out	again	by	key	actors	at	the	meso-level,	its	successful	activity	
was	enabled	by	local	relationships	and	capacities	such	as	the	presence	of	Wessex	Home	
Loans	as	a	finance	provider,	CSE	and	its	advice	line	and	customer	service	capacity,	and	the	
existing	influence	of	the	European	Bank	funded	ELENA	programme	supporting	the	retrofit	
agenda,	thus	delivering	its	activities	from	the	middle-out.	The	ESC	is	also	more	complex	than	
a	simple	typology	suggests.	The	influence	of	the	CEO	at	the	meso-level	might	suggest	it	is	a	
bottom-up	response,	but	in	fact	what	his	vision	created	was	a	national	scale	organisational	
approach	which	was	imposed	–	again	in	a	top-down	manner	–	upon	the	places	it	wished	to	
work	in,	once	again	using	what	Janda	(2013)	calls	‘middle	actors’	to	populate	its	projects	at	
the	local	level.		However,	there	was	a	greater	acceptance	of	those	middle-actors’	views,	
priorities	and	interests	in	the	ESC	than	in	the	BHEU	which	reflects	more	closely	an	attempt	–	
albeit	a	failed	one	-	at	Hodson	and	Marvin’s	idea	of	collaborative	retrofit	‘with’	the	city.	
What	is	interesting	about	these	different	forms	is	that	they	can	also	change,	with	Carbon	
Co-op	beginning	as	a	retrofit	project	‘in’	a	city	without	much	relationship	with	formal	
governance	structures,	and	moving	into	a	retrofit	‘with’	the	city	situation	through	the	Go	
Early	and	Stockport-based	projects.	
These	comparisons	and	significant	differences	demonstrate	clearly	the	geographical	
unevenness	in	responses	to	the	issue	of	retrofit,	illustrating	a	prominent	trend	in	urban	
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development	and	governance	as	identified	in	the	literature.	The	next	section	will	explain	
exactly	how	this	unevenness	is	produced	through	a	process	of	assemblage,	mediation	and	
negotiation.	
9.2	Assemblage	as	process:	Explaining	variation	through	multi-level	
relationships	
9.2.1	Mediation	and	negotiation	of	landscape	and	local	issues.	
The	importance	of	the	organisational	forms	described	above	is	not	just	descriptive	in	terms	
of	the	cases.	What	these	different	forms	also	create	is	what	Hodson	and	Marvin	(2011)	and	
Bulkeley	and	Schroeder	(2011)	argue	is	different	balances	of	landscape	and	local	issues	and	
the	priorities	and	interests	of	different	actors,	through	processes	of	mediation.	They,	along	
with	Rutland	and	Aylett	(2008)	argued	that	intermediaries	–	organisations	or	projects	like	
the	cases	above	–	constituted	differently	in	different	urban	contexts	can	have	vastly	
different	effects	because	of	how	they	balance	different	stakeholders’	perspectives	and	
interests.	Intermediaries	constituted	of	a	narrow	range	of	actors	and	perspectives	–	such	as	
the	BHEU	-	produced	a	narrow	vision	and	orientation	both	technically	and	in	householder	
engagement,	whereas	inclusive	intermediaries	with	varied	perspectives	and	interests	can	
end	up	with	less	consensus	but	better	representation	–	such	as	the	ESC	or	the	Carbon	Co-
op.		
In	our	cases	we	see	this	through	the	varying	levels	of	importance	of	landscape	and	local	
issues	in	each	case	and	how	these	were	mediated	and	negotiated	through	the	responses:	
The	economic	crisis	was	an	important	landscape	factor	for	Energy	Saving	Co-operative	
because	of	both	the	local	installers’	experience	and	influence	of	it,	and	the	perceived	value	
of	the	co-op	brand	that	the	CEO	hoped	for,	and	although	an	indirect	driver	through	policy,	
climate	change	was	less	of	an	explicit	priority.	Carbon	Co-op	connected	directly	and	strongly	
to	the	landscape	issue	of	climate	change	because	of	the	personal	interests	and	commitment	
of	its	members.	It	also	related	to	issues	of	social	justice	through	its	co-operative	form	and	
again	through	the	activist	roots	of	many	of	its	members,	making	it	ideologically	at	odds	with	
market	solutions.	Both	Carbon	Co-op	and	Energy	Saving	Co-op	were	influenced	heavily	by	
personal	commitment	to	the	co-operative	form,	and	selecting	this	form	brought	into	the	
assemblage	influence	from	the	wider	co-operative	movement	at	the	macro-level.	BHEU,	on	
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the	other	hand,	related	to	climate	change	through	Bristol’s	citywide	engagement	with	
carbon	reduction	targets,	and	did	not	have	any	particular	engagement	with	social	justice	or	
the	co-operative	movement.	BHEU	was	also	able	to	position	climate	change	as	its	highest	
priority	over	economic	concerns	because	of	the	specific	way	in	which	Bristol	–	less	so	than	
Birmingham,	for	example	–	was	perceived	to	be	less	affected	by	the	economic	crisis.	Energy	
security	and	fuel	poverty	on	the	other	hand,	although	significant	in	policy,	were	not	really	
explicit	issues	for	any	of	the	cases	and	were	only	very	lightly	addressed	through	their	proxy	
connection	to	lower	fuel	bills.	Partly	this	is	due	to	the	focus	of	all	three	case	studies	being	
on	‘able-to-pay’,	or	privately	owned	and	occupied	homeowners,	a	deliberate	commonality	
built	into	the	research	design	to	enable	effective	comparison,	but	one	which	has	natural	
consequences	of	focussing	on	initiatives	which	are	by	their	nature	less	likely	to	engage	with	
households	in	fuel	poverty.		
The	only	case	that	engaged	directly	with	issues	of	interurban	competition	and	external	
investment	was	BHEU,	through	its	connections	to	the	European	Green	Capital	award	and	its	
concern	for	its	external	reputation	as	a	‘green	city’:	the	other	cases	did	not	seem	to	feel	
these	pressures	as	keenly,	being	too	consumed	by	their	own	internal	agendas:	although	
GMCA’s	perspective	on	retrofit	was	partly	to	do	with	‘competitive	advantage’,	Carbon	Co-op	
was	not	part	of	this	agenda.	Speculatively,	this	could	be	related	to	the	grassroots	nature	of	
Carbon	Co-op	–	not	embedded	in	the	strategic	urban	priorities	of	Greater	Manchester,	and	
the	new	and	emerging	network	in	Birmingham	created	by	ESC	which	did	not	connect	to	an	
existing	city-regional	governance	network,	leaving	them	somewhat	disconnected	from	the	
strategic	urban	priorities	of	contemporary	cities	highlighted	by	Hodson	and	Marvin	(2010).	
Balancing	landscape	and	place-specific	pressures	
In	terms	of	balancing	these	landscape	issues	with	local	issues,	all	three	cases	related	
differently	to	place	specific	pressures.	Interestingly,	all	three	cases	mentioned	the	high	
number	of	solid	walled	properties	as	being	a	specific	contextual	factor	that	influenced	the	
need	to	work	in	those	three	cities,	which	indicates	that	although	many	actors	may	have	
thought	this	was	context	specific,	it	in	fact	was	a	shared	issue.	ESC	engaged	with	local	issues	
around	unemployment	through	the	inclusion	of	Jericho	and	NWS	in	their	membership,	but	
this	was	not	because	of	a	desire	to	act	on	this	specific	issue,	it	was	a	negotiated	condition	of	
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attempting	to	utilise	their	strengths	as	well	established	suppliers	in	the	city-region	to	
further	ESC’s	progress.	BHEU	–	with	its	more	narrowly	constituted	network	and	vision	-	
made	effective	use	of	local	capacity	and	reputation	in	lobbying	and	community	energy-
related	activity,	but	this	had	little	benefit	for	the	grassroots	organisations,	whose	
perspective	was	not	included	in	its	creation.	Carbon	Co-op,	on	the	other	hand,	did	not	really	
engage	specifically	with	Greater	Manchester’s	economic	priorities	despite	its	meso-level	
connections,	performing	a	role	based	on	its	commitment	to	grassroots	action	on	climate	
change,	representing	the	dominance	of	this	issue	in	Carbon	Co-op’s	identity	and	activity.		
Linking	these	processes	of	mediation	to	the	internal	dynamics,	struggles	and	decisions	that	
were	made	within	the	initiatives,	we	can	see	how	certain	things	were	prioritised	over	
others:	for	Carbon	Co-op,	the	deliberations	about	identity	and	mission	statement	were	a	
product	of	these	very	clear	priorities,	and	the	issues	around	burnonut,	roles	and	conflict	at	
the	installation	stage	could	be	attributed	to	the	organisation’s	grassroots	approach	being	
thrust	into	a	new	citywide	project	management	role.	The	negotiations	about	grant	funding	
replacing	ECO	funding	that	BHEU	had	with	DECC,	and	the	buffering	role	of	CSE	were	the	
result	of	a	top-down	approach	and	the	dominance	and	power	of	DECC	and	the	ECO	market,	
and	for	ESC	the	internal	struggles	of	low	sales	and	profits	reflected	the	business	approach	
and	the	dominance	of	commercial	interests	both	of	the	ESC	itself	and	its	funders.	
9.2.2	Advocating	context-sensitivity	and	thinking	relationally	
These	cases	and	the	differences	in	importance	and	influence	of	different	actors	interests	
show	clearly	the	importance	of	acknowledging	the	particular	urban	contexts	in	which	these	
responses	occur	and	the	richness	and	detail	of	the	relationships	around	them,	connecting	
with	Swyngedouw’s	(2004)	suggestions	that	urban	responses	to	energy	issues	tend	to	be	
made	up	of	place-specific	governance	coalitions	or	‘geometries	of	power’,	which	have	
different	capabilities	to	act.	Comparing	the	three	figures	below	shows	us	that	these	
assemblages	of	actors,	each	including	individuals,	commercial	organisations,	national	and	
local	state	institutions	and	third	sector	organisations	at	various	levels	have	certainly	created	
different,	place-specific	levels	of	interest	and	capacity	in	different	areas	of	the	retrofit	issue	
through	processes	of	mediation,	demonstrating	that	the	actors	in	each	of	the	networks	are	
not	only	defined	by	their	own	attributes	and	the	influence	they	bring	but	by	their	
relationships	to	other	factors	and	actors	in	the	assemblages,	termed	relations	of	exteriority.	
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For	example,	in	figure	27,	Birmingham’s	superior	supply	chain	capacity	alone	appears	to	be	
a	contextual	advantage	over	Manchester	and	Bristol,	yet	in	the	network	it	was	embedded	
in,	it	made	little	difference	to	the	financial	failure	of	the	ESC	and	its	transformational	
outcomes.	Manchester	and	Bristol’s	networks	of	environmental	organisations	may	appear	
to	have	similar	advantages,	but	when	one	was	involved	in	a	more	bottom-up	response	and	
one	was	involved	in	a	top-down	response,	their	ability	to	influence	the	network	was	
completely	different	resulting	in	vastly	different	effects	in	terms	of	contributing	to	a	wider	
transition,	as	shown	in	figures	26	and	28.	These	relations	of	exteriority	therefore	produce	
unevenly	distributed	agency	resulting	in	a	context-specific	(context	not	just	referring	to	the	
locality	but	the	broader	contexts	too)	capacity	to	act	that	is	manifest	in	the	cases	engaging	
with	landscape	issues	and	local	pressures	to	different	extents,	and	in	their	different	
approaches	to	the	specifics	of	householder	engagement	and	technical	expertise,	finance	
and	the	supply	chain.	The	varying	influences	of	the	different	actors	and	their	horizontal	and	
vertical	relationships	in	different	parts	of	the	responses	produce	unique	collective	
capabilities,	features,	outcomes	and	effects	of	each	assemblage	in	its	specific	context	as	
shown	below	in	the	diagrams	depicting	the	process	of	assemblage	of	factors	and	actors	
from	different	levels,	mediation	of	issues	and	priorities	through	internal	dynamics	and	
negotiations,	and	the	production	of	a	place-specific	experiment	for	each	case.	
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Figure	26	Assemblage	as	process	-	Carbon	Co-op	
	 	 	
Landscape	factors/actors:	Climate	change,	
co-operative	movement,	retrofit	policy,	
DECC	support	and	range	of	funders.	
Micro-context	factors:	Contribution	of	
individual	members’	shared	values	and	
technical	expertise		
Place-specific	
factors:	High	level	of	
technical	capacity	in	
URBED,	
relationships	with	
community	orgs,	
relationship	with	
GM	and	its	
contractors,	lack	of	
local	supply	chain.	
	
Effects	and	
outcomes	
Transformation:	
8	whole	house	
retrofits.		
Transition:	
Monitoring		and	
survey	methods,	
understanding	
whole	house	
process,	new	
householders	
engaged.		
Reproduction:	
Carbon	Co-op	
returned	to	
niche.	No	
improvement	in	
local	supply	
chain		
Place-specific	
experiment:	
Bottom-up	org,	
middle-out	
projects.	
Process/policy	
experiment,	
testing	technical	
issues,	peer-to-
peer	householder	
engagement,	
delivery	process	
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Figure	27	Assemblage	as	process	-	Energy	Saving	Co-operative	
	 	 	
Landscape	factors/actors:	Economic	
crisis,	co-operative	movement,	retrofit	
policy,	lack	of	DECC/Energy	companies	
support.	
Micro-context	factors:	Approach	
very	heavily	influenced	by	CEO’s	
vision.		
Place-specific	factors:	
Lack	of	community	
engagement	and	
finance	capacity,	
competition	with	and	
momentum	from	BES,	
funding	relationship	
with	Midlands	Co-op,	
strong	supply	chain	
capacity.	
	
Effects	and	
outcomes	
Transformation:
18	mixed	
measures	
retrofits.	New	
relationships	in	
the	region.	
Transition:	
Limited	
contribution	
Reproduction:	
Alternative	
approach	did	
not	survive.	
Little	legacy	
from	ESC.	Few	
retrofits	
completed.	
Place-specific	
experiment:	
Top-down	defined,	
middle-out	
delivered	business	
experiment,	
testing	commercial	
idea,	alternative	to	
Green	Deal,	new	
organisational	
form	and	network.	
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Figure	28	Assemblage	as	process:	Bristol	Home	Energy	Upgrade	
The	lessons	that	can	be	taken	from	this	is	that	the	form,	focus	and	orientation	of	such	
experiments	cannot	be	attributed	to	a	few	issues,	but	to	many	factors	and	their	
interrelations	within	and	outside	the	place	in	which	the	assemblage	acts,	which	come	
together	through	the	process	of	creating	an	experiment.	This	illustrates	the	place-specific	
immanent	causality	embraced	by	assemblage	theory	and	explained	in	chapter	3	(pages	84,	
88	and	92),	showing	how	the	causes	of	and	contributing	factors	to	these	particular	urban	
responses	lie	both	within	and	without	the	experimental	assemblage,	and	operate	at	
multiple	spatial	scales.	Looking	inside	the	experiments	at	their	internal	dynamics	and	
negotiations	has	shown	us	that	people	and	their	agency,	with	individual	attributes	and	
motivations,	are	in	some	cases,	particularly	the	Carbon	Co-op	and	the	ESC,	as	influential	as	
the	broad	pressures	at	the	macro-level,	and	the	fundamental	message	is	that	in	all	cases,	
the	mobilisation	of	local	resources,	capacities	and	capabilities	at	the	meso-level	has	a	huge	
effect	on	both	the	shape	and	nature	of	the	responses,	as	well	as	the	process	of	balancing	
different	interests,	pressures	and	priorities.		
	 	 	
Landscape	factors/actors:	Climate	
change,	Retrofit	policy	and	city	
deals,	DECC,	OFGEM.	
Micro-context	factors:	
Householders	and	individuals	had	
little	role	in	defining	the	response.	
Place-specific	factors:	
Community	
engagement	and	
finance	capacity,	‘green’	
reputation,	momentum	
and	political	support	
from	ELENA	and	Green	
Capital,		lack	of	supply	
chain	capacity,	funding	
relationship	with	DECC.	
	
Effects	and	
outcomes	
Transformation
:157	single	
measure	
retrofits.	
Transition:	
Learning	about	
retrofit	delivery	
contributed	to	
subsequent	
Bristol	scheme.	
Reproduction:	
No	technical	
progress,	no	
ideological	
challenge,	no	
new	actors	in	
governance	
network.	
Place-specific	
experiment:	
Top-down	policy	
experiment	
delivered	by	middle	
actors,	testing	policy	
process,	finance	and	
role	of	local	
authority,	focussed	
on	larger	number	of	
‘shallow’	retrofits.		
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Having	explained	how	these	different	kinds	of	experiments	have	been	produced,	the	
following	section	will	explore	specifically	the	nature	of	the	testing	and	knowledge	involved	
in	the	three	cases	and	what	this	tells	us	about	the	trend	towards	urban	experimentation	
identified	in	the	literature	review.	
9.3	Learning	about	experimentation	through	domestic	retrofit	at	the	
city	level.	
It	is	clear	from	this	comparison	that	the	three	cases	are	testing	and	learning	about	different	
things,	which	is	another	way	of	illustrating	the	unevenness	in	urban	development	and	
responses	around	the	socio-technical	issue	of	energy	efficiency.	Along	with	the	differences	
in	the	ways	that	each	case	approached	the	technical	issues,	householder	engagement	and	
motivation,	and	organisational	aspects	of	the	domestic	retrofit	problem,	these	variations	in	
experimental	approach	and	focus	show	us	clearly	that	a	complex,	multi-faceted	socio-
technical	problem	has	produced	differently	constituted	responses	at	the	local	level	
depending	on	which	areas	are	focussed	on.	
The	mini-table	below	shows	the	experimental	and	knowledge	foci	of	each	case	study,	
showing	that	certain	areas	and	forms	of	knowledge	were	of	greater	importance	in	each	case	
than	others	–	for	example,	technical	excellence	and	learning	as	a	priority	for	Carbon	Co-op,	
whereas	this	was	not	a	priority	for	Energy	Saving	Co-op	or	BHEU.	BHEU’s	tight	policy	focus	
steered	its	learning	towards	a	relatively	narrow	brief	of	testing	policy	delivery	and	in	
particular,	the	local	authority’s	role	in	that	delivery,	whereas	Energy	Saving	Co-op	had	a	
much	more	loosely	defined	process	of	experimentation,	testing	a	business	proposition	in	its	
entirety	rather	than	particular	parts	of	the	domestic	retrofit	system	or	problem.		
	 Carbon	Co-op	 Energy	Saving	Co-op	 Bristol	Home	Energy	
Upgrade	
Experimental	focus	 Testing	technical	
solutions		and	co-
ordination	of	the	
whole	house	retrofit	
process.	Learning	
about	householder	
experiences	of	
retrofit.	
Testing	a	business	
and	commercial	idea,	
new	form	of	
governance	of	
retrofit.	Some	focus	
on	tacit	knowledge	
and	demonstration	
of	retrofit.	
Testing	‘delivery’	of	
policy	–	learning	
about	financial	tools,	
marketing,	particular	
focus	on	local	
authority	role.		
Table	14	-	Comparing	experimental	foci	
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9.3.1	Identifying	forms	of	experimentation	
But	in	terms	of	the	kinds	of	experiments	that	these	cases	represent,	and	what	they	can	
contribute	to	understanding	the	trend	towards	urban	experimentation	on	socio-technical	
issues,	there	are	some	valuable	insights.	Carbon	Co-op	started	its	life	most	closely	
resembling	a	grassroots	niche	at	the	local	level,	relying	heavily	on	individual	passion	for	
tackling	on	energy	efficiency,	voluntary	capacity	and	working	very	much	on	the	basis	of	
testing	and	building	an	alternative	ideology	around	energy	use	through	community	
empowerment	and	small-scale	technical	innovation.	However,	through	its	involvement	in	
the	Green	Deal	Go	Early	project	its	experimental	nature	was	shifted	from	being	an	
‘alternative’	or	‘niche’	to	being	integrated	with	a	city-regional	strategy,	thus	acquiring	some	
features	of	a	direct	policy	experiment	–	testing	the	Green	Deal	process,	for	example.	After	
the	Go	Early	project,	however,	this	element	of	Carbon	Co-op’s	experimentation	ended	and	it	
returned	back	to	its	grassroots	base	and	‘niche’	status,	focussed	on	its	peer-to-peer	support,	
unique	technical	approach	and	householder	experiences,	and	moving	on	to	other	
experimental	exploits	such	as	smart	networks.	
The	Bristol	Home	Energy	Upgrade	shows	most	of	the	characteristics	of	a	bounded	
sociotechnical	experiment	(BSTE):	it	was	bounded	in	both	space	(Bristol	only)	and	time	(It	
had	to	end	in	April	2013)	and	was	explicitly	trying	to	produce	a	particular	type	of	knowledge	
and	create	a	socio-technical	configuration	around	a	particular	technology	–	in	this	case	
deliberately	trying	to	promote	and	normalise	solid	wall	insulation	in	the	Bristol	context.	It	
also	had	an	explicit	role	as	a	policy	experiment,	testing	out	how	the	specific	priorities	and	
features	of	the	national	policy	framework	such	as	assessments,	loan	finance,	ECO,	solid	wall	
insulation	and	boilers,	would	come	together	in	practice	to	deliver	completed	retrofits	
through	a	local	delivery	partnership.	Its	knowledge	focus	was	clear	–	it	was	trying	to	
generate	policy	delivery	knowledge	to	lead	into	further	schemes	of	the	same	kind	–	which	it	
did.	In	this	sense	the	BHEU	had	the	clearest	experimental	approach,	but	because	of	its	close	
relationship	to	policy	it	was	also	the	most	narrowly	constituted	in	terms	of	the	learning	from	
it,	which	was	not	designed	to	challenge	aspects	of	the	policy	environment	it	was	testing,	
more	to	road-test	and	marginally	refine	them.		
Energy	Saving	Co-operative,	on	the	other	hand,	was	ultimately	a	business	experiment,	
which	makes	it	more	difficult	to	align	with	the	models	of	experimentation	presented	in	the	
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literature.	It	lacked	crucial	elements	of	BSTEs	because	it	wasn’t	bounded	in	space	and	time	–	
its	ambitions	ranged	between	the	local	and	the	national	scale	-	and	it	was	intended	to	be	
ongoing.	Furthermore,	whilst	actors	involved	in	ESC	acknowledged	its	experimental	nature,	
it	was	not	designed	to	produce	knowledge	of	a	specific	type,	and	stakeholders	had	varied	
views	about	the	knowledge	it	was	producing,	from	demonstration	of	retrofit	to	co-operative	
models	of	working	and	exploring	alternatives	to	working	with	large	energy	companies.	As	a	
start-up	business	it	shares	some	qualities	with	that	of	a	niche	experiment	–	an	attempt	at	
socio-technical	innovation	at	the	beginning	of	its	path	-	but	its	ambitions	were	systemic.	
Aiming	for	no	less	than	a	cultural	and	ideological	shift	in	governing	and	organising	retrofit,	it	
attempted	to	create	an	entirely	new	system	from	scratch	with	its	‘best	of	big	with	the	best	
of	local’	organisational	model,	at	times	working	outside	of	policy	like	a	living	lab,	and	at	
other	times	working	with	it	such	as	gaining	Green	Deal	accreditation.	
9.3.2	Trending	now:	Governing	by	experiment.	
However,	where	all	of	the	cases	are	similar	is	that	none	of	them	operated	completely	
outside	of	formal	policy	processes	as	it	was	argued	by	Evans	and	Karvonen	(2011)	that	an	
urban	living	lab	would.	Carbon	Co-op	and	BHEU,	with	their	involvement	in	the	Green	Deal	
Go	Early	projects,	were	to	different	extents	explicitly	charged	with	delivering	elements	of	
national	policy	at	the	local	level.	Even	Energy	Saving	Co-operative	presented	elements	of	a	
policy	experiment	in	terms	of	creating	a	market,	orchestrating	a	process	from	assessment	to	
installation	and	co-ordinating	an	industry	around	retrofit.	Its	marketing	and	branding	
strategy	also	relied	on	its	positioning	relative	to	the	Green	Deal	–	needing	this	comparative	
relationship	with	policy	to	appear	as	a	‘better’	option	for	householders.		
What	this	exploration	shows	is	that	even	though	there	is	significant	variation	between	the	
experiments	in	terms	of	their	type,	form	and	focus,	their	engagement	with	that	macro-
context	produces	some	significant	similarities.	It	supports	the	view	that,	as	argued	by	
Bulkeley	and	Castan-Broto	(2013a)	a	dominant	form	of	governing	is	through	
experimentation:	all	of	the	experiments	represent	a	form	of	governing	by	experiment,	not	
only	by	testing	specific	elements	of	state	policy,	but	by	the	fundamental	premise	of	acting	
on	general	goals	and	priorities	defined	at	the	macro-level.	It	also	shows	how	conceptually	
different	‘types’	of	experiment	can	overlap	or	coexist	in	the	same	response	and	even	how	
the	form	and	orientation	of	an	experiment	can	change	over	time	–	particularly	in	the	case	of	
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Carbon	Co-op,	contributing	to	a	more	nuanced	and	flexible	understanding	of	what	urban	
experimentation	looks	like	in	practice.	
9.4	Forms	of	change	–	outcomes	and	effects		
The	table	below	outlines	the	areas	in	which	each	case	either	transformed	something	about	
the	retrofit	‘system’	either	locally	or	beyond,	contributed	incrementally	to	a	wider	transition	
process,	or	actually	reproduced	the	status	quo	–	i.e.	did	not	change	anything.	
The	combinations	and	negotiations	of	different	interests	and	issues,	different	relationships	
with	other	actors	and	interests	and	issues	at	different	levels,	has	produced	differences	in	
experimental	focus	and	the	differences	in	approach	to	the	key	issues	surrounding	domestic	
retrofit	in	cities	have	in	turn	produced	a	particular	place-specific	responses	to	the	issue	of	
domestic	retrofit,	which	have	produced	particular	outcomes	and	effects.	Carbon	Co-op’s	
focus	on	technical	knowledge	resulted	in	transformative	and	transitional	effects	–	albeit	
only	on	eight	houses	–	in	these	areas	of	the	socio-technical	system,	acting	on	particular	
components	such	as	the	survey	method	and	process,	post-installation	monitoring,	and	the	
design	process.	Other	more	people-focussed	or	value-based	areas	of	learning	such	as	the	
detailed	evaluation	of	the	experiences	of	the	householders,	the	development	of	peer-to	–
peer	support	and	their	experiences	of	legal	processes	and	understandings	of	contract	forms	
continue	to	be	of	use	internally	to	Carbon	Co-op	and	its	members,	but	were	not	linked	to	
any	higher	order	learning	or	transformation	in	the	wider	industry.	
Changes	resulting	from	the	Energy	Saving	Co-operative	are	comparatively	less.	The	new	
network	and	relationships	it	formed	around	retrofit	were	truly	transformative	at	the	time,	
connecting	actors	and	interests	such	as	local,	Birmingham	based	installers,	with	community	
organisations	that	were	ideologically	aligned.	However,	because	the	business	ultimately	
failed,	the	transformative	business	model	and	retrofit	service	it	was	trying	to	establish	was	
unable	to	have	any	impact	or	do	what	it	had	intended	in	providing	an	alternative	to	Green	
Deal.	Because	of	the	starkness	of	Energy	Saving	Co-operative’s	rise	and	fall,	in	comparison	
with	Carbon	Co-op	which	still	operates	as	an	organisation,	and	Bristol	Home	Energy	
Upgrade,	which	contributed	directly	to	further	retrofit	activity,	it	is	very	difficult	to	identify	
any	incremental	changes	that	Energy	Saving	Co-operative	contributed	to	a	transition	
process.		
	
	
247	
	
Table	15	-	Forms	of	change	from	the	case	studies	
On	the	other	hand,	the	Bristol	Home	Energy	Upgrade	shows	potentially	more	incremental	
contributions	to	a	long-term	process	of	change	in	the	city	region	in	relation	to	retrofit.	Not	
only	did	it	change	the	physical	properties	of	157	homes,	the	highest	of	the	three	cases,	it	
Form	of	change	 Carbon	Co-op	 Energy	Saving	Co-op	 Bristol	Home	Energy	
Upgrade	
	 Eight	houses	fully	
retrofitted.	
Occupants’	energy	
use	reduced,	comfort	
improved	and	
homes’	appearance	
transformed.	
Created	new	
monitoring	device.	
New	relationships	
formed	around	
domestic	retrofit	in	
Birmingham.	
Over	100	homes	
retrofitted	–	comfort	
and	appearance	of	
homes	transformed.	
23	solid	wall	
insulation	jobs	
completed	and	134	
heating	system	
upgrades	installed	-	
comfort	improved	
and	appearance	of	
homes	improved.	
	 The	8	houses	build	
detailed	technical	
and	tacit	knowledge	
of	retrofit	process.	
Self	assessment	tool	
improves	survey	
process.	
Guidance	note	opens	
up	regional	dialogue	
about	planning.	
Community	
champions	gradually	
engage	more	people	
with	retrofit.	
Very	little	
incremental	change	
resulted	from	ESC.		
Initial	contribution	to	
long	term	retrofit	
goals	in	city-region.	
Learning	about	
retrofit	process	and	
roles	contributed	to	
Warm	Up	Bristol.	
Increase	in	number	
of	accredited	
installers	in	the	city	
region.	
	 Carbon	Co-op	
returned	to	niche	
status	-	not	
incorporated	in	GM	
strategy.	
Key	actors	at	
grassroots	and	
regional	level	remain	
largely	the	same.	
Supply	chain	not	
improved.	
	
Failure	of	the	
business	and	lack	of	
legacy.	
ESC	business	model	
did	not	provide	an	
alternative	to	Green	
Deal.	
Local	supply	chain	
did	not	acquire	any	
extra	work	or	build	
industry,	jobs	or	local	
economic	growth.	
No	challenge	to	
policy-based	
approaches	and	
stipulations.	
No	new	relationships	
or	actors	brought	
into	retrofit	
governance	network.	
No	significant	
progress	on	technical	
understanding	of	
whole	house	retrofit	
or	planning	issues.	
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directly	informed	processes	involved	in	Warm	Up	Bristol,	a	larger	retrofit	programme	run	by	
the	council,	offering	learning	about	marketing,	the	role	of	community	groups	and	their	
needs,	and	it	contributed	to	a	better	populated	local	supply	chain.	However,	the	
transformative	effects	of	the	BHEU	are	limited	by	the	shallow	nature	of	the	single	measure	
retrofits	themselves,	which	in	comparison	to	the	whole	house	or	hybrid	retrofits	of	the	
other	two	cases	are	far	less	dramatic	in	terms	of	energy	savings.	There	is	little	
transformative	effect	in	terms	of	the	governance	of	retrofit	in	the	area	with	the	initiative	
reusing	existing	relationships	rather	than	including	new	actors	and	perspectives.	
Furthermore,	the	transitional	changes	resulting	from	the	BHEU	are	also	limited	to	following	
a	narrow,	policy	defined	approach,	rather	than	contributing	to	any	alternative	or	challenge	
to	that	model	or	to	any	significant	technical	innovation	around	retrofit,	and	problems	with	
planning	processes	persist.	
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9.5	Enabling	and	limiting	change:	never	underestimate	the	landscape.	
This	section	will	examine	the	effect	that	the	macro-level	or	landscape	explored	in	chapter	5	
had	upon	all	the	cases,	acting	simultaneously	as	both	an	enabler	to	all	of	the	projects	and	
the	single	most	significant	inhibitor	to	progress.	
In	the	multi-level	perspective	(MLP)	the	landscape	is	described	as	a	series	of	‘macro-
societal’	shifts	taking	place	away	from	the	socio-technical	issue	at	hand,	which	interact	with	
existing	regimes	in	order	to	open	up	opportunities	for	change.	An	example	of	this	could	be	
the	issue	of	climate	change	creating	emissions	reduction	targets	and	energy	security	
concerns	creating	particular	drivers	for	retrofit,	with	global	trends	towards	neoliberal,	
marketised	policy	and	new	state	spaces	creating	particular	governance	styles.	What	this	
analysis	does	that	is	different	from	the	MLP	conceptualisation	is	that	it	directly	connects	
these	landscape	issues	with	the	actors	involved	in	the	domestic	responses	on	the	ground,	
through	the	assemblages,	rather	than	the	landscape	issues	remaining	as	detached	
‘background’	processes.	It	acknowledges	direct	links	such	as	the	personal	motivation	of	
householders	involved	in	Carbon	Co-op	to	address	climate	change,	or	the	direct	impact	of	
the	financial	crisis	and	the	changes	in	policy	on	the	installer	members	of	Energy	Saving	Co-
op,	or	the	specific	intention	of	BHEU	to	create	a	market	in	Bristol	in	line	with	policy	trends	
towards	marketization.	This	means	we	can	see	how	the	landscape	directly	affects	local	
practices	in	both	enabling	and	limiting	ways.	However,	the	most	significant	way	in	which	the	
landscape	affects	local	practices	is	through	policy.	
9.5.1	Policy	experiments	with	an	incomplete	system	
The	exploration	of	policy	in	chapter	5	showed	us	how	landscape	issues	and	factors	such	as	
growing	neoliberalism	in	the	economic	West,	climate	change,	economic	crisis,	energy	
security	and	fuel	poverty	have	become	embodied	in	national	policy	and	regulation	relating	
to	domestic	retrofit,	shifting	and	competing	for	importance	over	time	and	steadily	
increasing	the	prominence	and	importance	of	domestic	retrofit	of	existing,	privately	owner	
occupied	homes	as	a	political	issue.	At	an	ideological	level	there	has	been	a	move	towards	
neoliberalised	policy,	with	an	increased	focus	on	carbon	pricing	and	market	incentives,	
along	with	an	absence	of	regulation	on	energy	efficiency	and	retrofit	of	existing	housing.	
The	responsibility	for	enacting	a	systemic	change	in	energy	efficiency	of	domestic	properties	
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in	the	UK	has	been	passed	down	to	localised	public-private	coalitions	of	actors	through	
competitive	funding	pots	from	central	government.	In	terms	of	how	this	enabled	the	three	
cases,	the	anticipation	of	an	industry	created	by	the	Green	Deal	and	ECO	framework	
inspired	Energy	Saving	Co-op	to	create	something	‘better’	in	Birmingham	and	seize	what	the	
CEO	saw	as	a	business	opportunity.	The	growing	prominence	of	retrofit	as	an	issue	for	
climate	change	activists,	and	the	deliberate	connection	of	the	Green	Deal	Go	Early	projects	
to	the	City	Deals	created	the	conditions	in	Manchester	for	Carbon	Co-op	to	evolve,	acquire	
funding	and	take	an	active	role,	and	of	course	BHEU	was	a	direct	product	of	and	response	to	
DECC’s	Green	Deal	Go	Early	funding	call.	
But	whilst	localised	experimentation	and	variation	have	been	encouraged	both	directly	and	
indirectly	in	these	ways,	certain	aspects	of	a	desired	approach	to	retrofit	have	been	
specified	quite	clearly	through	both	EU	and	national	policy,	such	as	the	mandatory	
household	survey	or	‘Green	Deal	Assessment’,	the	provision	of	loan	finance	as	a	financial	
incentive,	and	the	provision	of	subsidies	through	the	Energy	Company	Obligation	to	
vulnerable	households	and	for	particularly	expensive	measures	such	as	external	wall	
insulation.	There	is	also	a	distinct	technological	specificity	in	the	policy	climate	which	is	a	
historical	trend	in	UK	energy	efficiency	policy,	and	is	manifest	in	the	nature	of	the	subsidies	
and	loan	finance	available,	which	primarily	supports	solid	wall	insulation	and	heating	system	
retrofits,	with	other	measures	less	supported	or	conditional	upon	these	measures.	The	
result	is	picture	in	which	certain	areas	of	the	retrofit	‘system’	outlined	by	Vergragt	and	
Brown	(2012)	and	Swan	(2013),	are	overemphasised	–	such	as	the	markets,	supply	chain	
accreditation	and	social	housing	aspects,	while	others	are	neglected,	such	as	the	regulatory	
‘push’	elements,	user	behaviour,	motivation	and	preferences,	along	with	support	for	only	
certain	specific	products	in	the	technical	areas	of	the	system.		
The	true	effects	of	this	macro-context	on	the	possibilities	for	change	become	especially	
apparent	when	we	view	them	through	the	biographies	of	the	case	studies.	Looking	at	the	
forms	of	change	coming	out	of	each	case	it	is	clear	that	each	one	makes	attempts	at,	or	
sometimes	enacts	successful	changes,	in	different	parts	of	the	system:	the	survey,	
monitoring	and	householder	engagement	aspects	addressed	by	Carbon	Co-op,	the	
procedural	policy	and	governance	aspects	addressed	by	BHEU,	and	the	business	or	‘market’	
elements	as	well	as	new	local	relationships	addressed	by	ESC.	But	as	Swan	(2013)	and	
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Vergragt	and	Brown	(2012)	warned	–	these	innovations	and	steps	of	progress	in	domestic	
retrofit	are	only	addressing	small	parts	of	the	system.	To	achieve	systemic	change,	all	parts	
of	the	system	should	be	in	harmony,	and	in	this	case	they	are	not,	because	there	are	
fundamental	elements	missing	from	the	policy	and	regulatory	setup,	and	a	significant	
misalignment	between	the	motives	and	values	of	the	actors	involved	and	those	who	have	
constructed	that	setup.	
Despite	their	local	and	contextual	differences,	the	constant	factor	in	all	three	cases	is	that	
the	policy	context	was	extremely	difficult	to	work	within,	and	despite	navigating	and	
relating	to	it	differently,	it	caused	significant	problems	for	each	case.	For	BHEU,	the	
constraints	of	trying	to	work	within	the	bounds	of	ECO	reporting,	and	the	limitations	that	
Green	Deal	accreditation	put	on	the	technological	options	available	compromised	the	
deepness	of	the	retrofits	and	carbon	savings,	but	compliance	with	these	constraints	enabled	
a	much	higher	number	of	retrofits	and	greater	scale	of	activity.	For	Birmingham	the	lack	of	
clarity	around	the	extent	of	ECO	funding	and	the	inability	to	gain	an	ECO	deal	put	an	end	to	
a	flagship	project	that	set	into	motion	a	sequence	of	events	that	ended	the	ESC’s	business,	
and	not	conforming	to	the	Green	Deal	policy	framework	or	receiving	funding	from	DECC	left	
ESC	financially	vulnerable	as	well	as	the	local	partners	who	had	invested	and	collaborated	
with	it.		For	Carbon	Co-op,	navigating	the	changes	to	subsidies	available	due	to	changes	in	
ECO,	and	managing	issues	with	planning	created	strain	on	the	organisation	and	on	the	
householders,	reducing	the	number	of	retrofits	they	were	able	to	complete	and	worsening	
the	personal	experiences	of	the	process.	Its	constant	shifting	in	activities	and	seeking	
funding	from	multiple	sources	creates	instability	and	risk	for	the	organisation,	hindering	its	
ability	to	continue	working	on	the	problem.		
Furthermore,	there	is	an	ideological	misalignment	between	the	value-based	approaches	of	
the	people	and	organisations	involved	at	the	local	level,	whose	priorities	range	from	
genuine	commitment	to	tackling	climate	change,	to	community	empowerment,	
strengthening	local	economies	and	industries	and	protecting	householders	and	citizens	
from	harm,	rather	than	those	of	policy	which	focus	on	markets	and	competition,	upscaling	
and	largely	engage	with	retrofit	motivations	only	on	a	rational	financial	basis.		
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So	despite	the	influence	of	local	capacity	on	the	shape	and	balance	of	each	assemblage	and	
on	the	way	it	approached	certain	elements	of	the	retrofit	issue,	the	policy	landscape	has	a	
direct	impact	on	the	power	distribution	and	relationships	in	the	networks:	
• With	ECO	the	only	source	of	subsidy,	and	energy	companies	in	control	of	who	they	
award	these	subsidies	to,	energy	companies	have	a	distinctly	large	amount	of	power	
in	terms	of	how	they	can	dictate	the	success	or	failure	of	a	project	or	response,	and	
across	all	three	cases,	ECO	and	its	surrounding	processes	in	fact	provided	very	little	
support	and	presented	substantial	obstacles.	
• The	Green	Deal	framework	created	a	very	particular	process	and	approach	that	all	
initiatives	had	to	fit	into,	but	its	mandatory	aspects	created	conflicts	and	practical	
problems	at	various	points	and	for	multiple	actors	in	each	network	e.g.	assessments,	
planning,	accreditation	for	installers.	
• The	control	of	central	government	–	largely	DECC	-	over	the	localised	networks	is	
contradictory	to	the	rhetorical	encouragement	of	localised	experimentation,	with	
conditionality	and	co-option	of	local	responses	through	funding	dependency,	or	
vulnerability	to	failure	without	it,	as	warned	of	by	Whitehead	(2013).	
9.5.2	Resistances	to	change	–	dependency	and	power.	
In	terms	of	what	this	means	about	how	the	macro-level	limits	the	transformative	potential	
of	localised	responses,	Geels	(2014)	highlights	the	role	of	politics	and	power	in	resistance	to	
low-carbon	transitions,	suggesting	that	different	forms	of	power	from	material	and	
instrumental,	to	discursive	and	institutional,	help	to	reinforce	the	existing	interests	of	those	
in	powerful	positions	in	existing	regimes.	This	prevents	change	from	occurring	in	response	
to	pressures	of	climate	change	and	energy	security.		
The	UK	policy	setup	aimed	to	create	an	entirely	new	system	for	addressing	reduced	
domestic	energy	use	through	the	particular	financial,	technical	and	tools	it	prioritised,	
showing	that	even	though	the	domestic	retrofit	‘regime’	is	yet	to	be	established,	elements	
of	discursive	and	institutional	power	–	through	policy	–	are	being	used	to	define	an	
ideologically	rigid	rationale	and	approach.	Through	the	funding	dependencies	and	uneven	
material	power	dynamics	this	generates	between	the	local	experiments	and	the	state,	this	
rationale	and	approach	has	been	very	difficult	to	challenge	despite	its	obvious	flaws	
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illustrated	in	the	experiences	(and	frustrations)	of	the	participants	in	the	case	studies.	
Elements	of	progress	and	learning	that	did	not	fit	ideologically	with	the	market-making,	
financially	driven,	and	technically	specific	policy	approach	were	less	protected	and	
supported	by	central	government	than	those	which	did:	there	is	little	or	no	incorporation	of	
Carbon	Co-op’s	peer	to	peer	approach,	or	ESC’s	co-operative	local	supplier	network	
approach	in	DECC’s	Green	Deal	Communities	programme.	Conversely,	it	tends	to	support	
collaborations	between	local	authorities	and	larger	private	building	contractors	or	energy	
companies	rather	than	grassroots	approaches	with	strong	values.		
Furthermore,	these	experiments	have	made	very	little	impact	on	the	actual	scale	of	the	
issue	–	outlined	in	chapter	1	-	which	prompted	them.	The	focus	on	boilers	and	insulation	
was	specifically	designed	to	tackle	the	high	proportion	of	domestic	energy	use	that	is	taken	
up	by	space	heating,	the	specific	focus	on	solid	wall	insulation	was	intended	to	tackle	the	
house	types	that	lose	the	most	heat	and	require	greater	energy	use	through	heating	to	
compensate,	and	the	focus	on	loan	finance	was	designed	to	address	the	largest	tenure	type	
in	English	housing	–	privately	owner	occupied,	and	presumed	‘able	to	pay’	rather	than	fuel	
poor.	However,	the	outcomes	and	effects	of	the	initiatives	do	very	little	to	impact	these	
areas.	It	is	impossible	to	know	at	this	stage	whether	the	change	and	effects	from	them	
collectively	may	form	part	of	a	longer	term	shift	–	through	improving	tools	such	as	surveying	
and	design,	householder	experience	and	process-based	learning,	or	financial	and	business	
learning.	But	the	closing	of	the	Green	Deal	Finance	Company	in	2015,	significant	reductions	
in	ECO	–	the	only	subsidy	supporting	the	retrofit	industry	-	places	serious	doubt	over	
whether	any	of	the	existing	framework	or	process	is	still	considered	viable,	making	the	
potential	the	potential	incremental	contributions	the	three	cases	make	pale	in	comparison.		
Viewing	this	part	of	the	issue	through	Reddy’s	(2013)	framework,	it	seems	clear	that	these	
barriers	at	the	macro-level	in	policy,	regulation	and	ideology,	are	not	possible	for	local	
actors	to	effect	change	upon	directly	–	they	have,	as	discussed,	either	worked	around	or	
within	policy	constraints,	rather	than	being	able	to	challenge	those	constraints.	Like	Seyfang	
et	al	(2013)	this	discussion	challenges	the	idea	that	systemic	socio-technical	change	can	be	
brought	about	by	the	development	of	niches	and	localised	experiments,	because	without	a	
supportive	policy	context	and	enabling	landscape,	there	is	a	fundamental	barrier	to	systemic	
change.	It	also	shows	how	place-specific	and	contingent	‘niche	experiments’	and	their	
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effects	and	changes	are,	and	supports	analyses	suggesting	that	the	knowledge	generated	
from	living	laboratories	and	other	forms	of	urban	experiment	do	represent	only	one	form	of	
knowledge	–	rather	than	‘the	ultimate’	knowledge	-	which	is	not	always	transferrable	to	
other	contexts,	and	cannot	always	have	any	effect	on	dominant	political	or	ideological	
forces.		
In	relation	to	the	debate	around	the	theoretical	contribution	of	assemblage	thinking	to	
studies	of	political	economy	in	City	journal	(see	McFarlane,	2011	and	2011a,	Dovey,	2011,	
Brenner	et	al,	2011	and	Farias,	2011),	this	process	shows	assemblage	thinking	to	be	very	
helpful	for	connecting	political	economy	to	localised	activity,	through	showing	how	the	
political	economy	of	neoliberal	capitalism	that	has	encouraged	networked,	fluid	governance	
and	interurban	variation	and	uneven	development,	yet	stifled	alternative	ideologies	in	this	
way.	
9.6	What	is	needed?	An	ideological	landscape	shift.		
Any	prospect	of	deliberately	enacting	a	transition	in	this	area	thus	requires	far	greater	
attention	to	the	‘missing’	areas	of	the	system	such	as	regulation,	understanding	complex	
motives,	developing	a	whole	suite	of	interrelated	technologies	other	than	insulation	and	
boilers	and	ideological	alignment	between	national	policy	and	the	local	and	personal	
agendas	and	priorities	of	the	actors	charged	with	addressing	domestic	retrofit.	What	could	
improve	the	situation	is	a	landscape	shift	in	the	way	policy	is	constructed	–	moving	away	
from	marketization,	technical	obsessions,	carbon	pricing	and	inconsistency,	and	towards	
equity	and	dependability	especially	in	subsidies,	supported	by	stricter	and	better	regulation	
of	energy	efficiency	in	existing	buildings	and	support	for	creative	technical	approaches.	This	
could	better	support	longer-term	development	of	alternative	approaches	and	make	room	
for	varied	motives	for	retrofit,	technical	innovation	and	supply	development,	and	truly	give	
power	to	the	local	organisations	working	on	it	instead	of	to	the	energy	companies.	A	
landscape	scenario	like	this	could	potentially	open	up	space	for	more	niche	level	responses	
to	produce	creative	solutions	to	the	problem	and	construct	and	inclusive	equitable	regime	
for	domestic	retrofit	that	addressed	climate	change,	energy	security	and	economic	concerns	
together.	This	would	be	the	regime	desired	by	the	academics,	policy	makers	and	grassroots	
actors	who	share	such	enthusiasm	for	retrofit	but	have	so	far	struggled	to	find	a	solution	
under	the	limiting	ideological	approach	dictated	by	policy.	
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Chapter	10	–	Conclusion:	What	has	domestic	retrofit	shown	
us	about	pressures,	policy	and	people	in	urban	contexts?	
10.1	Revisiting	the	research	questions	
Firstly,	it	is	necessary	to	return	to	the	original	questions	posed	at	the	beginning	of	the	thesis	
and	demonstrate	how	they	have	been	answered	over	the	course	of	this	doctoral	journey.	
The	first	aim	of	the	research	was:	
i. To	understand	how	and	why	different	responses	to	the	issue	might	emerge	from	
different	urban	contexts,	despite	operating	under	the	same	policy	context.		
The	thesis	has	established	that	such	divergence	in	domestic	retrofit	experimentation	in	
English	cities	is	a	product	of	their	different,	context	specific	process	of	assemblage.	These	
different	processes	of	assemblage	are	partly	due	to	the	style	of	policy	and	governance	in	
relation	to	both	cities	and	energy	efficiency	in	the	UK,	which	encourages	localised	
experimentation	and	variation.	However,	it	is	also	due	to	the	inherently	contingent	and	
‘messy’	nature	of	localised	urban	responses	to	energy	issues,	dependent	on	features	of	the	
places	in	which	the	experiments	have	emerged	such	as	organisations	with	specialist	retrofit	
knowledge,	environmental	networks,	and	supportive	local	government.	Finally	this	variation	
is	also	partly	a	product	of	the	level	of	influence	and	the	roles	of	individual	people	who	are	
working	on	and	in	these	initiatives,	whose	motives,	values	and	level	of	influence	varies	
enormously	depending	on	the	relationships	between	them	and	the	other	factors	and	scales.	
The	relationships,	negotiations	and	dynamics	between	these	levels	and	between	the	actors	
and	factors	at	all	levels	produce	differently	orientated	experiments	with	different	
approaches.	
The	second	aim	was:	
i. To	ascertain	whether	the	policy	context	in	which	these	responses	operate	acts	as	
an	enabler	or	a	limitation	to	the	transformative	potential	of	these	responses.	
As	discussed	in	chapter	9	the	research	has	also	established	that	the	policy	or	‘macro’	
context	–	which	is	a	combination	of	both	global	landscape	issues	and	trends,	and	UK	specific	
policy	features	and	trends	such	as	shifting	priorities	and	preoccupations	with	particular	
technological	fixes		-	both	enabled	and	limited	the	changes	emerging	from	the	different	case	
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studies.	It	enabled	by	encouraging	localised	activity	and	offering	funding	for	domestic	
retrofit	initiatives,	thus	creating	opportunities	and	spaces	for	experimentation	and	varying	
approaches	as	described	by	(Hodson	and	Marvin,	2014).	However,	landscape	issues	in	and	
of	themselves	created	pressure	to	respond	at	all	levels	–	people	and	organisations	often	
engaged	directly	and	personally	with	these	pressures	rather	than	just	through	policy,	
particularly	with	climate	change	and	economic	issues	such	as	the	perceived	upcoming	value	
shift	towards	co-operatives	as	a	result	of	the	financial	crisis.		
However,	this	context	also	limited	transformation,	in	part	due	to	an	ideological	gap	–	
rationales	for	action	and	problem	solving	approaches		differ	from	markets	and	specific	
technologies	in	macro-context	to	a	complex	array	of	other	rationales	often	based	on	more	
pro-social	value-bases	at	the	meso	and	micro	levels,	connecting	with	the	issues	of	differing	
‘worldviews’	identified	by	Brown	and	Vergragt	(2008)	in	their	example	of	a	Bounded	Socio-
technical	experiment	(BSTE),	and	the	challenges	with	transferring	learning	from	
experimentation	in	an	unsupportive	policy	and	regulatory	context	that	they	outlined	in	their	
exploration	of	domestic	retrofit	in	Worcester,	MA	(Vergragt	and	Brown,	2012).	
This,	combined	with	resistances	to	change	through	instrumental	and	institutional	
constraints	such	as	funding	dependencies	and	technical	specificity	(Geels,	2014)	either	co-
opted	transformative	responses	into	the	dominant	policy	approach,	or	prevented	them	
from	moving	beyond	the	experimental	niche	phase.		
10.2	Implications	of	the	work	presented	in	this	thesis.	
10.2.1	Raising	questions	for	policy	
One	of	the	reasons	that	the	work	in	this	thesis	is	important	is	that	the	experiences	of	the	
people	involved	in	the	case	studies	and	the	macro-level	analysis	in	Chapter	5	exposed	some	
significant	and	acute	issues	with	the	effectiveness	of	domestic	retrofit	policy	and	the	
conditions	it	creates	for	practical	action.	The	sporadic,	inconsistent	and	fragmented	nature	
of	policy	creates	uncertainty	for	domestic	retrofit	professionals	and	householders	alike,	and	
the	constraints	and	stipulations	of	policy	create	an	incomplete	system	for	local	actors	to	
experiment	in	and	with,	thus	discouraging	really	creative	responses	that	could	generate	
systemic	change.	The	research	also	exposed	the	ineffectiveness	of	specific	policy	tools	such	
as	ECO,	which	is	not	reaching	households	and	supporting	costly	retrofit	activity	as	it	was	
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intended	to	do.	Similarly	the	Green	Deal,	-	which	was	too	complex	for	industry	and	
householders	alike	to	understand	and	engage	with	-	has	not	initiated	an	overhaul	of	energy	
efficiency	in	English	properties	as	hoped,	thus	not	meeting	policy	priorities	of	significantly	
reducing	carbon	emissions	from	energy	use	in	homes,	reducing	reliance	on	fossil	fuel	or	
protecting	against	fuel	price	hikes	and	improving	energy	security.		Varying	local	capacities	
and	capabilities	to	respond	also	creates	greater	challenges	for	some	contexts	than	others,	
often	varying	between	different	parts	of	the	‘problem’.	These	findings	beg	questions	about	
what	policy	changes	would	better	support	retrofit	activity.	Stable	policy	that	is	more	
sensitive	to	the	ways	in	which	problems	can	be	felt	and	interpreted	differently	in	different	
contexts,	with	different	levels	of	capability	to	act,	and	is	less	dependent	on	large	energy	
suppliers	(in	whose	best	interests,	perversely,	reducing	energy	use	in	homes	is	not)	would	
be	a	step	forward.	Furthermore,	addressing	the	overreliance	on	markets	and	finance	in	so	
many	areas	of	policy	(from	loan	finance	for	householders	to	allowing	the	influence	of	
bartering	with	ECO	prices	to	ride	roughshod	over	local	projects)	should	be	a	priority,	along	
with	more	stringent	regulation	of,	and	more	consistent,	accessible	financial	support	and	
subsidy	for	retrofit	in	the	privately	owned	and	occupied	sector.	These	changes	could	
combine	to	make	something	that	is	currently	a	‘hard-sell’	into	a	necessary	and	normal	part	
of	home	improvements,	which	could	in	turn	support	consistent	work	and	revenue	for	local	
retrofit	supply	chains,	thus	meeting	local	economic	development	objectives.	
In	terms	of	progress	on	the	localism	agenda,	there	is	certainly	evidence	from	the	cases	that	
city-based	actors	are	keen	and	committed	to	creating	and	enacting	their	own	strategies	for	
addressing	the	issue	of	domestic	retrofit,	and	that	certain	policy	programmes	such	as	the	
Green	Deal	Go	Early	programme	enabled	and	empowered	them	to	do	so	–	in	the	cases	of	
Bristol	and	Manchester	at	least.	Whilst	this	research	relates	to	the	specific	issue	of	domestic	
retrofit,	it	connects	to,	and	supports,	Hodson	and	Marvin’s	(2010a	and	2010b)	findings	that	
cities	are	trying	to	enact	their	own	low	carbon	transitions,	by	connecting,	utilising	and	
protecting	their	own	organisational	resources,	and	to	some	extent	are	able	to	attempt	it.	
However,	the	potential	for	successful	transitions	resulting	from	these	attempts	is	
questionable	because	of	the	macro-level	constraints	on	them,	as	discussed	at	the	end	of	
Chapter	9.	
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As	a	result,	the	key	recommendations	to	policymakers	in	the	field	of	cities	and	domestic	
retrofit	would	be:	
• There	should	be	fewer	conditions	and	constraints	on	funding	from	national	
government	to	city-based	projects	(such	as	requirements	to	blend	finance,	involve	
ECO	partners,	and	create	unrealistic	target	numbers	of	properties),	giving	greater	
freedom	to	places	to	govern	themselves	and	their	retrofit	strategies,	making	the	
best	use	of	their	own	strengths	and	resources	and	creating	responses	that	are	
tailored	to	their	local	contexts.	
• Assuming	there	is	a	desire	to	increase	retrofit	activity,	policy	messages	promoting	
retrofit	should	not	assume	that	householders’	motivation	is	primarily	financial,	or	
environmental.	Complex	motivations	and	concerns	should	be	acknowledged	and	
addressed,	with	bespoke,	one-to-one	advice	and	information	for	each	household.		
• The	importance	of	detailed,	technical	information	and	advice	should	not	be	
underestimated.	This	should	be	provided	by	reputable	organisations	such	as	
architects	or	experienced	retrofit	contractors	and	should	be	bespoke	to	each	
household	and	its	peculiarities.		
• Community	groups	should	not	be	assumed	to	have	adequate	technical	expertise	or	
voluntary	capacity	to	promote	and	advise	householders	about	retrofit.	They	can	be	
very	useful	for	mutual	support	and	networking,	but	are	often	already	stretched	for	
resources	and	being	placed	in	positions	of	excessive	responsibility	is	often	
destructive	to	them.	They	should	be	allowed	to	define	their	own	level	of	
involvement	rather	than	have	roles	imposed	upon	them	by	national	or	local	
government.	
• Gaps	and	unevenness	in	resources	and	capacity	at	the	local	level	should	be	plugged	
using	a	national,	overarching	retrofit	organisation	or	hub,	which	can	add	support	to	
local	schemes	in	a	bespoke	manner,	e.g.	if	they	are	struggling	with	particular	parts	
of	the	retrofit	process	such	as	outreach	or	technical	advice.	
• There	should	be	greater	willingness	from	national	policymakers	to	learn	from	
localised	projects	and	experiments	in	retrofit	without	predefining	the	learning	that	
is	required	-	i.e.	with	an	open	mind.	This	includes	learning	from	those	retrofit	
experiments	deemed	‘unsuccessful’	or	not	in	line	with	dominant	approaches.		
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10.2.2	Reflection:	contributions	to	knowledge	and	existing	literatures.	
This	thesis	has	encouraged	holistic,	interdisciplinary,	joined	up	thinking	in	academic	
approaches	to	studying	both	domestic	retrofit	specifically	and	socio-technical	issues	in	
urban	contexts.	The	topic	and	methodological	approach	required	perspectives	and	ideas	
assembled	from	a	range	of	approaches	in	order	to	effectively	account	for	and	investigate	
issues	that	emerged.	It	has	made	an	original	contribution	to	knowledge	in	three	significant	
ways.	
Firstly,	it	has	taken	a	uniquely	urban	focussed	perspective	on	domestic	retrofit,	looking	at	
the	responses	of	city-based	actors	to	this	issue	under	certain	policy	and	political	conditions.	
Much	research	has	looked	at	urban	responses	to	energy	and	climate	change	issues,	localised	
responses	to	sustainability	challenges,	and	even	some	that	investigate	domestic	retrofit	in	
specific	contexts	(e.g.	Williams	et	al,	2013).	But	none	has	compared	city-based	domestic	
retrofit	responses	in	this	way	with	a	particular	focus	on	the	urban	nature	of	the	responses.	
This	research	supports	the	arguments	in	the	literature	suggesting	that	landscape	political	
changes	have	resulted	in	networked	urban	governance	styles,	particularly	in	relation	to	
climate	and	energy	issues,	that	produce	uneven	results	and	development	in	different	places.	
In	terms	of	urban	governance	of	energy	issues,	we	have	seen	clear	evidence	of	‘glocalised’,	
‘geometries	of	power’	in	the	urban	context,	that	connect	spaces	and	territories	of	activity	to	
organisations,	interests	and	ideologies	at	higher	levels,	at	some	risk	(Swyngedouw,	2004).	
We	have	also	seen	networks	of	varying	levels	of	representation	that	are	fluid	and	often	
temporary	(Bulkeley	and	Schroeder,	2011	and	Rutland	and	Aylett	2008).	
Secondly,	it	has	synthesised	a	range	of	issues	and	pressures	at	different	scales	and	in	
different	academic	disciplines	in	a	holistic	analysis,	using	themes	and	concepts	from	
dramatically	different	literature	traditions	and	theoretical	approaches.	This	produced	a	new	
hybrid	theoretical	framework	in	‘Experimental	Assemblages’	for	addressing	the	socio-
technical	issue	of	domestic	retrofit	in	a	context-sensitive	way.	The	real	value	of	this	
framework	is	in	how	it	captures	the	contingency	of	place	in	defining	urban	experiments,	at	
the	same	time	as	successfully	incorporating	influential	factors	from	the	global	scale,	through	
national	policy	right	down	to	the	scale	of	individual	people	and	technologies	and	the	impact	
of	complex	interrelations	between	them.	
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The	experimental	assemblages	framework	also	captures	the	change	orientation	of	the	
‘thing’	–	organisation,	project	or	initiative	-	under	question	by	examining	its	goals	and	
intentions	around	knowledge	and	learning.	The	cases	and	discussion	show	that	the	focus	of	
learning	within	experimental	assemblages	was	also	highly	contingent	on	the	people	and	
organisations	involved.	The	knowledge	foci	of	the	different	initiatives	varied	significantly	
within	the	specific	topic	of	domestic	retrofit	and	thus	learning	and	was	often	difficult	to	
articulate	or	predefine,	taking	an	almost	organic	form	in	some	instances.	Furthermore,	
there	was	evidence	of	learning	between	cases	which	is	very	significant	in	terms	of	
understanding	how	localised	experiments	use	and	interpret	place-specific	knowledge	and	
experiences	of	retrofit.	Further	study	could	be	done	to	identify	how	this	knowledge	is	
applied,	modified	or	rejected	when	entering	new	contexts.	
The	cases	and	discussion	have	shown	unevenness	and	urban	experimentation	‘in	action’	
through	the	lens	of	domestic	retrofit	and	the	differences	in	responses	between	urban	
contexts.	It		has,	however,	moved	towards	a	more	fluid	understanding	of	‘types’	of	urban	
experimentation,	showing	that	experimental	assemblages	can	at	once	display	features	of	
BSTEs,	grassroots	niches,	urban	living	labs	and	policy	experiments	in	varying	measure,	
rather	than	these	representing	categorically	separate	forms	of	experimentation.	It	also	
challenges	perceptions	of	Bulkeley	and	Castan-Broto	(2013)	and	Evans	and	Karvonen	(2011)	
that	these	experiments	sit	outside	of	formal	policy	approaches	–	with	all	of	them	operating	
in	response	to,	or	dependent	upon	policy	in	some	way	such	as	through	funding	or	
anticipation	of	policy	trends.	However,	all	cases	demonstrated	the	other	commonly	cited	
elements	of	urban	experimentation	highlighted	in	the	literature	of	messiness,	contingency	
and	embeddedness.		
It	has	also	engaged	with	ideas	around	the	organisation	of	retrofit	in	terms	of	roles	and	
responsibilities,	such	as	middle-actors	and	intermediaries,	finding	that	the	‘models’	of	
retrofit	outlined	by	Williams	et	al	(2013)	and	Hodson	and	Marvin	(forthcoming)	and	the	
roles	of	intermediaries	and	middle-actors	(Karvonen,	2013	and	Janda	and	Parag,	2013)	are	
not	as	clearly	delineated	as	the	literatures	present.	Whilst	helpful	as	guiding	concepts,	what	
this	research	has	found	is	that	these	roles	and	forms	of	organisation	are	in	fact	
interchangeable,	that	retrofit	responses	and	actors	can	shift	between	roles	and	forms	over	
time,	or	occupy	multiple	positions	at	once.	This	raises	questions	about	exactly	what	a	
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retrofit	experiment	actually	is	–	is	it	an	organisation,	a	project,	a	network	or	simply	a	
platform	for	creating	any	one	of	these	things?	
Finally,	the	research	clearly	illustrates	the	context	dependency	and	place	specific	nature	of	
the	responses	–	the	particular	manifestations	of	Carbon	Co-op,	Energy	Saving	Co-operative	
and	the	Bristol	Home	Energy	Upgrade	could	not	have	emerged	in	other	contexts	because	
they	were	so	fundamentally	a	product	of	the	local	networks,	organisations,	resources	and	
even	individuals	that	influenced	their	creation	and	development.	This	clearly	supports	the	
arguments	of	Smith	and	Raven	(2012),	Seyfang	(2009)	(Hielscher,	Seyfang	and	Smith,	2013	
and	Raven	et	al,	2015)	for	the	importance	of	context	sensitivity	and	looking	inside	local	
experiments	at	their	internal	dynamics,	their	relations	to	wider	contexts,	and	the	limitations	
of	these	localised	experiments	to	effect	change	without	a	supportive	policy	context	that	is	
aware	of	these	factors.	
10.2.4	Limitations	to	the	research	
A	key	limitation	of	the	research	is	that,	partly	due	to	the	holistic	approach	adopted,	and	
partly	due	to	the	timing	of	the	fieldwork	coinciding	with	the	development	and	assemblage	
of	the	cases	rather	than	the	installation	phase,	it	identifies	such	an	enormous	range	of	
issues	and	factors	that	it	can’t	examine	them	all	in	depth.		
Taking	on	an	approach	that	synthesised	all	these	issues	at	once	was	a	lot	more	complicated	
than	originally	thought	–	bringing	together	literatures	and	theoretical	approaches	that	cover	
urban	politics,	low	carbon	and	sustainability	issues,	socio-technical	systems,	actor	network	
theory,	and	the	interdependent	technical,	behavioural	and	organisational	issues	around	
domestic		energy	efficiency,	has	been	a	significant	challenge,	and	creating	a	framework	that	
linked	these,	utilising	different	elements	from	different	approaches,	was	a	very	difficult	task.	
This	means	that	some	detail	is	lost	in	the	analysis	of	the	multiple	socio-technical	issues	
touched	on,	particularly	the	practical	and	technical	intricacies	of	retrofit	and	the	complex	
motives	and	decision	making	processes	for	householders.	For	example,	there	is	a	consistent	
acknowledgement	of	the	technical	complexity	of	whole	house	retrofit	and	the	difficulties	
with	co-ordinating	measures	in	one	installation,	selecting	materials	and	understanding	the	
influence	of	householder	behaviour,	but	the	details	of	this	and	how	they	played	out	in	each	
case	have	not	been	explored	in	detail	and	therefore	the	research	is	limited	in	its	
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contribution	to	knowledge	and	progress	in	this	particular	area.	It	is	hoped	that	what	it	does	
bring	in	lieu	is	an	increased	awareness	that	any	study	of	the	many	specific	socio-technical	
facets	of	domestic	retrofit	should	acknowledge	both	the	macro-societal	and	local	level	
pressures	and	influences	on	these	issues.	This	was	exacerbated	by	access	differences	and	
differential	data	between	contexts	and	cases	which	made	it	difficult	to	compare	like	for	like.	
The	timing	of	Bristol	Home	Energy	Upgrade	being	finished,	the	closeness	and	welcoming	
nature	of	Carbon	Co-op	and	the	conditionality	attached	to	researching	Energy	Saving	Co-
operative	produced	different	levels	of	detail	on	different	aspects	of	each	case,	which	
presented	difficult	choices	about	what	was	reported	and	what	was	not	–	hence	losing	some	
of	the	detail	as	described	above.	
Furthermore,	this	thesis	has	dealt	primarily	with	retrofit	of	privately	owned	and	occupied	
housing	and	responses	to	this	issue	aimed	at	people	who	were	able	to	pay	for	their	retrofits.	
However,	there	are	different	pressures	on	the	social	housing	sector	and	the	privately	rented	
sector	(which	is	soon	to	be	subject	to	regulated	minimum	standards	for	energy	efficiency),	
and	fuel	poverty	continues	to	be	a	political	and	socio-economic	problem	with	serious	
consequences,	none	of	which	this	research	was	able	to	explore	in	great	detail.		
Furthermore,	the	practical	and	logistical	challenges	of	being	a	lone	researcher	limit	the	
scope	of	such	‘big’	research:	whilst	selecting	a	small	number	of	in-depth	cases	as	an	
approach	has	certainly	illuminated	some	significant	challenges	and	themes	pertaining	to	
domestic	retrofit	in	cities,	the	theoretical	findings	cannot	generate	grand	theories	or	
generalizable	knowledge.	This	means	that	the	findings	from	this	research	cannot	be	used	as	
examples	of	‘how	to	do’	or	‘how	not	to	do’	domestic	retrofit	in	cities,	or	used	to	make	
claims	about	how	the	issue	is	governed	in	all	cities.	What	they	can	do	is	show	us	what	
general	urban	trends	and	processes	such	as	governing	by	experiment,	urban	variation,	
networks	and	interests	around	energy	and	climate	issues	look	like	in	different	contexts,	or	
how	specific	socio-technical	issues	with	domestic	retrofit,	such	as	householder	engagement,		
technical	risks	and	organising	retrofit	can	be	approached	in	different	ways	in	different	
contexts.	These	findings	are	certainly	more	modest	than	grand	theories,	but	are	still	
valuable.	
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10.3	Future	directions	for	this	research	
10.3.1	Other	applications	of	the	framework		
There	are	a	number	of	ways	in	which	the	framework	and	methodological	approach	
employed	in	this	research	could	be	applied	to	further	research,	some	of	which	could	
address	some	of	the	limitations	above.	For		example,	whilst	there	is	a	wealth	of	research	
into	domestic	retrofit	in	relation	to		fuel	poverty	or	energy	vulnerability	more	broadly,	this	
research	approach	and	framework	could	quite	easily	be	applied	to	urban	or	place-based	
research	at	other	scales	that	specifically	focuses	on	other	housing	sectors	or	domestic	
retrofit	aimed	specifically	at	those	at	risk	of	or	experiencing	issues	related	to	fuel	poverty.	
The	urban	experimental	assemblages	framework	could	also	be	used	not	only	to	study	
domestic	retrofit	but	any	socio-technical	issue	that	needs	to	incorporate	global	and	place	
specific	pressures	and	individual	people,	technologies	and	physical	elements	of	the	built	
environment	all	at	once.	It	could	be	used	to	study	local	approaches	to	water	and	transport	
issues,	for	example,	or	place-specific	experiments	in	other	areas	of	the	energy	sector	such	
as	district	heating,	smart	networks	or	micro-renewables.		
There	are	also	other,	complimentary	frameworks	available	for	looking	at	the	issues	
surrounding	domestic	retrofit.	Ideas	emerging	from	this	PhD	have	already	been	built	upon	
in	an	EPSRC	Impact	Acceleration	Account	(IAA)	project	investigating	domestic	retrofit	
systems	in	Haringey,	London.	The	IAA	research	uses	a	multi-level,	multi-factor	approach	
similar	to	the	experimental	assemblages	framework,	but	adds	to	it	a	‘suburban	
infrastructures’	approach,	incorporating	an	appreciation	of	features	of	contemporary	
suburbanism	rather	than	the	urban	context	as	a	whole,	and	allowing	a	view	of	what	kind	of	
service	the	system	is	providing	to	the	place	in	which	it	has	emerged,	and	whether	it	is	
effective	and	equitable.	
10.3.2	Potential	Publications	
There	are	a	number	of	potential	publications	from	this	work:	
• A	policy	critique	paper	giving	voice	to	experiences	of	retrofit	at	the	city	level	and	
exposing	the	ideological	gap	between	policy	and	practice.	
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• An	empirical	paper	presenting	different	approaches	to	domestic	retrofit	emerging	
from	different	city	contexts,	demonstrating	unevenness	and	variation	in	capacity	and	
progress	in	different	urban	contexts.		
The	most	significant	potential	publication	is	currently	in	draft	and	is	based	on	the	
experimental	assemblages	theoretical	approach,	intending	to	engage	with	the	debate	
around	assemblage	thinking	and	connect	it	to	a	developing	research	agenda	around	urban	
experimentation.	It	is	Intended	for	submission	to	City	journal	and	its	working	title	is:	
“Using	the	concept	of	experimental	assemblages	to	describe	and	explain	domestic	retrofit	in	
different	UK	cities.”	
It	will	demonstrate	how	the	framework	combines	concepts	from	socio-technical	
experiments	with	urban	assemblage	theory	to	capture	the	dynamics,	knowledge	politics	and	
change	orientation	of	retrofit	initiatives	in	different	urban	contexts.	
10.3.3	Summing	up	
Hopefully	this	thesis	has	offered	the	reader	some	insight	into	why	domestic	retrofit	is	
important,	and	how	policy,	people	and	place	are	important	to	domestic	retrofit	in	urban	
contexts,	opening	up	a	research	approach	and	agenda	that	could	go	in	many	different	
directions.	The	quote	below	from	one	very	wise	participant	captures	the	essence	of	this	
thesis	nicely:	
“Things	emerge	where	they	do	because	of	the	relationships	that	are	there.”	Carbon	
Co-op	Generating	Success	partner.	
It	should	also	serve	to	remind	us	that	there	is	likely	no	single	‘answer’	to	the	problems	of	
climate	change,	energy	security	and	economic	crisis	that	converge	around	domestic	retrofit	
in	cities,	especially	not	one	that	will	emerge	from	multiple	local	experiments	and	be	
replicated	elsewhere.	However,	the	efforts	of	those	who	try,	in	their	own	contexts,	in	their	
own	ways,	to	do	their	part	to	address	these	issues,	should	be	commended.		
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